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The  Emperor  Marcus  Aurelius 


THE    HARVARD    CLASSICS 

EDITED    BY    CHARLES    W    ELIOT    LL  D 


r 


THE   APOLOGY,    VHMDO    AND 
CKITO    OF    PLATO 

TRANSLATED  BY  BENJAMIN  JOWETT 

THE    GOLDEN    SAYINGS 
OF    EPICTETUS 

TRANSLATED    BY    HASTINGS     CROSSLEY 

THE  MEDITATIONS  OF 
MARCUS  AURELIUS 

TRANSLATED    BY    GEORGE    LONG 
WITH    INTRODUCTIONS    AND    NOTES 

VOLUME     2 


P    F    COLLIER    &    SON    COMPANY 
NEW    YORK 


Copyright,  1909 
By  p.  F.  Coloer  &  Son 

manufactured  in  u.  s.  a. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 

Socrates,  the  son  of  an  Athenian  sculptor,  was  horn  in  469 
B.  C.  He  was  trained  in  his  father's  art,  but  gave  it  up  early  to 
devote  his  time  to  the  search  for  truth  and  virtue.  He  took  his 
part  as  a  citizen  both  in  war  and  in  peace,  and  bore  the  hardships 
of  poverty  and  u  shrewish  wife  with  calm  indifference.  He  did 
not  give  formal  instruction  after  the  fashion  of  other  philoso- 
phers of  his  time,  but  went  about  engaging  people  in  conversa- 
tion, seeking,  chiefly  by  questions,  to  induce  his  contemporaries, 
and  especially  the  young  men,  to  think  clearly  and  to  act  reason- 
ably.  He  made  profession  of  no  knowledge  except  of  His  ozun 
ignorance,  and  the  famous  "Socratic  irony"  was  shown  in  his  at- 
titude of  apparent  willingness  to  learn  from  anyone  who  professed 
to  know.  The  inevitable  result  of  such  conversations,  however, 
was  the  reduction  of  the  would-be  instructor  to  a  state  either  of  ■ 
irritation  at  the  unmasking  of  his  pretensions,  or  of  humility 
and  eagerness  to  be  instructed  by  his  questioner.  It  was  natural 
that  such  a  habit  should  create  enemies,  and  Socrates  was  finally 
accused  of  introducing  new  gods  and  of  corrupting  the  youth. 
His  defense,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  "Apology,"  was  conducted 
with  his  customary  firm  adherence  to  his  convictions,  and  with 
entire  fearlessness  of  consequences.  He  could,  in  all  probability, 
have  easily  escaped  the  death  sentence  had  he  been  willing  to 
take  a  conciliatory  tone,  but  he  died  (B.  C.  399)  a  martyr  to  his 
unswerving  devotion  to  truth.  Socrates  wrote  nothing,  and  we 
learn  what  we  know  of  his  teachings  chiefly  from  his  disciples, 
Xenophon  and  Plato. 

Plato  was  also  an  Athenian,  horn  in  428  B.  C.  of  a  distinguished 
family.  He  became  a  disciple  of  Socrates  at  the  age  of  twenty, 
and  after  the  death  of  his  master  he  traveled  in  Egypt,  Sicily, 
and  elsewhere,  returning  to  Athens  about  388.  Here  he  estab- 
lished his  school  of  philosophy  in  a  garden  near  a  gymnasium, 
called  the  Academy,  and  here  he  spent  the  last  forty  years  of  his 
life,  numbering  among  his  pupils  his  great  rival  in  philosophical 
renown,  Aristotle.  Unlike  Socrates,  Plato  took  no  part  in  the 
civic  life  of  Athens,  but  he  was  much  interested  in  political  phi- 
losophy, and  is  said  to  have  been  consulted  by  statesmen  both  at 
home  and  abroad. 


Hc — ^Vol.  % 


2  INTRODUCTORY   NOTE 

All  the  zvorks  of  Plato  have  been  preserved,  and  they  include^ 
besides  those  here  printed,  the  "Republic*'  *' Symposium,'"  "Phae- 
drus^^  '^'Protagoras,"  ^'Theaetetus,"  "Gorgi'as,^*  and  many  others. 
They  take  the  form  of  dialogues,  in  which  Plato  himself  appears, 
if  at  all,  only  as  a  listener,  and  in  which  the  chief  speaker  is 
Socrates.  As  Plato  developed  the  philosophy  of  Socrates,  es- 
pecially on  speculative  lines,  far  beyond  the  point  reached  by 
Socrates  himself,  it  is  impossible  to  judge  with  any  exactness 
precisely  how  much  of  the  teaching  is  the  master^s,  how  much 
the  pupil's. 

The  philosophy  of  these  dialogues  has  remained  for  over  two 
thousand  years  one  of  the  great  intellectual  influences  of  the  civ- 
ilised world;  and  they  are  as  admirable  from  the  point  of  view 
of  literature  as  of  philosophy.  The  style  is  not  only  beautiful  in 
itself,  but  is  adapted  with  great  dramatic  skill  to  the  large  variety 
of  speakers;  and  the  suggestion  of  situation  and  the  drawing  of 
character  are  the  work  of  a  great  artist.  The  three  dialogues 
here  given  are  at  once  favorable  examples  of  the  literary  skill  of 
Plato  and  intim.ate  pictures  of  the  personality  of  his  master. 


Planfied  and  Destined 
at  The  Collier  Press 
£y  Williayn  Patien 


'OW  you  have  felt,  O  men  of  Athens,  at  hearing  the 
speeches  of  my  accusers,  I  cannot  tell;  but  I 
know  that  their  persuasive  v/ords  almost  made 
me  forget  who  I  was,  such  was  the  effect  of  them;  and  yet 
they  have  hardly  spoken  a  word  of  truth.  But  many  as 
their  falsehoods  were,  there  was  one  of  them  which  quite 
amiazed  me:  I  miean  when  they  told  you  to  be  upon  your 
guard,  and  not  to  let  yourself  be  deceived  by  the  force  of  my 
eloquence.  They  ought  to  have  been  ashamed  of  saying 
this,  because  they  were  sure  to  be  detected  as  soon  as  I  opened 
my  lips  and  displayed  my  deficiency;  they  certainly  did  ap- 
pear to  be  most  shameless  in  saying  this,  unless  by  the  force 
of  eloquence  they  mean  the  force  of  truth:  for  then  I  do 
indeed  admit  that  I  am  eloquent.  But  in  how  different  a 
way  from  theirs!  Well,  as  I  was  saying,  they  have  hardly 
uttered  a  word,  or  not  more  than  a  word,  of  truth ;  but  you 
shall  hear  from  m^e  the  whole  truth:  not,  however,  delivered 
after  their  m.anner,  in  a  set  oration  duly  ornamented  >. with 
words  and  phrases.  No,  indeed!  but  I  shall  use  the  words 
and  arguments  which  occur  to  me  at  the  moment;  for  T 
am  certain  that  this  is  right,  and  that  at  my  time  of  life  I 
ought  not  to  be  appearing  before  you,  O  men  of  Athens,  in 
the  character  of  a  juvenile  orator:  let  no  one  expect  this 
of  me.  And  I  must  beg  of  you  to  grant  me  one  favor, 
which  is  this — if  you  hear  me  using  the  same  words  in  my 
defence  which  I  have  been  in  the  habit  of  using,  and  which 
most  of  you  may  have  heard  in  the  agora,  and  at  the  tables  of 
the  money-changers,  or  anywhere  else,  I  would  ask  you  not 
to  be  surprised  at  this,  and  not  to  interrupt  me.  For  I  am 
more  than  seventy  years  of  age,  and  this  is  the  first  time 

3 


4  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

that  I  have  ever  appeared  in  a  court  of  law,  and  I  am  quite 
a  stranger  to  the  ways  of  the  place;  and  therefore  I  would 
have  you  regard  me  as  if  I  were  really  a  stranger,  whom 
you  would  excuse  if  he  spoke  in  his  native  tongue,  and 
after  the  fashion  of  his  country :  that  I  think  is  not  an  unfair 
request.  Never  mind  the  manner,  which  may  or  may  not 
be  good;  but  think  only  of  the  justice  of  my  cause,  and 
give  heed  to  that:  let  the  judge  decide  justly  and  the  speaker 
speak  truly. 

And  first,  I  have  to  reply  to  the  older  charges  and  to 
my  first  accusers,  and  then  I  will  go  to  the  later  ones. 
For  I  have  had  many  accusers,  who  accused  me  of  old,  and 
their  false  charges  have  continued  during  many  years;  and 
I  am.  more  afraid  of  them  than  of  Anytus  and  his  associates, 
who  are  dangerous,  too,  in  their  own  way.  But  far  more 
dangerous  are  these,  who  began  when  you  were  children, 
and  took  possession  of  your  minds  with  their  falsehoods, 
telling  of  one  Socrates,  a  wise  man,  who  speculated  about 
the  heaven  above,  and  searched  into  the  earth  beneath,  and 
made  the  worse  appear  the  better  cause.  These  are  the 
accusers  whom  I  dread;  for  they  are  the  circulators  of  this 
rumor,  and  their  hearers  are  too  apt  to  fancy  that  specu- 
lators of  this  sort  do  not  believe  in  the  gods.  And  they  are 
many,  and  their  charges  against  me  are  of  ancient  date, 
and  they  made  them  in  days  when  you  were  impressible— 
in  childhood,  or  perhaps  in  youth — and  the  cause  when  heard 
went  by  default,  for  there  was  none  to  answer.  And,  hard- 
est of  all,  their  names  I  do  not  know  and  cannot  tell ;  unless 
in  the  chance  of  a  comic  poet.  But  the  main  body  of 
these  slanderers  who  from  envy  and  malice  have  wrought 
upon  you — and  there  are  some  of  them  who  are  convinced 
themselves,  and  impart  their  convictions  to  others — all  these, 
I  say,  are  most  difficult  to  deal  with ;  for  I  cannot  have  them 
Up  here,  and  examine  them,  and  therefore  I  must  simply 
fight  with  shadows  in  my  own  defence,  and  examine  when 
there  is  no  one  who  answers.  I  will  ask  you  then  to  assume 
with  me^  as  I  was  saying,  that  my  opponents  are  of  two  kinds 
— one  recent,  the  other  ancient;  and  I  hope  that  you  will  see 
the  propriety  of  my  answering  the  latter  first,  for  these  accu- 
sations you  heard  long  before  the  others,  and  much  oftener. 


APOLOGY  5 

Well,  then,  I  will  make  my  defence,  and  I  will  endeavor 
in  the  short  time  which  is  allowed  to  do  away  with  this  evil 
opinion  of  me  which  you  have  held  for  such  a  long  time; 
and  I  hope  I  may  succeed,  if  this  be  well  for  you  and  me, 
and  that  my  words  may  find  favor  with  you.  But  I  know 
that  to  accomplish  this  is  not  easy — I  quite  see  the  nature  of 
the  task.  Let  the  event  be  as  God  wills:  in  obedience  to 
the  law  I  make  my  defence. 

I  will  begin  at  the  beginning,  and  ask  what  the  accusation 
is  which  has  given  rise  to  this  slander  of  me,  and  v/hich  has 
encouraged  Meletus  to  proceed  against  me.  What  do  the 
slanderers  say?  They  shall  be  my  prosecutors,  and  I  will 
sum  up  their  words  in  an  affidavit :  "  Socrates  is  an  evil- 
doer, and  a  curious  person,  who  searches  into  things  under 
the  earth  and  in  heaven,  and  he  makes  the  worse  appear  the 
better  cause;  and  he  teaches  the  aforesaid  doctrines  to 
others."  That  is  the  nature  of  the  accusation,  and  that  is 
what  you  have  seen  yourselves  in  the  comedy  of  Aristoph- 
anes; who  has  introduced  a  man  whom  he  calls  Socrates, 
going  about  and  saying  that  he  can  walk  in  the  air,  and  tallc- 
ing  a  deal  of  nonsense  concerning  matters  of  which  I  do  not 
pretend  to  know  either  much  or  little — not  that  I  mean  to 
say  anything  disparaging  of  anyone  who  is  a  student  of 
natural  philosophy.  I  should  be  very  sorry  if  Meletus  could 
lay  that  to  my  charge.  But  the  simple  truth  is,  O  Atheni- 
ans, that  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  these  studies.  Very 
many  of  those  here  present  are  witnesses  to  the  truth  of 
this,  and  to  them  I  appeal.  Speak  then,  you  who  have  heard 
me,  and  tell  your  neighbors  whether  any  of  you  have  ever 
known  me  hold  forth  in  few  words  or  in  many  upon  mat- 
ters of  this  sort.  .  .  .  You  hear  their  answer.  And 
from  what  they  say  of  this  you  will  be  able  to  judge  of  the 
truth  of  the  rest. 

As  little  foundation  is  there  for  the  report  that  I  am  a 
teacher,  and  take  m.oney ;  that  is  no  more  true  than  the  other. 
Although,  if  a  man  is  able  to  teach,  I  honor  him  for  being 
paid.  There  is  Gorgias  of  Leontlum,  and  Prodicus  of  Ceos, 
and  Hippias  of  Elis,  who  go  the  round  of  the  cities,  and  are 
able  to  persuade  the  young  men  to  leave  their  own  citizens, 
by  whom  they  might  be  taught  for  nothing,  and  come  to  them. 


6  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

whom  they  not  only  pay,  but  are  thankful  if  they  may  be  al- 
lowed to  pay  them.  There  is  actually  a  Parian  philosopher 
residing  in  Athens,  of  whom  I  have  heard ;  and  I  came  to  hear 
of  him  in  this  way:  I  met  a  man  who  has  spent  a  world  of 
money  on  the  Sophists,  Callias  the  son  of  Hipponicus,  and 
knowing  that  he  had  sons,  I  asked  him :  "  Callias,"  I  said, 
"  if  your  two  sons  were  foals  or  calves,  there  would  be  no 
difficulty  in  finding  someone  to  put  over  them;  we  should 
hire  a  trainer  of  horses  or  a  farmer  probably  who  would 
improve  and  perfect  them  in  their  own  proper  virtue  and  ex- 
cellence ;  but  as  they  are  human  beings,  whom  are  you  think- 
ing of  placing  over  them  ?  Is  there  anyone  who  understands 
human  and  political  virtue?  You  must  have  thought  about 
this  as  you  have  sons ;  is  there  anyone  ?  "  "  There  is,"  he 
said.  "  Who  is  he  ?  "  said  I,  "  and  of  what  country  ?  and 
what  does  he  charge  ?  "  "  Evenus  the  Parian,"  he  replied ; 
"  he  is  the  man,  and  his  charge  is  five  minse."  Happy  is 
[Evenus,  I  said  to  myself,  if  he  really  has  this  wisdom,  and 
teaches  at  such  a  modest  charge.  Had  I  the  same,  I  should 
have  been  very  proud  and  conceited ;  but  the  truth  is  that  I 
have  no  knowledge  of  the  kind,  O  Athenians. 

I  dare  say  that  someone  will  ask  the  question,  "  Why  is 
this,  Socrates,  and  what  is  the  origin  of  these  accusations  of 
you :  for  there  must  have  been  something  strange  which  you 
have  been  doing?  All  this  great  fame  and  talk  about  you 
would  never  have  arisen  if  you  had  been  like  other  men :  tell 
us,  then,  why  this  is,  as  we  should  be  sorry  to  judge  hastily 
of  you."  Nov/  I  regard  this  as  a  fair  challenge,  and  I  will 
endeavor  to  explain  to  you  the  origin  of  this  name  of  "  wise," 
and  of  this  evil  fame.  Please  to  attend  them.  And  although 
some  of  you  may  think  I  am  joking,  I  declare  that  I  will 
tell  you  the  entire  truth.  Men  of  Athens,  this  reputation  of 
mine  has  come  of  a  certain  sort  of  wisdom  which  I  possess. 
If  you  ask  me  what  kind  of  wisdom,  I  reply,  such  wisdom 
as  is  attainable  by  man,  for  to  that  extent  I  am  inclined  to 
believe  that  I  am  wise;  whereas  the  persons  of  whom  I  was 
speaking  have  a  superhuman  wisdom,  which  I  may  fail  to 
describe,  because  I  have  it  not  myself ;  and  he  who  says  that 
I  have,  speaks  falsely,  and  is  taking  away  my  character. 
'And  here,  O  men  of  Athens,  I  must  beg  you  not  to  interrupt 


APOLOGY  7 

me,  eyen  if  I  seem  to  say  something  extravagant.  For  the 
word  which  I  wiU  speak  is  not  mme.  I  will  refer  you  tp  a 
witness  who  is  worthy  of  credit,  and  will  tell  you  about  my 
wisdom— whether  I  have  any,  and  of  what  sort— and  that 
witness  shall  be  the  god  of  Delphi.  You  must  have  known 
Chsrephon ;  he  was  early  a  friend  of  mine,  and  also  a  friend 
of  yours,  for  he  shared  in  the  exile  of  the  people,  and  re- 
turned with  you.  Well,  Chaerephon,  as  you  know,  was  very 
impetuous  in  all  his  doings,  and  he  went  to  Delphi  and  boldly 
asked  the  oracle  to  tell  him  whether — as  I  was  saying,  I  must 
beg  yau  not  to  interrupt — he  asked  the  oracle  to  tell  him 
whether  there  was  anyone  wiser  than  I  .was,  and  the 
Pythian  prophetess  answered  that  there  was  no  man  wiser. 
Chasrephon  is  dead  himself,  but  his  brotlier,  who  is  in  court, 
will  confirm  the  truth  of  this  story. 

Why  do  I  mention  this?  Because  I  am  going  to  explain 
to  you  why  I  have  such  an  evil  name.  When  I  heard  the 
answer,  I  said  to  myself.  What  can  the  god  mean  ?  and  wh^at 
is  the  interpretation  of  this  riddle?  for  I  know  that  I  have 
no  wisdom,  small  or  great.  What  can  he  mean  when  he 
says  that  I  am  the  wisest  of  men?  And  yet  he  is  a  god  and 
cannot  lie;  that  would  be  against  his  nature.  After  a  long 
consideration,  I  at  last  thought  of  a  method  of  trying  the 
question.  I  reflected  that  if  I  could  only  find  a  man  wiser 
than  myself,  then  I  might  go  to  the  god  with  a  refutation  in 
my  hand.  I  should  say  to  him,  "  Here  is  a  man  who  is  wiser 
than  I  am ;  but  you  said  that  I  was  the  wisest."  Accordingly 
I  went  to  one  who  had  the  reputation  of  wisdom,  and  ob- 
served to  him — his  name  I  need  not  mention ;  he  was  a  poli- 
tician whom  I  selected  for  examination — and  the  result  was 
as  follows :  When  I  began  to  talk  with  him,  I  could  not  help 
thinking  that  he  was  not  really  wise,  although  he  was  thought 
wise  by  many,  and  wiser  still  by  himself;  and  I  went  and 
tried  to  explain  to  him  that  he  thought  himself  wise,  but  was 
not  really  wise ;  and  the  consequence  was  that  he  hated  me, 
and  his  enmity  was  shared  by  several  who  were  present  and 
heard  me.  So  I  left  him,  saying  to  myself,  as  I  went  away : 
Well,  although  I  do  not  suppose  that  either  of  us  knows 
anything  really  beautiful  and  good,  I  am  better  off  than  he 
is — for  he  knows  nothing,  and  thinks  that  he  knows,     i 


8  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

neither  know  nor  think  that  I  know.  In  this  latter  particular, 
then,  I  seem  to  have  slightly  the  advantage  of  him.  Then  I 
went  to  another,  who  had  still  higher  philosophical  preten- 
sions, and  my  conclusion  was  exactly  the  same.  I  made 
another  enemy  of  him,  and  of  many  others  besides  him. 

After  this  I  went  to  one  man  after  another,  being  not  un- 
conscious of  the  enmity  which  I  provoked,  and  I  lamented 
and  feared  this :  but  necessity  was  laid  upon  me — the  word 
of  God,  I  thought,  ought  to  be  considered  first.  And  I  said 
to  myself,  Go  I  must  to  all  who  appear  to  know,  and  find  out 
the  meaning  of  the  oracle.  And  I  swear  to  you,  Athenians, 
by  the  dog  I  swear  ! — for  I  must  tell  you  the  truth — the  result 
of  my  mission  was  just  this:  I  found  that  the  men  most  in 
repute  were  all  but  the  most  foolish;  and  that  some  inferior 
men  were  really  wiser  and  better.  I  will  tell  you  the  tale  of 
my  wanderings  and  of  the  "  Herculean "  labors,  as  I  may 
call  them,  which  I  endured  only  to  find  at  last  the  oracle 
irrefutable.  When  I  left  the  politicians,  I  went  to  the  poets ; 
tragic,  dithyrambic,  and  all  sorts.  And  there,  I  said  to  my- 
self, you  will  be  detected ;  now  you  will  find  out  that  you  are 
more  ignorant  than  they  are.  Accordingly,  I  took  them  some 
of  the  most  elaborate  passages  in  their  own  writings,  and 
asked  what  was  the  meaning  of  them — thinking  that  they 
would  teach  me  something.  Will  you  believe  me?  I  am 
almost  ashamed  to  speak  of  this,  but  still  I  must  say  that  there 
is  hardly  a  person  present  who  would  not  have  talked  better 
about  their  poetry  than  they  did  themselves.  That  showed 
me  in  an  instant  that  not  by  wisdom  do  poets  write  poetry, 
but  by  a  sort  of  genius  and  inspiration ;  they  are  like  diviners 
or  soothsayers  who  also  say  many  fine  things,  but  do  not  un- 
derstand the  meaning  of  them.  And  the  poets  appeared  to  me 
to  be  much  in  the  same  case;  and  I  further  observed  that 
upon  the  strength  of  their  poetry  they  believed  themselves  to 
be  the  wisest  of  men  in  other  things  in  which  they  were  not 
wise.  So  I  departed,  conceiving  myself  to  be  superior  to 
them  for  the  same  reason  that  I  was  superior  to  the 
politicians. 

At  last  I  went  to  the  artisans,  for  I  was  conscious  that  I 
Icnew  nothing  at  all,  as  I  may  say,  and  I  was  sure  that  they 
knew  many  fine  things ;  and  in  this  I  was  not  mistaken,  for 


APOLOGY  9 

tHey  did  know  many  things  of  which  I  was  ignorant,  and  in 
this  they  certainly  were  wiser  than  I  was.  But  I  observed 
that  even  the  good  artisans  fell  into  the  same  error  as  the 
poets;  because  they  were  good  workmen  they  thought  that 
they  also  knew  all  sorts  of  high  matters,  and  this  defect  in 
them  overshadowed  their  wisdom — therefore  I  asked  myself 
on  behalf  of  the  oracle,  whether  I  would  like  to  be  as  I  was, 
neither  having  their  knowledge  nor  their  ignorance,  or  like 
them  in  both;  and  I  made  answer  to  myself  and  the  oracle 
that  I  was  better  off  as  I  was. 

This  investigation  has  led  to  my  having  many  enemies  of 
the  worst  and  most  dangerous  kind,  and  has  given  occasion 
also  to  many  calummies,  and  I  am  called  wise,  for  my  hearers 
always  imagine  that  I  myself  possess  the  wisdom  which  I 
find  wanting  in  others :  but  the  truth  is,  O  men  of  Athens, 
that  God  only  is  wise;  and  in  this  oracle  he  means  to  say 
that  the  wisdom  of  men  is  little  or  nothing;  he  is  not  speaking 
of  Socrates,  he  is  only  using  my  name  as  an  illustration,  as 
if  he  said,  He,  O  men,  is  the  wisest,  who,  like  Socrates,  knows 
that  his  wisdom  is  in  truth  worth  nothing.  And  so  I  go  my 
way,  obedient  to  the  god,  and  make  inquisition  into  the  wis- 
dom of  anyone,  whether  citizen  or  stranger,  who  appears  to 
be  wise;  and  if  he  is  not  wise,  then  in  vindication  of  the 
oracle  I  show  him  that  he  is  not  wise;  and  this  occupation 
quite  absorbs  me,  and  I  have  no  time  to  give  either  to  any 
public  matter  of  interest  or  to  any  concern  of  my  own,  but  I 
am  in  utter  poverty  by  reason  of  my  devotion  to  the  god. 

There  is  another  thing: — young  men  of  the  richer  classes, 
who  have  not  much  to  do,  come  about  me  of  their  own  ac- 
cord; they  like  to  hear  the  pretenders  examined,  and  they 
often  imitate  me,  and  exam.ine  others  themselves;  there  are 
plenty  of  persons,  as  they  soon  enough  discover,  who  think 
that  they  know  something,  but  really  know  little  or  nothing : 
and  then  those  who  are  examined  by  them  instead  of  being 
angry  with  themselves  are  angry  with  me :  This  confounded 
Socrates,  they  say ;  this  villainous  misleader  of  youth ! — and 
then  if  som.ebody  asks  them.  Why,  what  evil  does  he  practise 
or  teach?  they  do  not  know,  and  cannot  tell;  but  in  order 
that  they  may  not  appear  to  be  at  a  loss,  they  repeat  the 
ready-made  charges  which  are  used  against  all  philosophers 


10  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

about  teaching  things  up  in  the  clouds  and  under  the  earth, 
and  having  no  gods,  and  making  the  worse  appear  the  better 
cause;  for  they  do  not  Uke  to  confess  that  their  pretence  of 
knowledge  has  been  detected — which  is  the  truth:  and  as 
they  are  numerous  and  ambitious  and  energetic,  and  are  ah 
in  battle  array  and  have  persuasive  tongues,  they  have  filled 
your  ears  with  their  loud  and  inveterate  calumnies.  And 
this  is  the  reason  why  my  three  accusers,  Meletus  and  Anytus 
and  Lycon,  have  set  upon  me;  Meletus,  who  has  a  quarrel 
with  me  on  behalf  of  the  poets;  Anytus,  on  behalf  of  the 
craftsmen;  Lycon,  on  behalf  of  the  rhetoricians:  and  as 
I  said  at  the  beginning,  I  cannot  expect  to  get  rid  of  this 
mass  of  calumny  all  in  a  moment.  And  this,  O  men  of 
Athens,  is  the  truth  and  the  whole  truth;  I  have  concealed 
nothing,  I  have  dissembled  nothing.  And  yet  I  know  that 
this  plainness  of  speech  makes  them  hate  me,  and  what  is 
their  hatred  but  a  proof  that  I  am  speaking  the  truth  ? — this 
is  the  occasion  and  reason  of  their  slander  of  me,  as  you  will 
find  out  either  in  this  or  in  any  future  inquiry. 

I  have  said  enough  in  my  defence  against  the  first  class  of 
my  accusers;  I  turn  to  the  second  class,  who  are  headed  by 
Meletus,  that  good  and  patriotic  m^an,  as  he  calls  himself. 
And  now  I  will  try  to  defend  myself  against  them:  these 
new  accusers  must  also  have  their  affidavit  read.  What  do 
they  say?  Something  of  this  sort:  That  Socrates  is  a  doer 
of  evil,  and  corrupter  of  the  youth,  and  he  does  not  believe 
in  the  gods  of  the  State,  and  has  other  new  divinities  of  his 
own.  That  is  the  sort  of  charge ;  and  now  let  us  examine  the 
particular  counts-.  He  says  that  I  am  a  doer  of  evil,  who 
corrupt  the  youth ;  but  I  say,  O  men  of  Athens,  that  Meletus 
is  a  doer  of  evil,  and  the  evil  is  that  he  makes  a  joke  of  a 
serious  matter,  and  is  too  ready  at  bringing  other  men  to 
trial  from  a  pretended  zeal  and  interest  about  matters  in 
which  he  really  never  had  the  smallest  interest.  And  the 
truth  of  this  I  will  endeavor  to  prove. 

Com.e  hither,  Meletus,  and  let  me  ask  a  question  of  yoti. 
You  think  a  great  deal  about  the  improvement  of  youth  ? 

Yes,  I  do. 

Tell  the  judges,  then,  who  Is  their  improver;  for  you  must 
know,  as  you  have  taken  the  pains  to  discover  their  corrupter. 


APOLOGY  11 

and  are  citing  and  accusing  me  before  them.  Speak,  then, 
and  tell  the  judges  who  their  im.prover  is.  Observe,  Meletus, 
that  you  are  silent,  and  have  nothing  to  say.  But  is  not  this 
rather  disgraceful,  and  a  very  considerable  proof  of  what 
I  was  saying,  that  you  have  no  interest  in  the  matter  ?  Speak 
up,  friend,  and  tell  us  who  their  improver  is. 

The  laws. 

But  that,  my  good  sir,  is  not  my  meaning.  I  want  to  know 
who  the  person  is,  who,  in  the  first  place,  knows  the  laws. 

The  judges,  Socrates,  who  are  present  in  court. 

What  do  you  mean  to  say,  Meletus,  that  they  are  able  to 
instruct  and  improve  youth? 

Certainly  they  are. 

What,  all  of  them,  or  some  only  and  not  others? 

All  of  them.. 

By  the  goddess  Here,  that  is  good  news  !  There  are  plenty 
of  improvers,  then.  And  what  do  you  say  of  the  audience — 
do  they  im.prove  them? 

Yes,  they  do. 

And  the  Senators? 

Yes,  the  Senators  improve  them. 

But  perhaps  the  ecclesiasts  corrupt  them?— or  do  they  too 
improve  them? 

They  improve  them. 

Then  every  Athenian  improves  and  elevates  them;  all 
with  the  exception  of  myself;  and  I  alone  am  their  cor- 
rupter ?    Is  that  what  you  affirm  ? 

That  is  what  I  stoutly  affirm. 

I  am  very  unfortunate  if  that  is  true.  But  suppose  I  ask 
you  a  question:  Would  you  say  that  this  also  holds  true  in 
the  case  of  horses?  Does  one  man  do  them  harm  and  all 
the  world  good  ?  Is  not  the  exact  opposite  of  this  true  ?  One 
man  is  able  to  do  them  good,  or  at  least  not  many ;  the  trainer 
of  horses,  that  is  to  say,  does  them  good,  and  others  who  have 
to  do  with  them  rather  injure  them  ?  Is  not  that  true,  Meletus, 
of  horses,  or  any  other  animals?  Yes,  certainly.  Whether 
you  and  Anytus  say  yes  or  no,  that  is  no  matter.  Happy 
indeed  would  be  the  condition  of  youth  if  they  had  one  cor- 
rupter only,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  v/orld  were  their  im- 
provers.    And  you,  Meletus,  have  sufficiently  shown  that 


12  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

you  never  had  a  thought  about  the  young:  your  carelessness 
is  seen  in  your  not  caring  about  matters  spoken  of  in  this 
very  indictment. 

And  now,  Meletus,  I  must  ask  you  another  question: 
Which  is  better,  to  live  among  bad  citizens,  or  among  good 
ones?  Answer,  friend,  I  say;  for  that  is  a  question  which 
may  be  easily  answered.  Do  not  the  good  do  their  neighbors 
good,  and  the  bad  do  them  evil? 

Certainly. 

And  is  there  anyone  who  would  rather  be  injured  than 
benefited  by  those  who  live  with  him?  Answer,  my  good 
friend;  the  law  requires  you  to  answer — does  anyone  like  to 
be  injured? 

Certainly  not. 

And  when  you  accuse  me  of  corrupting  and  deteriorating 
the  youth,  do  you  allege  that  I  corrupt  them  intentionally  or 
unintentionally  ? 

Intentionally,  I  say. 

But  you  have  just  admitted  that  the  good  do  their  neigh- 
bors good,  and  the  evil  do  them  evil.  Now  is  that  a  truth 
which  your  superior  wisdom  has  recognized  thus  early  in  life, 
and  am  I,  at  my  age,  in  such  darkness  and  ignorance  as  not 
to  know  that  if  a  man  with  whom  I  have  to  live  is  corrupted 
by  me,  I  am  very  likely  to  be  harmed  by  him,  and  yet  I  cor- 
rupt him,  and  intentionally,  too  ?  that  is  what  you  are  saying, 
and  of  that  you  will  never  persuade  me  or  any  other  human 
being.  But  either  I  do  not  corrupt  them,  or  I  corrupt  them 
unintentionally,  so  that  on  either  view  of  the  case  you  lie. 
If  my  offence  is  unintentional,  the  law  has  no  cognizance  of 
unintentional  offences :  you  ought  to  have  taken  me  privately, 
and  warned  and  admonished  me;  for  if  I  had  been  better 
advised,  I  should  have  left  of¥  doing  what  I  only  did  unin- 
tentionally— no  doubt  I  should;  whereas  you  hated  to  con- 
verse with  me  or  teach  me,  but  you  indicted  me  in  this  court, 
which  is  a  place  not  of  instruction,  but  of  punishment. 

I  have  shown,  Athenians,  as  I  was  saying,  that  Meletus  has 
no  care  at  all,  great  or  small,  about  the  matter.  But  still  I 
should  like  to  know,  Meletus,  in  what  I  am  aflirmed  to  cor- 
rupt the  young.  I  suppose  you  mean,  as  I  infer  from  your 
indictment,  that  I  teach  them  not  to  acknowledge  the  gods 


APOLOGY  13 

which  the  State  acknowledges,  but  some  other  new  divinities 
or  spiritual  agencies  in  their  stead.  These  are  the  lessons 
which  corrupt  the  youth,  as  you  say. 

Yes,  that  I  say  emphatically. 

Then,  by  the  gods,  Meletus,  of  whom  we  are  speaking,  tell 
me  and  the  court,  in  somewhat  plainer  terms,  what  you 
mean !  for  I  do  not  as  yet  understand  whether  you  affirm  that 
I  teach  others  to  acknowledge  some  gods,  and  therefore 
do  believe  in  gods  and  am  not  an  entire  atheist — this  you  do 
not  lay  to  my  charge;  but  only  that  they  are  not  the  same 
gods  which  the  city  recognizes — the  charge  is  that  they  are 
different  gods.  Or,  do  you  mean  to  say  that  I  am  an  atheist 
simply,  and  a  teacher  of  atheism  ? 

I  mean  the  latter — that  you  are  a  complete  atheist. 

That  is  an  extraordinary  statement,  Meletus.  Why  do 
you  say  that?  Do  you  mean  that  I  do  not  believe  in  the 
god-head  of  the  sun  or  moon,  which  is  the  common  creed 
of  all  men? 

I  assure  you,  judges,  that  he  does  not  believe  in  them;  for 
he  says  that  the  sun  is  stone,  and  the  moon  earth. 

Friend  Meletus,  you  think  that  you  are  accusing  Anaxag- 
oras;  and  you  have  but  a  bad  opinion  of  the  judges,  if  you 
fancy  them  ignorant  to  such  a  degree  as  not  to  know  that 
those  doctrines  are  found  in  the  books  of  Anaxagoras  the 
Clazomenian,  who  is  full  of  them.  And  these  are  the  doc- 
trines which  the  youth  are  said  to  learn  of  Socrates,  when 
there  are  not  unfrequently  exhibitions  of  them  at  the  theatre 
(price  of  admission  one  drachma  at  the  most)  ;  and  they 
might  cheaply  purchase  them,  and  laugh  at  Socrates  if  he 
pretends  to  father  such  eccentricities.  And  so,  Meletus,  you 
really  think  that  I  do  not  believe  in  any  god  ? 

I  swear  by  Zeus  that  you  believe  absolutely  in  none  at  all. 

You  are  a  liar,  Meletus,  not  believed  even  by  yourself. 
For  I  cannot  help  thinkings  O  men  of  Athens,  that  Meletus 
is  reckless  and  impudent,  and  that  he  has  written  this  indict- 
ment in  a  spirit  of  mere  wantonness  and  youthful  bravado. 
Has  he  not  compounded  a  riddle,  thinking  to  try  me?  He 
said  to  himself:  I  shall  see  v/hether  this  wise  Socrates  will 
discover  my  ingenious  contradiction,  or  whether  I  shall  be 
able  to  deceive  him  and  the  rest  of  them.    For  he  certainly 


14  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

does  appear  to  me  to  contradict  himself  in  the  indictment  as 
much  as  if  he  said  that  Socrates  is  guilty  of  not  believing 
in  the  gods,  and  yet  of  believing  in  them — but  this  surely 
is  a  piece  of  fun. 

I  should  like  you,  O  men  of  Athens,  to  join  me  in  examin- 
ing Vs^hat  I  conceive  to  be  his  inconsistency;  and  do  you, 
Melettts,  answer.  And  I  must  remind  you  that  you  are  not 
to  interrupt  me  if  I  speak  in  my  accustomed  manner. 

Did  ever  man,  Meletus,  believe  in  the  existence  of  human 
things,  and  not  of  human  beings?  ...  I  wish,  men  of 
Athens,  that  he  would  answer,  and  not  be  always  trying  to 
get  up  an  interruption.  Did  ever  any  man  beli'eve  in  horse- 
manship, and  not  in  horses?  or  in  flute-playing  and  not  in 
flute-players?  No,  my  friend;  I  will  answer  to  you  and  to 
the  court,  as  you  refuse  to  answer  for  yourself.  There  is  no 
man  who  ever  did.  But  now  please  to  answer  the  next  ques- 
tion :  Can  a  man  believe  in  spiritual  and  divine  agencies,  and 
not  in  spirits  or  demigods  ? 

He  cannot. 

I  am  glad  that  I  have  extracted  that  answer,  by  the  assist- 
ance of  the  court;  nevertheless  you  swear  in  the  indictment 
that  I  teach  and  believe  in  divine  or  spiritual  agencies  (new 
or  old,  no  matter  for  that)  ;  at  any  rate,  I  believe  in  spiritual 
agencies,  as  you  say  and  swear  in  the  affidavit;  but  if  I 
believe  in  divine  beings,  I  must  beHeve  in  spirits  or  demi- 
gods ;  is  not  that  true  ?  Yes,  that  is  true,  for  I  may  assume 
that  your  silence  gives  assent  to  that.  Now  what  are  spirits 
or  demigods?  are  they  not  either  gods  ot  the  sons  of  gods? 
Is  that  true? 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

But  this  is  just  the  ingenious  riddle  of  which  I  was  speak- 
ing :  the  demigods  or  spirits  are  gods,  and  you  say  first  that 
I  don't  believe  in  gods,  and  then  again  that  I  do  believe  in 
gods ;  that  is,  if  I  believe  in  demigods.  For  if  the  demigods 
are  the  illegitimate  sons  of  gods,  whether  by  the  Nymphs  or 
by  any  other  mothers,  as  is  thought,  that,  as  all  men  will 
allow,  necessarily  implies  the  existence  of  th^ir  parents*  You 
might  as  well  affirm  the  existence  of  mules,  and  deny  that 
of  horses  and  asses.  Such  nonsense,  Meletus,  could  only 
haye  jseen  intended  by  yott  as  a  trial  of  me.    You  hare  gttt 


APOLOGY  IS 

this  into  the  indictment  because  you  had  nothing  real  of 
which  to  accuse  me.  But  no  one  who  has  a  particle  of 
understanding  will  ever  be  convinced  by  you  that  the  same 
man  can  believe  in  divine  and  superhuman  things,  and  yet 
not  believe  that  there  are  gods  and  demigods  and  heroes. 

I  have  said  enough  in  answer  to  the  charge  of  Meletus: 
any  elaborate  defence  is  unnecessary;  but  as  I  was  saying 
before,  I  certainly  have  many  enemies, -"and  this  is  what  will 
be  my  destruction  if  I  am  destroyed;  of  that  I  am  certain; 
not  Meletus,  nor  yet  Anytus,  but  the  envy  and  detraction  of 
the  world,  which  has  been  the  death  of  many  good  men,  and 
,will  probably  be  the  death  of  many  more ;  there  is  no  danger 
of  my  being  the  last  of  them. 

Someone  will  say :  And  are  you  not  ashamed,  Socrates,  of 
a  course  of  life  which  is  likely  to  bring  you  to  an  untimely 
end?  To  him  I  may  fairly  answer:  There  you  are  mistaken: 
a  man  who  is  good  for  anything  ought  not  to  calculate  the 
chance  of  living  or  dying ;  he  ought  only  to  consider  whether 
in  doing  anything  he  is  doing  right  or  wrong — acting  the 
part  of  a  good  man  or  of  a  bad.  Whereas,  according  to  your 
viev/,  the  heroes  who  fell  at  Troy  were  not  good  for  much, 
and  the  son  of  Thetis  above  all,  who  altogether  despised  dan- 
ger in  comparison  with  disgrace;  and  when  his  goddess 
mother  said  to  him,  in  his  eagerness  to  slay  Hector,  that  if 
he  avenged  his  companion  Patroclus^  and  slew  Hector,  he 
would  die  himself — "  Fate,"  as  she  said,  "  waits  upon  you 
next  after  Hector  " ;  he,  hearing  this,  utterly  despised  danger 
and  death,  and  instead  of  fearing  them,  feared  rather  to  live 
in  dishonor,  and  not  to  avenge  his  friend,  "Let  me  die 
next/'  he  replies,  "  and  be  avenged  of  my  enemy,  rather  than 
abide  here  by  the  beaked  ships,  a  scorn  and  a  burden  of  the 
earth."  Had  Achilles  any  thought  of  death  and  danger? 
For  wherever  a  man's  place  is,  whether  the  place  which  he 
has  chosen  or  that  in  v/hich  he  has  been  placed  by  a  com- 
mander, there  he  ought  to  remain  in  the  hour  of  danger;  he 
should  not  think  of  death  or  of  anything,  but  of  disgrace. 
And  this,  O  men  of  Athens,  is  a  true  saying. 

Strange,  indeed,  would  be  my  conduct,  O  men  of  Athens, 
if  I  who,  when  I  was  ordered  by  the  generals  whom  you 
chose  to  command  me  at  Potidsea  and  Amphipolis  and  Delium, 


16  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

remained  where  they  placed  me,  like  any  other  man,  facing 
death — if,  I  say,  nov/,  when,  as  I  conceive  and  imagine,  God 
orders  me  to  fulfil  the  philosopher's  mission  of  searching  into 
myself  and  other  men,  I  were  to  desert  my  post  through  fear 
of  death,  or  any  other  fear;  that  would  indeed  be  strange, 
and  I  might  justly  be  arraigned  in  court  for  denying  the 
existence  of  the  gods,  if  I  disobeyed  the  oracle  because  I  was 
afraid  of  death:  then  I  should  be  fancying  that  I  was  wise 
when  I  was  not  wise*    For  this  fear  of  death  is  indeed  the 
pretence  of  wisdom,  and  not  real  wisdom,  being  the  appear- 
ance of  knowing  the  unknown;  since  no  one  knows  whether 
death,  which  they  in  their  fear  apprehend  to  be  the  greatest 
evil,  may  not  be  the  greatest  good.     Is  there  not  here  conceit 
of  knowledge,   which  is  a  disgraceful   sort   of  ignorance? 
And  this  is  the  point  in  which,  as  I  think,  I  am  superior  to 
men  m  general,  and  in  which  I  might  perhaps  fancy  myself 
wiser  than  other  men — that  whereas  I  know  but  little  of  the 
world  below,  I  do  not  suppose  that  I  know :  but  I  do  know  that 
injustice  and  disobedience  to  a  better,  v\/"hether  God  or  man, 
is  evil  and  dishonorable,  and  I  will  never  fear  or  avoid  a 
possible  good  rather  than  a  certain  evil.    And  therefore  if 
you  let  me  go  now,  and  reject  the  counsels  of  Anytus,  who 
said  that  if  I  were  not  put  to  death  I  ought  not  to  have  been 
prosecuted,  and  that  if  I  escape  now,  your  sons  will  all  be 
utterly  ruined  by  listening  to  my  words — if  you  say  to  me, 
Socrates,  this  time  we  will  not  mind  Anytus,  and  will  let 
you  off,  but  upon  one  condition,  that  you  are  not  to  inquire 
and  speculate  in  this  way  any  more,  and  that  if  you  are  caught 
doing  this  again  you  shall  die — if  this  was  the  condition  on 
which  you  let  me  go,  I  should  reply :  Men  of  Athens,  I  honor 
and  love  you ;  but  I  shall  obey  God  rather  than  you,  and  while 
I  have  life  and  strength  I  shall  never  cease  from  the  practice 
and  teaching  of  philosophy,  exhorting  anyone  whom  I  meet 
after  my  manner,  and  convincing  him,  saying:  O  my  friend, 
why  do  you  who  are  a  citizen  of  the  great  and  mighty  and 
wise  city  of  Athens,   care  so  much   about  laying  up  the 
greatest  amount  of  money  and  honor  and  reputation,  and 
so  little  about  wisdom  and  truth  and  the  greatest  improve- 
ment of  the  soul,  which  you  never  regard  or  heed  at  all? 
Are  you  not  ashamed  of  this  ?   And  if  the  person  with  whom 


APOLOGY  17 

I  am  arguing  says :  Yes,  but  I  do  care ;  I  do  not  depart  or  let 
him  go  at  once;  I  interrogate  and  examine  and  cross-exam- 
ine him,  and  if  I  think  that  he  has  no  virtue,  but  only  says 
that  he  has,  I  reproach  him^with  undervaluing  the  greater, 
and  overvaluing  the  less.  And  this  I  should  say  to  eve^ryone 
whom  I  meet,  young  and  old,  citizen  and  alien,  but  especially 
to  the  citizens,  inasmuch  as  they  are  my  brethren.  For  this 
is  the  command  of  God,  as  I  would  have  you  know;  and  I 
believe  that  to  this  day  no  greater  good  has  ever  happened 
in  the  State  than  my  service  to  the  God.  For  I  do  nothing 
but  go  about  persuading  you  all,  old  and  young  alike,  not  to 
take  thought  for  your  persons  and  your  properties,  but  first 
and  chiefly  to  care  about  the  greatest  improvement  of  the 
soul.  I  tell  you  that  virtue  is  not  given  by  money,  but  that 
from  virtue  come  money  and  every  other  good  of  man,  pub- 
lic as  well  as  private.  This  is  my  teaching,  and  if  this  is 
the  doctrine  which  corrupts  the  youth,  my  influence  is  ruin- 
ous indeed.  But  if  anyone  says  that  this  is  not  my  teaching, 
he  is  speaking  an  untruth.  Wherefore,  O  men  of  Athens,  I 
say  to  you,  do  as  Anytus  bids  or  not  as  Anytus  bids,  and  either 
acquit  me  or  not;  but  whatever  you  do,  know  that  I  shall 
never  alter  my  ways,  not  even  if  I  have  to  die  many  times. 

Men  of  Athens,  do  not  interrupt,  but  hear  me;  there  was 
an  agreement  between  us  that  you  should  hear  me  out.  And 
I  think  that  what  I  am  going  to  say  will  do  you  good:  for 
I  have  something  more  to  say,  at  which  you  may  be  in- 
clined to  cry  out;  but  I  beg  that  you  will  not  do  this*  I 
would  have  you  know  that,  if  you  kill  such  a  one  as  I  am, 
you  wall  injure  yourselves  more  than  you  will  injure  me. 
Meletus  and  Anytus  will  not  injure  me:  they  cannot;  for  it 
is  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that  a  bad  man  should  injure 
a  better  than  himself.  I  do  not  deny  that  he  may,  perhaps, 
kill  him,  or  drive  him  into  exile,  or  deprive  him  of  civil 
rights;  and  he  may  imagine,  and  others  may  imagine,  that 
he  is  doing  him  a  great  injury:  but  in  that  I  do  not  agree 
with  him;  for  the  evil  of  doing  as  Anytus  is  doing—of  un- 
justly taking  away  another  man's  life — is  greater  far.  And 
now,  Athenians,  I  am  not  going  to  argue  for  my  own  sake, 
as  you  may  think,  but  for  yours,  that  you  may  not  sin  against 
the  God,  or  lightly  reject  his  boon  by  condemning  me.    Foc 


tB  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

if  you  kill  me  you  will  not  easily  find  another  like  me,  who, 
if  I  may  use  such  a  ludicrous  figure  of  speech,  am  a  sort  of 
gadfly,  given  to  the  State  by  the  God;  and  the  State  is  like 
a  great  and  noble  steed  who  is  tardy  in  his  motions  owing  to 
Ills  very  size,  and  requires  to  be  stirred  into  life.  I  am  that 
gadfly  which  God  has  given  the  State  and  all  day  long  and 
in  all  places  am  always  fastening  upon  you,  arousing  and 
persuading  and  reproaching  you.  And  as  you  will  not  easily 
find  another  like  me,  I  would  advise  you  to  spare  me.  I 
dare  say  that  you  may  feel  irritated  at  being  suddenly  awak- 
ened when  you  are  caught  napping;  and  you  may  think  that 
if  you  v/ere  to  strike  me  dead,  as  Anytus  advises,  which  you 
easily  might,  then  you  would  sleep  on  for  the  remainder  of 
your  lives,  unless  God  in  his  care  of  you  gives  you  another 
gadfly.  And  that  I  am  given  to  you  by  God  is  proved  by 
this:  that  if  I  had  been  like  other  men,  I  should  not  have 
neglected  all  my  own  concerns,  or  patiently  seen  the  neglect 
of  them  during  all  these  years,  and  have  been  doing  yours, 
coming  to  you  individually,  like  a  father  or  elder  brother,  ex- 
horting you  to  regard  virtue;  this,  I  say,  would  not  be  like 
human  nature.  And  had  I  gained  anything,  or  if  my  exhor- 
tations had  been  paid,  there  would  have  been  some  sense  in 
that:  but  now,  as  you  will  perceive,  not  even  the  impudence 
of  my  accusers  dares  to  say  that  I  have  ever  exacted  or 
sought  pay  of  anyone;  they  have  no  vv^itness  of  that.  And  I 
have  a  witness  of  the  truth  of  what  I  say;  my  poverty  is 
a  sufficient  witness. 

Someone  may  wonder  why  I  go  about  in  private,  giving 
advice  and  busying  myself  with  the  conce*>ns  of  others,  but 
do  not  venture  to  come  forward  in  public  and  advise  the 
State.  I  will  tell  you  the  reason  of  this.  You  have  often 
heard  me  speak  of  an  oracle  or  sign  which  comes  to  me,  and 
is  the  divinity  which  Meletus  ridicules  in  the  indictment. 
This  sign  I  have  had  ever  since  I  was  a  child.  The  sign 
is  a  voice  which  comes  to  me  and  always  forbids  me  to  do 
something  which  I  am  going  to  do,  but  never  commands  me 
to  do  anything,  and  this  is  what  stands  in  the  way  of  m.y  be- 
ing a  politician.  A-ud  rightly,  as  I  think.  For  I  am  cer- 
tain, O  men  of  Athens,  that  'if  I  had  engaged  in  politics, 
I   should    have    perished    long    ago    and   done   no    good 


APOLOGY  19 

eitfier  to  you  or  to  myself.  And  don't  be  offended  at  my 
telling  you  the  truth:  for  the  truth  is  that  no  man  who 
goes  to  war  with  you  or  any  other  multitude,  honestly 
struggling  against  the  commission  of  unrighteousness  and 
wrong  in  the  State,  will  save  his  life;  he  who  will  really 
fight  for  the  right,  if  he  would  live  even  for  a  little  while, 
must  have  a  private  station  and  not  a  public  one. 

I  can  give  you  as  proofs  of  this,  not  words  only,  but  deeds, 
which  you  value  more  than  words.  Let  me  tell  you  a  passage 
of  my  own  life,  which  will  prove  to  you  that  I  should  never 
have  yielded  to  injustice  from  any  fear  of  death,  and  that 
if  I  had  not  yielded  I  should  have  died  at  once.  I  will  tell 
you  a  story — tasteless,  perhaps,  and  commonplace,  but  never- 
theless true.  The  only  office  of  State  which  I  ever  held,  O 
men  of  Athens,  was  that  of  Senator;  the  tribe  Antiochis, 
which  is  my  tribe,  had  the  presidency  at  the  trial  of  the 
generals  who  had  not  taken  up  the  bodies  of  the  slain  after 
the  battle  of  Arginuss;  and  you  proposed  to  try  them  all 
together,  which  was  illegal,  as  you  all  thought  afterwards; 
but  at  the  time  I  was  the  only  one  of  the  Prytanes  who  was 
opposed  to  the  illegality,  and  I  gave  miy  vote  against  you; 
and  when  the  orators  threatened  to  impeach  and  arrest  me, 
and  have  me  taken  away,  and  you  called  and  shouted,  I 
made  up  my  mind  that  I  would  run  the  risk,  having  law 
and  justice  with  me,  rather  than  take  part  in  your  injustice 
because  I  feared  imprisonment  and  death.  This  happened 
in  the  days  of  the  democracy.  But  when  the  oligarchy  of 
the  Thirty  was  in  power,  they  sent  for  me  and  four  others 
into  the  rotunda,  and  bade  us  bring  Leon  the  Salaminian 
from  Salamis,  as  they  v/anted  to  execute  him.  This  was  a 
specimen  of  the  sort  of  commands  which  they  were  always 
giving  with  the  view  of  implicating  as  many  as  possible  in 
their  crimes;  and  then  I  showed,  not  in  words  only,  but  in 
deed,  that,  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  use  such  an  expression,  I 
cared  not  a  straw  for  death,  and  that  my  only  fear  was  the 
fear  of  doing  an  unrighteous  or  unholy  thing.  For  the 
strong  arm  of  that  oppressive  power  did  not  frighten  me  into 
doing  wrong;  and  v/hen  we  came  out  of  the  rotunda  the 
other  four  went  to  Salamis  and  fetched  Leon,  but  I  went 
qtiietly  home.    For  which  I  might  have  lost  my  life,  had 


20  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

not  the  power  of  the  Thirty  shortly  afterwards  come  to  an 
end.     And  to  this  many  will  witness. 

Now  do  you  really  imagine  that  I  could  have  survived  all 
these  years,  if  I  had  led  a  public  life,  supposing  that  like 
a  good  man  I  had  always  supported  the  right  and  had  made 
justice,  as  I  ought,  the  first  thing?  No,  indeed,  men  of 
Athens,  neither  I  nor  any  other.  But  I  have  been  always 
the  same  in  all  my  actions,  public  as  well  as  private,  and 
never  have  I  yielded  any  base  compliance  to  those  whO' 
are  slanderously  termed  my  disciples  or  to  any  other.  For  the 
truth  is  that  I  have  no  regular  disciples:  but  if  anyone  likes 
to  come  and  hear  me  while  I  am  pursuing  my  mission, 
whether  he  be  young  or  old,  he  may  freely  come.  Nor  do 
I  converse  with  those  who  pay  only,  and  not  with  those  who 
do  not  pay ;  but  any  one,  whether  he  be  rich  or  poor,  may  ask 
and  answer  me  and  listen  to  my  words;  and  whether  he 
turns  out  to  be  a  bad  man  or  a  good  one;  that  cannot  be 
justly  laid  to  my  charge,  as  I  never  taught  him  anything. 
And  if  anyone  says  that  he  has  ever  learned  or  heard  any- 
thing from  me  m  private  which  all  the  world  has  not  heard, 
I  should  like  you  to  know  that  he  is  speaking  an  untruth. 

But  I  shall  be  asked.  Why  do  people  delight  in  continually 
conversing  with  you?  I  have  told  you  already,  Athenians, 
the  whole  truth  about  this:  they  like  to  hear  the  cross  ex- 
amination of  the  pretenders  to  wisdom;  there  is  amusement 
in  this.  And  this  is  a  duty  which  the  God  has  imposed  upon 
me,  as  I  am  assured  by  oracles,  visions,  and  in  every  sort  of 
way  in  which  the  will  of  divine  power  was  ever  signified  to 
anyone.  This  is  true,  O  Athenians ;  or,  if  not  true,  would  be 
soon  refuted.  For  if  I  am  really  corrupting  the  youth,  and 
have  corrupted  some  of  them  already,  those  of  them  who 
have  grown  up  and  have  become  sensible  that  I  gave  them 
bad  advice  in  the  days  of  their  youth  should  come  forward 
as  accusers  and  take  their  revenge ;  and  if  they  do  not  like  to 
come  themselves,  some  of  their  relatives,  fathers,  brothers, 
or  other  kinsmen,  should  say  what  evil  their  families  suffered 
at  my  hands.  Now  is  their  time.  Many  of  them  I  see  in  the 
court.  There  is  Crito,  who  is  of  the  same  age  and  of  the 
same  deme  with  myself;  and  there  is  Critobulus  his  son, 
whom  I  also  see.    Then  again  there  is  Lysanias  of  Sphettus^ 


APOLOGY  21 

wKo  IS  tfie  father  of  vEschines — he  is  present ;  and  also  there 
is  Antiphon  of  Cephisus,  who  is  the  father  of  Epignes;  and 
there  are  the  brothers  of  several  who  have  associated  with 
me.  There  is  Nicostratus  the  son  of  Theosdotides,  and  the 
brother  of  Theodotus  (now  Theodotus  himself  is  dead,  and 
therefore  he,  at  any  rate,  will  not  seek  to  stop  him)  ;  and 
there  is  Paralus  the  son  of  Demodocus,  who  had  a  brother 
Theages ;  and  Adeimantus  the  son  of  Ariston,  whose  brother 
Plato  is  present;  and  ^antodorus,  who  is  the  brother  of 
Apollodorus,  whom  I  also  see.  I  might  mention  a  great 
many  others,  any  of  whom  Meletus  should  have  produced  as 
witnesses  in  the  course  of  his  speech ;  and  let  him  still  produce 
them,  if  he  has  forgotten;  I  will  make  way  for  him.  And 
let  him  say,  if  he  has  any  testimony  of  the  sort  which  he  can 
produce.  Nay,  Athenians,  the  very  opposite  is  the  truth. 
For  all  these  are  ready  to  witness  on  behalf  of  the  corrupter, 
of  the  destroyer  of  their  kindred,  as  Meletus  and  Anytus  call 
me;  not  the  corrupted  youth  only — there  might  have  been  a 
motive  for  that — but  their  uncorrupted  elder  relatives.  Why 
should  they  too  support  me  with  their  testimony?  Why,  in- 
deed, except  for  the  sake  of  truth  and  justice,  and  because 
they  know  that  I  am  speaking  the  truth,  and  that  Meletus 
is  lying. 

Well,  Athenians,  this  and  the  like  of  this  is  nearly  all  the 
defence  which  I  have  to  offer.  Yet  a  word  more.  Perhaps 
there  may  be  someone  vv^ho  is  offended  at  me,  when  he  calls 
to  mind  how  he  himself,  on  a  similar  or  even  a  less  serious 
occasion,  had  recourse  to  prayers  and  supplications  with 
many  tears,  and  how  he  produced  his  children  in  court,  which 
was  a  moving  spectacle,  together  with  a  posse  of  his  relations 
and  friends;  whereas  I,  who  am  probably  in  danger  of  my 
life,  will  do  none  of  these  things.  Perhaps  this  may  come 
into  his  mind,  and  he  may  be  set  against  me,  and  vote  in 
anger  because  he  is  displeased  at  this.  Now  if  there  be  such 
a  person  among  you,  which  I  am  far  from  affirming,  I  may 
fairly  reply  to  him :  My  friend,  I  am  a  man,  and  like  other 
men,  a  creature  of  flesh  and  blood,  and  not  of  wood  or  stone, 
as  Homer  says;  and  I  have  a  family,  yes,  and  sons,  O  Athe- 
nians, three  in  number,  one  of  whom  is  growing  up,  and 
the  two  others  are  still  young;  and  yet  I  will  not  bring  any 


22  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

of  them  hither  in  order  to  petition  you  for  an  acquittal.  And 
why  not?  Not  from  any  self-will  or  disregard  of  you. 
Whether  I  am  or  am  not  afraid  of  death  is  another  question, 
of  which  I  will  not  now  speak.  But  my  reason  simply  is 
that  I  feel  such  conduct  to  be  discreditable  to  m.yself,  and 
you,  and  the  whole  State.  One  who  has  reached  my  years, 
and  who  has  a  name  for  wisdom,  whether  deserved  or  not, 
ought  not  to  debase  himself.  At  any  rate,  the  world  has 
decided  that  Socrates  is  in  some  way  superior  to  other  men. 
And  if  those  among  you  who  are  said  to  be  superior  in  wisdom 
and  courage,  and  any  other  virtue,  demean  themselves  in  this 
way,  how  shameful  is  their  conduct !  I  have  seen  m.en  of 
reputation,  when  they  have  been  condemned,  behaving  in 
the  strangest  manner:  they  seemed  to  fancy  that  they  were 
going  to  suffer  something  dreadful  if  they  died,  and  that 
they  could  be  immortal  if  you  only  allowed  them  to  live ;  and 
I  think  that  they  were  a  dishonor  to  the  State,  and  that 
any  stranger  coming  in  would  say  of  them  that  the  most 
eminent  men  of  Athens,  to  whom  the  Athenians  themselves 
give  honor  and  command,  are  no  better  than  women.  And 
I  say  that  these  things  ought  not  to  be  done  by  those  of 
us  who  are  of  reputation;  and  if  they  are  done,  you  ought 
not  to  permit  them;  you  ought  rather  to  show  that  you  are 
more  inclined  to  condemn,  not  the  man  who  is  quiet,  but 
the  m.an  who  gets  up  a  doleful  scene,  and  makes  the  city 
ridiculous. 

But,  setting  aside  the  question  of  dishonor,  there  seems  to 
be  something  wrong  in  petitioning  a  judge,  and  thus  procur- 
ing an  acquittal  instead  of  informing  and  convincing  him. 
For  his  duty  is,  not  to  make  a  present  of  justice,  but  to  give 
judgment;  and  he  has  sworn  that  he  will  judge  according  to 
the  laws,  and  not  according  to  his  own  good  pleasure;  and 
neither  he  nor  we  should  get  into  the  habit  of  perjuring  our- 
selves— there  can  be  no  piety  in  that.  Do  not  then  require 
me  to  do  what  I  consider  dishonorable  and  impious  and 
wrong,  especially  now,  when  I  am  being  tried  for  impiety  on 
the  indictment  of  Meletus.  For  if,  O  men  of  Athens,  by 
force  of  persuasion  and  entreaty,  I  could  overpower  youf 
oaths,  then  I  should  be  teaching  you  to  believe  that  therg 
are  no  gods,  and  convict  myself,  in  my  own  defence,  ol 


APOLOGY  23 

tiot  believing  in  them.  But  that  is  not  the  case ;  for  I  do  be- 
lieve that  there  are  gods,  and  in  a  far  higher  sense  than  that 
in  which  any  of  my  accusers  believe  in  them.  And  to  you 
and  to  God  I  commit  my  cause,  to  be  determined  by  you  as 
is  best  for  you  and  me. 

There  are  many  reasons  why  I  am  not  grieved,  O  men  of 
Athens,  at  the  vote  of  condemnation.  I  expected  this,  and 
am  only  surprised  that  the  votes  are  so  nearly  equal;  for  I 
had  thought  that  the  majority  against  me  would  have 
been  far  larger;  but  now,  had  thirty  votes  gone  over  to  the 
other  side,  I  should  have  been  acquitted.  And  I  may  say 
that  I  have  escaped  Meletus.  And  I  may  say  more;  for 
without  the  assistance  of  Anytus  and  Lycon,  he  would  not 
have  had  a  fifth  part  of  the  votes,  as  the  law  requires,  in 
which  case  he  would  have  incurred  a  fine  of  a  thousand 
drachmae,  as  is   evident. 

And  so  he  proposes  death  as  the  penalty.  And  what  shall 
I  propose  on  my  part,  O  men  of  Athens  ?  Clearly  that  which 
is  my  due.  And  what  is  that  which  I  ought  to  pay  or  to  re- 
ceive? What  shall  be  done  to  the  man  who  has  never  had 
the  wit  to  be  idle  during  his  whole  life;  but  has  been  care- 
less of  what  the  many  care  about — wealth  and  family  inter- 
ests, and  military  offices,  and  speaking  in  the  assembly,  and 
magistracies,  and  plots,  and  parties.  Reflecting  that  I  v/as 
really  too  honest  a  man  to  follow  in  this  way  and  live,  I  did 
not  go  where  I  could  do  no  good  to  you  or  to  m^yself;  but 
where  I  could  do  the  greatest  good  privately  to  everyone  of 
you,  thither  I  went,  and  sought  to  persuade  every  man  among 
you  that  he  must  look  to  himself,  and  seek  virtue  and  wis- 
dom before  he  looks  to  his  private  interests,  and  look  to  the 
State  before  he  looks  to  the  interests  of  the  State;  and  that 
this  should  be  the  order  which  he  observes  in  all  his  actions. 
What  shall  be  done  to  such  a  one?  Doubtless  some  good 
thing,  O  men  of  Athens,  if  he  has  his  rev/ard;  and  the  good 
should  be  of  a  kind  suitable  to  him.  What  would  be  a  re- 
ward suitable  to  a  poor  m.an  who  is  your  benefactor,  who 
desires  leisure  that  he  may  instruct  you?  There  can  be  no 
more  fitting  reward  than  maintenance  in  the  Prytaneum,  O 
men  of  Athens,  a  reward  which  he  deserves  far  more  thaa 


24  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

the  citizen  who  has  won  the  prize  at  Olympia  in  the  horse 
or  chariot  race,  whether  the  chariots  were  drawn  by  two 
horses  or  by  many.  For  I  am  in  want,  and  he  has  enough; 
and  he  only  gives  you  the  appearance  of  happiness,  and  I 
give  you  the  reaHty.  And  if  I  am  to  estimate  the  penalty 
justly,  I  say  that  maintenance  in  the  Prytaneum  is  the  just 
return. 

Perhaps  you  may  think  that  I  am  braving  you  in  saying 
this,  as  in  what  I  said  before  about  the  tears  and  prayers. 
But  that  is  not  the  case.  I  speak  rather  because  I  am  con- 
vinced that  I  never  intentionally  wronged  anyone,  although 
I  cannot  convince  you  of  that — for  we  have  had  a  short  con- 
versation only;  but  if  there  were  a  law  at  Athens,  such  as 
there  is  in  other  cities,  that  a  capital  cause  should  not  be 
decided  in  one  day,  then  I  believe  that  I  should  have  con- 
vinced you;  but  now  the  time  is  too  short.  I  cannot  in  a 
moment  refute  great  slanders;  and,  as  I  am  convinced  that 
I  never  wronged  another,  I  will  assuredly  not  wrong  myself. 
I  will  not  say  of  myself  that  I  deserve  any  evil,  or  propose 
any  penalty.  Why  should  I?  Because  I  am  afraid  of  the 
penalty  of  death  which  Meletus  proposes?  When  I  do  not 
know  whether  death  is  a  good  or  an  evil,  why  should  I  pro- 
pose a  penalty  which  would  certainly  be  an  evil?  Shall 
I  say  imprisonment?  And  why  should  I  live  in  prison,  and 
be  the  slave  of  the  magistrates  of  the  year — of  the  Eleven? 
Or  shall  the  penalty  be  a  fine,  and  imprisonment  until  the 
fine  is  paid?  There  is  the  same  objection.  I  should  have 
to  lie  in  prison,  for  money  I  have  none,  and  I  cannot  pay. 
Arid  if  I  say  exile  (and  this  may  possibly  be  the  penalty 
which  you  will  affix),  I  must  indeed  be  blinded  by  the  love 
of  life  if  I  were  to  consider  that  when  you,  who  are  my  own 
citizens,  cannot  endure  my  discourses  and  words,  and  have 
found  them  so  grievous  and  odious  that  you  would  fain  have 
done  with  them,  others  are  likely  to  endure  me.  No,  indeed, 
men  of  Athens,  that  is  not  very  likely.  And  what  a  life  should 
I  lead,  at  my  age,  wandering  from  city  to  city,  living  in  ever- 
changing  exile,  and  always  being  driven  out !  For  I  am 
quite  sure  that  into  whatever  place  I  go,  as  here  so  also 
there,  the  young  m.en  will  come  to  me;  and  if  I  drive  them 
away,  their  elders  will  drive  me  out  at  their  desire;  and  if 


APOLOGY  25 

I  let  them  come,  their  fathers  and  friends  will  drive  me  out 
for  their  sakes.  Someone  will  say :  Yes,  Socrates,  but  can- 
not you  hold  your  tongue,  and  then  you  may  go  into  a  foreign 
city,  and  no  one  will  interfere  with  you  ?  Now  I  have  great 
difficulty  in  making  you  understand  my  answer  to  this.  For 
if  I  tell  you  that  this  would  be  a  disobedience  to  a  divine 
command,  and  therefore  that  I  cannot  hold  my  tongue,  you 
will  not  believe  that  I  am  serious ;  and  if  I  say  again  that  the 
greatest  good  of  man  is  daily  to  converse  about  virtue,  and 
all  that  concerning  which  you  hear  me  examining  myself  and 
others,  and  that  the  life  which  is  unexamined  is  not  worth 
living — ^that  you  are  still  less  likely  to  believe.  And  yet  what 
I  say  is  true,  although  a  thing  of  which  it  is  hard  for  me  to 
persuade  you.  Moreover,  I  am  not  accustomed  to  think  that 
I  deserve  any  punishment.  Had  I  money  I  might  have  pro- 
posed to  give  you  what  I  had,  and  have  been  none  the  worse. 
But  you  see  that  I  have  none,  and  can  only  ask  you  to  propor- 
tion the  fine  to  my  means.  However,  I  think  that  I  could 
afford  a  mina,  and  therefore  I  propose  that  penalty;  Plato, 
Crito,  Critobulus,  and  Apollodorus,  my  friends  here,  bid  me 
say  thirty  minss,  and  they  will  be  the  sureties.  Well  then, 
say  thirty  minse,  let  that  be  the  penalty ;  for  that  they  will  be 
ample  security  to  you. 

Not  much  time  will  be  gained,  O  Athenians,  in  return  for 
the  evil  name  which  you  will  get  from  the  detractors  of  the 
city,  who  will  say  that  you  killed  Socrates,  a  wise  man;  for 
they  will  call  me  wise  even  although  I  am  not  wise  when 
they  want  to  reproach  you.  If  you  had  waited  a  little  while, 
your  desire  would  have  been  fulfilled  in  the  course  of  nature, 
For  I  am  far  advanced  in  years,  as  you  may  perceive  and 
not  far  from  death.  I  am  speaking  now  only  to  those  of  you 
who  have  condemned  me  to  death.  And  I  have  another 
thing  to  say  to  them:  You  think  that  I  was  convicted 
through  deficiency  of  words — I  mean,  that  if  I  had  thought 
fit  to  leave  nothing  undone,  nothing  unsaid,  I  might  have 
gained  an  acquittal.  Not  so;  the  deficiency  which  led  to 
my  conviction  was  not  of  words — certainly  not.  But  I  had 
not  the  boldness  or  impudence  or  inclination  to  address  you 
as  you  would  have  liked  me  to  address  you,  weeping  and 


26  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

wailing  and  lamenting,  and  saying  and  doing  many  things 
which  you  have  been  accustomed  to  heai*  from  others,  and 
which,  as  I  say,  are  unworthy  of  me.  But  I  thought  that 
I  ought  not  to  do  anything  common  or  mean  in  the  hour  of 
danger:  nor  do  I  now  repent  of  the  manner  of  my  defence, 
and  I  would  rather  die  having  spoken  after  my  manner,  than 
speak  in  your  manner  and  live.  For  neither  in  war  nor 
yet  at  law  ought  any  man  to  use  every  way  of  escaping  death. 
For  often  in  battle  there  is  no  doubt  that  if  a  man  will  throw 
away  his  arms,  and  fall  on  his  knees  before  his  pursuers, 
he  may  escape  death;  and  in  other  dangers  there  are  other 
ways  of  escaping  death,  if  a  man  is  willing  to  say  and  do 
anything.  The  difficulty,  my  friends,  is  not  in  avoiding 
death,  but  in  avoiding  unrighteousness;  for  that  runs  faster 
than  death.  I  am  old  and  move  slowly,  and  the  slower  run- 
ner has  overtaken  me,  and  my  accusers  are  keen  and  quick, 
and  the  faster  runner,  who  is  unrighteousness,  has  overtaken 
them.  And  now  I  depart  hence  condemned  by  you  to  suffer 
the  penalty  of  death,  and  they,  too,  go  their  ways  condemned 
by  the  truth  to  suffer  the  penalty  of  villainy  and  wrong; 
and  I  must  abide  by  my  award — let  them  abide  by  theirs. 
I  suppose  that  these  things  may  be  regarded  as  fated — and 
I  think  that  they  are  well. 

And  now,  O  men  who  have  condemned  me,  I  would  fain 
prophesy  to  you ;  for  I  am  about  to  die,  and  that  is  the  hour 
in  which  men  are  gifted  with  prophetic  power.  And  I 
prophesy  to  you  who  are  my  murderers,  that  immediately 
after  my  death  punishment  far  heavier  than  you  have  in- 
flicted on  me  will  surely  await  you.  Me  you  have  killed 
because  you  wanted  to  escape  the  accuser,  and  not  to  give 
an  account  of  your  lives.  But  that  will  not  be  as  you  sup- 
pose :  far  otherwise.  For  I  say  that  there  will  be  more  ac- 
cusers of  you  than  there  are  now;  accusers  whom  hitherto 
I  have  restrained :  and  as  they  are  younger  they  will  be  more 
severe  with  you,  and  you  will  be  more  offended  at  them. 
For  if  you  think  that  by  killing  men  you  can  avoid  the  accuser 
censuring  your  lives,  you  are  mistaken;  that  is  not  a  way 
of  escape  which  is  either  possible  or  honorable;  the  easiest 
and  noblest  way  is  not  to  be  crushing  others,  but  to 
b^    improving   yourselves.     This    is   the    prophecy   which 


APOLOGY  27 

I  utter  before  my  departure,  to  the  judges  who  have  con- 
demjied  me. 

Friends,  who  would  have  acquitted  me,  I  would  like  alsQ 
to  talk  with  you  about  this  thing  which  has  happened,  while 
the  magistrates  are  busy,  and  before  I  go  to  the  place  at 
which  I  must  die.  Stay  then  awhile,  for  v^^e  may  as  well 
talk  with  one  another  while  there  is  time.  You  are  my 
friends,  and  I  should  like  to  show  you  the  meaning  of  this 
event  which  has  happened  to  me.  O  my  judges— for  you  I 
may  truly  call  judges — I  should  like  to  tell  you  of  a  wonder- 
ful circumstance.  Hitherto  the  familiar  oracle  within  me 
has  constantly  been  in  the  habit  of  opposing  me  even  about 
trifles,  if  I  was  going  to  make  a  slip  or  error  about  anything ; 
and  now  as  you  see  there  has  come  upon  me  that  which  may 
be  thought,  and  is  generally  believed  to  be,  the  last  and 
worst  evil.  But  the  oracle  made  no  sign  of  opposition,  either 
as  I  was  leaving  my  house  and  going  out  in  the  morning, 
or  when  I  was  going  up  into  this  court,  or  while  I  was 
speaking,  at  anything  which  I  was  going  to  say;  and  yet  I 
have  often  been  stopped  in  the  middle  of  a  speech;  but  now 
in  nothing  I  either  said  or  did  touching  this  matter  has  the 
oracle  opposed  me.  What  do  I  take  to  be  the  explanation  of 
this?  I  will  tell  you.  I  regard  this  as  a  proof  that  what 
has  happened  to  me  is  a  good,  and  that  those  of  us  who  think 
that  death  is  an  evil  are  in  error.  This  is  a  great  proof  to 
me  of  what  I  am  saying,  for  the  customary  sign  would  surely 
have  opposed  me  had  I  been  going  to  evil  and  not  to  good. 

Let  us  reflect  in  another  way,  and  we  shall  see  that  there 
is  great  reason  to  hope  that  death  is  a  good,  for  one  of  two 
things :  either  death  is  a  state  of  nothingness  and  utter  uncon- 
sciousness, or,  as  men  say,  there  is  a  change  and  migration 
of  the  soul  from  this  world  to  another.  Now  if  you  suppose 
that  there  is  no  consciousness,  but  a  sleep  like  the  sleep  of 
him  who  is  undisturbed  even  by  the  sight  of  dreams,  death 
will  be  an  unspeakable  gain.  For  if  a  person  were  to  select 
the  night  in  which  his  sleep  was  undisturbed  even  by  dreams, 
and  were  to  compare  with  this  the  other  days  and  nights  of 
his  lifcj  and  then  were  to  tell  us  how  many  days  and  nights 
be  had  passed  in  the  course  of  his  life  better  and  more  pleas- 
antly than  this  one,  I  think  that  any  man,  I  will  not  say  a 


28  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

private  man,  but  even  the  great  king,  will  not  find  many  such 
days  or  nights,  when  compared  with  the  others.  Now  if 
death  is  like  this,  I  say  that  to  die,  is  gain;  for  eternity  is 
then  only  a  single  night.  But  if  death  is  the  journey  to  an- 
other place,  and  there,  as  men  say,  all  the  dead  are,  what  good, 
O  my  friends  and  judges,  can  be  greater  than  this?  If  in- 
deed when  the  pilgrim  arrives  in  the  world  below,  he  is  de- 
livered from  the  professors  of  justice  in  this  world,  and 
finds  the  true  judges  who  are  said  to  give  judgm.ent  there, 
Minos  and  Rhadamanthus  and  ^acus  and  Triptolemus,  and 
other  sons  of  God  who  were  righteous  in  their  own  life,  that 
pilgrimage  will  be  worth  making.  What  would  not  a  man 
give  if  he  might  converse  with  Orpheus  and  Musseus  and 
Hesiod  and  Homer?  Nay,  if  this  be  true,  let  me  die  again 
and  again.  I,  too,  shall  have  a  wonderful  interest  in  a  place 
where  I  can  converse  with  Palamedes,  and  Ajax  the  son  of 
Telamon,  and  other  heroes  of  old,  who  have  suffered  death 
through  an  unjust  judgment;  and  there  will  be  no  small 
pleasure,  as  I  think,  in  comparing  my  own  sufferings  with 
theirs.  Above  all,  I  shall  be  able  to  continue  my  search 
into  true  and  false  knowledge;  as  in  this  world,  so  also  in 
that;  I  shall  find  out  who  is  wise,  and  who  pretends  to  be 
wise,  and  is  not.  What  would  not  a  man  give,  O  judges,  tO' 
be  able  to  examine  the  leader  of  the  great  Trojan  expedition; 
or  Odysseus  or  Sisyphus,  or  numberless  others,  men  and 
women  too !  What  infinite  delight  would  there  be  in  con- 
versing with  them  and  asking  them  questions !  For  in  that 
world  they  do  not  put  a  man  to  death  for  this ;  certainly  not. 
For  besides  being  happier  in  that  world  than  in  this,  they  will 
be  immortal,  if  what  is  said  is  true. 

Wherefore,  O  judges,  be  of  good  cheer  about  death,  and 
know  this  of  a  truth — that  no  evil  can  happen  to  a  good  man, 
either  in  life  or  after  death.  He  and  his  are  not  neglected 
by  the  gods;  nor  has  my  own  approaching  end  happened 
by  mere  chance.  But  I  see  clearly  that  to  die  and  be  released 
was  better  for  me;  and  therefore  the  oracle  gave  no  sign. 
For  which  reason  also,  I  am  not  angry  with  my  accusers,  or 
my  condemners;  they  have  done  me  no  harm,  although 
neither  of  them  meant  to  do  me  any  good ;  and  for  this  I  ma}^ 
gently  blame  them. 


APOLOGY  29 

Still  I  have  a  favor  to  ask  of  them.  When  my  sons  are 
grown  np,  I  would  ask  you,  O  my  friends,  to  punish  them; 
and  I  would  have  you  trouble  them,  as  I  have  troubled  you, 
if  they  seem  to  care  about  riches,  or  anything,  more  than 
about  virtue;  or  if  they  pretend  to  be  something  when  they 
are  really  nothing — then  reprove  them,  as  I  have  reproved 
you,  for  not  caring  about  that  for  which  they  ought  to  care, 
and  thinking  that  they  are  something  when  they  are  really 
nothing.  And  if  you  do  this,  I  and  my  sons  will  have  re- 
ceived justice  at  your  hands. 

The  hour  of  departure  has  arrived,  and  we  go  our  ways — 
I  to  die,  and  you  to  live.    Which  is  better,  God  only  knows. 


CRITO 

PERSONS  OF  THE  DIALOGUE 
Socrates  Crito 

Scene:  The  Prison  of  Socrates 

Socrates 

HY  have  you  come  at  this  hour,  Crito?  it  must  be 
quite  early. 
Crito.  Yes,  certainly. 

Soc.  What  is  the  exact  time? 

Cr.  The  dawn  is  breaking. 

Soc.  I  wonder  the  keeper  of  the  prison  would  let  you  in. 

Cr.  He  knows  me  because  I  often  come,  Socrates;  more- 
over, I  have  done  him  a  kindness. 

Soc.  And  are  you  only  just  come? 

Cr.  No,  I  came  some  time  ago. 

Soc.  Then  why  did  you  sit  and  say  nothing,  instead  of 
awakening  me  at  once? 

Cr.  Why,  indeed,  Socrates,  I  myself  would  rather  not 
have  all  this  sleeplessness  and  sorrow.  But  I  have  been 
wondering  at  your  peaceful  slumbers,  and  that  was  the 
reason  why  I  did  not  awaken  you,  because  I  wanted  you  to 
be  out  of  pain.  I  have  always  thought  you  happy  in  the 
calmness  of  your  temperament;  but  never  did  I  see  the 
like  of  the  easy,  cheerful  way  in  which  you  bear  this 
calamity. 

Soc.  Why,  Crito,  when  a  man  has  reached  my  age  !ie 
ought  not  to  be  repining  at  the  prospect  of  death. 

Cr.  And  yet  other  old  men  find  themselves  in  similar  mis- 
fortunes, and  age  does  not  prevent  them  from  repining. 

Soc,  That  may  be.  But  you  have  not  told  me  why  you 
come  at  this  early  hour. 

Cr,  I  come  to  bring  you  a  message  which  is  sad  and  pain- 

31 


32  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

ful;  not^  as  I  believe,  to  yourself,  but  to  all  of  us  who  are 
your  friends,  and  saddest  of  all  to  me. 

Soc,  What !  I  suppose  that  the  ship  has  come  from 
Delos,  on  the  arrival  of  which  I  am  to  die  ? 

Cr,  No,  the  ship  has  not  actually  arrived,  but  she  will 
probably  be  here  to-day,  as  persons  who  have  come  from 
Sunium  tell  me  that  they  have  left  her  there ;  and  therefore 
to-morrow,  Socrates,  will  be  the  last  day  of  your  life. 

Soc.  Very  well,  Crito;  if  such  is  the  will  of  God,  I  am 
wilHng;  but  my  belief  is  that  there  will  be  a  delay  of 
a  day. 

Cr.  Why  do  you  say  this  ? 

Soc.  I  will  tell  you.  I  am  to  die  on  the  <iay  after  the  ar- 
rival of  the  ship? 

Cr.  Yes;  that  is  what  the  authorities  say. 

Soc.  But  I  do  not  think  that  the  ship  will  be  here  until 
to-morrow;  this  I  gather  from  a  vision  which  I  had  last 
night,  or  rather  only  just  now,  when  you  fortunately  allowed 
me  to  sleep. 

Cr.  And  what  was  the  nature  of  the  vision? 

Soc.  There  came  to  me  the  likeness  of  a  woman,  fair  and 
comely,  clothed  in  white  raiment,  who  called  to  me  and  said : 

0  Socrates- — 

"  The  third  day  hence,  to  Phthia  shalt  thou  go." 

Cr.  What  a  singular  dream,  Socrates  ! 

Soc.  There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  meaning,  Crito,  I 
think. 

Cr.  Yes :  the  meaning  is  only  too  clear.  But,  O !  my 
beloved  Socrates,  let  me  entreat  you  once  more  to  take  my 
advice  and  escape.  For  if  you  die  I  shall  not  only  lose  a 
friend  who  can  never  be  replaced,  but  there  is  another  evil : 
people  who  do  not  know  you  and  me  will  believe  that  I  might 
have  saved  you  if  I  had  been  willing  to  give  money,  but  that 

1  did  not  care.  Now,  can  there  be  a  worse  disgrace  than  this 
— that  I  should  be  thought  to  value  money  more  than  the 
life  of  a  friend  ?  For  the  many  will  not  be  persuaded  that  I 
wanted  you  to  escape,  and  that  you  refused. 

Soc.  But  why,  my  dear  Crito,  should  we  care  about  the 
opinion  of  the  many?     Good  men,  and  they  are  the  only 

1  HC— Vol.  2 


CEITO  33 

persons  who  are  worth  considering,  will  think  of  these  things 
truly  as  they  happened. 

Cr.  But  do  you  see,  Socrates,  that  the  opinion  of  the 
many  must  be  regarded,  as  is  evident  in  your  own  case,  be- 
cause they  can  do  the  very  greatest  evil  to  anyone  who  has 
lost  their  good  opinion? 

Soc.  I  only  wish,  Crito,  that  they  could;  for  then  they 
could  also  do  the  greatest  good,  and  that  would  be  well.  But 
the  truth  is,  that  they  can  do  neither  good  nor  evil:  they 
cannot  make  a  man  wise  or  make  him  foolish ;  and  whatever 
they  do  is  the  result  of  chance. 

Cr.  Well,  I  will  not  dispute  about  that;  but  please  to  tell 
me,  Socrates,  whether  you  are  not  acting  out  of  regard  to  me 
and  your  other  friends :  are  you  not  afraid  that  if  you  escape 
hence  we  may  get  into  trouble  with  the  informers  for  having 
stolen  you  away,  and  lose  either  the  whole  or  a  great  part  of 
our  property;  or  that  even  a  worse  evil  may  happen  to  us? 
Now,  if  this  is  your  fear,  be  at  ease;  for  in  order  to  save 
you,  we  ought  surely  to  run  this  or  even  a  greater  risk;  be 
persuaded,  then,  and  do  as  I  say. 

Soc.  Yes,  Crito,  that  is  one  fear  which  you  mention,  but 
by  no  means  the  only  one. 

Cr.  Fear  not.  There  are  persons  who  at  no  great  cost  are 
willing  to  save  you  and  bring  you  out  of  prison ;  and  as  for 
the  informers,  you  may  observe  that  they  are  far  from  being 
exorbitant  in  their  demands ;  a  little  money  will  satisfy  them. 
My  means,  which,  as  I  am  sure,  are  ample,  are  at  your  ser- 
vice, and  if  you  have  a  scruple  about  spending  all  mine,  here 
are  strangers  v/ho  will  give  you  the  use  of  theirs ;  and  one  of 
them,  Simmias  the  Theban,  has  brought  a  sum  of  money  for 
this  very  purpose;  and  Cebes  and  many  others  are  willing 
to  spend  their  money  too.  I  say,  therefore,  do  not  on  that 
account  hesitate  about  making  your  escape,  and  do  not  say, 
as  you  did  in  the  court,  that  you  will  have  a  difficulty  in 
knowing  what  to  do  with  yourself  if  you  escape.  For  men 
will  love  you  in  other  places  to  which  you  may  go,  and  not 
in  Athens  only;  there  are  friends  of  mine  in  Thessaly,  if 
you  like  to  go  to  them,  who  will  value  and  protect  you,  and 
no  Thessalian  will  give  you  any  trouble.  Nor  can  I  think  that 
jrou  are  justified,  Socrates,  in  betraying  your  own  life  when 

2  HC— Vol.  2 


34  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

you  might  be  saved;  this  is  playing  into  the  hands  of  your 
enemies  and  destroyers ;  and  moreover  I  should  say  that  you 
were  betraying  your  children;  for  you  might  bring  them 
up  and  educate  them;  instead  of  which  you  go  away  and 
leave  them,  and  they  will  have  to  take  their  chance;  and 
if  they  do  not  meet  with  the  usual  fate  of  orphans,  there  will 
be  small  thanks  to  you.  No  man  should  bring  children  into 
the  world  who  is  unwilling  to  persevere  to  the  end  in  their 
nurture  and  education.  But  you  are  choosing  the  easier 
part,  as  I  think,  not  the  better  and  manlier,  which  would 
rather  have  become  one  who  professes  virtue  in  all  his 
actions,  like  yourself.  And,  indeed,  I  am  ashamed  not  only 
of  you,  but  of  us  who  are  your  friends,  when  I  reflect  that 
this  entire  business  of  yours  will  be  attributed  to  our  want 
of  courage.  The  trial  need  never  have  come  on,  or  might 
have  been  brought  to  another  issue ;  and  the  end  of  all,  which 
Is  the  crowning  absurdity,  will  seem  to  have  been  permitted 
by  us,  through  cowardice  and  baseness,  who  might  have 
saved  you,  as  you  might  have  saved  yourself,  if  we  had  been 
good  for  anything  (for  there  was  no  difficulty  in  escaping)  ; 
and  we  did  not  see  how  disgraceful,  Socrates,  and  also  mis- 
erable all  this  will  be  to  us  as  well  as  to  you.  Make  your 
mind  up  then,  or  rather  have  your  mind  already  made  up, 
for  the  time  of  deliberation  is  over,  and  there  is  only  one 
thing  to  be  done,  which  must  be  done,  if  at  all,  this  very 
night,  and  which  any  delay  will  render  all  but  imipossible; 
I  beseech  you  therefore,  Socrates,  to  be  persuaded  by  me, 
and  to  do  as  I  say. 

Soc.  Dear  Crito,  your  zeal  is  invaluable,  if  a  right  one; 
but  if  wrong,  the  greater  the  zeal  the  greater  the  evil ;  and 
therefore  we  ought  to  consider  whether  these  things  shall 
be  done  or  not.  For  I  am  and  always  have  been  one  of  those 
natures  who  must  be  guided  by  reason,  whatever  the  reason 
may  be  which  upon  reflection  appears  to  me  to  be  the  best; 
and  now  that  this  fortune  has  come  upon  me,  I  cannot  put 
away  the  reasons  which  I  have  before  given:  the  principles 
which  I  have  hitherto  honored  and  revered  I  still  honor,  and 
unless  we  can  find  other  and  better  principles  on  the  instant, 
I  am  certain  not  to  agree  with  you ;  no,  not  even  if  the  power 
of  the  multitude  could  inflict  rnanjr  more  imprisonments. 


CRITO  35 

confiscations,  deaths,  frightening  us  like  children  with  hob- 
goblin terrors.  But  what  will  be  the  fairest  way  of  con- 
sidering the  question?  Shall  I  return  to  your  old  argument 
about  the  opinions  of  men,  some  of  which  are  to  be  re- 
garded, and  others,  as  we  were  saying,  are  not  to  be 
regarded  ?  Now  were  we  right  in  maintaining  this  before  I 
was  condemned?  And  has  the  argument  which  was  once 
good  now  proved  to  be  talk  for  the  sake  of  talking;  in  fact 
an  amusement  only,  and  altogether  vanity?  That  is  wnat 
I  want  to  consider  with  your  help,  Crito :  whether,  under  my 
present  circumstances,  the  argument  appears  to  be  in  any 
way  different  or  not;  and  is  to  be  allov/ed  by  me  or  disal- 
lowed. That  argument,  which,  as  I  believe,  is  maintained 
by  many  who  assume  to  be  authorities,  was  to  the  effect,  as 
I  was  saying,  that  the  opinions  of  some  men  are  to  be  re- 
garded, and  of  other  men  not  to  be  regarded.  Now^  you, 
Crito,  are  a  disinterested  person  who  are  not  going  to  die 
to-morrow — at  least,  there  is  no  human  probability  of  this, 
and  you  are  therefore  not  liable  to  be  deceived  by  the 
circumstances  in  which  you  are  placed.  Tell  me,  then, 
whether  I  am  right  in  saying  that  some  opinions,  and  the 
opinions  of  some  men  only,  are  to  be  valued,  and  other 
opinions,  and  the  opinions  of  other  men,  are  not  to  be 
valued.  I  ask  you  whether  I  was  right  in  maintaining 
this? 

Cr.  Certainly. 

Soc.  The  good  are  to  be  regarded,  and  not  the  bad? 

Cr.  Yes. 

Sgc.  And  the  opinions  of  the  wise  are  good,  and  the  opin- 
ions of  the  unwise  are  evil  ? 

Cr.  Certainly. 

Soc.  And  what  was  said  about  another  matter?  Was 
the  disciple  in  gymnastics  supposed  to  attend  to  the  praise 
and  blame  and  opinion  of  every  man,  or  of  one  man  only — 
his  physician  or  trainer,  whoever  that  was? 

Cr.  Of  one  man  only. 

Soc.  And  he  ought  to  fear  the  censure  and  welcome  the 
praise  of  that  one  only,  and  not  of  the  many? 

Cr.  That  is  clear. 

Soc,  And  he  ought  to  live  and  train,  and  eat  and  drink 


36  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

in  the  way  which  seems  good  to  his  single  master  who  has 
understanding,  rather  than  according  to  the  opinion  of  all 
other  men  put  together? 

Cr.  True. 

Soc.  And  if  he  disobeys  and  disregards  the  opinion  and 
approval  of  the  one,  and  regards  the  opinion  of  the  manjr 
who  have  no  understanding,  will  he  not  suffer  evil? 

Cr.  Certainly  he  will. 

Soc.  And  what  will  the  evil  be,  whither  tending  and  what 
affecting,  in  the  disobedient  person? 

Cr.  Clearly,  affecting  the  body;  that  is  what  is  destroyed 
by  the  evil. 

Soc.  Very  good;  and  is  not  this  true,  Crito,  of  other 
things  which  we  need  not  separately  enumerate?  In  the 
matter  of  just  and  unjust,  fair  and  foul,  good  and  evil,  which 
are  the  subjects  of  our  present  consultation,  ought  we  to 
follow  the  opinion  of  the  many  and  to  fear  them;  or  the 
opinion  of  the  one  man  who  has  understanding,  and  whom 
we  ought  to  fear  and  reverence  more  than  all  the  rest  of  the 
world:  and  whom  deserting  we  shall  destroy  and  injure  that 
principle  in  us  which  may  be  assumed  to  be  improved  by 
justice  and  deteriorated  by  injustice;  is  there  not  such  a 
principle  ? 

Cr.  Certainly  there  is,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Take  a  parallel  instance;  if,  acting  under  the  advice 
of  m.en  who  have  no  understanding,  we  destroy  that  which 
is  improvable  by  health  and  deteriorated  by  disease — when 
that  has  been  destroyed,  I  say,  would  life  be  worth  having? 
And  that  is — the  body? 

Cr.  Yes. 

Soc.  Could  we  live,  having  an  evil  and  corrupted  body  ? 

Cr.  Certainly  not. 

Soc.  And  will  life  be  worth  having,  if  that  higher  part  of 
man  be  depraved,  which  is  improved  by  justice  and  deterio- 
rated by  injustice?  Do  we  suppose  that  principle,  whatever 
it  may  be  in  man,  which  has  to  do  with  justice  and  injustice, 
to  be  inferior  to  the  body? 

Cr.  Certainly  not. 

Soc.  More  honored,  then? 

Cr.  Far  more  honored. 


CRITO  37 

Soc,  Then,  my  friend,  we  must  not  regard  what  the  many 
say  of  us :  but  what  he,  the  one  man  who  has  understanding 
of  just  and  unjust,  will  say,  and  what  the  truth  will  say.  And 
therefore  you  begin  in  error  when  you  suggest  that  we 
should  regard  the  opinion  of  the  many  about  just  and  unjust, 
good  and  evil,  honorable  and  dishonorable.  Well,  someone 
will  say,  "  But  the  many  can  kill  us." 

Cr.  Yes,  Socrates;  that  will  clearly  be  the  answer. 

Soc.  That  is  true;  but  still  I  find  with  surprise  that  the 
old  argument  is,  as  I  conceive,  unshaken  as  ever.  And  I 
should  like  to  know  whether  I  may  say  the  same  of  another 
proposition — that  not  life,  but  a  good  life,  is  to  be  chiefly 
valued  ? 

Cr.  Yes,  that  also  remains. 

Soc.  And  a  good  life  is  equivalent  to  a  just  and  honorable 
one — that  holds  also? 

Cr.  Yes,  that  holds. 

Soc.  From  these  premises  I  proceed  to  argue  the  question 
^whether  I  ought  or  ought  not  to  try  to  escape  without  the 
consent  of  the  Athenians :  and  if  I  am  clearly  right  in  escap- 
ing, then  I  will  m.ake  the  attempt;  but  if  not,  I  will  abstain. 
The  other  considerations  which  you  mention,  of  money  and 
loss  of  character,  and  the  duty  of  educating  children,  are  as 
I  hear,  only  the  doctrines  of  the  multitude,  who  would  be  as 
ready  to  call  people  to  life,  if  they  were  able,  as  they  are  to 
put  them  to  death — and  with  as  little  reason.  But  now,  since 
the  argument  has  thus  far  prevailed,  the  only  question  which 
remains  to  be  considered  is,  whether  we  shall  do  rightly 
either  in  escaping  or  in  suffering  others  to  aid  in  our  escape 
and  paying  them  in  money  and  thanks,  or  whether  we  shall 
not  do  rightly;  and  if  the  latter,  then  death  or  any  other 
calamity  which  may  ensue  on  my  remaining  here  must  not 
be  allowed  to  enter  into  the  calculation. 

Cr.  I  think  that  you  are  right,  Socrates;  how  then  shall 
"we  proceed? 

Soc.  Let  us  consider  the  matter  together,  and  do  you 
either  refute  me  if  you  can,  and  I  will  be  convinced ;  or  else 
cease,  my  dear  friend,  from  repeating  to  me  that  I  ought 
to  escape  against  the  wishes  of  the  Athenians:  for  I  am 
extremely  desirous  to  be  persuaded  by  you,  but  not  against 


38  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

my   own  better   judgment.     And   now   please  to  consider 
my  first  position,  and  do  your  best  to  answer  me. 

Cr.  I  will  do  my  best. 

Soc.  Are  we  to  say  that  we  are  never  intentionally  to  do 
wrong,  or  that  in  one  way  we  ought  and  in  another  way  we 
ought  not  to  do  wrong,  or  is  doing  wrong  always  evil  and 
dishonorable,  as  I  was  just  now  saying,  and  as  has  been 
already  acknowledged  by  us  ?  Are  all  our  former  admissions 
which  were  made  within  a  few  days  to  be  thrown  away? 
And  have  we,  at  our  age,  been  earnestly  discoursing  with 
one  another  all  our  life  long  only  to  discover  that  we  are 
no  better  than  children?  Or  are  we  to  rest  assured,  in  spite 
of  the  opinion  of  the  many,  and  in  spite  of  consequences 
whether  better  or  worse,  of  the  truth  of  what  was  then  said, 
that  injustice  is  always  an  evil  and  dishonor  to  him  who  acts 
unjustly?    Shall  we  affirm  that? 

Cr.  Yes. 

Soc.  Then  we  must  do  no  wrong? 

Cr.  Certainly  not. 
'    Soc.  Nor   when   injured   injure   in   return,  as  the  many 
imagine ;  for  we  must  injure  no  one  at  all  ? 

Cr.  Clearly  not. 

Soc.  Again,  Crito,  may  we  do  evil? 

Cr.  Surely  not,  Socrates. 

Soc.  And  what  of  doing  evil  in  return  for  evil,  which  is 
the  morality  of  the  many — is  that  just  or  not? 

Cr.  Not  just. 

Soc.  For  doing  evil  to  another  is  the  same  as  injuring 
him  ? 

Cr.  Very  true. 

Soc.  Then  we  ought  not  to  retaliate  or  render  evil  for 
evil  to  anyone,  whatever  evil  w^e  may  have  suffered  from 
him.  But  I  would  have  you  consider,  Crito,  whether  you 
really  mean  what  you  are  saying.  For  this  opinion  has  never 
been  held,  and  never  will  be  held,  by  any  considerable  num- 
ber of  persons;  and  those  who  are  agreed  and  those  who 
are  not  agreed  upon  this  point  have  no  common  ground, 
and  can  only  despise  one  another,  when  they  see  how  widely 
they  differ.  Tell  me,  then,  whether  you  agree  with  and 
assent  to  my  first  principle,  that  neither  injury  nor  retalia- 


CRITO  39 

tion  nor  v/arding  off  evil  by  evil  is  ever  right.  And  shall 
that  be  the  premise  of  our  argument  ?  Or  do  you  decline  and 
dissent  from  this?  For  this  has  been  of  old  and  is  still  my 
opinion ;  but,  if  you  are  of  another  opinion,  let  me  hear  what 
you  have  to  say.  If,  however,  you  remain  of  the  same  mind 
as  formerly,  I  will  proceed  to  the  next  step. 

Cr,  You  may  proceed,  for  I  have  not  changed  my  mind. 

Soc.  Then  I  will  proceed  to  the  next  step,  which  may  be 
put  in  the  form  of  a  question:  Ought  a  man  to  do  what  he 
admits  to  be  right,  or  ought  he  to  betray  the  right? 

Cr,  He  ought  to  do  what  he  thinks  right. 

Soc.  But  if  this  is  true,  what  is  the  application?  In  leav- 
ing the  prison  against  the  will  of  the  Athenians,  do  I  wrong 
any  ?  or  rather  do  I  not  wrong  those  whom  I  ought  least  to 
wrong?  Do  I  not  desert  the  principles  v/hich  were  acknowl- 
edged by  us  to  be  just?    What  do  you  say? 

Cr.  I  cannot  tell,  Socrates,  for  I  do  not  know. 

Soc.  Then  consider  the  matter  in  this  way:  Imagine  that 
I  am  about  to  play  truant  (you  may  call  the  proceeding  by 
any  name  which  you  like),  and  the  laws  and  the  government 
come  and  interrogate  me:  "Tell  us,  Socrates,"  they  say; 
"  what  are  you  about  ?  are  you  going  by  an  act  of  yours  to 
overturn  us — the  laws  and  the  whole  State,  as  far  as  in  3^ou 
lies?  Do  you  imagine  that  a  State  can  subsist  and  not  be 
overthrown,  in  which  the  decisions  of  law  have  no  power, 
but  are  set  aside  and  overthrown  by  individuals?"  What 
will  be  our  answer,  Crito,  to  these  and  the  like  words? 
Anyone,  and  especially  a  clever  rhetorician,  will  have  a  good 
deal  to  urge  about  the  evil  of  setting  aside  the  law  which 
requires  a  sentence  to  be  carried  out;  and  we  might  reply, 
"Yes;  but  the  State  has  injured  us  and  given  an  unjust 
sentence."    Suppose  I  say  that? 

Cr.  Very  good,  Socrates. 

Soc.  "And  was  that  our  agreement  v/ith  you?"  the  law 
would  say;  "or  were  you  to  abide  by  the  sentence  of  the 
State?"  And  if  I  were  to  express  astonishment  at  their 
saying  this,  the  law  would  probably  add :  "  Ansv^er,  Socrates, 
instead  of  opening  your  eyes :  you  are  in  the  habit  of  asking 
and  answering  questions.  Tell  us  what  complaint  you  have 
tio  make  against  us  which  justifies  you  in  attempting  to  de- 


40  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

s-troy  tas  and  the  State  ?  In  the  first  place  did  we  no?  bring 
you  into  existence?  Your  father  married  your  mother  by 
our  aid  and  begat  you.  Say  whether  you  have  any  objection 
to  urge  against  those  of  us  who  regulate  marriage  ?  "  None, 
I  should  reply.  "  Or  against  those  of  us  who  regulate  the 
system  of  nurture  and  education  of  children  in  which  you 
were  trained?  Were  not  the  laws,  v/ho  have  the  charge  of 
this,  right  in  commanding  your  father  to  train  you  in  music 
and  gymnastic  ?  "  Right,  I  should  reply.  ''  Well,  then,  since 
you  were  brought  into  the  world  and  nurtured  and  educated 
by  us,  can  you  deny  in  the  first  place  that  you  are  our  child 
and  slave,  as  your  fathers  were  before  you?  And  if  this  is 
true  you  are  not  on  equal  terms  with  us;  nor  can  you  think 
that  you  have  a  right  to  do  to  us  what  we  are  doing  to  you. 
Would  you  have  any  right  to  strike  or  revile  or  do  any  other 
evil  to  a  father  or  to  your  master,  if  you  had  one,  when  you 
have  been  struck  or  reviled  by  him,  or  received  some  other 
evil  at  his  hands? — you  would  not  say  this?  And  because 
we  think  right  to  destroy  you,  do  you  think  that  you  have 
any  right  to  destroy  us  in  return,  and  your  country  as  far 
as  in  you  lies  ?  And  will  you,  O  professor  of  true  virtue,  say 
that  you  are  justified  in  this?  Has  a  philosopher  like  you 
failed  to  discover  that  our  country  is  more  to  be  valued  and 
higher  and  holier  far  than  mother  or  father  or  any  ancestor, 
and  more  to  be  regarded  in  the  eyes  of  the  gods  and  of  men 
of  understanding?  also  to  be  soothed,  and  gently  and  rev- 
erently entreated  when  angry,  even  more  than  a  father,  and 
if  not  persuaded,  obeyed?  And  when  we  are  punished  by 
her,  whether  with  imprisonment  or  stripes,  the  punishment 
is  to  be  endured  in  silence;  and  if  she  leads  us  to  wounds 
or  death  in  battle,  thither  we  follow  as  is  right;  neither  may 
anyone  yield  or  retreat  or  leave  his  rank,  but  whether  in 
battle  or  in  a  court  of  law,  or  In  any  other  place,  he  must 
do  what  his  city  and  his  country  order  him;  or  he  must 
change  their  view  of  what  is  just:  and  if  he  may  do  no  vio- 
lence to  his  father  or  mother,  much  less  may  he  do  violence 
to  his  country."  What  answer  shall  we  make  to  this,  Crito  ? 
Do  the  lav>^s  speak  truly,  or  do  they  not  ? 

Cr.  I  think  that  they  do. 

Soc.  Then  the  laws  will  say :  "  Consider,  Socrates,  if  this 


CRITO  41 

is  true,  that  in  your  present  attempt  you  are  going  to  do  us 
wrong.  For,  after  having  brought  you  into  the  world,  and 
nurtured  and  educated  you,  and  given  you  and  every  other 
citizen  a  share  in  every  good  that  we  had  to  give,  we  further 
proclaim  and  give  the  right  to  every  Athenian,  that  if  he 
does  not  like  us  when  he  has  come  of  age  and  has  seen  the 
ways  of  the  city,  and  made  our  acquaintance,  he  may  go 
where  he  pleases  and  take  his  goods  with  him;  and  none  of 
us  laws  will  forbid  him  or  interfere  with  him.  Any  of  you 
who  does  not  like  us  and  the  city,  and  who  wants  to  go  to 
a  colony  or  to  any  other  city,  may  go  where  he  likes,  and 
take  his  goods  with  him.  But  he  who  has  experience  of  the 
manner  in  which  we  order  justice  and  administer  the  State, 
and  still  remains,  has  entered  into  an  implied  contract  that 
he  will  do  as  we  command  him.  And  he  who  disobeys  us 
is,  as  we  maintain,  thrice  wrong:  first,  because  in  disobeying 
us  he  is  disobeying  his  parents;  secondly,  because  we  are 
the  authors  of  his  education;  thirdly,  because  he  has  made 
an  agreement  with  us  that  he  will  duly  obey  our  commands ; 
and  he  neither  obeys  them  nor  convinces  us  that  our  com- 
mands are  v/rong;  and  we  do  not  rudely  impose  them,  but 
give  him  the  alternative  of  obeying  or  convincing  us;  that 
is  what  we  offer,  and  he  does  neither.  These  are  the  sort 
of  accusations  to  which,  as  we  were  saying,  you,  Socrates, 
will  be  exposed  if  you  accomplish  your  intentions;  you, 
above  all  other  Athenians."  Suppose  I  ask,  why  is  this? 
they  will  justly  retort  upon  me  that  I  above  all  other  men 
have  acknowledged  the  agreement.  "  There  is  clear  proof," 
they  will  say,  "  Socrates,  that  we  and  the  city  were  not  dis- 
pleasing to  you.  Of  all  Athenians  you  have  been  the  most 
constant  resident  in  the  city,  which,  as  you  never  leave,  you 
may  be  supposed  to  love.  For  you  never  went  out  of  the 
city  either  to  see  the  games,  except  once  when  you  went  to 
the  Isthmus,  or  to  any  other  place  unless  when  you  were  on 
military  service;  nor  did  you  travel  as  other  men  do.  Nor 
had  you  any  curiosity  to  know  other  States  or  their  laws: 
your  affections  did  not  go  beyond  us  and  our  State ;  we  were 
your  especial  favorites,  and  you  acquiesced  in  our  govern- 
ment of  you;  and  this  is  the  State  in  which  you  begat  your 
children,  which  is  a  proof  of  your  satisfaction.    Moreover^ 


42  DIALOGUES    OF    PLATO 

you  might,  if  you  had  liked,  have  fixed  the  penalty  at  ban- 
ishment in  the  course  of  the  trial — the  State  which  refuses 
to  let  you  go  now  would  have  let  you  go  then.  But  you 
pretended  that  you  preferred  death  to  exile,  and  that  you 
were  not  grieved  at  death.  And  now  you  have  forgotten 
these  fine  sentiments,  and  pay  no  respect  to  us,  the  laws, 
of  whom  you  are  the  destroyer;  and  are  doing  what  only  a 
miserable  slave  would  do,  running  away  and  turning  your 
back  upon  the  compacts  and  agreements  which  you  made 
as  a  citizen.  And  first  of  all  answer  this  very  question :  Are 
we  right  in  saying  that  you  agreed  to  be  governed  according 
to  us  in  deed,  and  not  in  word  only  ?  Is  that  true  or  not  ?  " 
How  shall  we  answer  that,  Crito  ?    Must  we  not  agree  ? 

Cr.  There  is  no  help,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Then  will  they  not  say:  "You,  Socrates,  are  break- 
ing the  covenants  and  agreements  which  you  made  with  us 
at  your  leisure,  not  in  any  haste  or  under  any  compulsion  or 
deception,  but  having  had  seventy  years  to  think  of  them, 
during  which  time  you  were  at  liberty  to  leave  the  city,  if  we 
were  not  to  your  mind,  or  if  our  covenants  appeared  to  you 
to  be  unfair.  You  had  your  choice,  and  might  have  gone 
either  to  Lacedasmon  or  Crete,  which  you  often  praise  for 
their  good  government,  or  to  some  other  Hellenic  or  foreign 
State.  Whereas  you,  above  all  other  Athenians,  seemed  to 
be  so  fond  of  the  State,  or,  in  other  words,  of  us  her  laws 
(for  who  would  like  a  State  that  has  no  laws?),  that  you 
never  stirred  out  of  her:  the  halt,  the  blind,  the  maimed, 
were  not  more  stationary  in  her  than  you  were.  And  now 
you  run  away  and  forsake  your  agreements.  Not  so,  Soc- 
rates, if  you  will  take  our  advice;  do  not  make  yourself 
ridiculous  by  escaping  out  of  the  city. 

"For  just  consider,  if  you  transgress  and  err  in  this  sort 
of  way,  what  good  will  you  do,  either  to  yourself  or  to  your 
friends?  That  your  friends  will  be  driven  into  exile  and 
deprived  of  citizenship,  or  will  lose  their  property,  is  toler- 
ably certain;  and  you  yourself,  if  you  fly  to  one  of  the  neigh- 
boring cities,  as,  for  example,  Thebes  or  Megara,  both  of 
which  are  well-governed  cities,  will  come  to  them  as  an 
enemy,  Socrates,  and  their  government  will  be  against  you, 
and  all  patriotic  citizens  will  cast  an  evil  eye  upon  you  as 


CRITO  43 

a  subverter  of  the  laws,  and  you  will  confirm  in  the  minds 
of  the  judges  the  justice  of  their  own  condem.nation  of  you. 
For  he  who  is  a  corrupter  of  the  laws  is  more  than  likely  to 
be  corrupter  of  the  young  and  foolish  portion  of  mankind. 
Will  you  then  flee  from  well-ordered  cities  and  virtuous 
men?  and  is  existence  worth  having  on  these  terms?  Or 
will  you  go  to  them  without  shame,  and  talk  to  them,  Soc- 
rates ?  And  what  will  you  say  to  them  ?  What  you  say  here 
about  virtue  and  justice  and  institutions  and  laws  being  the 
best  things  among  men?  Would  that  be  decent  of  you? 
Surely  not.  But  if  you  go  away  from  well-governed  States 
to  Crito's  friends  in  Thessaly,  where  there  is  great  disorder 
and  license,  they  will  be  charmed  to  have  the  tale  of  your 
escape  from  prison,  set  off  with  ludicrous  particulars  of 
the  manner  in  which  you  were  wrapped  in  a  goatskin  or 
some  other  disguise,  and  metamorphosed  as  the  fashion  of 
runaways  is — that  is  very  likely;  but  will  there  be  no  one 
to  remind  you  that  in  your  old  age  you  violated  the  most 
sacred  laws  from  a  miserable  desire  of  a  little  m-ore  life? 
Perhaps  not,  if  you  keep  them  in  a  good  temper ;  but  if  they 
are  out  of  temper  you  will  hear  many  degrading  things; 
you  will  live,  but  hov/  ? — as  the  flatterer  of  all  men,  and  the 
servant  of  all  men ;  and  doing  what  ? — eating  and  drinking 
in  Thessaly,  having  gone  abroad  in  order  that  you  may 
get  a  dinner.  And  where  will  be  your  fine  sentiments  about 
justice  and  virtue  then?  Say  that  3^ou  wish  to  live  for  the 
sake  of  your  children,  that  you  may  bring  them  up  and  edu- 
cate them — will  you  take  them  into  Thessaly  and  deprive 
them  of  Athenian  citizenship  ?  Is  that  the  benefit  which  you 
would  confer  upon  them.?  Or  are  you  under  the  impression 
that  they  will  be  better  cared  for  and  educated  here  if  you 
are  still  alive,  although  absent  from  them;  for  that  your 
friends  will  take  care  of  them  ?  Do  you  fancy  that  if  you  are 
an  inhabitant  of  Thessaly  they  will  take  care  of  them,  and  if 
you  are  an  inhabitant  of  the  other  world  they  will  not  take 
xare  of  them  ?  Nay ;  but  if  they  who  call  themselves  friends 
are  trtily  friends,  they  surely  will. 

"  Listen,  then,  Socrates,  to  us  v^^ho  have  brought  you  up. 
Think  not  of  life  and  children  first,  and  of  justice  afterwards, 
but  of  justice  first,  that  you  may  be  justified  before  the 


44  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

princes  of  the  world  below.  For  neither  will  you  nor  any 
that  belong  to  you  be  happier  or  holier  or  juster  in  this  life, 
or  happier  in  another,  if  you  do  as  Crito  bids.  Now  you 
depart  in  innocence,  a  sufferer  and  not  a  doer  of  evil; 
a  victim,  not  of  the  laws,  but  of  men.  But  if  you  go  forth, 
returning  evil  for  evil,  and  injury  for  injury,  breaking  the 
covenants  and  agreements  which  you  have  made  with  us, 
and  wronging  those  whom  you  ought  least  to  wrong,  that 
is  to  say,  yourself,  your  friends,  your  country,  and  us,  we 
shall  be  angry  with  you  while  you  live,  and  our  brethren, 
the  laws  in  the  world  below,  will  receive  you  as  an  enemy; 
for  they  will  know  that  you  have  done  your  best  to  destroy? 
us.    Listen,  then,  to  us  and  not  to  Crito." 

This  is  the  voice  which  I  seem  to  hear  murmuring  in  my 
ears,  like  the  sound  of  the  flute  in  the  ears  of  the  mystic; 
that  voice,  I  say,  is  humming  in  my  ears,  and  prevents  me 
from  hearing  any  other.  And  I  know  that  anything  more 
which  you  will  say  will  be  in  vain.  Yet  speak,  if  you  have 
anything  to  say. 

Cr.  I  have  nothing  to  say,  Socrates. 

Soc.  Then  let  me  follow  the  intimations  of  the  will  of 
God 


PH^DO 

PERSONS  OF  THE  DIALOGUE 
"Pbjedo,  who  is  the  narrator  of  Apollodorus 

the   dialogue   to    Echecrates  Simmias 

of  Phlius  Cebes 

Socrates  Crito 

Attendant  of  the  Prison 
Scene:   The  Prison  of  Socrates 
Place  of  the  Narration:  Phlius 

Echecrates 

WERE  you  yourself,  Phaedo,  in  the  prison  with  Soc- 
rates on  the  day  when  he  drank  the  poison  ? 
Pkcedo.  Yes,  Echecrates,  I  was. 

Ech.  I  wish  that  you  would  tell  me  about  his  death.  What 
did  he  say  in  his  last  hours?  We  were  informed  that  he 
died  by  taking  poison,  but  no  one  knew  anything  more ;  for  no 
Phliasian  ever  goes  to  Athens  now,  and  a  long  time  has 
elapsed  since  any  Athenian  found  his  way  to  Phlius,  and 
therefore  we  had  no  clear  account. 

Phced.  Did  you  not  hear  of  the  proceedings  at  the  trial? 

Ech.  Yes ;  some  one  told  us  about  the  trial,  and  we  could 
not  understand  why,  having  been  condemned,  he  was  put  to 
death,  as  appeared,  not  at  the  time,  but  long  afterwards. 
What  was  the  reason  of  this  ? 

PhcBd.  An  accident,  Echecrates.  The  reason  was  that  the 
stern  of  the  ship  which  the  Athenians  send  to  Delos  happened 
to  have  been  crowned  on  the  day  before  he  was  tried. 

Ech.  What  is  this  ship? 

Phcsd.  This  is  the  ship  in  which,  as  the  Athenians  say, 
Theseus  went  to  Crete  when  he  took  with  him  the  fourteen 
youths,  and  was  the  saviour  of  them  and  of  himself.  And 
they  were  said  to  have  vowed  to  Apollo  at  the  time,  that  if 
they  were  saved  they  would  make  an  annual  pilgrimage  tQ 

45 


46  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

0elos.  Now  this  custom  still  continues,  and  the' whole  period 
of  the  voyage  to  and  from  Delos,  beginning  when  the  priest 
of  Apollo  crowns  the  stern  of  the  ship,  is  a  holy  season,  dur- 
ing which  the  city  is  not  allowed  to  be  polluted  by  public 
executions ;  and  often,  when  the  vessel  is  detained  by  adverse 
winds,  there  may  be  a  very  considerable  delay.  As  I  was  say- 
ing, the  ship  was  crowned  on  the  day  before  the  trial,  and 
this  was  the  reason  why  Socrates  lay  in  prison  and  was  not 
put  to  death  until  long  after  he  was  condemned. 

Ech.  What  was  the  manner  of  his  death,  Ph^do?  What 
was  said  or  done?  And  which  of  his  friends  had  he  with 
him?  Or  were  they  not  allowed  by  the  authorities  to  be 
present?    And  did  he  die  alone? 

Phced.  No;  there  were  several  of  his  friends  with  him. 

Ech.  If  you  have  nothing  to  do,  I  wish  that  you  would  tell 
me  what  passed,  as  exactly  as  you  can. 

Phcud.  I  have  nothing  to  do,  and  will  try  to  gratify  your 
wish.  For  to  me,  too,  there  is  no  greater  pleasure  than  to 
have  Socrates  brought  to  my  recollection,  whether  I  speak 
myself  or  hear  another  speak  of  him.. 

Ech.  You  will  have  listeners  who  are  of  the  same 
mind  with  you,  and  I  hope  that  you  will  be  as  exact  as 
you  can. 

Phced.  I  remember  the  strange  feeling  which  came  over  me 
at  being  with  him.  For  I  could  hardly  believe  that  I  was 
present  at  the  death  of  a  friend,  and  therefore  I  did  not  pity 
him,  Echecrates;  his  mien  and  his  language  were  so  noble 
and  fearless  in  the  hour  of  death  that  to  me  he  appeared 
blessed.  I  thought  that  in  going  to  the  other  world  he  could 
not  be  without  a  divine  call,  and  that  he  would  be  happy,  if 
any  man  ever  was,  when  he  arrived  there,  and  therefore  I  did 
not  pity  him  as  might  seem  natural  at  such  a  time.  But 
neither  could  I  feel  the  pleasure  which  I  usually  felt  in  phil- 
osophical discourse  (for  philosophy  was  the  theme  of  which 
we  spoke).  I  was  pleased,  and  I  was  also  pained,  because  I 
knew  that  he  was  soon  to  die,  and  this  strange  mixture  of 
feeling  was  shared  by  us  all ;  we  were  laughing  and  weeping 
by  turns,  especially  the  excitable  ApoUodorus — you  know  the 
sort  of  man? 

Ech.  Yes. 


PH^DO  47 

PlicEd.  He  was  quite  overcome ;  and  I  myself,  and  all  of  us 
were  greatly  moved. 

Ech.  Who  were  present? 

Phcsd.  Of  native  Athenians  there  v/ere,  besides  Apollo- 
dorus,  Critobulus  and  his  father  Crito,Hermogenes,  Epigenes, 
^schines,  and  Antisthenes;  likewise  Ctesippus  of  the  deme 
of  Pseania,  Menexenus,  and  some  others;  but  Plato,  if  I  am 
not  mistaken,  was  ill. 

Ech.  Were  there  any  strangers? 

Phced.  Yes,  there  were;  Sim.mias  the  Theban,  and  Cebes, 
and  Phsedondes;  Euclid  and  Terpison,  w^ho  came  from  Meg- 
ara. 

Ech.  And  was  Aristippus  there,  and  Cleombrotus  ? 

Phced.  No,  they  were  said  to  be  in  ^gina. 

Ech.  Anyone  else? 

Phced.  I  think  that  these  were  about  all. 

Ech.  And  what  was  the  discourse  of  which  you  spoke? 

Phced.  I  will  begin  at  the  beginning,  and  endeavor  to  re- 
peat the  entire  conversation.  You  must  understand  that  we 
had  been  previously  in  the  habit  of  assembling  early  in  the 
morning  at  the  court  in  which  the  trial  was  held,  and  which 
is  not  far  from  the  prison.  There  we  remained  talking  with 
one  another  until  the  opening  of  the  prison  doors  (for  they 
were  not  opened  very  early),  and  then  vv^ent  in  and  generally 
passed  the  day  with  Socrates.  On  the  last  morning  the  meet- 
ing was  earlier  than  usual ;  this  was  owing  to  our  having  heard 
on  the  previous  evening  that  the  sacred  ship  had  arrived  from 
Delos,  and  therefore  we  agreed  to  meet  very  early  at  the  ac- 
customed place.  On  our  going  to  the  prison,  the  jailer  who 
answered  the  door,  instead  of  admitting  us,  came  out  and  bade 
us  wait  and  he  would  call  us.  "  For  the  Eleven,"  he  said, 
"  are  now  with  Socrates ;  they  are  taking  off  his  chains,  and 
giving  orders  that  he  is  to  die  to-day."  He  soon  returned 
and  said  that  we  might  come  in.  On  entering  we  found  Soc- 
rates just  released  from  chains,  and  Xanthippe,  whom  you 
know,  sitting  by  him,  and  holding  his  child  in  her  arms. 
When  she  saw  us  she  uttered  a  cry  and  said,  as  women 
will :  "  O  Socrates,  this  is  the  last  time  that  either  you  will 
converse  with  your  friends,  or  they  with  you."  Socrates 
turned  to  Crito  and  said :    "  Crito,  let  some  one  take  her 


48  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

home."  Some  of  Crito's  people  accordingly  led  her  away, 
crying  out  and  beating  herself.  And  when  she  was  gone, 
Socrates,  sitting  up  on  the  couch,  began  to  bend  and  rub  his 
leg,  saying,  as  he  rubbed :  "  How  singular  is  the  thing  called 
pleasure,  and  how  curiously  related  to  pain,  which  might  be 
thought  to  be  the  opposite  of  it;  for  they  never  come  to  a 
man  together,  and  yet  he  who  pursues  either  of  them  is  gen- 
erally compelled  to  take  the  other.  They  are  two,  and  yet 
they  grow  together  out  of  one  head  or  stem;  and  I  cannot 
help  thinking  that  if  ^sop  had  noticed  them,  he  would  have 
made  a  fable  about  God  trying  to  reconcile  their  strife,  and 
when  he  could  not^  he  fastened  their  heads  together ;  and  this 
is  the  reason  why  when  one  comes  the  other  follows,  as  I 
find  in  my  own  case  pleasure  comes  following  after  the  pain 
in  my  leg,  which  was  caused  by  the  chain." 

Upon  this  Cebes  said:  I  am  very  glad  indeed,  Socrates, 
that  you  mentioned  the  name  of  ^sop.  For  that  reminds  me 
of  a  question  which  has  been  asked  by  others,  and  was  asked 
of  me  only  the  day  before  yesterday  by  Evenus  the  poet,  and 
as  he  will  be  sure  to  ask  again,  you  may  as  well  tell  me  what 
I  should  say  to  him,  if  you  would  like  him  to  have  an  answer. 
He  wanted  to  know  why  you  who  never  before  wrote  a  line 
of  poetry,  now  that  you  are  in  prison  are  putting  ^sop  into 
verse,  and  also  composing  that  hymn  in  honor  of  Apollo. 

Tell  him,  Cebes,  he  replied,  that  I  had  no  idea  of  rivalling 
him  or  his  poems;  which  is  the  truth,  for  I  knew  that  I 
could  not  do  that.  But  I  wanted  to  see  whether  I  could 
purge  away  a  scruple  which  I  felt  about  certain  dreams.  In 
the  course  of  my  life  I  have  often  had  intimations  in  dreams 
"that  I  should  make  music."  The  same  dream  came  to  me 
sometimes  in  one  form,  and  sometimes  in  another,  but  always 
saying  the  same  or  nearly  the  same  words :  Make  and  cultivate 
music,  saia  the  dream.  And  hitherto  I  had  imagined  that 
this  was  only  intended  to  exhort  and  encourage  me  in  the 
study  of  philosophy,  which  has  always  been  the  pursuit  of  my 
life,  and  is  the  noblest  and  best  of  music.  The  dream  was  bid- 
ding me  to  do  what  I  was  already  doing,  In  the  same  way  that 
the  competitor  in  a  race  is  bidden  by  the  spectators  to  run 
when  he  is  already  running.  But  I  was  not  certain  of  this, 
as  the  dream  might  have  meant  music  in  the  popular  sense 


PH^DO  49 

of  the  word,  and  being  under  sentence  of  death,  and  the  festi- 
val giving  me  a  respite,  I  thought  that  I  should  be  safer  if  I 
satisfied  the  scruple,  and,  in  obedience  to  the  dream,  com- 
posed a  few  verses  before  I  departed.  And  first  I  made  a 
hymn  in  honor  of  the  god  of  the  festival,  and  then  consider- 
ing that  a  poet,  if  he  is  really  to  be  a  poet  or  maker,  should 
not  only  put  words  together  but  make  stories,  and  as  I  have 
no  invention,  I  took  some  fables  of  ^sop,  which  I  had  ready 
at  hand  and  knew,  and  turned  them  into  verse.  Tell  Evenus 
this,  and  bid  him  be  of  good  cheer;  say  that  I  would  have 
him  come  after  me  if  he  be  a  wise  man,  and  not  tarry;  and 
that  to-day  I  am  likely  to  be  going,  for  the  Athenians  say 
that  I  must. 

Simmias  said :  What  a  message  for  such  a  man !  having 
been  a  frequent  companion  of  his  I  should  say  that,  as  far 
as  I  know  him,  he  will  never  take  your  advice  unless  he  is 
obliged. 

Why,  said  Socrates.    Is  not  Evenus  a  philosopher? 

I  think  that  he  is,  said  Simmias. 

Then  he,  or  any  man  who  has  the  spirit  of  philosophy,  will 
be  willing  to  die,  though  he  will  not  take  his  own  life,  for 
that  is  held  not  to  be  right. 

Here  he  changed  his  position,  and  put  his  legs  off  the  couch 
on  to  the  ground,  and  during  the  rest  of  the  conversation  he 
remained  sitting. 

Why  do  you  say,  inquired  Cebes,  that  a  man  ought  not  to 
take  his  own  life,  but  that  the  philosopher  will  be  ready  to 
follow  the  dying? 

Socrates  replied:  And  have  you,  Cebes  and  Simmias,  who 
are  acquainted  with  Philolaus,  never  heard  him  speak  of 
this? 

I  never  understood  him,  Socrates. 

My  words,  too,  are  only  an  echo ;  but  I  am  very  willing  to 
say  what  I  have  heard:  and  indeed,  as  I  am  going  to  another 
place,  I  ought  to  be  thinking  and  talking  of  the  nature  of  the 
pilgrimage  which  I  am  about  to  make.  What  can  I  do  better 
in  the  interval  between  this  and  the  setting  of  the  sun  ? 

Then  tell  me,  Socrates,  why  is  suicide  held  not  to  be  right  ? 
as  I  have  certainly  heard  Philolaus  affirm  when  he  was  stay- 
ing with  us  at  Thebes:  and  there  are  others  who  say  the 


50  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

same,  although  none  of  them  has  ever  made  me  tinderstatid 
him. 

But  do  your  best,  replied  Socrates,  and  the  day  may  come 
when  you  will  understand.  I  suppose  that  you  wonder  why, 
as  most  things  which  are  evil  may  be  accidentally  good,  this 
is  to  be  the  only  exception  (for  may  not  death,  too,  be  better 
than  life  in  some  cases?),  and  why, when  a  man  is  better 
dead,  he  is  not  permitted  to  be  his  own  benefactor,  but  must 
wait  for  the  hand  of  another. 

By  Jupiter !  yes,  indeed,  said  Cebes,  laughing,  and  speak- 
ing in  his  native  Doric. 

I  admit  the  appearance  of  inconsistency,  replied  Socrates, 
but  there  may  not  be  any  real  inconsistency  after  all  in  this. 
There  is  a  doctrine  uttered  in  secret  that  man  is  a  prisoner 
who  has  no  right  to  open  the  door  of  his  prison  and  run  away ; 
this  is  a  great  mystery  which  I  do  not  quite  understand.  Yet 
I,  too,  believe  that  the  gods  are  our  guardians,  and  that  we 
are  a  possession  of  theirs.     Do  you  not  agree? 

Yes,  I  agree  to  that,  said  Cebes. 

And  if  one  of  your  ovv'n  possessions,  an  ox  or  an  ass,  for  ex- 
ample, took  the  liberty  of  putting  himself  out  of  the  way  when 
you  had  given  no  intim.ation  of  your  wish  that  he  should  die, 
would  you  not  be  angry  with  him,  and  would  you  not  punish 
him  if  you  could? 

Certainly,  replied  Cebes. 

Then  there  may  be  reason  in  saying  that  a  man  should  wait, 
and  not  take  his  own  life  until  God  summons  him,  as  he  is 
now  summoning  me. 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Cebes,  there  is  surely  reason  in  that. 
And  yet  how  can  you  reconcile  this  seemingly  true  belief 
that  God  is  our  guardian  and  we  his  possessions,  with  that 
willingness  to  die  which  we  were  attributing  to  the  philos- 
opher? That  the  wisest  of  men  should  be  willing  to  leave 
this  service  in  which  they  are  ruled  by  the  gods  who  are 
the  best  of  rulers  is  not  reasonable,  for  surely  no  wise  man 
thinks  that  when  set  at  liberty  he  can  take  better  care  of 
himself  than  the  gods  take  of  him.  A  fool  may  perhaps  think 
tfiis — ^he  may  argue  that  he  had  better  run  away  from  his 
master,  not  considering  that  his  duty  is  to  remain  to  the  end, 
and  not  to  run  away  from  the  good,  and  that  there  is  no  sense 


PHiEDO  Si 

in  his  rtinning  away.  But  the  wise  man  will  want  to  be  ever 
with  hira  who  is  better  than  himself.  Now  this,  Socrates,  is 
the  reverse  of  what  was  just  now  said;  for  upon  this  vitw 
the  wise  man  should  sorrow  and  the  fool  rejoice  at  passing 
out  of  life. 

The  earnestness  of  Cebes  seemed  to  please  Socrates.  Here, 
said  he,  turning  to  us,  is  a  man  who  is  always  inquiring,  and 
is  not  to  be  convinced  all  in  a  moment,  nor  by  every  argument. 

And  in  this  case,  added  Simmias,  his  objection  does  ap- 
pear to  me  to  have  some  force.  For  what  can  be  the  mean- 
ing of  a  truly  wise  man  wanting  to  fly  away  and  lightly 
leave  a  master  who  is  better  than  himself?  And  I  rather 
imagine  that  Cebes  is  referring  to  you;  he  thinks  that  you 
are  too  ready  to  leave  us,  and  too  ready  to  leave  the  gods 
who,  as  you  acknowledge,  are  our  good  rulers. 

Yes,  replied  Socrates;  there  is  reason  in  that.  And  this 
indictment  you  think  that  I  ought  to  answer  as  if  I  were 
in  court? 

That  is  what  we  should  like,  said  Simmias. 

Then  I  must  try  to  make  a  better  impression  upon  you  than 
I  did  when  defending  myself  before  the  judges.  For  I  am 
quite  ready  to  acknowledge,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  that  I  ought 
to  be  grieved  at  death,  if  I  were  not  persuaded  that  I  am  go- 
ing to  other  gods  who  are  wise  and  good  (of  this  I  am  as 
certain  as  I  can  be  of  anything  of  the  sort)  and  to  men  de- 
parted (though  I  am  not  so  certain  of  this),  who  are  better 
than  those  whom  I  leave  behind;  and  therefore  I  do  not 
grieve  as  I  might  have  done,  for  I  have  good  hope  that  there 
is  yet  something  remaining  for  the  dead,  and,  as  has  been 
said  of  old,  some  far  better  thing  for  the  good  than  for  the 
evil. 

But  do  you  mean  to  take  away  your  thoughts  with  you, 
Socrates?  said  Simmias.  Will  you  not  communicate  them  to 
us? — the  benefit  is  one  in  which  we  too  may  hope  to  share. 
Moreover,  if  you  succeed  in  convincing  us,  that  will  be  an 
answer  to  the  charge  against  yourself. 

I  will  do  m.y  best,  replied  Socrates.  But  you  must  first 
let  me  hear  v/hat  Crito  wants;  he  was  going  to  say  some- 
thing to  me. 

Only  this,  Socrates,  replied  Crito:  the  attendant  who  is  to 


52  DIALOGUES  OP  PLATO 

give  you  the  poison  has  been  telling  me  that  you  are  not  to 
talk  much,  and  he  wants  me  to  let  you  know  this;  for  that 
by  talking  heat  is  increased,  and  this  interferes  with  the 
action  of  the  poison;  those  who  excite  themselves  are  some- 
times obliged  to  drink  the  poison  two  or  three  times. 

Then,  said  Socrates,  let  him  mind  his  business  and  be 
prepared  to  give  the  poison  two  or  three  times,  if  necessary; 
that  is  all. 

I  was  almost  certain  that  you  would  say  that,  replied  Crito ; 
but  I  was  obliged  to  satisfy  him. 

Never  mind  him,  he  said. 

And  now  I  will  make  answer  to  you,  O  my  judges,  and 
show  that  he  who  has  lived  as  a  true  philosopher  has  reason 
to  be  of  good  cheer  when  he  is  about  to  die,  and  that  after 
death  he  may  hope  to  receive  the  greatest  good  in  the  other 
world.  And  how  this  may  be,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  I  will 
endeavor  to  explain.  For  I  deem  that  the  true  disciple  of 
philosophy  is  likely  to  be  misunderstood  by  other  men;  they 
do  not  perceive  that  he  is  ever  pursuing  death  and  dying; 
and  if  this  is  true,  why,  having  had  the  desire  of  death  all 
his  life  long,  should  he  repine  at  the  arrival  of  that  which 
he  has  been  always  pursuing  and  desiring? 

Simmias  laughed  and  said :  Though  not  in  a  laughing  humor 
I  swear  that  I  cannot  help  laughing  when  I  think  what  the 
wicked  world  will  say  when  they  hear  this.  They  will  say 
that  this  is  very  true,  and  our  people  at  home  will  agree  with 
them  in  saying  that  the  life  which  philosophers  desire  is 
truly  death,  and  that  they  have  found  them  out  to  be  deserv- 
ing of  the  death  which  they  desire. 

And  they  are  right,  Simmias,  in  saying  this,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  words  "  They  have  found  them  out " ;  for  they 
have  not  found  out  what  is  the  nature  of  this  death  which  the 
true  philosopher  desires,  or  how  he  deserves  or  desires  death. 
But  let  us  leave  them  and  have  a  word  with  ourselves :  Do  we 
believe  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  death? 

To  be  sure,  replied  Simmias. 

And  is  this  anything  but  the  separation  of  soul  and  body? 
And  being  dead  is  the  attainment  of  this  separation  whgn 
the  soul  exists  in  herself,  and  is  parted  from  the  body  and  the 
h<^4y  is  parted  from  the  soul — that  is  death? 


PHiEDO  53 

Exactly:  that  and  nothing  else,  he  replied. 

And  what  do  you  say  of  another  question,  my  friend, 
about  which  I  should  like  to  have  your  opinion,  and  the  an- 
swer to  which  will  probably  throw  light  on  our  present 
inquiry:  Do  you  think  that  the  philosopher  ought  to  care 
about  the  pleasures — if  they  are  to  be  called  pleasures — of 
eating  and  drinking? 

Certainly  not,  answered  Simmias. 

And  what  do  you  say  of  the  pleasures  of  love — should  h@ 
care  about  them? 

By  no  means. 

And  will  he  think  much  of  the  other  ways  of  indulging  the 
body — for  example,  the  acquisition  of  costly  raiment,  or  san- 
dals, or  other  adornments  of  the  body?  Instead  of  caring 
about  them,  does  he  not  rather  despise  anything  more  than 
nature  needs?    What  do  you  say? 

I  should  say  the  true  philosopher  would  despise  them. 

Would  you  not  say  that  he  is  entirely  concerned  with  the 
soul  and  not  with  the  body?  He  v/ould  like,  as  far  as  he 
can,  to  be  quit  of  the  body  and  turn  to  the  soul. 

That  is  true. 

In  matters  of  this  sort  philosophers,  above  all  other  men, 
may  be  observed  in  every  sort  of  way  to  dissever  the  soul 
from  the  body. 

That  is  true. 

Whereas,  Simmias,  the  rest  of  the  world  are  of  opinion 
that  a  life  which  has  no  bodily  pleasures  and  no  part  in 
them  is  not  worth  having;  but  that  he  who  thinks  nothing 
of  bodily  pleasures  is  almost  as  though  he  were  dead. 

That  is  quite  true. 

What  again  shall  we  say  of  the  actual  requirement  of 
knowledge? — is  the  body,  if  invited  to  share  in  the  inquiry, 
a  hinderer  or  a  helper  ?  I  mean  to  say,  have  sight  and  hear- 
ing any  truth  in  them?  Are  they  not,  as  the  poets  are 
always  telling  us,  inaccurate  witnesses  ?  and  yet,  if  even  they 
are  inaccurate  and  indistinct,  what  is  to  be  said  of  the 
other  senses? — for  you  will  allow  that  they  are  the  best  of 
them? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

Then  when  does  the  soul  attain  truth?— for  in  attempting 


54  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

to  consider  anything  in  company  with  the  body  she  is  ob- 
viously deceived. 

Yes,  that  is  true. 

Then  must  not  existence  be  revealed  to  her  in  thought,  if 
at  all? 

Yes. 

And  thought  is  best  when  the  mind  is  gathered  into  herself 
and  none  of  these  things  trouble  her — neither  sounds  nor 
sights  nor  pain  nor  any  pleasure — when  she  has  as  little  as 
possible  to  do  v/ith  the  body,  and  has  no  bodily  sense  or 
feeling,  but  is  aspiring  after  being? 

That  is  true. 

And  in  this  the  philosopher  dishonors  the  body;  his  soul 
runs  away  from  the  body  and  desires  to  be  alone  and  by 
herself  ? 

That  is  true. 

Well,  but  there  is  another  thing,  Simmias:  Is  there  or  is 
there  not  an  absolute  justice? 

Assuredly  there  is. 

And  an  absolute  beauty  and  absolute  good  ? 

Of  course. 

But  did  you  ever  behold  any  of  them  with  your  eyes  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  did  you  ever  reach  them  with  any  other  bodily  sense? 
(and  I  speak  not  of  these  alone,  but  of  absolute  greatness, 
and  health  and  strength,  and  of  the  essence  or  true  nature 
of  everything).  Has  the  reality  of, them  ever  been  perceived 
by  you  through  the  bodily  organs?  or  rather,  is  not  the 
nearest  approach  to  the  knowledge  of  their  several  natures 
made  hy  him  who  so  orders  his  intellectual  vision  as  to  have 
the  most  exact  conception  of  the  essence  of  that  which  he 
considers  ? 

Certainly. 

And  he  attains  to  the  knowledge  of  them  in  their  highest 
purity  who  goes  to  each  of  them  with  the  mind  alone,  not 
allowing  when  in  the  act  of  thought  the  intrusion  or  intro- 
duction of  sight  or  any  other  sense  in  the  company  of  reason, 
but  v/ith  the  very  light  of  the  mind  in  her  clearness  penetrates 
into  the  very  light  of  truth  in  each;  he  has  got  rid,  as  far 
as  he  can,  of  eyes  and  ears  and  of  the  whole  body,  which  he 


PH^DO  55 

conceives  of  only  as  a  disturbing  element,  hindering  the 
soul  from  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  when  in  company 
with  her — is  not  this  the  sort  of  man  who,  if  ever  man  did, 
is  likely  to  attain  the  knowledge  of  existence  ? 

There  is  admirable  truth  in  that,  Socrates,  replied 
Simmias. 

And  when  they  consider  all  this,  must  not  true  philoso- 
phers make  a  reflection,  of  which  they  will  speak  to  one 
another  in  such  words  as  these:  We  have  found,  they  will 
say,  a  path  of  speculation  which  seem.s  to  bring  us  and  the 
argument  to  the  conclusion  that  while  we  are  in  the  body, 
and  while  the  soul  is  mingled  with  this  mass  of  evil,  our 
desire  will  not  be  satisfied,  and  our  desire  is  of  the  truth. 
For  the  body  is  a  source  of  endless  trouble  to  us  by  reason 
of  the  mere  requirement  of  food;  and  also  is  liable  to  diseases 
which  overtake  and  impede  us  in  the  search  after  truth: 
and  by  filling  us  so  full  of  loves,  and  lusts,  and  fears,  and 
fancies,  and  idols,  and  every  sort  of  folly,  prevents  out  ever 
having,  as  people  say^  so  much  as  a  thought.  For  whence 
come  wars,  and  fightings,  and  factions?  whence  btit  from 
the  body  and  the  lusts  of  the  body  ?  For  wars  are  occasioned 
by  the  love  of  money,  and  money  has  to  be  acquired  for  the 
sake  and  in  the  service  of  the  body ;  and  in  consequence  of  all 
these  things  the  time  which  ought  to  be  given  to  philosophy  is 
lost.  Moreover,  if  there  is  time  and  an  inclination  tov/ard 
philosophy,  yet  the  body  introduces  a  turmoil  and  confusion 
and  fear  into  the  course  of  speculation,  and  hinders  ua  from 
seeing  the  truth :  and  all  experience  shows  that  if  we  would 
have  pure  knowledge  of  anything  we  must  be  quit  of  the 
body,  and  the  soul  in  herself  must  behold  all  things  in  them- 
selves: then  I  suppose  that  we  shall  attain  that  which  we 
desire,  and  of  which  we  say  that  we  are  lovers,  and  that  is 
wisdom,  not  while  we  live,  but  after  death,  as  the  argument 
shows;  for  if  wdiile  in  company  with  the  body  the  soul 
cannot  have  pure  knowledge,  one  of  two  things  seems  to 
follow — either  knowledge  is  not  to  be  attained  at  all,  or, 
if  at  all,  after  death.  For  then,  and  not  till  then,  the  soul 
will  be  in  herself  alone  and  without  the  body.  In  this  present 
life,  I  reckon  that  we  make  the  nearest  approach  to  knowl- 
edge when  we  have  the  least  possible  concern  or  interes' 


56  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

in  the  body,  and  are  not  saturated  with  the  bodily  nature, 
but  remain  pure  until  the  hour  when  God  himself  is  pleased 
to  release  us.  And  when  the  foolishness  of  the  body  will  be 
cleared  away  and  we  shall  be  pure  and  hold  converse  with 
other  pure  souls,  and  know  of  ourselves  the  clear  light  every- 
where; and  this  is  surely  the  light  of  truth.  For  no  impure 
thing  is  allowed  to  approach  the  pure.  These  are  the  sort 
of  words,  Simmias,  which  the  true  lovers  of  wisdom  cannot 
help  saying  to  one  another,  and  thinking.  You  will  agree 
with  me  in  that? 

Certainly,  Socrates. 

But  if  this  is  true,  O  my  friend,  then  there  is  great  hope 
that,  going  whither  I  go,  I  shall  there  be  satisfied  with  that 
which  has  been  the  chief  concern  of  you  and  me  in  our  past 
lives.  And  now  that  the  hour  of  departure  is  appointed  to 
me,  this  is  the  hope  with  which  I  depart,  and  not  I  only, 
but  every  man  who  believes  that  he  has  his  mind  purified. 

Certainly,  replied  Simmias. 

And  what  is  purification  but  the  separation  of  the  soul 
from  the  body,  as  I  was  saying  before ;  the  habit  of  the  soul 
gathering  and  collecting  herself  into  herself,  out  of  all  the 
courses  of  the  body;  the  dwelling  in  her  own  place  alone, 
as  in  another  life,  so  also  in  this,  as  far  as  she  can;  the  re- 
lease of  the  soul  from  the  chains  of  the  body  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  what  is  that  which  is  termed  death,  but  this  very  sepa- 
ration and  release  of  the  soul  from  the  body? 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  the  true  philosophers,  and  they  only,  study  and  are 
eager  to  release  the  soul.  Is  not  the  separation  and  release 
of  the  soul  from  the  body  their  especial  study? 

That  is  true. 

And  as  I  was  saying  at  first,  there  v/ould  be  a  ridiculous 
contradiction  in  men  studying  to  live  as  nearly  as  they  can 
in  a  state  of  death,  and  yet  repining  when  death  comes. 

Certainly. 

Then,  Simmias,  as  the  true  philosophers  are  ever  studying 
'death,  to  them,  of  all  men,  death  is  the  least  terrible.  Look 
at  the  matter  in  this  way :  how  inconsistent  of  them  to  have 
been  always  enemies  of  the  body^  and  wanting  to  have  the 


PH^DO  57 

soul  alone,  and  when  this  is  granted  to  them,  to  be  trembling 
and  repining;  instead  of  rejoicing  at  their  departing  to  that 
place  where,  when  they  arrive,  they  hope  to  gain  that  which 
in  life  they  loved  (and  this  was  wisdom),  and  at  the  same 
time  to  be  rid  of  the  company  of  their  enemy.  Many  a 
man  has  been  willing  to  go  to  the  world  below  in  the  hope 
of  seeing  there  an  earthly  love,  or  wife,  or  son,  and  con- 
versing VN^ith  them.  And  will  he  who  is  a  true  lover  of 
wisdom,  and  is  persuaded  in  like  manner  that  only  in  the 
,world  below  he  can  worthily  enjoy  her,  still  repine  at  death? 
Will  he  not  depart  with  joy?  Surely  he  will,  my  friend,  if 
he  be  a  true  philosopher.  For  he  will  have  a  firm  convic- 
tion that  there  only,  and  nowhere  else,  he  can  find  wisdom 
in  her  purity.  And  if  this  be  true,  he  would  be  very  absurd, 
as  I  was  saying,  if  he  were  to  fear  death. 

He  would,  indeed,  replied  Simmias. 

And  when  you  see  a  man  who  is  repining  at  the  approach 
of  death,  is  not  his  reluctance  a  sufficient  proof  that  he  is  not 
a  lover  of  wisdom,  but  a  lover  of  the  body,  and  probably  at 
the  same  time  a  lover  of  either  money  or  power,  or  both? 

That  is  very  true,  he  replied. 

There  is  a  virtue,  Simmias,  which  is  named  courage.  Is 
not  that  a  special  attribute  of  the  philosophy. 

Certainly. 

Again,  there  is  temperance.  Is  not  the  calm,  and  control, 
and  disdain  of  the  passions  which  even  the  many  call  tem- 
perance, a  quality  belonging  only  to  those  who  despise  the 
body  and  live  in  philosophy? 

That  is  not  to  be  denied. 

For  the  courage  and  temperance  of  other  men,  if  you  will 
consider  them,  are  really  a  contradiction. 

How  is  that,  Socrates? 

Well,  he  said,  you  are  aware  that  death  is  regarded  by 
tnen  in  general  as  a  great  evil. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

And  do  not  courageous  men  endure  death  because  they  are 
afraid  of  yet  greater  evils? 

That  is  true. 

Then  all  but  the  philosophers  are  courageous  only  from 
fear,  and  because  they  are  afraid ;  and  yet  that  a  man  should 


S8  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

be  courageous  from  fear,  and  because  he  is  a  coward,  is 
surely  a  strange  thing. 

Very  true. 

And  are  not  the  temperate  exactly  in  the  same  case? 
They  are  temperate  because  they  are  intemperate — which 
may  seem  to  be  a  contradiction,  but  is  nevertheless  the  sort 
of  thing  which  happens  with  this  foolish  temperance;  For 
there  are  pleasures  which  they  must  have,  and  are  afraid 
of  losing;  and  therefore  they  abstain  from  one  class  of 
pleasures  because  they  are  overcome  by  another :  and  whereas 
intemperance  is  defined  as  "  being  under  the  dominion  of 
pleasure,"  they  overcome  only  because  they  are  overcome 
by  pleasure.  And  that  is  what  I  mean  by  saying  that  they 
are  temperate  through  intemperance. 

That  appears  to  be  true. 

Yet  the  exchange  of  one  fear  or  pleasure  or  pain  for 
another  fear  or  pleasure  or  pain,  which  are  measured  like 
coins,  the  greater  with  the  less,  is  not  the  exchange  of  virtue. 
O  my  dear  Simmias,  is  there  not  one  true  coin  for  which 
all  things  ought  to  exchange  ? — and  that  is  wisdom ;  and  only 
in  exchange  for  this,  and  in  company  with  this,  is  anything 
truly  bought  or  sold,  whether  courage  or  temperance  or 
justice.  And  is  not  all  true  virtue  the  companion  of  wisdom, 
no  matter  what  fears  or  pleasures  or  other  similar  goods  or 
evils  may  not  attend  her?  But  the  virtue  which  is  made 
up  of  these  goods,  when  they  are  severed  from  wisdom 
and  exchanged  with  one  another,  is  a  shadow  of  virtue  only, 
nor  is  there  any  freedom  or  health  or  truth  in  her;  but  in 
the  true  exchange  there  is  a  purging  away  of  all  these  things, 
and  temperance,  and  justice,  and  courage,  and  wisdom  her- 
self are  a  purgation  of  them.  And  I  conceive  that  the  found- 
ers of  the  mysteries  had  a  real  m-caning  and  were  not  mere 
triflers  when  they  intimated  in  a  figure  long  ago  that  he  who 
passed  unsanctified  and  uninitiated  into  the  w^orld  below 
w-ill  live  in  a  slough,  but  that  he  who  arrives  there  after 
initiation  and  purification  will  dwell  with  the  gods.  For 
"  many,"  as  they  say  in  the  mysteries,  *'  are  the  thyrsus  bear- 
ers, but  few  are  the  mystics," — meaning,  as  I  interpret  the 
words,  the  true  philosophers.  In  the  number  of  whom  I 
have  been  seeking,  according  to  my  ability,  to  find  a  $lace 


PHiEDO  59 

during  my  whole  life;  whether  I  have  sought  in  a  right 
way  or  not,  and  whether  I  have  succeeded  or  not,  I  shall 
truly  know  in  a  little  while,  if  God  will,  when  I  myself  arrive 
in  the  other  world:  that  is  my  belief.  And  now,  Simmias 
and  Cebes,  I  have  answered  those  who  charge  me  v/ith  not 
grieving  or  repining  at  parting  from  you  and  my  masters 
in  this  world;  and  I  am  right  in  not  repining,  for  I  believe 
that  I  shall  find  other  masters  and  friends  who  are  as  good 
in  the  world  below.  But  all  men  cannot  receive  this,  and 
I  shall  be  glad  if  my  words  have  any  more  success  with  you 
than  with  the  judges  of  Athenians. 

Cebes  answered:  I  agree,  Socrates,  in  the  greater  part  of 
what  you  say.  But  in  what  relates  to  the  soul,  men  are  apt 
to  be  incredulous;  they  fear  that  when  she  leaves  the  body 
her  place  miay  be  nowhere,  and  that  on  the  very  day  of  death 
she  may  be  destroyed  and  perish — immediately  on  her  release 
from  the  body,  issuing  forth  like  smoke  or  air  and  vanishing 
away  into  nothingness.  For  if  she  could  only  hold  together 
and  be  herself  after  she  was  released  from  the  evils  of  the 
body,  there  would  be  good  reason  to  hope,  Socrates,  that 
what  you  say  is  true.  But  much  persuasion  and  miany  argu- 
ments are  required  in  order  to  prove  that  when  the  man  is 
dead  the  soul  yet  exists,  and  has  any  force  of  intelligence. 

True,  Cebes,  said  Socrates;  and  shall  I  suggest  that  we 
talk  a  little  of  the  probabilities  of  these  things? 

I  am  sure,  said  Cebes,  that  I  should  greatly  like  to  know 
your  opinion  about  them. 

I  reckon,  said  Socrates,  that  no  one  who  heard  me  now, 
not  even  if  he  were  one  of  my  old  enemies,  the  comic  poets, 
could  accuse  me  of  idle  talking  about  matters  in  which  I 
have  no  concern.  Let  us,  then,  if  you  please,  proceed  with 
the  inquiry. 

Whether  the  souls  of  men  after  death  are  or  are  not  in 
the  world  below,  is  a  question  which  may  be  argued  in  this 
manner.  The  ancient  doctrine  of  which  I  have  been  speak- 
ing affirms  that  they  go  from  this  into  the  other  world,  and 
return  hither,  and  are  born  from  the  dead.  Now  if  this  be 
true,  and  the  living  come  from  the  dead,  then  our  souls  must 
be  in  the  other  world,  for  if  not,  how  could  they  be  born 
again?     And  this  ;would  be  conclusive,  if  there  were  an^ 


60  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

real  evidence  that  the  living  are  only  born  from  the  dead; 
but  if  there  is  no  evidence  of  this,  then  other  arguments 
will  have  to  be  adduced. 

That  is  very  true,  replied  Cebes. 

Then  let  us  consider  this  question,  not  in  relation  to  man 
only,  but  in  relation  to  animals  generally,  and  to  plants,  and 
to  everything  of  which  there  is  generation,  and  the  proof 
will  be  easier.  Are  not  all  things  which  have  opposites 
generated  out  of  their  opposites?  I  mean  such  things  as 
good  and  evil,  just  and  unjust — and  there  are  innumerable 
other  opposites  which  are  generated  out  of  opposites.  And 
I  want  to  show  that  this  holds  universally  of  all  opposites; 
I  mean  to  say,  for  example,  that  anything  which  becomes 
greater  must  become  greater  after  being  less. 

True. 

And  that  which  becomes  less  must  have  been  once  greater 
and  then  become  less. 

Yes. 

And  the  weaker  is  generated  from  the  stronger,  and  the 
swifter  from  the  slower. 

Very  true. 

And  the  worse  is  from  the  better,  and  the  more  just  is 
from  the  more  unjust? 

Of  course. 

And  is  this  true  of  all  opposites?  and  are  we  convinced 
that  all  of  them  are  generated  out  of  opposites  ? 

Yes. 

And  in  this  universal  opposition  of  all  things,  are  there  not 
also  two  intermediate  processes  which  are  ever  going  on, 
from  one  to  the  other,  and  back  again;  where  there  is  a 
greater  and  a  less  there  is  also  an  intermediate  process  of 
increase  and  diminution,  and  that  which  grows  is  said  to 
wax,  and  that  which  decays  to  wane? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  there  are  many  other  processes,  such  as  division  and 
composition,  cooling  and  heating,  which  equally  involve  a 
passage  into  and  out  of  one  another.  And  this  holds  of  all 
opposites,  even  though  not  always  expressed  in  words — they 
are  generated  out  of  one  another,  and  there  is  a  passing  or 
process  from  one  to  the  other  of  them? 


PH^DO  61 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Well,  and  is  there  not  an  opposite  of  life,  as  sleep  is  the 
opposite  of  waking? 

True,  he  said. 

And  what  is  that? 

Death,  he  answered. 

And  these,  then,  are  generated,  if  they  are  opposites,  the 
one  from  the  other,  and  have  there  their  two  intermediate 
processes  also? 

Of  course. 

Now,  said  Socrates,  I  will  analyze  one  of  the  two  pairs  of 
opposites  which  I  have  mentioned  to  you,  and  also  its  inter- 
mediate processes,  and  you  shall  analyze  the  other  to  me. 
The  state  of  sleep  is  opposed  to  the  state  of  waking,  and  out 
of  sleeping  waking  is  generated,  and  out  of  waking,  sleeping, 
and  the  process  of  generation  is  in  the  one  case  falling  asleep, 
and  in  the  other  waking  up.    Are  you  agreed  about  that? 

Quite  agreed. 

Then  suppose  that  you  analyze  life  and  death  to  me  in  the 
same  manner.    Is  not  death  opposed  to  life? 

Yes. 

And  they  are  generated  one  from  the  other  ? 

Yes. 

What  is  generated  from  life? 

Death. 

And  what  from  death? 

I  can  only  say  in  answer — life. 

Then  the  living,  whether  things  or  persons,  Cebes,  are 
generated  from  the  dead? 

That  is  clear,  he  replied. 

Then  the  inference  is,  that  our  souls  are  in  the  world 
below  ? 

That  is  true. 

And  one  of  the  two  processes  or  generations  is  visible — 
for  surely  the  act  of  dying  is  visible? 

Surely,  he  said. 

And  may  not  the  othef  1)e  inferred  as  the  complement  of 
nature,  who  is  not  to  be  supposed  to  go  on  one  leg  only? 
And  if  not,  a  corresponding  process  of  generation  in  death 
must  also  be  assigned  to  her^ 


62  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

And  what  is  that  process  ? 

Revival. 

And  revival,  if  there  be  such  a  thing,  is  the  birth  of  the 
dead  into  the  world  of  the  living? 

Quite  true. 

Then  there  is  a  new  way  in  which  we  arrive  at  the  infer- 
ence that  the  living  come  from  the  dead,  just  as  the  dead 
come  from  the  living;  and  if  this  is  true,  then  the  souls  of 
the  dead  must  be  in  some  place  out  of  which  they  come 
again.    And  this,  as  I  think,  has  been  satisfactorily  proved. 

Yes,  Socrates,  he  said;  all  this  seems  to  flow  necessarily 
out  of  our  previous  admissions. 

And  that  these  admissions  are  not  unfair,  Cebes,  he  said, 
may  be  shown,  as  I  think,  in  this  way :  If  generation  were  in 
a  straight  line  only,  and  there  were  no  compensation  or  circle 
in  nature,  no  turn  or  return  into  one  another,  then  you  know 
that  all  things  would  at  last  have  the  same  form  and  pass 
into  the  same  state,  and  there  would  be  no  more  generation 
of  them.  . 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

A  simple  thing  enough,  which  I  will  illustrate  by  the  case 
of  sleep,  he  replied.  You  know  that  if  there  were  no  com- 
pensation of  sleeping  and  waking,  the  story  of  the  sleeping 
Endymion  would  in  the  end  have  no  meaning,  because  all 
other  things  would  be  asleep,  too,  and  he  would  not  be 
thought  of.  Or  if  there  were  composition  only,  and  no 
division  of  substances,  then  the  chaos  of  Anaxagoras  w^ould 
come  again.  And  in  like  manner,  my  dear  Cebes,  if  all 
things  which  partook  of  life  were  to  die,  and  after  they  were 
dead  remained  in  the  form  of  death,  and  did  not  come  to 
life  again,  all  would  at  last  die,  and  nothing  would  be  alive — 
how  could  this  be  otherwise  ?  For  if  the  living  spring  from 
any  others  who  are  not  the  dead,  and  they  die,  must  not 
all  things  at  last  be  swallowed  up  in  death  ? 

There  is  no  escape  from  that,  Socrates,  said  Cebes;  and  I 
think  that  what  you  say  is  entirely  true. 

Yes,  he  said,  Cebes,  I  entirely  think  so,  too;  and  we  are 
not  v/alking  in  a  vain  imagination;  but  I  am  confident  in 
the  belief  that  there  truly  is  such  a  thing  as  living  again,  and 


PHiEDO  63 

that  the  living  spring  from  the  dead,  and  that  the  souls  of 
the  dead  are  in  existence,  and  that  the  good  souls  have  a 
better  portion  than  the  evil. 

Cebes  added :  Your  favorite  doctrine,  Socrates,  that  knowl- 
edge is  simply  recollection,  if  true,  also  necessarily  implies  a 
previous  time  in  which  we  learned  that  which  we  now  recol- 
lect. But  this  would  be  impossible  unless  our  soul  was  in 
som.e  place  before  existing  in  the  human  form;  here,  then, 
is  another  argument  of  the  soul's  immortality. 

But  tell  me,  Cebes,  said  Simmias,  interposing,  what  proofs 
are  given  of  this  doctrine  of  recollection?  I  am  not  very 
sure  at  this  moment  that  I  remember  them. 

One  excellent  proof,  said  Cebes,  is  afforded  by  questions, 
if  you  put  a  question  to  a  person  in  a  right  way,  he  will  give 
a  true  answer  of  himself;  but  how  could  he  do  this  unless 
there  were  knowledge  and  right  reason  already  in  him  ?  And 
this  is  most  clearly  shown  when  he  is  taken  to  a  diagram  or 
to  anything  of  that  sort. 

But  if,  said  Socrates,  you  are  still  incredulous,  Simmias, 
I  would  ask  you  whether  you  may  not  agree  with  me  when 
you  look  at  the  matter  in  another  way;  I  mean,  if  you  are 
still  incredulous  as  to  whether  knowledge  is  recollection? 

Incredulous,  I  am  not,  said  Simmias;  but  I  want  to  have 
this  doctrine  of  recollection  brought  to  my  own  recollection, 
and,  from  v/hat  Cebes  has  said,  I  am  beginning  to  recollect 
and  be  convinced;  but  I  should  still  like  to  hear  what  more 
you  have  to  say. 

This  is  what  I  would  say,  he  replied :  We  should  agree,  if 
I  am  not  mistaken,  that  what  a  man  recollects  he  must  have 
known  at  some  previous  time. 

Very  true. 

And  what  is  the  nature  of  this  recollection?  And,  in  ask- 
ing this,  I  mean  to  ask  whether,  v/hen  a  person  has  already 
seen  or  heard  or  in  any  way  perceived  anything,  and  he 
knows  not  only  that,  but  something  else  of  which  he  has 
not  the  same,  but  another  knowledge,  we  may  not  fairly  say 
that  he  recollects  that  which  comes  into  his  mind.  Are  we 
agreed  about  that? 

What  do  you  mean? 

I  mean  what  I  may  illustrate  by  the  following  instance: 


64  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

The  knowledge  of  a  lyre  is  not  the  same  as  the  knowledge 
of  a  man? 

True. 

And  yet  what  is  the  feeling  of  lovers  when  they  recognize 
a  lyre,  or  a  garment,  or  anything  else  which  the  beloved  has 
been  in  the  habit  of  using?  Do  not  they,  from  knowing  the 
lyre,  form  in  the  mind's  eye  an  image  of  the  youth  to  whom 
the  lyre  belongs?  And  this  is  recollection:  and  in  the  same 
way  any  one  who  sees  Simmias  may  remember  Cebes;  and 
there  are  endless  other  things  of  the  same  nature. 

Yes,  indeed,  there  are — endless,  replied  Simmias. 

And  this  sort  of  thing,  he  said,  is  recollection,  and  is  most 
commonly  a  process  of  recovering  that  which  has  been  for- 
gotten through  time  and  inattention. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Well;  and  may  you  not  also  from  seeing  the  picture  of  a 
horse  or  a  lyre  remember  a  man?  and  from  the  picture  of 
Simmias,  you  may  be  led  to  remember  Cebes  ? 

True. 

Or  you  may  also  be  led  to  the  recollection  of  Simmias  him- 
self? 

True,  he  said. 

And  in  all  these  cases,  the  recollection  may  be  derived 
from  things  either  like  or  unlike? 

That  is  true. 

And  when  the  recollection  is  derived  from  like  things,  then 
there  is  sure  to  be  another  question,  which  is,  Whether  the 
likeness  of  that  which  is  recollected  is  in  any  way  defective 
or  not? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  shall  we  proceed  a  step  further,  and  affirm  that  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  equality,  not  of  wood  with  wood,  or  of 
stone  with  stone,  but  that,  over  and  above  this,  there  is 
equality  in  the  abstract?     Shall  we  affirm  this? 

Affirm,  yes,  and  swear  to  it,  replied  Simmias,  with  all  the 
confidence  in  life. 

And  do  we  know  the  nature  of  this  abstract  essence? 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  whence  did  we  obtain  this  knowledge?  Did  we  not 
see  equalities  of  material  things,  such  as  pieces  of  wood  and 


PHiEDO  65 

stones,  and  gather  from  them  the  idea  of  an  equality  which 
is  different  from  them? — you  will  admit  that?  Or  look  at 
the  matter  again  in  this  way:  Do  not  the  same  pieces  of 
wood  or  stone  appear  at  one  time,  equal  and  at  another  time 
unequal  ? 

That  is  certain. 

But  are  real  equals  ever  unequal  ?  or  is  the  idea  of  equality 
ever  inequality? 

That  surely  was  never  yet  known,  Socrates. 

Then  these  (so-called)  equals  are  not  the  same  with  the 
idea  of  equality? 

I  should  say,  clearly  not,  Socrates. 

And  yet  from  these  equals,  although  differing  from  the 
idea  of  equality,  you  conceived  and  attained  that  idea  ? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Which  might  be  like,  or  might  be  unlike  them? 

Yes. 

But  that  makes  no  difference;  whenever  from  seeing  one 
thing  you  conceived  another,  whether  like  or  unlike,  there 
must  surely  have  been  an  act  of  recollection? 

Very  true. 

But  what  would  you  say  of  equal  portions  of  wood  and 
stone,  or  other  material  equals?  and  what  is  the  impression 
produced  by  them  ?     Are  they  equals  in  the  same  sense  as  ' 
absolute  equality  ?  or  do  they  fall  short  of  this  in  a  measure  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  in  a  very  great  measure,  too. 

And  must  we  not  allow  that  when  I  or  any  one  look  at 
any  object,  and  perceive  that  the  object  aims  at  being  some 
other  thing,  but  falls  short  of,  and  cannot  attain  to  it — he  who 
makes  this  observation  must  have  had  previous  knowledge  of 
that  to  which,  as  he  says,  the  other,  although  similar,  was 
inferior  ? 

Certainly. 

And  has  not  this  been  our  case  in  the  matter  of  equals 
and  of  absolute  equality? 

Precisely. 

Then  we  must  have  known  absolute  equality  previously  to 
the  time  when  we  first  saw  the  material  equals,  and  reflected 
that  all  these  apparent  equals  aim  at  this  absolute  equality, 
but  fall  short  of  it? 

3  HC— Vol.  2 


66  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

That  is  true. 

And  we  recognize  also  that  this  absolute  equality  has  only 
been  known,  and  can  only  be  known,  through  the  medium  of 
sight  or  touch,  or  of  some  other  sense.  And  this  I  would 
affirm  of  all  such  conceptions. 

Yes,  Socrates,  as  far  as  the  argument  is  concerned,  one  of 
them  is  the  sam.e  as  the  other. 

And  from  the  senses,  then,  is  derived  the  knowledge  that 
all  sensible  things  aim  at  an  idea  of  equality  of  which  they 
fall  short — is  not  that  true? 

Yes. 

Then  before  we  began  to  see  or  hear  or  perceive  in  any 
way,  we  must  have  had  a  knowledge  of  absolute  equality,  or 
we  could  not  have  referred  to  that  the  equals  which  are 
derived  from  the  senses — for  to  that  they  all  aspire,  and  of 
that  they  fall  short? 

That,  Socrates,  is  certainly  to  be  inferred  from  the  previous 
statements. 

And  did  we  not  see  and  hear  and  acquire  our  other  senses 
as  soon  as  we  v/ere  born? 

Certainly. 

Then  we  must  have  acquired  the  knowledge  of  the  ideal 
equal  at  some  time  previous  to  this? 

Yes. 

That  is  to  say,  before  we  were  born,  I  suppose? 

True. 

And  if  we  acquired  this  knowledge  before  we  were  born, 
and  were  born  having  it,  then  we  also  knew  before  we  were 
born  and  at  the  instant  of  birth  not  only  equal  or  the  greater 
or  the  less,  but  all  other  ideas ;  for  we  are  not  speaking  only 
of  equality  absolute,  but  of  beauty,  good,  justice,  holiness,  and 
all  which  we  stamp  with  the  name  of  essence  in  the  dialectical 
process,  when  we  ask  and  answer  questions.  Of  all  this  we 
may  certainly  affirm  that  we  acquired  the  knowledge  before 
birth  ? 

That  is  true. 

Eut  if,  after  having  acquired,  we  have  not  forgotten  tliat 
which  we  acquired,  then  we  must  always  have  been  born 
with  knowledge,  and  shall  always  continue  to  know  as  long 
as  life  lasts — for  knowing  is  the  acquiring  and  retaining 


PHiEDO  67 

knowledge  and  not  forgetting.  Is  not  forgetting,  Simmias, 
just  the  losing  of  knowledge? 

Quite  true,   Socrates. 

But  if  the  knowledge  which  we  acquired  before  birth  was 
lost  by  us  at  birth,  and  afterwards  by  the  use  of  the  senses 
we  recovered  that  which  we  previously  knew,  will  not  that 
which  we  call  learning  be  a  process  of  recovering  our  know- 
ledge, and  may  not  this  be  rightly  termed  recollection  by  us  ? 

Very  true. 

For  this  is  clear,  that  when  we  perceived  something,  either 
by  the  help  of  sight  or  hearing,  or  some  other  sense,  there  was 
no  difficulty  in  receiving  from  this  a  conception  of  some 
other  thing  like  or  unlike  which  had  been  forgotten  and  which 
was  associated  with  this;  and  therefore,  as  I  was  saying, 
one  of  two  alternatives  follow :  either  we  had  this  knowledge 
at  birth,  and  continued  to  know  through  life;  or,  after  birth, 
those  who  are  said  to  learn  only  remember,  and  learning  is 
recollection  only. 

Yes,  that  is  quite  true,  Socrates. 

And  which  alternative,  Simmias,  do  you  prefer?  Had  we 
the  knowledge  at  our  birth^  or  did  we  remember  afterwards 
the  things  which  we  knew  previously  to  our  birth  ? 

I  cannot  decide  at  the  moment. 

At  any  rate  you  can  decide  whether  he  who  has  knowledge 
ought  or  ought  not  to  be  able  to  give  a  reason  for  what  he 
knows. 

Certainly,  he  ought. 

But  do  you  think  that  every  man  is  able  to  give  a  reason 
about  these  very  matters  of  which  we  are  speaking? 

I  wish  that  they  could,  Socrates,  but  I  greatly  fear  that  to- 
morrow at  this  time  there  will  be  no  one  able  to  give  a  reason 
worth  having. 

Then  you  are  not  of  opinion,  Simmias,  that  all  men  know 
these  things? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  they  are  In  process  of  recollecting  that  which  they 
learned  before. 

Certainly. 

But  when  did  our  souls  acquire  this  knowledge  ? — not  since 
we  were  born  as  men? 


63 


DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 


Certainly  not. 

And  therefore  previously? 

Yes. 

Then,  Simmias,  our  souls  must  have  existed  before  they 
were  in  the  form  of  man — without  bodies,  and  must  have  had 
intelligence  ? 

Unless  indeed  you  suppose,  Socrates,  that  these  notions 
were  given  us  at  the  moment  of  birth;  for  this  is  the  only 
time  that  remains. 

Yes,  my  friend,  but  when  we  did  lose  them?  for  they  are 
not  in  us  when  we  are  born — that  is  admitted.  Did  we  lose 
them  at  the  moment  of  receiving  them,  or  at  some  other  time  ? 

No,  Socrates,  I  perceive  that  I  was  unconsciously  talking 
nonsense. 

Then  may  we  not  say,  Simmias,  that  if,  as  we  are  always 
repeating,  there  is  an  absolute  beauty,  and  goodness,  and  es- 
sence in  general,  and  to  this,  which  is  now  discovered  to  be 
a  previous  condition  of  our  being,  we  refer  all  our  sensations, 
and  with  this  compare  them — assuming  this  to  have  a  prior 
existence,  then  our  souls  must  have  had  a  prior  existence, 
but  if  not,  there  would  be  no  force  in  the  argument.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that  if  these  absolute  ideas  existed  before  we 
were  born,  then  our  souls  must  have  existed  before  we  were 
born,  and  if  not  the  ideas,  then  not  the  souls. 

Yes,  Socrates;  I  am  convinced  that  there  is  precisely  the 
Same  necessity  for  the  existence  of  the  soul  before  birth,  and 
of  the  essence  of  which  you  are  speaking:  and  the  argument 
arrives  at  a  result  which  happily  agrees  with  my  own  notion. 
For  there  is  nothing  which  to  my  mind  is  so  evident  as  that 
beauty,  good,  and  other  notions  of  which  you  were  just  now 
speaking  have  a  most  real  and  absolute  existence;  and  I  am 
Satisfied  with  the  proof. 

Well,  but  is  Cebes  equally  satisfied?  for  I  must  convince 
him  too. 

I  think,  said  Simmias,  that  Cebes  Is  satisfied :  although  he  is 
the  most  incredulous  of  mortals,  yet  I  believe  that  he  is  con- 
vinced of  the  existence  of  the  soul  before  birth.  But  that 
after  death  the  soul  will  continue  to  exist  is  not  yet  proven 
even  to  my  own  satisfaction.  I  cannot  get  rid  of  the  feeling 
of  the  many  to  which  Cebes  was  referring— the  feeling  that 


PHiEDO  69 

when  the  man  dies  the  soul  may  be  scattered,  and  that  this 
may  be  the  end  of  her.  For  admitting  that  she  may  be  gen- 
erated and  created  in  some  other  place,  and  may  have  existed 
before  entering  the  human  body,  why  after  having  entered  in 
and  gone  out  again  may  she  not  herself  be  destroyed  and 
come  to  an  end? 

Very  true,  Simmias,  said  Cebes;  that  our  soul  existed  be- 
fore we  were  born  was  the  first  half  of  the  argument,  and 
this  appears  to  have  been  proven;  that  the  soul  will  exist 
after  death  as  well  as  before  birth  is  the  other  half  of  which 
the  proof  is  still  wanting,  and  has  to  be  supplied. 

But  that  proofs  Simmias  and  Cebes,  has  been  already  given 
said  Socrates,  if  you  put  the  two  arguments  together — I 
mean  this  and  the  former  one,  in  which  we  admitted  that 
everything  living  is  born  of  the  dead.  For  if  the  soul  existed 
before  birth,  and  in  coming  to  life  and  being  born  can  be 
born  only  from  death  and  dying,  must  she  not  after  death 
continue  to  exist,  since  she  has  to  be  born  again?  surely  the 
proof  which  your  desire  has  been  already  furnished.  Still 
I  suspect  that  you  and  Simmias  would  be  glad  to  probe  the 
argument  further;  like  children,  you  are  haunted  with  a  fear 
that  when  the  soul  leaves  the  body,  the  wind  may  really  blow 
her  away  and  scatter  her ;  especially  if  a  man  should  happen 
to  die  in  stormy  weather  and  not  when  the  sky  is  calm. 

Cebes  answered  with  a  smile:  Then,  Socrates,  you  must 
argue  us  out  of  our  fears — and  yet,  strictly  speaking,  they 
are  not  our  fears,  but  there  is  a  child  within  us  to  whom 
death  is  a  sort  of  hobgoblin;  him  too  we  laust  persuade  not 
to  be  afraid  when  he  is  alone  with  him  in  the  dark. 

Socrates  said:  Let  the  voice  of  the  charmer  be  applied 
daily  until  you  have  charmed  him  away. 

And  where  shall  we  find  a  good  charmer  of  our  fears, 
Socrates,  when  you  are  gone? 

Hellas,  he  replied,  is  a  large  place,  Cebes,  and  has  many 
good  men,  and  there  are  barbarous  races  not  a  few:  seek 
for  him  among  them  all,  far  and  wide,  sparing  neither  pains 
nor  money ;  for  there  is  no  better  way  of  using  your  money. 
And  you  must  not  forget  to  seek  for  him  among  yourselves 
too ;  for  he  is  nowhere  more  likely  to  be  found. 

The  search,  replied  Cebes,  shall  certainly  be  made.    And 


70  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

now,  if  you  please,  let  us  return  to  the  point  of  the  argument 
at  which  we  digressed. 

By  all  means,  replied  Socrates ;  what  else  should  I  please  ? 

Very  good,  he  said. 

Must  we  not,  said  Socrates,  ask  ourselves  some  question 
of  this  sort? — What  is  that  which,  as  we  imagine,  is  liable 
to  be  scattered  away,  and  about  which  we  fear?  and  what 
again  is  that  about  which  we  have  no  fear  ?  And  then  we  may 
proceed  to  inquire  whether  that  which  suffers  dispersion  is 
or  is  not  of  the  nature  of  soul — our  hopes  and  fears  as  to 
our  own  souls  will  turn  upon  that. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

Now  the  compound  or  composite  may  be  supposed  to  be 
naturally  capable  of  being  dissolved  in  like  manner  as  of  be- 
ing compounded;  but  that  which  is  uncompounded,  and  that 
only,  must  be,  if  anything  is,  indissoluble. 

Yes;  that  is  what  I  should  imagine,  said  Cebes. 

And  the  uncompounded  may  be  assumed  to  be  the  same  and 
unchanging,  where  the  compound  is  always  changing  and 
never  the   same? 

That  I  also  think,  he  said. 

Then  now  let  us  return  to  the  previous  discussion.  Is  that 
idea  or  essence,  which  in  the  dialectical  process  we  define 
as  essence  of  true  existence — whether  essence  of  equality, 
beauty,  or  anything  else:  are  these  essences,  I  say,  liable  at 
times  to  some  degree  of  change?  or  are  they  each  of  them 
always  what  they  are,  having  the  same  simple,  self-existent 
and  unchanging  forms,  and  not  admitting  of  variation  at  all, 
or  in  any  way,  or  at  any  time? 

They  must  be  always  the  same,  Socrates,  replied  Cebes. 

And  what  would  you  say  of  the  many  beautiful — whether 
men  or  horses  or  garments  or  any  other  things  which  may 
be  called  equal  or  beautiful — are  they  all  unchanging 
and  the  same  always,  or  quite  the  reverse?  May  they 
not  rather  be  described  as  almost  alv^^ays  changing  and 
hardly  ever  the  same  either  with  themselves  or  with  one 
another  ? 

The  latter,  replied  Cebes;  they  are  always  in  a  state  of 
change. 

And  these  you  can  touch  and  see  and  perceive  with  the 


PHiEDO  71 

senses,  but  the  unchanging  things  you  can  only  perceive  with 
the  mind — ^they  are  invisible  and  are  not  seen  ? 

That  is  very  true,  he  said. 

Well,  then,  he  added,  let  us  suppose  that  there  are  two 
sorts  of  existences,  one  seen,  the  other  unseen. 

Let  us  suppose  them. 

The  seen  is  the  changing,  and  the  unseen  is  the  unchanging. 

That  may  be  also  supposed. 

And,  further,  is  not  one  part  of  us  body,  and  the  rest  of 
us  soul? 

To  be  sure. 

And  to  which  class  may  we  say  that  the  body  is  more  alike 
and  akin? 

Clearly  to  the  seen :  no  one  can  doubt  that. 

And  is  the  soul  seen  or  not  seen? 

Not  by  man,  Socrates. 

And  by  "  seen  "  and  "  not  seen  "  is  meant  by  us  that  which 
is  or  is  not  visible  to  the  eye  of  man? 

Yes,  to  the  eye  of  man. 

And  what  do  we  say  of  the  soul  ?  is  that  seen  or  not  seen  ? 

Not  seen. 

Unseen  then? 

Yes. 

Then  the  soul  is  more  like  to  the  unseen,  and  the  body  to 
the  seen? 

That  is  most  certain,  Socrates. 

And  were  we  not  saying  long  ago  that  the  soul  when  using 
the  body  as  an  instrument  of  perception,  that  is  to  say,  when 
using  the  sense  of  sight  or  hearing  or  some  other  sense  (for 
the  meaning  of  perceiving  through  the  body  is  perceiving 
through  the  senses) — were  we  not  saying  that  the  soul  too 
is  then  dragged  by  the  body  into  the  region  of  the  change- 
able, and  wanders  and  is  confused;  the  world  spins  round 
her,  and  she  is  like  a  drunkard  when  under  their  influence  ? 

Very  true. 

But  when  returning  into  herself  she  reflects;  then  she 
passes  into  the  realm  of  purity,  and  eternity,  and  immortality, 
and  unchangeableness,  which  are  her  kindred,  and  with  them 
she  ever  lives,  when  she  is  by  herself  and  is  not  let  or  hin- 
dered; then  she  ceases  from  her  erring  ways,  and  being  in 


72  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

communion  with  the  unchanging  is  unchanging.  And  this 
state  of  the  soul  is  called  wisdom  ? 

That  is  well  and  truly  said,  Socrates,  he  replied. 

And  to  which  class  is  the  soul  more  nearly  alike  and  akin, 
as  far  as  may  be  inferred  from  this  argument,  as  well  as  from 
the  preceding  one? 

I  think,  Socrates,  that^  in  the  opinion  of  every  one  who  fol- 
lows the  argument,  the  soul  will  be  infinitely  more  like  the  un- 
changeable— even  the  most  stupid  person  will  not  deny  that. 

And  the  body  is  more  like  the  changing? 

Yes. 

Yet  once  more  consider  the  matter  in  this  light :  When  the 
soul  and  the  body  are  united,  then  nature  orders  the  soul  to 
rule  and  govern,  and  the  body  to  obey  and  serve. 

Now  which  of  these  two  functions  is  akin  to  the  divine? 
and  which  to  the  mortal  ?  Does  not  the  divine  appear  to  you 
to  be  that  which  naturally  orders  and  rules,  and  the  mortal 
that  which  is  subject  and  servant? 

True. 

And  which  does  the  soul  resemble  ? 

The  soul  resembles  the  divine  and  the  body  the  mortal — 
there  can  be  no  doubt  of  that,  Socrates. 

Then  reflect,  Cebes :  is  not  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  mat- 
ter this — that  the  soul  is  in  the  very  likeness  of  the  divine, 
and  immortal,  and  intelligible,  and  uniform,  and  indissoluble, 
and  unchangeable ;  and  the  body  is  in  the  very  likeness  of  the 
human,  and  mortal,  and  unintelligible,  and  multiform,  and 
dissoluble,  and  changeable.  Can  this,  my  dear  Cebes,  be 
denied  ? 

No,  indeed. 

But  if  this  is  true,  then  is  not  the  body  liable  to  speedy 
dissolution?  and  is  not  the  soul  almost  or  altogether  indis- 
soluble ? 

Certainly. 

And  do  you  further  observe,  that  after  a  man  is  dead,  the 
body,  which  is  the  visible  part  of  man,  and  has  a  visible 
framework,  which  is  called  a  corpse,  and  which  would  nat- 
urally be  dissolved  and  decomposed  and  dissipated,  is  not 
dissolved  or  decomposed  at  once,  but  may  remain  for  a  good 
while,  if  the  constitution  be  sound  at  the  time  of  death,  and 


PH^DO  73 

the  season  of  the  year  favorable  ?  For  the  body  when  shrunk 
and  embalmed,  as  is  the  custom  in  Egypt,  may  remain  almost 
entire  through  infinite  ages ;  and  even  in  decay,  still  there  are 
some  portions,  such  as  the  bones  and  ligaments,  which  are 
practically  indestructible.    You  allow  that? 

Yes. 

And  are  we  to  suppose  that  the  soul,  which  is  invisible,  in 
passing  to  the  true  Hades,  which  like  her  is  invisible,  and 
pure,  and  noble,  and  on  her  way  to  the  good  and  wise  God, 
whither,  if  God  will,  my  soul  is  also  soon  to  go — ^that  the 
soul,  I  repeat,  if  this  be  her  nature  and  origin,  is  blown  away 
and  perishes  immediately  on  quitting  the  body  as  the  many 
say?  That  can  never  be,  dear  Simmias  and  Cebes.  The 
truth  rather  is  that  the  soul  which  is  pure  at  departing  draws 
after  her  no  bodily  taint,  having  never  voluntarily  had  con- 
nection with  the  body,  which  she  is  ever  avoiding,  herself 
gathered  into  herself  (for  such  abstraction  has  been  the  study 
of  her  life).  And  what  does  this  mean  but  that  she  has  been 
a  true  disciple  of  philosophy  and  has  practised  how  to  die 
easily?    And  is  not  philosophy  the  practice  of  death? 

Certainly. 

That  soul,  I  say,  herself  invisible,  departs  to  the  invisible 
world — to  the  divine  and  immortal  and  rational :  thither  arriv- 
ing, she  lives  in  bliss  and  is  released  from  the  error  and 
folly  of  men,  their  fears  and  wild  passions  and  all  other 
human  ills,  and  forever  dwells,  as  they  say  of  the  initiated, 
in  company  with  the  gods.     Is  not  this  true,  Cebes? 

Yes,  said  Cebes,  beyond  a  doubt. 

But  the  soul  which  has  been  polluted,  and  is  impure  at  the 
time  of  her  departure,  and  is  the  companion  and  servant  of 
the  body  always,  and  is  in  love  with  and  fascinated  by  the 
body  and  by  the  desires  and  pleasures  of  the  body,  until  she 
is  led  to  believe  that  the  truth  only  exists  in  a  bodily  form, 
which  a  man  may  touch  and  see  and  taste  and  use  for  the  pur- 
poses of  his  lusts — the  soul,  I  mean,  accustomed  to  hate  and 
fear  and  avoid  the  intellectual  principle,  which  to  the  bodily 
eye  is  dark  and  invisible,  and  can  be  attained  only  by  philos- 
ophy— do  you  suppose  that  such  a  soul  as  this  will  depart 
pure  and  unalloyed? 

That  is  impossible,  he  replied. 


74  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

She  is  engrossed  by  the  corporeal,  which  the  continual  as- 
sociation and  constant  care  of  the  body  have  made  natural 
to  her. 

Very  true. 

And  this,  my  friend,  may  be  conceived  to  be  that  heavy, 
weighty,  earthy  element  of  sight  by  which  such  a  soul  is 
depressed  and  dragged  down  again  into  the  visible  world,  be- 
cause she  is  afraid  of  the  invisible  and  of  the  world  below — 
prowling  about  tombs  and  sepulchres,  in  the  neighborhood  of 
which,  as  they  tell  us,  are  seen  certain  ghostly  apparitions 
of  souls  which  have  not  departed  pure,  but  are  cloyed  with 
sight  and  therefore  visible. 

That  is  very  likely,  Socrates. 

Yes,  that  is  very  likely,  Cebes ;  and  these  must  be  the  souls, 
not  of  the  good,  but  of  the  evil,  who  are  compelled  to  wander 
about  such  places  in  payment  of  the  penalty  of  their  former 
evil  way  of  life ;  and  they  continue  to  wander  until  the  desire 
which  haunts  them  is  satisfied  and  they  are  imprisoned  in 
another  body.  And  they  may  be  supposed  to  be  fixed  in  the 
same  natures  which  they  had  in  their  former  life. 

What  natures  do  you  mean,  Socrates? 

I  mean  to  say  that  men  who  have  followed  after  gluttony, 
and  wantonness,  and  drunkenness,  and  have  had  no  thought 
of  avoiding  them,  would  pass  into  asses  and  animals  of  that 
sort.    What  do  you  think? 

I  think  that  exceedingly  probable. 

And  those  who  have  chosen  the  portion  of  injustice,  and 
tyranny,  and  violence,  will  pass  into  wolves,  or  hawks,  and 
kites ;  whither  else  can  we  suppose  them  to  go  ? 

Yes,  said  Cebes ;  that  is  doubtless  the  place  of  natures  such 
as  theirs. 

And  there  is  no  difficulty,  he  said,  in  assigning  to  all  of 
them  places  answering  to  their  several  natures  and  pro- 
pensities ? 

There  is  not,  he  said. 

Even  among  them  some  are  happier  than  others;  and  the 
happiest  both  in  themselves  and  their  place  of  abode  are  those 
who  have  practised  the  civil  and  social  virtues  which  are 
called  temperance  and  justice,  and  are  acquired  by  habit  and 
attention  without  philosophy  and  mind. 


PHiEDO  75 

Why  are  they  the  happiest? 

Because  they  may  be  expected  to  pass  into  some  gentle, 
social  nature  which  is  hke  their  own,  such  as  that  of  bees  or 
ants,  or  even  back  again  into  the  form  of  man,  and  just  and 
moderate  men  spring  from  them. 

That  is  not  impossible. 

But  he  who  is  a  philosopher  or  lover  of  learning,  and  is 
entirely  pure  at  departing,  is  alone  permitted  to  reach  the 
gods.  And  this  is  the  reason,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  why  the 
true  votaries  of  philosophy  abstain  from  all  fleshly  lusts, 
and  endure  and  refuse  to  give  themselves  up  to  them — not 
because  they  fear  poverty  or  the  ruin  of  their  families,  like 
the  lovers  of  money,  and  the  world  in  general;  nor  like  the 
lovers  of  power  and  honor,  because  they  dread  the  dishonor 
or  disgrace  of  evil  deeds. 

No,  Socrates,  that  would  not  become  them,  said  Cebes. 

No,  indeed,  he  replied;  and  therefore  they  who  have  a 
care  of  their  souls,  and  do  not  merely  live  in  the  fashions 
of  the  body,  say  farewell  to  all  this ;  they  will  not  walk  in 
the  ways  of  the  blind:  and  when  Philosophy  offers  them 
purification  and  release  from  evil,  they  feel  that  they  ought 
not  to  resist  her  influence,  and  to  her  they  incline,  and 
whither  she  leads  they  follow  her. 

What  do  you  mean,  Socrates  ? 

I  will  tell  you,  he  said.  The  lovers  of  knowledge  are  con- 
scious that  their  souls,  when  philosophy  receives  them,  are 
simply  fastened  and  glued  to  their  bodies:  the  soul  is  only 
able  to  view  existence  through  the  bars  of  a  prison,  and  not 
in  her  own  nature;  she  is  wallowing  in  the  mire  of  all 
ignorance;  and  philosophy,  seeing  the  terrible  nature  of  her 
confinement,  and  that  the  captive  through  desire  is  led  to 
conspire  in  her  own  captivity  (for  the  lovers  of  knowledge 
are  aware  that  this  was  the  original  state  of  the  soul,  and 
that  when  she  was  in  this  state  philosophy  received  and 
gently  counseled  her,  and  wanted  to  release  her,  pointing 
out  to  her  that  the  eye  is  full  of  deceit,  and  also  the  ear  and 
other  senses,  and  persuading  her  to  retire  from  them  in  all 
but  the  necessary  use  of  them  and  to  be  gathered  up  and 
collected  into  herself,  and  to  trust  only  to  herself  and  her 
own  intuitions  of  absolute  existence,  and  mistrust  that  which 


76  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

comes  to  her  through  others  and  is  subject  to  vicissitude) — 
philosophy  shows  her  that  this  is  visible  and  tangible,  but 
that  what  she  sees  in  her  own  nature  is  intellectual  and  in- 
visible. And  the  soul  of  the  true  philosopher  thinks  that 
she  ought  not  to  resist  this  deliverance,  and  therefore  ab- 
stains from  pleasures  and  desires  and  pains  and  fears,  as 
far  as  she  is  able;  reflecting  that  when  a  man  has  great  joys 
or  sorrows  or  fears  or  desires  he  suffers  from  them,  not 
the  sort  of  evil  which  might  be  anticipated — as,  for  example, 
the  loss  of  his  health  or  property,  ,which  he  has  sacrificed 
to  his  lusts — but  he  has  suffered  an  evil  greater  far,  which 
is  the  greatest  and  worst  of  all  evils,  and  one  of  which  he 
never  thinks. 

And  what  is  that,  Socrates?  said  Cebes. 

Why  this:  When  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain  in  the 
soul  is  most  intense,  all  of  us  naturally  suppose  that  the 
object  of  this  intense  feeling  is  then  plainest  and  truest: 
but  this  is  not  the  case. 

Very  true. 

And  this  is  the  state  in  which  the  soul  is  most  enthralled 
by  the  body. 

How  is  that? 

Why,  because  each  pleasure  and  pain  is  a  sort  of  nail 
which  nails  and  rivets  the  soul  to  the  body,  and  engrosses 
her  and  makes  her  believe  that  to  be  true  which  the  body 
affirms  to  be  true;  and  from  agreeing  with  the  body  and 
having  the  same  delights  she  is  obliged  to  have  the  same 
habits  and  ways,  and  is  not  likely  ever  to  be  pure  at  her 
departure  to  the  world  below,  but  is  always  saturated  with 
the  body ;  so  that  she  soon  sinks  into  another  body  and  there 
germinates  and  grows,  and  has  therefore  no  part  in  the 
communion  of  the  divine  and  pure  and  simple. 

That  is  most  true,  Socrates,  answered  Cebes. 

And  this,  Cebes,  is  the  reason  why  the  true  lovers  of 
knowledge  are  temperate  and  brave;  and  not  for  the  reason 
which  the  world  gives. 

Certainly  not. 

Certainly  not!  For  not  in  that  way  does  the  soul  of  a 
philosopher  reason;  she  will  not  ask  philosophy  to  release 
her  in  order  that  when  released  she  may  deliver  herself  up 


PHiEDO  77 

again  to  the  thraldom  of  pleasures  and  pains,  doing  a  work 
only  to  be  undone  again,  weaving  instead  of  unweaving  her 
Penelope's  web.  But  she  will  make  herself  a  calm  of  passion 
and  follow  Reason,  and  dwell  in  her,  beholding  the  true  and 
divine  (which  is  not  matter  of  opinion),  and  thence  derive 
nourishment.  Thus  she  seeks  to  live  while  she  lives,  and 
after  death  she  hopes  to  go  to  her  own  kindred  and  to  be 
freed  from  human  ills.  Never  fear,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  that 
a  soul  which  has  been  thus  nurtured  and  has  had  these  pur- 
suits, will  at  her  departure  from  the  body  be  scattered  and 
blown  away  by  the  winds  and  be  nowhere  and  nothing. 

When  Socrates  had  done  speaking,  for  a  considerable  time 
there  was  silence;  he  himself  and  most  of  us  appeared  to  be 
meditating  on  what  had  been  said;  only  Cebes  and  Simmias 
spoke  a  few  words  to  one  another.  And  Socrates  observing 
this  asked  them  what  they  thought  of  the  argument,  and 
whether  there  was  anything  wanting?  For,  said  he,  much  is 
still  open  to  suspicion  and  attack,  if  any  one  were  disposed 
to  sift  the  matter  thoroughly.  If  you  are  talking  of  some- 
thing else  I  would  rather  not  interrupt  you,  but  if  you  are 
still  doubtful  about  the  argument  do  not  hesitate  to  say 
exactly  what  you  think,  and  let  us  have  anything  better 
which  you  can  suggest;  and  if  I  am  likely  to  be  of  any  use, 
allow  me  to  help  you. 

Simmias  said:  I  must  confess,  Socrates,  that  doubts  did 
arise  in  our  minds,  and  each  of  us  was  urging  and  inciting 
the  other  to  put  the  question  which  he  wanted  to  have 
answered  and  which  neither  of  us  liked  to  ask,  fearing  that 
our  importunity  might  be  troublesome  under  present  cir- 
cumstances. 

Socrates  smiled  and  said :  O  Simmias,  how  strange  that  is ; 
I  am  not  very  likely  to  persuade  other  men  that  I  do  not 
regard  my  present  situation  as  a  misfortune,  if  I  am  unable  to 
persuade  you,  and  you  will  keep  fancying  that  I  am  at  all  more 
troubled  now  than  at  any  other  time.  Will  you  not  allow 
that  I  have  as  much  of  the  spirit  of  prophecy  in  me  as  the 
swans?  For  they,  when  they  perceive  that  they  must  die, 
having  sung  all  their  life  long,  do  then  sing  more  than  ever, 
rejoicing  in  the  thought  that  they  are  about  to  go  away  to 
the  god  whose  ministers  they  are.    But  men,  because  they 


78  DIALOGUES    OF    PLATO 

are  themselves  afraid  of  death,  slanderously  affirm  of  the 
swans  that  they  sing  a  lament  at  the  last,  not.  considering 
that  no  bird  sings  when  cold,  or  hungry,  or  in  pain,  not 
even  the  nightingale,  nor  the  swallow,  nor  yet  the  hoopoe; 
which  are  said  indeed  to  tune  a  lay  of  sorrow,  although  I 
do  not  believe  this  to  be  true  of  them  any  more  than  of  the 
swans.  But  because  they  are  sacred  to  Apollo  and  have  the 
gift  of  prophecy  and  anticipate  the  good  things  of  another 
world,  therefore  they  sing  and  rejoice  in  that  day  more  than 
they  ever  did  before.  And  I,  too,  believing  myself  to  be  the 
consecrated  servant  of  the  same  God,  and  the  fellow  servant 
of  the  swans,  and  thinking  that  I  have  received  from  my 
master  gifts  of  prophecy  which  are  not  inferior  to  theirs, 
would  not  go  out  of  life  less  merrily  than  the  swans.  Cease 
to  mind  then  about  this,  but  speak  and  ask  anything  which 
you  like,  while  the  eleven  magistrates  of  Athens  allow. 

Well,  Socrates,  said  Simmias,  then  I  will  tell  you  my  diffi- 
culty, and  Cebes  will  tell  you  his.  For  I  dare  say  that  you, 
Socrates,  feel  as  I  do,  how  very  hard  or  almost  impossible 
is  the  attainment  of  any  certainty  about  questions  such  as 
these  in  the  present  life.  And  yet  I  should  deem  him  a 
coward  who  did  not  prove  of  what  is  said  about  them  to  the 
uttermost,  or  whose  heart  failed  him  before  he  had  examined 
them  on  every  side.  For  he  should  persevere  until  he  has 
attained  one  of  two  things:  either  he  should  discover  or 
learn  the  truth  about  them ;  or,  if  this  is  impossible,  I  would 
have  him  take  the  best  and  most  irrefragable  of  human  no- 
tions, and  let  this  be  the  raft  upon  which  he  sails  through  life 
• — not  without  risk,  as  I  admit,  if  he  cannot  find  some  word 
of  God  which  will  more  surely  and  safely  carry  him.  And 
nov/,  as  you  bid  me,  I  will  venture  to  question  you,  as  I 
should  not  like  to  reproach  myself  hereafter  with  not  having 
said  at  the  time  what  I  think.  For  when  I  consider  the 
m-atter  either  alone  or  with  Cebes,  the  argument  does  cer- 
tainly appear  to  me,  Socrates,  to  be  not  sufficient. 

Socrates  answered:  I  dare  say,  my  friend,  that  you  may 
be  right,  but  I  should  like  to  know  in  what  respect  the  argu- 
ment is  not  sufficient. 

In  this  respect,  replied  Simmias:  Might  not  a  person  use 
the  same  argument  about  harmony  and  the  lyre — might  he 


PHiEDO  79 

not  say  that  harmony  is  a  thing  invisible,  incorporeal,  fair, 
divine,  abiding  in  the  lyre  which  is  harmonized,  but  that 
the  lyre  and  the  strings  are  matter  and  material,  composite^ 
earthy,  and  akin  to  mortality?  And  when  some  one  breaks 
the  lyre,  or  cuts  and  rends  the  strings,  then  he  who  takes 
this  view  would  argue  as  you  do,  and  on  the  same  analogy, 
that  the  harmony  survives  and  has  not  perished;  for  you 
cannot  imagine,  as  we  would  say,  that  the  lyre  without  the 
strings,  and  the  broken  strings  themselves,  remain,  and  yet 
that  the  harmony,  which  is  of  heavenly  and  immortal  nature 
and  kindred,  has  perished — and  perished  too  before  the 
mortal.  The  harmony,  he  would  say,  certainly  exists  some- 
v/here,  and  the  wood  and  strings  will  decay  before  that  de- 
cays. For  I  suspect,  Socrates,  that  the  notion  of  the  soul 
which  we  are  all  of  us  inclined  to  entertain,  would  also  be 
yours,  and  that  you  too  would  conceive  the  body  to  be  strung 
up,  and  held  together,  by  the  elements  of  hot  and  cold,  wet 
and  dry,  and  the  like,  and  that  the  soul  is  the  harmony  or 
due  proportionate  admixture  pf  them.  And,  if  this  is  true, 
the  inference  clearly  is  that  when  the  strings  of  the  body 
are  unduly  loosened  or  overstrained  through  disorder  or 
other  injury,  then  the  soul,  though  most  divine,  like  other 
harmonies  of  music  or  of  the  works  of  art,  of  course  perishes 
at  once,  although  the  material  remains  of  the  body  may 
last  for  a  considerable  time,  until  they  are  either  decayed 
or  burnt.  Now  if  any  one  maintained  that  the  soul,  being 
the  harmony  of  the  elements  of  the  body,  first  perishes  in 
that  which  is  called  death,  how  shall  we  answer  him? 

Socrates  looked  round  at  us  as  his  manner  was,  and  said, 
with  a  smile :  Simmias  has  reason  on  his  side ;  and  why  does 
not  some  one  of  you  who  is  abler  than  myself  answer  him? 
for  there  is  force  in  his  attack  upon  me.  But  perhaps,  before 
we  answer  him,  we  had  better  also  hear  what  Cebes  has  to 
say  against  the  argument — this  will  give  us  time  for  reflec- 
tion, and  when  both  of  them  have  spoken,  we  may  either 
assent  to  them  if  their  words  appear  to  be  in  consonance 
with  the  truth,  or  if  not,  v/e  may  take  up  the  other  side,  and 
argue  with  them.  Please  to  tell  me  then,  Cebes,  he  said, 
what  was  the  difficulty  which  troubled  you  ? 

Cebes  said:  I  will  tell  you.    My  feeling  is  that  the  argu- 


80  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

ment  is  still  in  the  same  position,   and  open  to  the  same 
objections  which  were  urged  before;  for  I  am  ready  to  admit 
that  the  existence  of  the  soul  before  entering  into  the  bodily 
lorm  has  been  very  ingeniously,  and,  as  I  may  be  allowed 
to  say,  quite  sufficiently  proven;  but  the  existence  of  the 
soul  after  death  is  still,  in  my  judgment,  unproven.     Now 
my  objection  is  not  the  same  as  that  of  Simmias;  for  I  am 
not  disposed  to  deny  that  the  soul  is   stronger  and  more 
lasting  than   the   body,  being   of   opinion   that  in  all   such 
respects  the  soul  very  far  excels  the  body.    Well,  then,  says 
the    argument   to   me,    why    do    you   remain   unconvinced? 
When  you  see  that  the  weaker  is  still  in  existence  after 
the  man  is  dead,  will  you  not  admit  that  the  more  lasting 
must  also  survive  during  the  same  period  of  time?    Now  I, 
like  Simmias,  must  employ  a  figure;  and  I  shall  ask  you  to 
consider  whether  the  figure  is  to  the  point.     The  parallel 
which  I  will  suppose  is  that  of  an  old  weaver,  who  dies, 
and  after  his  death  somebody  says :  He  is  not  dead,  he  must 
be  alive;  and  he  appeals  to  the  coat  which  he  himself  wove 
and  wore,  and  which  is  still  whole  and  undecayed.    And  then 
he  proceeds  to  ask  of  some  one  who  is  incredulous,  whether 
a  man  lasts  longer,  or  the  coat  which  is  in  use  and  wear; 
and  when  he  is  answered  that  a  man  lasts  far  longer,  thinks 
that  he   has   thus   certainly   demonstrated  the   survival   of 
the  man,  who  is  the  more  lasting,  because  the  less  lasting 
remains.    But  that,  Simmias,  as  I  would  beg  you  to  observe, 
is  not  the  truth;  every  one  sees  that  he  who  talks  thus  is 
talking  nonsense.    For  the  truth  is  that  this  weaver,  having 
worn  and  woven  many  such  coats,  though  he  outlived  several 
of  them,  was  himself  outlived  by  the  last;  but  this  is  surely 
very  far  from  proving  that  a  man  is  slighter  and  weaker 
than  a  coat.    Now  the  relation  of  the  body  to  the  soul  may 
be  expressed  in  a  similar  figure ;  for  you  may  say  with  reason 
that  the  soul  is  lasting,  and  the  body  weak  and  shortlived  in 
comparison.    And  every  soul  may  be  said  to  wear  out  many 
bodies,  especially  in  the  course  of  a  long  life.    For  if  while 
the  man  is  alive  the  body  deliquesces  and  decays,  and  yet 
the  soul  always  weaves  her  garment  anew  and  repairs  the 
waste,  then  of  course,  when  the  soul  perishes,  she  must  have 
on  her  last  garment,  and  this  only  ,will  survive  her;  but  then 


PH^DO  81 

again  when  the  soul  is  dead  the  body  will  at  last  show  its 
native  weakness,  and  soon  pass  into  decay.  And  therefore 
this  is  an  argument  on  which  I  would  rather  not  rely  as 
proving  that  the  soul  exists  after  death.  For  suppose  that 
we  grant  even  more  than  you  affirm  as  within  the  range 
of  possibility,  and  besides  acknowledging  that  the  soul  ex- 
isted before  birth  admit  also  that  after  death  the  souls  of 
some  are  existing  still,  and  will  exist,  and  will  be  born  and 
die  again  and  again,  and  that  there  is  a  natural  strength  in 
the  soul  which  will  hold  out  and  be  born  many  times — 
for  all  this,  we  may  be  still  inclined  to  think  that  she  will 
iweary  in  the  labors  of  successive  births,  and  may  at  last 
succumb  in  one  of  her  deaths  and  utterly  perish;  and  this 
death  and  dissolution  of  the  body  which  brings  destruction 
to  the  soul  may  be  imknown  to  any  of  us,  for  no  one  of 
us  can  have  had  any  experience  of  it:  and  if  this  be  true, 
then  I  say  that  he  who  is  confident  in  death  has  but  a  foolish 
confidence,  unless  he  is  able  to  prove  that  the  soul  is  alto- 
gether immortal  and  imperishable.  But  if  he  is  not  able  to 
prove  this,  he  who  is  about  to  die  will  always  have  reason 
to  fear  that  when  the  body  is  disunited,  the  soul  also  may 
utterly  perish. 

All  of  us,  as  we  afterwards  remarked  to  one  another,  had 
an  unpleasant  feeling  at  hearing  them  say  this.  When  we 
had  been  so  firmly  convicted  before,  now  to  have  our  faith 
shaken  seemed  to  introduce  a  confusion  and  uncertainty, 
not  only  into  the  previous  argument,  but  into  any  future 
one;  either  we  were  not  good  judges,  or  there  were  no  real 
grounds  of  belief. 

Ech.  There  I  feel  with  you — indeed  I  do,  Ph^do,  and 
when  you  were  speaking,  I  was  beginning  to  ask  myself  the 
same  question :  What  argument  can  I  ever  trust  again  ?  For 
what  could  be  more  convincing  than  the  argument  of  Soc- 
rates, which  has  now  fallen  into  discredit?  That  the  soul 
is  a  harmony  is  a  doctrine  which  has  always  had  a  wonderful 
attraction  for  me,  and,  when  mentioned,  came  back  to  me 
at  once,  as  my  own  original  conviction.  And  now  I  must 
begin  again  and  find  another  argument  which  will  assure 
me  that  when  the  man  is  dead  the  soul  dies  not  with  him. 
Tell  me,  I  beg,  how  did  Socrates  proceed?    Did  he  appear 


82  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

to  share  the  unpleasant  feeling  which  you  mentiofi?  or  did 
he  receive  the  interruption  calmly  and  give  a  sufficient 
answer  ?    Tell  us,  as  exactly  as  you  can,  what  passed. 

Phced.  Often,  Echecrates,  as  I  have  admired  Socrates,  I 
never  admired  him  more  than  at  that  moment.  That  he 
should  be  able  to  answer  was  nothing,  but  what  astonished 
me  was,  first,  the  gentle  and  pleasant  and  approving  manner 
in  which  he  regarded  the  words  of  the  young  men,  and  then 
his  quick  sense  of  the  wound  which  had  been  inflicted  by 
the  argument,  and  his  ready  application  of  the  healing  art. 
He  might  be  compared  to  a  general  rallying  his  defeated 
and  broken  army,  urging  them  to  follow  him  and  return  to 
the  field  of  argument. 

Ech.  How  was  that? 

Phced.  You  shall  hear,  for  I  was  close  to  him  on  his  right 
hand,  seated  on  a  sort  of  stool,  and  he  on  a  couch  which 
was  a  good  deal  higher.  Now  he  had  a  way  of  playing  with 
my  hair,  and  then  he  smoothed  my  head,  and  pressed  the 
hair  upon  my  neck,  and  said :  To-morrow,  Phsedo,  I  suppose 
that  these  fair  locks  of  yours  will  be  severed. 

Yes,  Socrates,  I  suppose  that  they  will,  I  replied. 

Not  so  if  you  will  take  my  advice. 

What  shall  I  do  with  them  ?  I  said. 

To-day,  he  replied,  and  not  to-morrow,  if  this  argument 
dies  and  cannot  be  brought  to  life  again  by  us,  you  and  I 
will  both  shave  our  locks;  and  if  I  were  you,  and  could 
not  maintain  my  ground  against  Simmias  and  Cebes,  I  would 
myself  take  an  oath,  like  the  Argives,  not  to  wear  hair  any 
more  until  I  had  renewed  the  conflict  and  defeated  them. 

Yes,  I  said,  but  Heracles  himself  is  said  not  to  be  a  match 
for  two. 

Summon  me  then,  he  said,  and  I  will  be  your  lolaus  until 
the  sun  goes  down. 

I  summon  you  rather,  I  said,  not  as  Heracles  summoning 
lolaus,  but  as  lolaus  might  summon  Heracles. 

That  will  be  all  the  same,  he  said.  But  first  let  us  take 
care  that  we  avoid  a  danger. 

And  what  is  that  ?  I  said. 

The  danger  of  becoming  misologists,  he  replied,  which  is 
one  of  the  very  worst  things  that  can  happen  to  us.    For  as 


PHvEDO  83 

there  are  misanthropists  or  haters  of  men,  there  are  also 
misologists  or  haters  of  ideas,  and  both  spring  from  the 
same  cause,  which  is  ignorance  of  the  world.  Misanthropy 
5irises  from  the- too  great  confidence  of  inexperience;  you 
trust  a  man  and  think  him  altogether  true  and  good  and 
faithful,  and  then  in  a  little  while  he  turns  out  to  be  false 
and  knaviph;  and  then  another  and  another,  and  when  this 
has  happened  several  times  to  a  man,  especially  within  the 
circle  of  his  most  trusted  friends,  as  he  deems  them,  and  he 
has  often  quarreled  with  them,  he  at  last  hates  all  men,  and 
believes  that  no  one  has  any  good  in  him  at  all.  I  dare  say 
that  you  must  have  observed  this. 

Yes,  I  said. 

And  is  not  this  discreditable?  The  reason  is  that  a  man, 
having  to  deal  with  other  men,  has  no  knowledge  of  them; 
for  if  he  had  knowledge  he  would  have  known  the  true  state 
of  the  case,  that  few  are  the  good  and  few  the  evil,  and  that 
the  great  majority  are  in  the  interval  between  them.. 

How  do  you  mean  ?  I  said. 

I  mean,  he  replied,  as  you  might  say  of  the  very  large  and 
very  small,  that  nothing  is  more  uncommon  than  a  very  large 
or  a  very  small  man;  and  this  applies  generally  to  all  ex- 
tremes, whether  of  great  and  small,  or  swift  and  slow,  or  fair 
and  foul,  or  black  and  white :  and  whether  the  instances  you 
select  be  men  or  dogs  or  anything  else,  few  are  the  extremes, 
but  many  are  in  the  mean  between  them.  Did  you  never  ob- 
serve this? 

Yes,  I  said,  I  have. 

And  do  you  not  imagine,  he  said,  that  if  there  were  a 
competition  of  evil,  the  first  in  evil  would  be  found  to  be 
very  few? 

Yes,  that  is  very  likely,  I  said. 

Yes,  that  is  very  likely,  he  replied ;  not  that  in  this  respect 
arguments  are  like  men — there  I  was  led  on  by  you  to  say 
more  than  I  had  intended;  but  the  point  of  comparison  was 
that  when  a  simple  man  who  has  no  skill  in  dialectics  be- 
lieves an  argument  to  be  true  which  he  afterwards  imagines 
to  be  false,  whether  really  false  or  not,  and  then  another  and 
another,  he  has  no  longer  any  faith  left,  and  great  disputers, 
;as  you  know,  come  to  think  at  last  that  they  have  grown  to 


84  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

be  the  wisest  of  mankind;  for  they  alone  perceive  the  utter 
unsoundness  and  instability  of  all  arguments,  or,  indeed,  of 
all  things,  which,  like  the  currents  in  the  Euripus,  are  going 
up  and  down  in  never-ceasing  ebb  and  flow. 

That  is  quite  true,  I  said. 

Yes,  Phsedo,  he  replied,  and  very  melancholy  too,  if  there 
be  such  a  thing  as  truth  or  certainty  or  power  of  knowing  at 
all,  that  a  man  should  have  lighted  upon  some  argument  or 
other  which  at  first  seemed  true  and  then  turned  out  to  be 
false,  and  instead  of  blaming  himself  and  his  own  want  of 
wit,  because  he  is  annoyed,  should  at  last  be  too  glad  to  trans- 
fer the  blame  from  himself  to  arguments  in  general ;  and  for- 
ever afterwards  should  hate  and  revile  them,  and  lose  the 
truth  and  knowledge  of  existence. 

Yes,  indeed,  I  said ;  that  is  very  melancholy. 

Let  us,  then,  in  the  first  place,  he  said,  be  careful  of  admit- 
ting into  our  souls  the  notion  that  there  is  no  truth  or  health 
or  soundness  in  any  arguments  at  all;  but  let  us  rather  say 
that  there  is  as  yet  no  health  in  us,  and  that  we  must  quit 
ourselves  like  men  and  do  our  best  to  gain  health — ^you  and 
all  other  men  with  a  view  to  the  whole  of  your  future  life, 
and  I  myself  with  a  view  to  death.  For  at  this  moment  I 
am  sensible  that  I  have  not  the  temper  of  a  philosopher ;  like 
the  vulgar,  I  am  only  a  partisan.  For  the  partisan,  when  he 
is  engaged  in  a  dispute,  cares  nothing  about  the  rights  of  the 
question,  but  is  anxious  only  to  convince  his  hearers  6i 
his  own  assertions.  And  the  difference  between  him  and  me 
at  the  present  moment  is  only  this — that  whereas  he  seeks  to 
convince  his  hearers  that  what  he  says  is  true,  I  am  rather 
seeking  to  convince  myself;  to  convince  my  hearers  is  a  sec- 
ondary matter  with  me.  And  do  but  see  how  much  I  gain  by 
this.  For  if  what  I  say  is  true,  then  I  do  well  to  be  persuaded 
of  the  truths  but  if  there  be  nothing  after  death,  still,  during 
the  short  time  that  remains,  I  shall  save  my  friends  from 
lamentations,  and  my  ignorance  will  not  last,  and  therefore 
no  harm  will  be  done.  This  is  the  state  of  mind,  Simmias  and 
Cebes,  in  which  I  approach  the  argument.  And  I  would  ask 
you  to  be  thinking  of  the  truth  and  not  of  Socrates:  agree 
with  me,  if  I  seem  to  you  to  be  speaking  the  truth ;  or  if  not, 
withstand  me  might  and  main,  that  I  may  not  deceive  you  as 


PH^DO  85 

well  as  myself  in  my  enthusiasm,  and,  like  the  bee,  leave  my 
sting  in  you  before  I  die. 

And  now  let  us  proceed,  he  said.  And  first  of  all  let  me 
be  sure  that  I  have  in  my  mind  what  you  were  saying.  Sim- 
mias,  if  I  remember  rightly,  has  fears  and  misgivings  whether 
the  soul,  being  in  the  form  of  harmony,  although  a  fairer 
and  diviner  thing  than  the  body,  may  not  perish  first.  On 
the  other  hand,  Cebes  appeared  to  grant  that  the  soul  was 
more  lasting  than  the  body,  but  he  said  that  no  one  could 
know  whether  the  soul,  after  having  worn  out  many  bodies, 
might  not  perish  herself  and  leave  her  last  body  behind  her; 
and  that  this  is  death,  which  is  the  destruction  not  of  the 
body  but  of  the  soul,  for  in  the  body  the  work  of  destruction 
is  ever  going  on.  Are  not  these,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  the 
points  which  we  have  to  consider? 

They  both  agreed  to  this  statement  of  them. 

He  proceeded:  And  did  you  deny  the  force  of  the  whole 
preceding  argument,  or  of  a  part  only? 

Of  a  part  only,  they  replied. 

And  what  did  you  think,  he  said,  of  that  part  of  the  argu- 
ment in  which  we  said  that  knowledge  was  recollection  only, 
and  inferred  from  this  that  the  soul  must  have  previously 
existed  somewhere  else  before  she  was  enclosed  in  the  body  ? 
Cebes  said  that  he  had  been  wonderfully  impressed  by  that 
part  of  the  argumient,  and  that  his  conviction  remained  un- 
shaken. Simmias  agreed,  and  added  that  he  himself  could 
hardly  imagine  the  possibility  of  his  ever  thinking  differently 
about  that. 

But,  rejoined  Socrates,  you  will  have  to  think  differently, 
my  Theban  friend,  if  you  still  maintain  that  harmony  is  a 
compound,  and  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony  which  is  made  out 
of  strings  set  in  the  frame  of  the  body;  for  you  will  surely 
never  allow  yourself  to  say  that  a  harmony  is  prior  to  the 
elements  which  com.pose  the  harmony. 

No,  Socrates,  that  is  impossible. 

But  do  you  not  see  that  you  are  saying  this  when  you  say 
that  the  soul  existed  before  she  took  the  form  and  body  of 
man,  and  was  made  up  of  elements  which  as  yet  had  no 
existence  ?  For  harmony  is  not  a  sort  of  thing  like  the  soul, 
as  you  suppose;  but  first  the  lyre,  and  the  strings,  and  the 


86  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

sounds  exist  in  a  state  of  discord,  and  then  harmony  is  made 
last  of  all,  and  perishes  first.  And  how  can  such  a  notion  of 
the  soul  as  this  agree  with  the  other? 

Not  at  all,  replied  Simmias. 

And  yet,  he  said,  there  surely  ought  to  be  harmony  when 
harmony  is  the  theme  of  discourse. 

Tliere  ought,  replied  Simmias. 

But  there  is  no  harmony,  he  said,  in  the  two  propositions 
that  knowledge  is  recollection,  and  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony. 
Which  of  them,  then,  will  you  retain  ? 

I  think,  he  replied,  that  I  have  a  much  stronger  faith,  Soc- 
rates, in  the  first  of  the  tvv^o,  which  has  been  fully  demon- 
strated to  me,  than  in  the  latter,  which  has  not  been  demon- 
strated at  all,  but  rests  only  on  probable  and  plausible 
grounds;  and  I  know  too  well  that  these  arguments  from 
probabilities  are  impostors,  and  unless  great  caution  is  ob- 
served in  the  use  of  them  they  are  apt  to  be  deceptive — in 
geometry,  and  in  other  things  too.  But  the  doctrine  of  knowl- 
edge and  recollection  has  been  proven  to  me  on  trustworthy 
grounds;  and  the  proof  was  that  the  soul  must  have  existed 
before  she  came  into  the  body,  because  to  her  belongs  the 
essence  of  which  the  very  name  implies  existence.  Having, 
as  I  am  convinced,  rightly  accepted  this  conclusion,  and  on 
sufficient  grounds,  I  must,  as  I  suppose,  cease  to  argue  or 
allow  others  to  argue  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony. 

Let  me  put  the  matter,  Simmias,  he  said,  in  another  point 
of  view:  Do  you  imagine  that  a  harmony  or  any  other 
composition  can  be  in  a  state  other  than  that  of  the  elements 
out  of  which  it  is  compounded  ? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  do  or  suffer  anything  other  than  they  do  or  suffer  ? 

He  agreed. 

Then  a  harmony  does  not  lead  the  parts  or  elements  which 
make  up  the  harmony,  but  only  follows  them. 

He  assented. 

For  harmony  cannot  possibly  have  any  motion,  or  sound, 
or  other  quality  which  is  opposed  to  the  parts. 

That  would  be  impossible,  he  replied. 

And  does  not  every  harmony  depend  upon  the  manner  in 
which  the  elements  are  harmonized? 


FHMDO  87 

I  do  not  understand  you,  he  said. 

I  mean  to  say  that  a  harmony  admits  of  degrees,  and  is 
more  of  a  harmony,  and  more  completely  a  harmony,  when 
more  completely  harmonized,  if  that  be  possible;  and  less 
of  a  harmiony,  and  less  completely  a  harmony,  when  less 
harmonized. 

True. 

But  does  the  soul  admit  of  degrees?  or  is  one  soul  in  the 
very  least  degree  more  or  less,  or  more  or  less  completely, 
a  soul  than  another? 

Not  in  the  least. 

Yet  surely  one  squI  is  said  to  have  intelligence  and  virtue, 
and  to  be  good,  and  another  soul  is  said  to  have  folly  and 
vice,  and  to  be  an  evil  soul :  and  this  is  said  truly  ? 

Yes,  truly. 

But  what  will  those  who  maintain  the  soul  to  be  a  harmony 
say  of  this  presence  of  virtue  and  vice  in  the  soul? — will 
they  say  that  there  is  another  harmony,  and  another  discord, 
and  that  the  virtuous  soul  is  harmonized,  and  herself  being 
harmony  has  another  harmony  within  her,  and  that  the 
vicious  soul  is  inharmonical  and  has  no  harmony  within  her? 

I  cannot  say,  replied  Simmias;  but  I  suppose  that  some- 
thing of  that  kind  would  be  asserted  by  those  who  take  this 
view. 

And  the  admission  is  already  made  that  no  soul  is  more  a 
soul  than  another;  and  this  is  equivalent  to  admitting  that 
harmony  is  not  more  or  less  harmony,  or  more  or  less  com- 
pletely a  harmony? 

Quite  true. 

And  that  which  is  not  more  or  less  a  harmony  is  not  more 
or  less  harmonized? 

True. 

And  that  which  is  not  more  or  less  harmonized  cannot  have 
more  or  less  of  harmony,  but  only  an  equal  harmony? 

Yes,  an  equal  harmony. 

Then  one  soul  not  being  more  or  less  absolutely  a  soul  than 
another,  is  not  more  or  less  harmonized? 

Exactly. 

And  therefore  has  neither  more  nor  less  of  harmony  or  of 
discord  ? 


88  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

She  has  not. 

And  having  neither  more  nor  less  of  harmony  or  of  dis- 
cord, one  soul  has  no  more  vice  or  virtue  than  another,  if 
vice  be  discord  and  virtue  harmony? 

Not  at  all  more. 

Or  speaking  more  correctly,  Simmias,  the  soul,  if  she  is  a 
harmony,  will  never  have  any  vice ;  because  a  harmony,  being 
absolutely  a  harmony,  has  no  part  in  the  inharmonical  ? 

No. 

And  therefore  a  soul  which  is  absolutely  a  soul  has  no  vice  ? 

How  can  she  have,  consistently  with  the  preceding  argu- 
ment? 

Then,  according  to  this,  if  the  souls  of  all  animals  are 
equally  and  absolutely  souls,  they  will  be  equally  good? 

I  agree  with  you,  Socrates,  he  said. 

And  can  all  this  be  true,  think  you?  he  said;  and  are  all 
these  consequences  admissible — which  nevertheless  seem  to 
follow  from  the  assumption  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony? 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

Once  m-ore,  he  said,  what  ruling  principle  is  there  of  human 
things  other  than  the  soul,  and  especially  the  wise  soul  ?  Do 
you  know  of  any? 

Indeed,  I  do  not. 

And  is  the  soul  in  agreement  with  the  affections  of  the 
body?  or  is  she  at  variance  with  them?  For  example,  when 
the  body  is  hot  and  thirsty,  does  not  the  soul  incline  us 
against  drinking?  and  when  the  body  is  hungry,  against  eat- 
ing? And  this  is  only  one  instance  out  of  ten  thousand  of 
the  opposition  of  the  soul  to  the  things  of  the  body. 

Very  true. 

But  we  have  already  acknowledged  that  the  soul,  being  a 
harmony,  can  never  utter  a  note  at  variance  with  the  tensions 
and  relaxations  and  vibrations  and  other  affections  of  the 
strings  out  of  which  she  is  composed;  she  can  only  follow, 
she  cannot  lead  them  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  we  acknowledged  that,  certainly. 

And  yet  we  do  not  now  discover  the  soul  to  be  doing  the 
exact  opposite — leading  the  elements  of  which  she  is  be- 
lieved to  be  composed;  almost  always  opposing  and  coercing 
them  in  all  sorts  of  ways  throughout  life,  sometimes  more 


PH^DO  89 

violently  with  the  pains  of  medicine  and  gymnastic;  then 
again  more  gently;  threatening  and  also  reprimanding  the 
desires,  passions,  fears,  as  if  talking  to  a  thing  which  is  not 
herself,  as  Homer  in  the  "  Odyssey "  represents  Odysseus 
doing  in  the  words, 

"He  beat  his  breast,  and  thus  reproached  his  heart: 
Endure,  my  heart;  far  worse  hast  thou  endured  I" 

Do  you  think  that  Homer  could  have  written  this  under  the 
idea  that  the  soul  is  a  harmony  capable  of  being  led  by  the  af- 
fections of  the  body,  and  not  rather  of  a  nature  which  leads 
and  masters  them;  and  herself  a  far  diviner  thing  than  any 
harmony  ? 

Yes,  Socrates,  I  quite  agree  to  that. 

Then,  my  friend,  we  can  never  be  right  in  saying  that  the 
soul  is  a  harmony,  for  that  would  clearly  contradict  the 
divine  Homer  as  well  as  ourselves. 

True,  he  said. 

Thus  much,  said  Socrates,  of  Harmonia,  your  Theban  god- 
dess, Cebes,  who  has  not  been  ungracious  to  us,  I  think;  but 
what  shall  I  say  to  the  Theban  Cadmus,  and  how  shall  I  pro- 
pitiate him? 

I  think  that  you  will  discover  a  way  of  propitiating  him, 
said  Cebes ;  I  am  sure  that  you  have  answered  the  argument 
about  harmony  in  a  manner  that  I  could  never  have  expected. 
For  when  Simmias  m.entioned  his  objection,  I  quite  imagined 
that  no  answer  could  be  given  to  him,  and  therefore  I  was 
surprised  at  finding  that  his  argument  could  not  sustain  the 
first  onset  of  yours ;  and  not  impossibly  the  other,  whom  you 
call  Cadmus,  may  share  a  similar  fate. 

Nay,  my  good  friend,  said  Socrates,  let  us  not  boast,  lest 
some  evil  eye  should  put  to  flight  the  word  which  I  am  about 
to  speak.  That,  however,  may  be  left  in  the  hands  of  those 
above,  while  I  draw  near  in  Homeric  fashion,  and  try  the 
mettle  of  your  words.  Briefly,  the  sum  of  your  objection  is 
as  follows:  You  want  to  have  proven  to  you  that  the  soul 
is  imperishable  and  immortal,  and  you  think  that  the  philoso- 
pher who  is  confident  in  death  has  but  a  vain  and  foolish 
confidence,  if  he  thinks  that  he  will  fare  better  than  one  v^rho 
has  led  another  sort  of  life,  in  the  world  below,,  unless  he 


90  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

can  prove  this;  and  you  say  that  the  demonstration  of  the 
strength  and  divinity  of  the  soul,  and  of  her  existence  prior 
to  our  becoming  men,  does  not  necessarily  imply  her  immor- 
tality. Granting  that  the  soul  is  long-lived,  and  has  known 
and  done  much  in  a  former  state,  still  she  is  not  on  that 
account  immortal;  and  her  entrance  into  the  human  form 
may  be  a  sort  of  disease  v/hich  is  the  beginning  of  dissolu- 
tion, and  may  at  last,  after  the  toils  of  life  are  over,  end 
in  that  which  is  called  death.  And  whether  the  soul  enters 
into  the  body  once  only  or  many  times,  that  as  you  would 
say,  makes  no  difference  in  the  fears  of  individuals.  For 
any  man,  who  is  not  devoid  of  natural  feeling,  has  reason 
to  fear,  if  he  has  no  knowledge  or  proof  of  the  soul's  immor- 
tality. That  is  what  I  suppose  you  to  say,  Cebes,  which  I 
designedly  repeat,  in  order  that  nothing  may  escape  us, 
and  that  you  may,  if  you  wish,  add  or  subtract  anything. 

But,  said  Cebes,  as  far  as  I  can  see  at  present,  I  have  noth- 
ing to  add  or  subtract;  you  have  expressed  my  meaning. 

Socrates  paused  awhile,  and  seemed  to  be  absorbed  in  re- 
flection. At  length  he  said:  This  is  a  very  serious  inquiry 
which  you  are  raising,  Cebes,  involving  the  whole  question 
of  generation  and  corruption,  about  which  I  will,  if  you  like, 
give  you  my  own  experience;  and  you  can  apply  this,  if 
you  think  that  anything  which  I  say  will  avail  towards  the 
solution  of  your  difficulty. 

I  should  very  much  like,  said  Cebes,  to  hear  what  you 
have  to  say. 

Then  I  will  tell  you,  said  Socrates.  When  I  was  young, 
Cebes,  I  had  a  prodigious  desire  to  know  that  department 
of  philosophy  which  is  called  Natural  Science ;  this  appeared 
to  me  to  have  lofty  aims,  as  being  the  science  which  has 
to  do  with  the  causes  of  things,  and  which  teaches  why  a 
thing  is,  and  is  created  and  destroyed;  and  I  was  always 
agitating  myself  with  the  consideration  of  such  questions 
as  these :  Is  the  growth  of  animals  the  result  of  some  decay 
which  the  hot  and  cold  principle  contract,  as  some  have 
said?  Is  the  blood  the  element  with  which  we  think,  or  the 
air,  or  the  fire  ?  or  perhaps  nothing  of  this  sort — but  the  brain 
may  be  the  originating  power  of  the  perceptions  of  hearing 
and  sight  and  smell,  and  memorjr  and  opinion  may  come 


PH^DO  91 

from  them,  and  science  may  be  based  on  mem.ory  and  opinion 
when  no  longer  in  motion,  but  at  rest.  And  then  I  went 
on  to  examine  the  decay  of  them,  and  then  to  the  things 
of  heaven  and  earth,  and  at  last  I  concluded  that  I  was 
wholly  incapable  of  these  inquiries,  as  I  will  satisfactorily 
prove  to  you.  For  I  was  fascinated  by  them  to  such  a 
degree  that  my  eyes  grew  blind  to  things  that  I  had  seemed 
to  myself,  and  also  to  others,  to  know  quite  v/ell;  and  I 
forgot  what  I  had  before  thought  to  be  self-evident,  that  the 
growth  of  man  is  the  result  of  eating  and  drinking ;  for  when 
by  the  digestion  of  food  flesh  is  added  to  flesh  and  bone  to 
bone,  and  whenever  there  is  an  aggregation  of  congenial 
elements,  the  lesser  bulk  becomes  larger  and  the  small  man 
greater.    Was  not  that  a  reasonable  notion? 

Yes,  said  Cebes,  I  think  so. 

Well;  but  let  me  tell  you  something  more.  There  was  a 
time  when  I  thought  that  I  understood  the  meaning  of  greater 
and  less  pretty  well;  and  when  I  saw  a  great  man  standing 
by  a  little  one  I  fancied  that  one  was  taller  than  the  other 
by  a  head,  one  horse  would  appear  to  be  greater  than  another 
horse:  and  still  more  clearly  did  I  seem  to  perceive  that 
ten  is  two  more  than  eight,  and  that  two  cubits  are  more 
than  one,  because  two  is  twice  one. 

And  what  is  now  your  notion  of  such  matters?  said 
.Cebes. 

I  should  be  far  enough  from  imagining,  he  replied,  that  I 
knew  the  cause  of  any  of  them,  indeed  I  should,  for  I  cannot 
satisfy  myself  that  when  one  is  added  to  one,  the  one  to 
which  the  addition  is  made  becomes  two,  or  that  the  two 
units  added  together  make  two  by  reason  of  the  addition. 
For  I  cannot  understand  how,  when  separated  from  the 
other,  each  of  them  was  one  and  not  two,  and  now,  when 
they  are  brought  together,  the  mere  juxtaposition  of  them 
can  be  the  cause  of  their  becoming  two:  nor  can  I  under- 
stand how  the  division  of  one  is  the  way  to  make  two;  for 
then  a  different  cause  would  produce  the  same  effect — as 
in  the  former  instance  the  addition  and  juxtaposition  of 
one  to  one  was  the  cause  of  two,  in  this  the  separation 
and  subtraction  of  one  from  the  other  would  be  the 
cause.     Nor  am  I  any  longer  satisfied  that  I  understand 


92  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

the  reason  why  one  or  anything  else  either  is  generated  or 
destroyed  or  is  at  all,  but  I  have  in  my  mind  some  confused 
notion  of  another  method,  and  can  never  admit  this. 

Then  I  heard  some  one  who  had  a  book  of  Anaxagoras,  as 
he  said,  out  of  which  he  read  that  mind  was  the  disposer  and 
cause  of  all,  and  I  was  quite  delighted  at  the  notion  of  this, 
which  appeared  admirable,  and  I  said  to  myself:  If  mind  is 
the  disposer,  mind  will  dispose  all  for  the  best,  and  put  each 
particular  in  the  best  place;  and  I  argued  that  if  any  one 
desired  to  find  out  the  cause  of  the  generation  or  destruction 
or  existence  of  anything,  he  must  find  out  what  state  of 
being  or  suffering  or  doing  was  best  for  that  thing,  and 
therefore  a  man  had  only  to  consider  the  best  for  himself 
and  others,  and  then  he  would  also  know  the  worse,  for  that 
the  same  science  comprised  both.  And  I  rejoiced  to  think 
that  I  had  found  in  Anaxagoras  a  teacher  of  the  causes 
of  existence  such  as  I  desired,  and  I  imagined  that  he  would 
tell  me  first  whether  the  earth  is  flat  or  round;  and  then 
he  would  further  explain  the  cause  and  the  necessity  of  this, 
and  would  teach  me  the  nature  of  the  best  and  show  that 
this  was  best;  and  if  he  said  that  the  earth  was  in  the 
centre,  he  would  explain  that  this  position  was  the  best, 
and  I  should  be  satisfied  if  this  were  shown  to  me,  and 
not  want  any  other  sort  of  cause.  And  I  thought  that  I 
would  then  go  and  ask  him  about  the  sun  and  moon  and 
stars,  and  that  he  would  explain  to  m.e  their  comparative 
swiftness,  and  their  returnings  and  various  states,  and  how 
their  several  affections,  active  and  passive,  were  all  for  the 
best.  For  I  could  not  imagine  that  when  he  spoke  of 
mind  as  the  disposer  of  them,  he  would  give  any  other 
account  of  their  being  as  they  are,  except  that  this  was  best ; 
and  I  thought  when  he  had  explained  to  me  in  detail  the 
cause  of  each  and  the  cause  of  all,  he  would  go  on  to 
explain  to  me  what  was  best  for  each  and  what  was  best 
for  all.  I  had  hopes  which  I  would  not  have  sold  for  much, 
and  I  seized  the  books. and  read  them  as  fast  as  I  could  in 
my  eagerness  to  know  the  better  and  the  worse. 

What  hopes  I  had  formed,  and  how  grievously  was  I  dis- 
appointed !  As  I  proceeded,  I  found  my  philosopher  alto- 
gether forsaking  mind  or  any  other  principle  of  order,  but 


PH^DO  93 

having  recourse  to  air,  and  ether,  and  >vater,  and  other 
eccentricities.  I  might  compare  him  to  a  person  who  began 
by  maintaining  generally  that  mind  is  the  cause  of  the  actions 
of  Socrates,  but  who,  when  he  endeavored  to  explain  the 
causes  of  my  several  actions  in  detail,  went  on  to  show  that 
I  sit  here  because  my  body  is  made  up  of  bones  and  muscles ; 
and  the  bones,  as  he  would  say,  are  hard  and  have  liga- 
ments which  divide  them,  and  the  muscles  are  elastic,  and 
they  cover  the  bones,  which  have  also  a  covering  or  en- 
vironment of  flesh  and  skin  which  contains  them ;  and  as  the 
bones  are  lifted  at  their  joints  by  the  contraction  or  relaxa- 
tion of  the  muscles,  I  am  able  to  bend  my  limbs,  and  this  is 
why  I  am  sitting  here  in  a  curved  posture:  that  is  what  he 
would  say,  and  he  would  have  a  similar  explanation  of  my 
talking  to  you,  which  he  would  attribute  to  sound,  and  air, 
and  hearing,  and  he  would  assign  ten  thousand  other  causes 
of  the  same  sort,  forgetting  to  mention  the  true  cause,  which 
is  that  the  Athenians  have  thought  fit  to  condemn  me,  and 
accordingly  I  have  thought  it  better  and  more  right  to 
remain  here  and  undergo  my  sentence;  for  I  am  inclined  to 
think  that  these  muscles  and  bones  of  mine  would  have  gone 
off  to  Megara  or  Boeotia — by  the  dog  of  Egypt  they  would, 
if  they  had  been  guided  only  by  their  own  idea  of  what  was 
best,  and  if  I  had  not  chosen  as  the  better  and  nobler  part, 
instead  of  playing  truant  and  running  away,  to  undergo  any 
punishment  which  the  State  inflicts.  There  is  surely  a 
strange  confusion  of  causes  and  conditions  in  all  this.  It 
may  be  said,  indeed,  that  without  bones  and  muscles  and  the 
other  parts  of  the  body  I  cannot  execute  my  purposes.  But 
to  say  that  I  do  as  I  do  because  of  them,  and  that  is  the 
way  in  which  mind  acts,  and  not  from  the  choice  of  the  best, 
is  a  very  careless  and  idle  mode  of  speaking.  I  wonder  that 
they  cannot  distinguish  the  cause  from  the  condition,  which 
the  many,  feeling  about  in  the  dark,  are  always  mistaking 
and  misnaming.  And  thus  one  man  makes  a  vortex  all 
round  and  steadies  the  earth  by  the  heaven;  another  gives 
the  air  as  a  support  to  the  earth,  which  is  a  sort  of  broad 
trough.  Any  power  which  in  disposing  them  as  they  are 
disposes  them  for  the  best  never  enters  into  their  minds,  nor 
do  they   imagine  that  there  is   any   superhuman   strength 


04  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

in  that ;  they  rather  expect  to  find  another  Atlas  of  the  world 
who  is  stronger  and  more  everlasting  and  more  containing 
than  the  good  is,  and  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  obliga- 
tory and  containing  power  of  the  good  is  as  nothing;  and 
yet  this  is  the  principle  which  I  would  fain  learn  if  any 
one  would  teach  me.  But  as  I  have  failed  either  to  discover 
myself  or  to  learn  of  anyone  else,  the  nature  of  the  best, 
I  will  exhibit  to  you,  if  you  like,  what  I  have  found  to  be 
the  second  best  mode  of  inquiring  into  the  cause. 

I  should  very  much  like  to  hear  that,  he  replied. 

Socrates  proceeded:  I  thought  that  as  I  had  failed  in  the 
contemplation  of  true  existence,  I  ought  to  be  careful  that 
I  did  not  lose  the  eye  of  my  soul;  as  people  may  injure  their 
bodily  eye  by  observing  and  gazing  on  the  sun  during  an 
eclipse,  unless  they  take  the  precaution  of  only  looking  at 
the  image  reflected  in  the  water,  or  in  some  similar  medium. 
That  occurred  to  me,  and  I  was  afraid  that  my  soul  might 
be  blinded  altogether  if  I  looked  at  things  with  my  eyes 
or  tried  by  the  help  of  the  senses  to  apprehend  them.  And 
I  thought  that  I  had  better  have  recourse  to  ideas,  and  seek 
in  them  the  truth  of  existence.  I  dare  say  that  the  simile 
is  not  perfect — for  I  am  very  far  from  admitting  that  he 
who  contemplates  existence  through  the  medium  of  ideas, 
sees  them  only  "  through  a  glass  darkly,"  any  more  than 
he  who  sees  them  in  their  working  and  effects.  However, 
this  was  the  method  which  I  adopted:  I  first  assumed  some 
principle  which  I  judged  to  be  the  strongest,  and  then  I 
afiirmed  as  true  whatever  seemed  to  agree  with  this,  whether 
relating  to  the  cause  or  to  anything  else;  and  that  which 
disagreed  I  regarded  as  untrue.  But  I  should  like  to  explain 
my  meaning  clearly,  as  I  do  not  think  that  you  under- 
stand me. 

No,  indeed,  replied  Cebes,  not  very  well. 

There  is  nothing  new,  he  said,  in  what  I  am  about  to  tell 
you;  but  only  what  I  have  been  always  and  everywhere  re- 
peating in  the  previous  discussion  and  on  other  occasions: 
I  want  to  show  you  the  nature  of  that  cause  which  has  occu- 
pied my  thoughts,  and  I  shall  have  to  go  back  to  those  famil- 
iar words  which  are  in  the  mouth  of  every  one,  and  first  of 
all  assume  that  there  is  an  absolute  beauty  and  goodness, 


PHiEDO  95 

and  greatness,  and  the  like ;  grant  me  this,  and  I  hope  to  be 
able  to  show  you  the  nature  of  the  cause,  and  to  prove  the 
immortality  of  the  soul. 

Cebes  said :  You  may  proceed  at  once  with  the  proof,  as  I 
readily  grant  you  this. 

Well,  he  said,  then  I  should  like  to  know  whether  you  agree 
with  me  in  the  next  step;  for  I  cannot  help  thinking  that 
if  there  be  anything  beautiful  other  than  absolute  beauty, 
that  can  only  be  beautiful  in  as  far  as  it  partakes  of  absolute 
beauty — and  this  I  should  say  of  everything.  Do  you  agree 
in  this  notion  of  the  cause? 

Yes,  he  said,  I  agree. 

He  proceeded:  I  know  nothing  and  can  understand  noth- 
ing of  any  other  of  those  wise  causes  which  are  alleged ;  and 
if  a  person  says  to  me  that  the  bloom  of  color,  or  form,  or 
anything  else  of  that  sort  is  a  source  of  beauty,  I  leave  all 
that,  which  is  only  confusing  to  me,  and  simply  and  singly, 
and  perhaps  foolishly,  hold  and  am  assured  in  my  own  mind 
that  nothing  makes  a  thing  beautiful  but  the  presence  and 
participation  of  beauty  in  whatever  way  or  manner  obtained ; 
for  as  to  the  manner  I  am  uncertain,  but  I  stoutly  contend 
that  by  beauty  all  beautiful  things  become  beautiful.  That 
appears  to  me  to  be  the  only  safe  answer  that  I  can  give, 
either  to  myself  or  to  any  other,  and  to  that  I  cling,  in  the 
persuasion  that  I  shall  nerer  be  overthrown,  and  that  I  may 
safely  answer  to  myself  or  any  other  that  by  beauty  beautiful 
things  become  beautiful.    Do  you  not  agree  to  that? 

Yes,  I  agree. 

And  that  by  greatness  only  great  things  become  great 
and  greater  greater,  and  by  smallness  the  less  becomes  less. 

True. 

Then  if  a  person  remarks  that  A  is  taller  by  a  head  than  B, 
and  B  less  by  a  head  than  A,  you  would  refuse  to  admit  this, 
and  would  stoutly  contend  that  what  you  mean  is  only  that 
the  greater  is  greater  by,  and  by  reason  of,  greatness,  and 
the  less  is  less  only  by,  or  by  reason  of,  smallness ;  and  thus 
you  would  avoid  the  danger  of  saying  that  the  greater^  is 
greater  and  the  less  less  by  the  measure  of  the  head,  which 
is  the  same  in  both  and  would  also  avoid  the  monstrous  ab- 
surdity of  supposing  that  the  greater  man  is  greater  by 


96  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

reason  of  the  head,  which  is  small.    Would  you  not  be  afraid 
of  that  ? 

Indeed,  I  should,  said  Cebes,  laughing. 

In  like  manner  you  would  be  afraid  to  say  that  ten  exceeded 
eight  by,  and  by  reason  of,  two;  but  would  say  by,  and  by 
reason  of,  number;  or  that  two  cubits  exceed  one  cubit  by 
a  half,  but  by  magnitude — that  is  what  you  would  say,  for 
there  is  the  same  danger  in  both  cases. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Again,  would  you  not  be  cautious  of  affirming  that  the 
addition  of  one  to  one,  or  the  division  of  one,  is  the  cause 
of  two?  And  you  would  loudly  asseverate  that  you  know 
of  no  way  in  which  anything  comes  into  existence  except  by 
participation  in  its  own  proper  essence,  and  consequently, 
as  far  as  you  know,  the  only  cause  of  two  is  the  participation 
in  duality;  that  is,  the  way  to  make  two,  and  the  participa- 
tion in  one  is  the  way  to  make  one.  Yoa  would  say:  I  will 
let  alone  puzzles  of  division  and  addition — wiser  heads  than 
mine  may  answer  them;  inexperienced  as  I  am,  and  ready 
to  start,  as  the  proverb  says,  at  my  own  shadow,  I  cannot 
afford  to  give  up  the  sure  ground  of  a  principle.  And  if 
any  one  assails  you  there,  you  would  not  mind  him,  or 
answer  him  until  you  had  seen  whether  the  consequences 
which  follow  agree  with  one  another  or  not,  and  when  you 
are  further  required  to  give  an  explanation  of  this  principle, 
you  would  go  on  to  assume  a  higher  principle,  and  the  best 
of  the  higher  ones  until  you  found  a  resting-place;  but  you 
would  not  refuse  the  principle  and  the  consequences  in  your 
reasoning  like  the  Eristics — at  least  if  you  wanted  to 
discover  real  existence.  Not  that  this  confusion  signifies 
to  them  who  never  care  or  think  about  the  matter  at 
all,  for  they  have  the  wit  to  be  well  pleased  with  them- 
selves, however  great  may  be  the  turmoil  of  their  ideas. 
But  you,  if  you  are  a  philosopher,  will,  I  believe,  do  as 
I  say. 

What  you  say  is  most  true,  said  Simmias  and  Cebes,  botK 
speaking  at  once. 

Ech.  Yes,  Phsedo;  and  I  don't  wonder  at  their  assenting. 
Anyone  who  has  the  least  sense  will  acknowledge  the  won- 
derful clearness  of  Socrates's  reasoning. 


PHiEDO  97 

Phced.  Certainly,  Echecrates;  and  that  was  the  feeling  of 
the  whole  company  at  the  time. 

Ech.  Yes,  and  equally  of  ourselves,  who  were  not  of  the 
company,  and  are  now  listening  to  your  recital.  But  what 
followed  ? 

Phced.  After  all  this  was  admitted,  and  they  had  agreed 
about  the  existence  of  ideas  and  the  participation  in  them 
of  the  other  things  which  derive  their  names  from  them,  Soc- 
rates, if  I  remember  rightly,  said : — 

This  is  your  way  of  speaking;  and  yet  when  you  say  that 
Simmias  is  greater  than  Socrates  and  less  than  Phaedo,  do 
you  not  predicate  of  Simmias  both  greatness  and  smallness? 

Yes,  I  do. 

But  still  you  allow  that  Simmias  does  not  really  exceed 
Socrates,  as  the  words  may  seem  to  imply,  because  he  is 
Simmias,  but  by  reason  of  the  size  which  he  has ;  just  as  Sim- 
mias does  not  exceed  Socrates  because  he  is  Simmias,  any 
more  than  because  Socrates  is  Socrates,  but  because  he  has 
smallness  when  compared  with  the  greatness  of  Simmias? 

True. 

And  if  Phgedo  exceeds  him  in  size,  that  is  not  because 
Phaedo  is  Phsedo,  but  because  Phaedo  has  greatness  relatively 
to  Simmias,  who  is  comparatively  smaller? 

That  is  true. 

And  therefore  Simmias  is  said  to  be  great,  and  is  also  said 
to  be  small,  because  he  is  in  a  mean  between  them,  exceeding 
the  smallness  of  the  one  by  his  greatness,  and  allowing  the 
greatness  of  the  other  to  exceed  his  smallness.  He  added, 
laughing,  I  am  speaking  like  a  book,  but  I  believe  that  what 
I  am  now  saying  is  true. 

Simmias  assented  to  this. 

The  reason  why  I  say  this  is  that  I  want  you  to  agree 
with  me  in  thinking,  not  only  that  absolute  greatness  will 
never  be  great  and  also  small,  but  that  greatness  in  us  or 
in  the  concrete  will  never  admit  the  small  or  admit  of  being 
exceeded:  instead  of  this,  one  of  two  things  will  happen — 
either  the  greater  will  fly  or  retire  before  the  opposite,  which 
is  the  less,  or  at  the  advance  of  the  less  will  cease  to  exist; 
but  will  not,  if  allowing  or  admitting  smallness,  be  changed 
by  that;  even  as  I,  having  received  and  admitted  smallness 

4  HC— Vol.  2 


98  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

when  compared  with  Simmias,  remain  just  as  I  was,  and  am 
the  same  small  person.  And  as  the  idea  of  greatness  cannot 
condescend  ever  to  be  or  become  small,  in  like  manner  the 
smallness  in  us  cannot  be  or  become  great;  nor  can  any  other 
opposite  which  remains  the  same  ever  be  or  become  its  own 
opposite,  but  either  passes  away  or  perishes  in  the  change. 

That,  replied  Cebes,  is  quite  my  notion. 

One  of  the  company,  though  I  do  not  exactly  remember 
which  of  them,  on  hearing  this,  said :  By  Heaven,  is  not  this 
the  direct  contrary  of  what  was  admitted  before— that  out 
of  the  greater  came  the  less  and  out  of  the  less  the  greater, 
and  that  opposites  are  simply  generated  from  opposites; 
whereas  now  this  seems  to  be  utterly  denied. 

Socrates  inclined  his  head  to  the  speaker  and  listened.  I 
like  your  courage,  he  said,  in  reminding  us  of  this.  But  you 
do  not  observe  that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  two  cases. 
For  then  we  were  speaking  of  opposites  in  the  concrete, 
and  now  of  the  essential  opposite  which,  as  is  afifirm_ed, 
neither  in  us  nor  in  nature  can  ever  be  at  variance  with 
itself:  then,  my  friend,  we  were  speaking  of  things  in  which 
opposites  are  inherent  and  which  are  called  after  them,  but 
now  about  the  opposites  which  are  inherent  in  them  and 
which  give  their  name  to  them;  these  essential  opposites 
will  never,  as  v/e  maintain,  admit  of  generation  into  or 
out  of  one  another.  At  the  same  timxe,  turning  to  Cebes,  he 
said:  Were  you  at  all  disconcerted,  Cebes,  at  our  friend's 
objection? 

That  was  not  my  feeling,  said  Cebes;  and  yet  I  cannot 
deny  that  I  am  apt  to  be  disconcerted. 

Then  we  are  agreed  after  all,  said  Socrates,  that  the 
opposite  will  never  in  any  case  be  opposed  to  itself? 

To  that  we  are  quite  agreed,  he  replied. 

Yet  once  more  let  me  ask  you  to  consider  the  question 
from  another  point  of  view,  and  see  whether  you  agree  with 
me:  There  is  a  thing  which  you  term  heat,  and  another 
thing  which  you  term  cold? 

Certainly. 

But  are  they  the  same  as  fire  and  snow? 

Most  assuredly  not. 

Heat  is  not  the  same  as  fire,  nor  is  cold  the  same  as  snow? 


FH^DO  99 

No. 

And  yet  you  will  surely  admit  that  when  snow,  as  before 
said,  is  under  the  influence  of  heat,  they  will  not  remain 
snow  and  heat ;  but  at  the  advance  of  the  heat  the  snow  will 
either  retire  or  perish? 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

And  the  fire  too  at  the  advance  of  the  cold  will  either 
retire  or  perish;  and  when  the  fire  is  under  the  influence  o£ 
the  cold,  they  will  not  remain,  as  before,  fire  and  cold. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

And  in  som.e  cases  the  name  of  the  idea  is  not  confined  to 
the  idea;  but  anything  else  which,  not  being  the  idea,  exists, 
only  in  the  form  of  the  idea,  may  also  lay  claim  to  it.  I  will 
try  to  make  this  clearer  by  an  example :  The  odd  number  is 
always  called  by  the  name  of  odd? 

Very  true. 

But  is  this  the  only  thing  which  is  called  odd?  Are  there 
not  other  things  which  have  their  own  name,  and  yet  are 
called  odd,  because,  although  not  the  same  as  oddness,  they 
are  never  without  oddness? — that  is  what  I  mean  to  ask — 
whether  numbers  such  as  the  number  three  are  not  of  the 
class  of  odd.  And  there  are  many  other  examples :  would 
you  not  say,  for  example,  that  three  may  be  called  by  its 
proper  name,  and  also  be  called  odd,  which  is  not  the  same 
with  three?  and  this  may  be  said  not  only  of  three  but  also 
of  five,  and  every  alternate  number — each  of  them  without 
being  oddness  is  odd,  and  in  the  same  way  two  and  four,  and 
the  whole  series  of  alternate  numbers,  has  ever}^  number  even, 
v/ithout  being  evenness.    Do  you  admit  that? 

Yes,  he  said,  how  can  I  deny  that? 

Then  now  mark  the  point  at  which  I  am  aiming:  not  only 
do  essential  opposites  exclude  one  another,  but  also  concrete 
things,  which,  although  not  in  themselves  opposed,  contain 
opposites;  these,  I  say,  also  reject  the  idea  which  is  opposed 
to  that  which  is  contained  in  them,  and  at  the  advance  of 
that  they  either  perish  or  withdraw.  There  is  the  number 
three  for  example;  will  not  that  endure  annihilation  or  any- 
thing sooner  than  be  converted  into  an  even  number,  remain- 
ing three? 

Very  true,  said  Cebes. 


100  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

And  yet,  he  said,  the  number  two  is  certainly  not  opposed 
to  the  number  three  ? 

It  is  not. 

Then  not  only  do  opposite  ideas  repel  the  advance  of  one 
another,  but  also  there  are  other  things  which  repel  the  ap- 
proach of  opposites. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

Suppose,  he  said,  that  we  endeavor,  if  possible,  to  deter- 
mine what  these  are. 

By  all  means. 

Are  they  not,  Cebes,  such  as  compel  the  things  of  which 
they  have  possession,  not  only  to  take  their  own  form,  but 
also  the  form  of  some  opposite? 

What  do  you  mean? 

I  mean,  as  I  was  just  now  saying,  and  have  no  need  to  re- 
peat to  you,  that  those  things  which  are  possessed  by  the 
number  three  m.ust  not  only  be  three  in  number,  but  must 
also  be  odd. 

Quite  true. 

And  on  this  oddness,  of  which  the  number  three  has  the 
impress,  the  opposite  idea  will  never  intrude? 

No. 

And  this  impress  was  given  by  the  odd  principle? 

Yes. 

And  to  the  odd  is  opposed  the  even  ? 

True. 

Then  the  idea  of  the  even  number  will  never  arrive  at 
three  ? 

No. 

Then  three  has  no  part  in  the  even? 

None. 

Then  the  triad  or  number  three  is  uneven? 

Very  true. 

To  return  then  to  my  distinction  of  natures  which  are  not 
opposites,  and  yet  do  not  admit  opposites :  as  in  this  instance, 
three  although  not  opposed  to  the  even,  does  not  any  the 
more  admit  of  the  even,  but  always  brings  the  opposite  into 
play  on  the  other  side;  or  as  two  does  not  receive  the  odd, 
or  fire  the  cold — from  these  examples  (and  there  are  many 
more  of  them)  perhaps  you  may  be  able  to  arrive  at  the  gen- 


PHJEDO  101 

eral  conclusion  that  not  only  opposites  will  not  receive  op- 
posites,  but  also  thai  nothing  which  brings  the  opposite  will 
admit  the  opposite  of  that  which  it  brings  in  that  to  which 
it  is  brought.  And  here  let  me  recapitulate — for  there  is  no 
harm  in  repetition.  The  number  five  will  not  admit  the 
nature  of  the  even,  any  more  than  ten,  which  is  the  double  of 
five,  will  admit  the  nature  of  the  odd — the  double,  though  not 
strictly  opposed  to  the  odd,  rejects  the  odd  altogether.  Nor 
again  will  parts  in  the  ratio  of  3 :  2,  nor  any  fraction  in 
which  there  is  a  half,  nor  again  in  which  there  is  a  third, 
admit  the  notion  of  the  whole,  although  they  are  not  opposed 
to  the  whole.     You  will  agree  to  that? 

Yes,  he  said,  I  entirely  agree  and  go  along  with  you  in 
that. 

And  now,  he  said,  I  think  that  I  may  begin  again ;  and  to 
the  question  which  I  am  about  to  ask  I  will  beg  you  to  give 
not  the  old  safe  answer,  but  another,  of  which  I  will  offer  you 
an  example;  and  I  hope  that  you  will  find  in  what  has  been 
just  said  another  foundation  which  is  as  safe.  I  mean  that 
if  anyone  asks  you,  "  What  that  is,  the  inherence  of  which 
makes  the  body  hot?"  you  will  reply  not  heat  (this  is  what 
I  call  the  safe  and  stupid  ansv/er),  but  fire,  a  far  better  an- 
swer, which  we  are  now  in  a  condition  to  give.  Or  if  any- 
one asks  you,  "  Why  a  body  is  diseased,"  you  will  not  say 
from  disease,  but  from  fever ;  and  instead  of  saying  that  odd- 
ness  is  the  cause  of  odd  numbers,  you  will  say  that  the  monad 
is  the  cause  of  them :  and  so  of  things  in  general,  as  I  dare  say 
that  you  will  understand  sufficiently  without  my  adducing 
any  further  examples. 

Yes,  he  said,  I  quite  understand  you. 

Tell  me,  then,  what  is  that  the  inherence  of  which  will 
render  the  body  alive? 

The  soul,  he  replied. 

And  is  this  always  the  case? 

Yes,  he  said,  of  course. 

Then  whatever  the  soul  possesses,  to  that  she  comes  bear^ 
ing  life? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  is  there  any  opposite  to  life? 

There  is,  he  said. 


102  DIALOGUE  OF  PLATO 

And  what  is  that? 

Death. 

Then  the  soul,  as  has  been  acknowledged,  will  never  re- 
ceive the  opposite  of  what  she  brings.  A.nd  now,  he  said^ 
what  did  we  call  that  principle  which  repels  the  even  ? 

The  odd. 

And  that  principle  which  repels  the  musical;  or  the  just?. 

The  unmusical,  he  said,  and  the  unjust. 

And  what  do  we  call  the  principle  which  does  not  admit 
of  death? 

The  immortal,  he  said. 

And  does  the  soul  admit  of  death? 

No. 

Then  the  soul  is  immortal? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  may  we  say  that  this  is  proven? 

Yes,  abundantly  proven,  Socrates,  he  replied. 

And  supposing  that  the  odd  were  imperishable,  must  not 
three  be  imperishable? 

Of  course. 

And  if  that  which  is  cold  were  imperishable,  when  the 
warm  principle  came  attacking  the  snow,  must  not  the  snow 
have  retired  whole  and  unmelted — for  it  could  never  have 
perished,  nor  could  it  have  remained  and  admitted  the  heat? 

True,  he  said. 

Again,  if  the  uncooling  or  warm  principle  were  imperish- 
able, the  fire  when  assailed  by  cold  would  not  have  perished 
or  have  been  extinguished,  but  would  have  gone  away  un- 
affected ? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  immortal :  if  the  Immortal 
is  also  imperishable,  the  soul  when  attacked  by  death  cannot 
perish;  for  the  preceding  argument  shows  that  the  soul  will 
not  admit  of  death,  or  ever  be  dead,  any  more  than  tkree  or 
the  odd  number  will  admit  of  the  even,  or  fire  or  the  heat 
in  the  fire,  of  the  cold.  Yet  a  person  may  say :  "  But  although 
the  odd  will  not  become  even  at  the  approach  of  the  even, 
why  may  not  the  odd  perish  and  the  even  take  the  place  of 
the  odd?''  Now  to  him  who  makes  this  objection,  we  can- 
not answer  that  the  odd  principle  is  imperishable;  for  this 


PHiEDO  103 

lias  not  been  acknowledged,  but  if  this  had  been  aclcnowl- 
edgedj  there  would  have  been  no  difficulty  in  contending 
that  at  the  approach  of  the  even  the  odd  principle  and  the 
number  three  took  up  their  departure;  and  the  same  argu- 
ment would  have  held  good  of  fire  and  heat  and  any  other 
thing. 

Very  true 

And  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  immortal :  if  the  immortal 
is  also  imperishable,  then  the  soul  v/ill  be  imperishable  as 
well  as  immortal;  but  if  not,  some  other  proof  of  her  im- 
perishableness  will  have  to  be  given. 

No  other  proof  is  needed,  he  said ;  for  if  the  immortal,  be- 
ing eternal,  is  liable  to  perish,  then  nothing  is  imperishable. 

Yes,  replied  Socrates,  all  men  will  agree  that  God,  and  the 
essential  form  of  life,  and  the  immortal  in  general  will  never 
perish. 

Yes,  all  men,  he  said— that  is  true ;  and  what  is  more,  gods, 
if  I  am  not  mistaken,  as  well  as  men. 

Seeing  then  that  the  immortal  is  indestructible,  must  not 
the  soul,  if  she  is  immortal,  be  also  imperishable? 

Most  certainly. 

Then  when  death  attacks  a  man,  the  mortal  portion  of  him 
may  be  supposed  to  die,  but  the  im^mortal  goes  out  of  the 
way  of  death  and  is  preserved  safe  and  sound? 

True.  -'^ 

Then,  Cebes,  beyond  question  the  soul  is  immortal  an3 
imperishable,  and  our  souls  will  truly  exist  in  another  world ! 

I  am  convinced,  Socrates,  said  Cebes,  and  have  nothing 
more  to  object;  but  if  my  friend  Simmias,  or  anyone  else, 
has  any  further  objection,  he  had  better  speak  out,  and  not 
keep  silence,  since  I  do  not  know  how  there  can  ever  be  a 
more  fitting  time  to  which  he  can  defer  the  discussion,  if 
there  is  anything  which  he  wants  to  say  or  have  said. 

But  I  have  nothing  more  to  say,  replied  Simmias ;  nor  do  I 
see  any  room  for  uncertainty,  except  that  which  arises  neces- 
sarily out  of  the  greatness  of  the  subject  and  the  feebleness 
of  man,  and  which  I  cannot  help  feeling. 

Yes,  Simmias,  replied  Socrates,  that  is  well  said :  and  more 
^han  that,  first  principles,  even  if  they  appear  certain,  should 
be  carefully  considered;  and  when  they  are  satisfactorily 


104  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

ascertained,  then,  with  a  sort  of  hesitating  conSdence  m 
human  reason,  you  may,  I  think,  follow  the  course  of  the 
argument ;  and  if  this  is  clear,  there  will  be  no  need  iov  any 
further  inquiry. 

That,  he  said,  is  true. 

But  then,  O  my  friends,  he  said,  if  the  soul  Is  really  im- 
mortal, what  care  should  be  taken  of  her,  not  only  in  respect 
of  the  portion  of  time  which  is  called  life,  but  of  eternity! 
And  the  danger  of  neglecting  her  from  this  point  of  view 
does  indeed  appear  to  be  awful.  If  death  had  only  been  the 
end  of  all,  the  wicked  would  have  had  a  good  bargain  in 
dying,  for  they  would  have  been  happily  quit  not  only  of  their 
body,  but  of  their  own  evil  together  with  their  souls.  But 
now,  as  the  soul  plainly  appears  to  be  immortal,  there  is  no 
release  or  salvation  from  evil  except  the  attainment  of  the 
highest  virtue  and  wisdom.  For  the  soul  when  on  her  progress 
to  the  world  below  takes  nothing  with  her  but  nurture  and 
education ;  which  are  indeed  said  greatly  to  benefit  or  greatly 
to  injure  the  departed,  at  the  very  beginning  of  its  pilgrimage 
in  the  other  world. 

For  after  death,  as  they  say,  the  genius  of  each  individual, 
to  whom  he  belonged  in  life,  leads  him  to  a  certain  place 
in  which  the  dead  are  gathered  together  for  judgment,  whence 
they  go  into  the  world  below,  following  the  guide  who  is 
appointed  to  conduct  them  from  this  world  to  the  other:  and 
when  they  have  there  received  their  due  and  remained  their 
time,  another  guide  brings  them  back  again  after  many  revo- 
lutions of  ages.  Now  this  journey  to  the  other  world  is  not, 
as  ^schylus  says  in  the  "  Telephus,"  a  single  and  straight 
path — no  guide  would  be  wanted  for  that,  and  no  one  could 
miss  a  single  path;  but  there  are  many  partings  of  the  road, 
and  windings,  as  I  must  infer  from  the  rites  and  sacrifices 
which  are  offered  to  the  gods  below  in  places  where  three 
ways  meet  on  earth.  The  wise  and  orderly  soul  is  conscious 
of  her  situation  and  follows  in  the  path;  but  the  soul  which 
desires  the  body,  and  which,  as  I  was  relating  before,  has 
long  been  fluttering  about  the  lifeless  frame  and  the  world 
of  sight,  is  after  many  struggles  and  many  sufferings  hardly 
and  with  violence  carried  away  by  her  attendant  genius,  and 
when  she  arrives  at   the  place  where  the  other  souls  are 


PH^DO  105 

gathered,  iff  she  be  impure  and  have  done  impure  deeds,  or 
been  concerned  in  foul  murders  or  other  crimes  which  are  the 
brothers  of  these,  and  the  works  of  brothers  in  crime — from 
that  soul  every  one  flees  and  turns  away;  no  one  will  be  her 
com.panion,  no  one  her  guide,  but  alone  she  wanders  in  ex- 
tremity of  evil  until  certain  times  are  fulfilled,  and  when  they 
are  fulfilled,  she  is  borne  irresistibly  to  her  own  fitting  habi- 
tation; as  every  pure  and  just  soul  which  has  passed  through 
life  in  the  company  and  under  the  guidance  of  the  gods  has 
also  her  own  proper  home. 

Now  the  earth  has  divers  wonderful  regions,  and  is  indeed 
in  nature  and  extent  very  unlike  the  notions  of  geographers, 
as  I  believe  on  the  authority  of  one  who  shall  be  nameless. 

What  do  you  mean,  Socrates?  said  Simmias.  I  have  my- 
self heard  many  descriptions  of  the  earth,  but  I  do  not 
know  in  what  you  are  putting  your  faith,  and  I  should 
like  to  know. 

Well,  Simmias,  replied  Socrates,  the  recital  of  a  tale  does 
not,  I  think,  require  the  art  of  Giaucus ;  and  I  know  not  that 
the  art  of  Giaucus  could  prove  the  truth  of  my  tale,  which  I 
myself  should  never  be  able  to  prove,  and  even  if  I  could,  I 
fear,  Simmias,  that  my  life  would  come  to  an  end  before  the 
argum^ent  was  com.pieted.  I  may  describe  to  you,  however, 
the  form  and  regions  of  the  earth  according  to  my  conception 
of  them. 

That,  said  Simmias,  will  be  enough. 

Well,  then,  he  said,  my  conviction  is  that  the  earth  is  a 
round  body  in  the  center  of  the  heavens,  and  therefore  has  no 
need  of  air  or  any  similar  force  as  a  support,  but  is  kept  there 
and  hindered  from  falling  or  inclining  any  way  by  the  equa- 
bility of  the  surrounding  heaven  and  by  her  own  equipoise. 
For  that  which,  being  in  equipoise,  is  in  the  center  of  that 
which  is  equably  diffused,  will  not  incline  any  way  in  any 
degree,  but  will  always  remain  in  the  same  state  and  not 
deviate.    And  this  is  my  first  notion. 

Which  is  surely  a  correct  one,  said  Simmias. 

Also  I  believe  that  the  earth  is  very  vast,  and  that  we  who 
dwell  in  the  region  extending  from  the  river  Phasis  to  the 
Pillars  of  Heracles,  along  the  borders  of  the  sea,  are  just  like 
ants  or  frogs  about  a  marsh,  and  inhabit  a  small  portion  only, 


106  DIALOGUES  OF   PLATO 

and  that  many  others  dwell  in  many  like  places.  For  I  should 
say  that  in  all  parts  of  the  earth  there  are  hollows  of  various 
forms  and  sizes,  into  which  the  water  and  the  mist  and  the 
air  collect;  and  that  the  true  earth  is  pure  and  in  the  pure 
heaven,  in  which  also  are  the  stars — that  is  the  heaven  which 
is  commonly  spoken  of  as  the  ether,  of  which  this  is  but  the 
sediment  collecting  in  the  hollows  of  the  earth.  But  we  who 
live  in  these  hollows  are  deceived  into  the  notion  that  we 
are  dwelling  above  on  the  surface  of  the  earth;  which  is  just 
as  if  a  creature  who  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea  w^ere  to  fancy 
that  he  was  on  the  surface  of  the  water,  and  that  the  sea  was 
the  heaven  through  which  he  saw  the  sun  and  the  other  stars 
— he  having  never  come  to  the  surface  by  reason  of  his 
feebleness  and  sluggishness,  and  havmg  never  lifted  up  his 
head  and  seen,  nor  ever  heard  from  one  who  had  seen,  this 
region  which  is  so  much  purer  and  fairer  than  his  own.  Now 
this  is  exactly  our  case :  for  we  are  dwelling  in  a  hollow  of 
the  earth,  and  fancy  that  we  are  on  the  surface ;  and  the  air 
we  call  the  heaven,  and  in  this  we  imagine  that  the  stars 
move.  But  this  is  also  owing  to  our  feebleness  and  sluggish- 
ness, which  prevent  our  reaching  the  surface  of  the  air :  for 
if  any  man  could  arrive  at  the  exterior  limit,  or  take  the 
wings  of  a  bird  and  fly  upward,  like  a  fish  who  puts  his  head 
out  and  sees  this  world,  he  would  see  a  world  beyond;  and, 
if  the  nature  of  mian  could  sustain  the  sight,  he  would  ac- 
knowledge that  this  was  the  place  of  the  true  heaven  and 
the  true  light  and  the  true  stars.  For  this  earth,  and  the 
stones,  and  the  entire  region  which  surrounds  us  are  spoilt 
and  corroded,  like  the  things  in  the  sea  which  are  corroded  by 
the  brine;  for  in  the  sea  too  there  is  hardly  any  noble  or 
perfect  growth,  but  clefts  onl)'-,  and  sand,  and  an  endless 
slough  of  mud:  and  even  the  shore  is  not  to  be  compared 
to  the  fairer  sights  of  this  world.  And  greater  far  is  the 
superiority  of  the  other.  Now  of  that  upper  earth  which  is 
mnder  the  heaven,  I  can  tell  you  a  charming  tale,  Simmias, 
which  is  well  worth  hearing. 

And  we,  Socrates,  replied  Simmias,  shall  be  charmed  to 
listen. 

The  tale,  my  friend,  he  said,  is  as  follows.  In  the  first 
place,  the  earth,  when  looked  at  from  above,  is  like  one  of 


PH^DO  107 

those  balls  which  have  leather  coverings  in  twelve  pieces, 
and  is  of  divers  colors,  of  which  the  colors  which  painters 
use  on  earth  are  only  a  sample.  But  there  the  whole  earth 
is  made  up  of  them,  and  they  are  brighter  far  and  clearer 
than  ours;  there  is  a  purple  of  wonderful  luster,  also  the 
radiance  of  gold,  and  the  white  which  is  in  the  earth  is 
whiter  than  any  chalk  or  snow.  Of  these  and  other  colors 
the  earth  is  made  up,  and  they  are  more  in  number  and 
fairer  than  the  eye  of  man  has  ever  seen;  and  the  very 
hollows  (of  which  I  was  speaking)  filled  with  air  and  water 
are  seen  like  light  flashing  amid  the  other  colors,  and  have 
a  color  of  their  own,  which  gives  a  sort  of  unity  to  the 
variety  of  earth.  And  in  this  fair  region  everything  that 
grows — trees,  and  flowers,  and  fruits — is  in  a  like  degree  fairer 
than  any  here;  and  there  are  hills,  and  stones  in  them  in  a 
like  degree  smoother,  and  more  transparent,  and  fairer  in 
color  than  our  highly  valued  emeralds  and  sardonyxes  and  jas- 
pers, and  other  gems,  which  are  but  minute  fragments  of  them : 
for  there  all  the  stones  are  like  our  precious  stones,  and 
fairer  still.  The  reason  of  this  is  that  they  are  pure,  and  not, 
like  our  precious  stones,  infected  or  corroded  by  the  corrupt 
briny  elements  which  coagulate  among  us,  and  which  breed 
foulness  and  disease  both  in  earth  and  stones,  as  well  as  in 
animals  and  plants.  They  are  the  jewels  of  the  upper  earth, 
which  also  shines  with  gold  and  silver  and  the  like,  and  they 
are  visible  to  sight  and  large  and  abundant  and  found  in 
every  region  of  the  earth,  and  blessed  is  he  who  sees  them. 
And  uoon  the  earth  are  animals  and  men,  some  in  a  middle 
region,  others  dwelling  about  the  air  as  we  dwell  about 
the  sea ;  others  in  islands  which  the  air  flov/s  round,  near  the 
continent:  and  in  a  word,  the  air  is  used  by  them  as  the 
water  and  the  sea  are  by  us,  and  the  ether  is  to  them  what 
the  air  to  us.  Moreover,  the  temperament  of  their  seasons 
is  such  that  they  have  no  disease,  and  live  much  longer  than 
we  do,  and  have  sight  and  hearing  and  smell,  and  all  the 
other  senses,  in  far  greater  perfection,  in  the  same  degree 
that  air  is  purer  than  water  or  the  ether  than  air.  Also 
they  have  temples  and  sacred  places  in  which  the  gods  really 
dwell,  and  they  hear  their  voices  and  receive  their  answers, 
and  are  conscious  of  them  and  hold  converse  with  them,  and 


108  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

they  see  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars  as  they  really  are,  and 
their  other  blessedness  is  of  a  piece  with  this. 

Such  is  the  nature  of  the  whole  earth,  and  of  the  things 
which  are  around  the  earth;  and  there  are  divers  regions 
in  the  hollows  on  the  face  of  the  globe  everywhere,  some  of 
them  deeper  and  also  wider  than  that  which  we  inhabit,  others 
deeper  and  with  a  narrower  opening  than  ours,  and  some 
are  shallower  and  wider;  all  have  numerous  perforations, 
and  passages  broad  and  narrow  in  the  interior  of  the  earth, 
connecting  them  with  one  another;  and  there  flows  into  and 
out  of  them,  as  into  basins,  a  vast  tide  of  v/ater,  and  huge 
subterranean  streams  of  perennial  rivers,  and  springs  hot 
and  cold,  and  a  great  fire,  and  great  rivers  of  fire,  and 
streams  of  liquid  mud,  thin  or  thick  (like  the  rivers  of  mud 
in  Sicily,  and  the  lava-streams  which  follow  them),  and  the 
regions  about  which  they  happen  to  flow  are  filled  up  with 
them.  And  there  is  a  sort  of  swing  in  the  interior  of  the 
earth  which  moves  all  this  up  and  down.  Now  the  swing  is 
in  this  wise :  There  is  a  chasm  which  is  the  vastest  of  them 
all,  and  pierces  right  through  the  whole  earth;  this  is  that 
which  Homer  describes  in  the  words — 

"Far  off,  where  is  the  inmost  depth  beneath  the  earth"; 

and  which  he  in  other  places,  and  many  other  poets,  have 
called  Tartarus.  And  the  swing  is  caused  by  the  streams 
flowing  into  and  out  of  this  chasm,  and  they  each  have  the 
nature  of  the  soil  through  which  they  flow.  And  the  reason 
why  the  streams  are  always  flowing  in  and  out  is  that 
the  watery  element  has  no  bed  or  bottom,  and  is  surging 
and  swinging  up  and  down,  and  the  surrounding  wind  and 
air  do  the  same;  they  follow  the  v/ater  up  and  dow^n,  hither 
and  thither,  over  the  earth — just  as  in  respiring  the  air  is 
always  in  process  of  inhalation  and  exhalation;  and  the 
wind  swinging  with  the  water  in  and  out  produces  fearful 
and  irresistible  blasts:  when  the  waters  retire  with  a  rush 
into  the  lower  parts  of  the  earth,  as  they  are  called,  they  flow 
through  the  earth  into  those  regions,  and  fill  them  up  as  with 
the  alternate  motion  of  a  pump,  and  then  when  they  leave 
those  regions  and  rush  back  hither,  they  again  fill  the  hol- 
lows here,  and  when  these  are  filled,  flow  through  subter- 


PH^DO  109 

ranean  channels  and  find  their  way  to  their  several  places, 
forming  seas,  and  lakes  and  rivers,  and  springs.  Thence 
they  again  enter  the  earth,  some  of  them  making  a  long  cir- 
cuit into  many  lands,  others  going  to  few  places  and  those 
not  distant,  and  again  fall  into  Tartarus,  some  at  a  point  a 
good  deal  lower  than  that  at  which  they  rose,  and  others 
not  much  lower,  but  all  in  some  degree  lower  than  the  point 
of  issue.  And  some  burst  forth  again  on  the  opposite  side, 
and  some  on  the  same  side,  and  some  wind  round  the  earth 
with  one  or  many  folds,  like  the  coils  of  a  serpent,  and 
descend  as  far  as  they  can,  but  always  return  and  fall  into 
the  lake.  The  rivers  on  either  side  can  descend  only  to  the 
center  and  no  further,  for  to  the  rivers  on  both  sides  the 
opposite  side  is  a  precipice. 

Now  these  rivers  are  many,  and  mighty,  and  diverse,  and 
there  are  four  principal  ones,  of  which  the  greatest  and 
outermost  is  that  called  Oceanus,  which  flows  round  the 
earth  in  a  circle ;  and  in  the  opposite  direction  flows  Acheron, 
which  passes  under  the  earth  through  desert  places,  into 
the  Acherusian  Lake :  this  is  the  lake  to  the  shores  of  which 
the  souls  of  the  many  go  when  they  are  dead,  and  after 
waiting  an  appointed  time,  which  is  to  som.e  a  longer  and  to 
some  a  shorter  time,  they  are  sent  back  again  to  be  born 
as  animals.  The  third  river  rises  between  the  two,  and 
near  the  place  of  rising  pours  into  a  vast  region  of  fire,  and 
forms  a  lake  larger  than  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  boiling  with 
water  and  mud;  and  proceeding  muddy  and  turbid,  and 
winding  about  the  earth,  comes,  among  other  places,  to  the 
extremities  of  the  Acherusian  Lake,  but  mingles  not  with 
the  waters  of  the  lake,  and  after  making  many  coils  about 
the  earth  plunges  into  Tartarus  at  a  deeper  level.  This  is 
that  Pyriphlegethon,  as  the  stream  is  called,  which  throws 
up  jets  of  fire  in  all  sorts  of  places.  The  fourth  river  goes 
out  on  the  opposite  side,  and  falls  first  of  all  into  a  wild  and 
savage  region,  which  is  all  of  a  dark-blue  color,  like  lapis 
lazuli;  and  this  is  that  river  which  is  called  the  Stygian 
River,  and  falls  into  and  forms  the  Lake  Styx,  and  after 
falling  into  the  lake  and  receiving  strange  powers  in  the 
waters,  passes  under  the  earth,  v/inding  round  in  the  op- 
posite direction  to  Pyriphlegethon,  and  meeting  in  the  Ache- 


110  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

rusian  Lake  from  the  opposite  side.  And  the  water  of  this 
river  too  mingles  with  no  other,  but  flows  round  in  a  circle 
and  falls  into  Tartarus  over  against  Pyriphlegethon,  and  the 
name  of  this  river,  as  the  poet  says,  is  Cocytus. 

Such  is  the  name  of  the  other  world;  and  when  the  dead 
arrive  at  the  place  to  which  the  genius  of  each  severally 
conveys  them,  first  of  all  they  have  sentence  passed  upon 
them,  as  they  have  lived  well  and  piously  or  not.  And  those 
who  appear  to  have  lived  neither  well  nor  ill,  go  to  the 
river  Acheron,  and  mount  such  conveyances  as  they  can  get, 
and  are  carried  in  them  to  the  lake,  and  there  they  dwell  and 
are  purified  of  their  evil  deeds,  and  suffer  the  penalty  of 
the  wrongs  which  they  have  done  to  others,  and  are  absolved, 
and  receive  the  rewards  of  their  good  deeds  according  to 
their  deserts.  But  those  who  appear  to  be  incurable  by 
reason  of  the  greatness  of  their  crimes — who  have  com- 
mitted many  and  terrible  deeds  of  sacrilege,  murders  foul 
and  violent,  or  the  like — such  are  hurled  into  Tartarus,  which 
is  their  suitable  destiny,  and  they  never  come  out.  Those 
again  v/ho  have  committed  crim.es,  which,  although  great,  are 
not  unpardonable — who  in  a  moment  of  anger,  for  example, 
have  done  violence  to  a  father  or  mother,  and  have  repented 
for  the  remainder  of  their  lives,  or  who  have  taken  the  life 
of  another  under  like  extenuating  circumstances — these  are 
plunged  into  Tartarus,  the  pains  of  which  they  are  com- 
pelled to  undergo  for  a  year,  but  at  the  end  of  the  year  the 
wave  casts  them  forth — mere  homicides  by  way  of  Cocytus, 
parricides  and  matricides  by  Pyriphlegethon — and  they  are 
borne  to  the  Acherusian  Lake,  and  there  they  lift  up 
their  voices  and  call  upon  the  victims  whom  they  have 
slain  or  wronged,  to  have  pity  on  them,  and  to  receive  them, 
and  to  let  them  come  out  of  the  river  into  the  lake.  And  if 
they  prevail,  then  they  come  forth  and  cease  from  their 
troubles;  but  if  not,  they  are  carried  back  again  into  Tar- 
tarus and  from  thence  into  the  rivers  unceasingly,  until  they 
obtain  mercy  from  those  whom  they  have  wronged :  for  that  is 
the  sentence  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  judges.  Those  also 
who  are  remarkable  for  having  led  holy  lives  are  released 
from  this  earthly  prison,  and  go  to  their  pure  home  which  is 
above,  and  dwell  in  the  purer  earth ;  and  those  who  have  duly 


PH^DO  111 

purifi'ed  tfiemselves  with  philosophy  live  henceforth  altogether 
without  the  body,  in  mansions  fairer  far  than  these,  which  may 
not  be  described,  and  of  which  the  time  would  fail  me  to  tell. 

Wherefore,  Simmias,  seeing  all  these  things,  what  ought 
not  we  to  do  in  order  to  obtain  virtue  and  ;wisdom  in  this 
life?    Fair  is  the  prize,  and  the  hope  great. 

I  do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  the  description  which  I  have 
given  of  the  soul  and  her  mansions  is  exactly  true — a  man  of 
sense  ought  hardly  to  say  that.  But  I  do  say  that,  inasmuch 
as  the  soul  is  shown  to  be  immortal,  he  may  venture  to  think 
not  improperly  or  unworthily,  that  something  of  the  kind  is 
true.  The  venture  is  a  glorious  one,  and  he  ought  to  com- 
fort himself  with  words  like  these,  which  is  the  reason  why 
I  lengthen  out  the  tale.  Wherefore,  I  say,  let  a  man  be  of 
good  cheer  about  his  soul,  who  hast  cast  away  the  pleasures 
and  ornaments  of  the  body  as  alien  to  him,  and  rather  hurt- 
ful in  their  effects,  and  has  followed  after  the  pleasures  of 
knowledge  in  this  life;  who  has  adorned  the  soul  in  her  own 
proper  jewels,  which  are  temperance,  and  justice,  and  cour- 
age, and  nobility,  and  truth — in  these  arrayed  she  is  ready 
to  go  on  her  journey  to  the  world  below,  when  her  time 
comes.  You,  Simmias  and  Cebes,  and  all  other  men,  will 
depart  at  some  time  or  other.  Me  already,  as  the  tragic 
poet  would  say,  the  voice  of  fate  calls.  Soon  I  must  drink 
the  poison;  and  I  think  that  I  had  better  repair  to  the  bath 
first,  in  order  that  the  women  may  not  have  the  trouble  of 
washing  my  body  after  I  am  dead. 

When  he  had  done  speaking,  Crito  said :  And  have  you  any 
commands  for  us,  Socrates — anything  to  say  ^bout  your 
children,  or  any  other  matter  in  v/hich  we  can  serve  you? 

Nothing  particular,  he  said:  only,  as  I  have  always  told 
you,  I  would  have  you  to  look  to  yourselves ;  that  is  a  service 
which  you  may  always  be  doing  to  me  and  mine  as  well  as 
to  yourselves.  And  you  need  not  make  professions;  for  if 
you  take  no  thought  for  yourselves,  and  walk  not  according 
to  the  precepts  v/hich  I  have  given  you,  not  now  for  the  first 
time,  the  warmth  of  your  professions  will  be  of  no  avail. 

We  will  do  our  best,  said  Crito.  But  in  what  way  would 
you  have  us  bury  you? 

In  any  ,way  that  you  like ;  only  you  must  get  hold  of  me. 


112  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

and  take  care  that  I  do  not  walk  away  from  you.  Then  he 
turned  to  us,  and  added  with  a  smile:  I  cannot  make  Crito 
believe  that  I  am  the  same  Socrates  who  have  been  talking 
and  conducting  the  argument ;  he  fancies  that  I  am  the  other 
Socrates  whom  he  will  soon  see,  a  dead  body—and  he  asks, 
How  shall  he  bury  me?  And  though  I  have  spoken  many 
words  in  the  endeavor  to  show  that  when  I  have  drunk  the 
poison  I  shall  leave  you  and  go  to  the  joys  of  the  blessed — 
these  word^  of  mine,  with  which  I  comforted  you  and  myself, 
have  had,  I  perceive,  no  effect  upon  Crito.  And  therefore 
I  want  you  to  be  surety  for  me  now,  as  he  was  surety  for 
me  at  the  trial:  but  let  the  promise  be  of  another  sort;  for 
he  was  my  surety  to  the  judges  that  I  would  remain,  but 
you  must  be  my  surety  to  him  that  I  shall  not  remain,  but 
go  away  and  depart;  and  then  he  will  suffer  less  at  my 
death,  and  not  be  grieved  when  he  sees  my  body  being 
burned  or  buried.  I  would  not  have  him  sorrow  at  my  hard 
lot,  or  say  at  the  burial.  Thus  we  lay  out  Socrates,  or,  Thus 
,we  follow  him  to  the  grave  or  bury  him ;  for  false  words  are 
not  only  evil  in  themselves,  but  they  infect  the  soul  with 
evil.  Be  of  good  cheer,  then,  my  dear  Crito,  and  say  that 
you  are  burying  my  body  only,  and  do  with  that  as  is  usual, 
and  as  you  think  best. 

When  he  had  spoken  these  words,  he  arose  and  went  into 
the  bath  chamber  with  Crito,  who  bade  us  wait;  and  we 
waited,  talking  and  thinking  of  the  subject  of  discourse,  and 
also  of  the  greatness  of  our  sorrow;  he  was  like  a  father  of 
whom  we  were  being  bereaved,  and  we  were  about  to  pass  the 
rest  of  our  lives  as  orphans.  When  he  had  taken  the  bath  his 
children  were  brought  to  him — (he  had  two  young  sons  and 
an  elder  one)  ;  and  the  women  of  his  family  also  came,  and 
he  talked  to  them  and  gave  them  a  few  directions  in  the  pres- 
ence of  Crito ;  and  he  then  dismissed  them  and  returned  to  us. 

Now  the  hour  of  sunset  was  near,  for  a  good  deal  of  time 
had  passed  while  he  was  within.  When  he  came  out,  he  sat 
down  with  us  again  after  his  bath,  but  not  much  was  said. 
Soon  the  jailer,  who  was  the  servant  of  the  Eleven,  entered 
and  stood  by  him,  saying:  To  you,  Socrates,  whom  I  know 
to  be  the  noblest  and  gentlest  and  best  of  all  who  ever  came 
to  this  place,  I  will  not  impute  the  angry  feelings  of  other 
men,  who  rage  and  swear  at  me  when,  in  obedience  to  the 


PHiEDO  113 

authorities,  I  bid  them  drink  the  poison— indeed  I  am  sure 
that  you  will  not  be  angry  with  me ;  for  others,  as  you  are 
aware,  and  not  I,  are  the  guilty  cause.  And  so  fare  you  well, 
and  try  to  bear  lightly  what  must  needs  be ;  you  know  my  er- 
rand. Then  bursting  into  tears  he  turned  away  and  went  out. 

Socrates  looked  at  him  and  said:  I  return  your  good 
wishes,  and  will  do  as  you  bid.  Then,  turning  to  us,  he  said. 
How  charming  the  man  is:  since  I  have  been  in  prison  he 
has  always  been  coming  to  see  me,  and  at  times  he  would 
talk  to  me,  and  was  as  good  as  could  be  to  me,  and  now  see 
how  generously  he  sorrows  for  me.  But  we  must  do  as  he 
says,  Crito ;  let  the  cup  be  brought,  if  the  poison  is  prepared : 
if  not,  let  the  attendant  prepare  some. 

Yet,  said  Crito,  the  sun  is  still  upon  the  hilltops,  and  many 
Sf  one  has  taken  the  draught  late,  and  after  the  announcement 
has  been  made  to  him,  he  has  eaten  and  drunk,  and  indulged 
in  sensual  delights ;  do  not  hasten,  then,  there  is  still  time. 

Socrates  said:  Yes,  Crito,  and  they  of  whom  you  speak 
are  right  in  doing  thus,  for  they  think  that  they  will  gain 
by  the  delay;  but  I  am  right  in  not  doing  thus,  for  I  do  not 
think  that  I  should  gain  anything  by  drinking  the  poison  a 
little  later;  I  should  be  sparing  and  saving  a  life  which  is 
already  gone :  I  could  only  laugh  at  myself  for  this.  Please 
then  to  do  as  I  say,  and  not  refuse  me. 

Crito,  when  he  heard  this,  made  a  sign  to  the  servant,  and 
the  servant  went  in,  and  remained  for  some  time,  and  then 
returned  with  the  jailer  carrying  a  cup  of  poison.  Socrates 
said:  You,  my  good  friend,  who  are  experienced  in  these 
matters,  shall  give  me  directions  how  I  am  to  proceed.  The 
man  answered :  You  have  only  to  walk  about  until  your  legs 
are  heavy,  and  then  to  lie  down,  and  the  poison  will  act 
At  the  same  time  he  handed  the  cup  to  Socrates,  who  in  the 
easiest  and  gentlest  manner,  without  the  least  fear  or  change 
of  color  or  feature,  looking  at  the  man  with  all  his  eyes, 
Echecrates,  as  his  manner  was,  took  the  cup  and  said: 
What  do  you  say  about  making  a  libation  out  of  this  cup  to 
any  god?  May  I,  or  not?  The  man  answered:  We  only 
prepare,  Socrates,  just  so  much  as  we  deem  enough.  I  un- 
derstand, he  said:  yet  I  may  and  must  pray  to  the  gods  to 
prosper  my  journey  from  this  to  that  other  world — may 
this,  then,  which  is  my  prayer,  be  granted  to  me,     Thea 


114  DIALOGUES  OF  PLATO 

holding  the  cup  to  his  lips,  quite  readily  and  cheerfully  he 
drank  off  the  poison.  And  hitherto  most  of  us  had  been  able 
to  control  our  sorrow ;  but  now  when  we  saw  hfm  drinking, 
and  saw  too  that  he  had  finished  the  draught,  we  could  no 
longer  forbear,  and  in  spite  of  myself  my  own  tears  were 
flowing  fast;  so  that  I  covered  my  face  and  wept  over 
myself,  for  certainly  I  was  not  weeping  over  him,  but  at  the 
thought  of  my  own  calamity  in  having  lost  such  a  com- 
panion. Nor  was  I  the  first,  for  Crito,  when  he  found  him- 
self unable  to  restrain  his  tears,  had  got  up  and  moved  away, 
and  I  followed;  and  at  that  moment,  Apollodorus,  who  had 
been  weeping  all  the  time,  broke  out  in  a  loud  cry  which 
made  cowards  of  us  all.  Socrates  alone  retained  his  calm- 
ness :  What  is  this  strange  outcry  ?  he  said.  I  sent  away  the 
women  mainly  in  order  that  they  might  not  offend  in  this 
way,  for  I  have  heard  that  a  man  should  die  in  peace.  Be 
quiet,  then,  and  have  patience. 

When  we  heard  that,  we  were  ashamed,  and  refrained  our 
tears;  and  he  walked  about  until,  as  he  said,  his  legs  began 
to  fail,  and  then  he  lay  on  his  back,  according  to  the  direc- 
tions, and  the  man  who  gave  him  the  poison  now  and  then 
looked  at  his  feet  and  legs ;  and  after  a  while  he  pressed  his 
foot  hard  and  asked  him.  if  he  could  feel;  and  he  said,  no^ 
and  then  his  leg,  and  so  upwards  and  upwards,  and 
showed  us  that  he  was  cold  and  stiff.  And  he  felt 
them  himself,  and  said:  When  the  poison  reaches  the 
heart,  that  will  be  the  end.  He  was  beginning  to  grow 
cold  about  the  groin,  when  he  uncovered  his  face,  for 
he  had  covered  himself  up,  and  said  (they  were  his 
last  words) — he  said:  Crito,  I  owe  a  cock  to  Asclepius; 
will  you  remember  to  pay  the  debt  ?  The  debt  shall  be  paid, 
said  Crito;  is  there  anything  else?  There  was  no  answer 
to  this  question;  but  in  a  minute  or  two  a  movement  was 
heard,  and  the  attendants  uncovered  him;  his  eyes  were  set, 
and  Crito  closed  his  eyes  and  mouth. 

Such  was  the  end,  Echecrates,  of  our  friend,  whom  I  may 
truly  call  the  wisest,  and  justest,  and  best  of  all  the  men 
whom  I  have  ever  known. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS 
OF   EPICTETUS 

TRANSLATED   AND  ARRANGED 
BY 

HASTINGS    CROSSLEY,  M.A, 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 

Epictetus  was  a  Greek,  horn  at  Hierapolis  in  Phrygia,  probably 
about  the  middle  of  the  first  century,  A.  D.  His  early  history  is 
unknown  till  we  find  him  in  Rome,  the  slave  of  Epaphroditus,  a 
freedman  of  Nero's.  The  lameness,  which  is  the  only  physical 
characteristic  of  his  recorded,  was,  according  to  one  tradition^ 
due  to  tortures  inflicted  by  his  master.  He  seems  to  have  become 
acquainted  with  the  principles  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  through  the 
lectures  of  C.  Musonim  Rufus;  and  after  his  emancipation  he 
•became  a  teacher  of  that  system  in  Rome.  When  the  Emperor 
'Domitian  banished  all  philosophers  from  Italy  about  go  A.  D.j 
Epictetus  went  to  Nicopolis  in  Epirus,  where  he  continued  his 
teaching.  He  left  nothing  in  writing,  and  for  a  knowledge  of  his 
utterances  we  are  indebted  to  his  disciple,  the  Greek  philosopher 
and  historian  Arrian,  who  compiled  from  his  master's  lectures  and 
conversations  the  "Discourses  and  Encheiridion,"  from  which 
the  "Golden  Sayings"  are  drawn.  The  date  and  circumstances 
of  his  death  are  unknown. 

Epictetus  is  a  main  authority  on  Stoic  morals.  The  points  on 
which  he  laid  chief  stress  were  the  importance  of  cultivating  com- 
plete  independence  of  external  circumstances,  the  realisation  that 
man  must  find  happiness  within  himself,  and  the  duty  of  rev* 
erencing  the  voice  of  Reason  in  the  soul.  Few  teachers  of  morals 
in  any  age  are  so  bracing  and  invigorating ;  and  the  tonic  quality 
of  his  utterances  has  been  recognized  ever  since  his  own  day  by 
Pagan  and  Christian  alike. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYI 

OF   EPICTETUS 


X 

RE  these  the  only  works  of  providence  in  us?  What 
words  suffice  to  praise  or  set  them  forth  ?  Had  we  but 
understanding,  should  we  ever  cease  hymning  and 
blessing  the  Divine  Power,  both  openly  and  in  secret,  and 
telling  of  His  gracious  gifts  ?  Whether  digging  or  ploughing 
or  eating,  should  we  not  sing  the  hymn  to  God: — 

Great  is  God,  for  that  He  has  given  us  such  instruments  to  till  the 
ground  withal : 

Great  is  God,  for  that  He  hath  given  us  hands,  and  the  power  of 
swallowing  and  digesting;  of  unconsciously  growing  and  breath- 
ing while  we  sleep  ! 

Thus  should  we  ever  have  sung :  yea  and  this,  the  grandest 
and  divinest  hymn  of  all : — 

Great  is  God,  for  that  He  hath  given  us  a  mind  to  apprehend  these 
things,  and  duly  to  use  them  i 

What  then !  seeing  that  most  of  you  are  blinded,  should 
there  not  be  some  one  to  fill  this  place,  and  sing  the  hymn 
to  God  on  behalf  of  all  men?  What  else  can  I  that  am  old 
and  lame  do  but  sing  to  God?  Were  I  a  nightingale,  I 
should  do  after  the  manner  of  a  nightingale.  Were  I  a  swan, 
I  should  do  after  the  manner  of  a  swan.  But  now,  since  I 
am  a  reasonable  being,  I  must  sing  to  God :  that  is  ray  work : 
I  do  it,  nor  will  I  desert  this  my  post,  as  long  as  it  is  granted 
me  to  hold  it;  and  upon  you  too  I  call  to  join  in  this  self- 
same hymn. 

117 


118  THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

II 

How  then  do  men  act?  As  though  one  returning  to  his 
country  who  had  sojourned  for  the  night  in  a  fair  inn,  should 
be  so  captivated  thereby  as  to  take  up  his  abode  there. 

"  Friend,  thou  hast  forgotten  thine  intention !  This  was 
not  thy  destination,  but  only  lay  on  the  way  thither." 

"  Nay,  but  it  is  a  proper  place." 

"  And  how  many  more  of  the  sort  there  be ;  only  to  pass 
through  upon  thy  way  1  Thy  purpose  was  to  return  to  thy 
country;  to  relieve  thy  kinsmen's  fears  for  thee;  thyself  to 
discharge  the  duties  of  a  citizen ;  to  marry  a  wife,  to  beget 
offspring,  and  to  fill  the  appointed  round  of  office.  Thou 
didst  not  come  to  choose  out  what  places  are  most  pleasant; 
but  rather  to  return  to  that  wherein  thou  wast  born  and 
where  thou  wert  appointed  to  be  a  citizen." 

Ill 

Try  to  enjoy  the  great  festival  of  life  with  other  men. 

IV 

But  I  have  one  whom  I  must  please,  to  whom  I  must  be 
subject,  whom  I  must  obey: — God,  and  those  who  come  next 
to  Him.^  He  hath  entrusted  m^e  with  myself :  He  hath  made 
my  will  subject  to  myself  alone  and  given  me  rules  for  the 
right  use  thereof. 

V 

Rufus^  used  to  say,  //  you  have  leisure  to  praise  me,  what 
tway  is  naught.  In  truth  he  spoke  in  such  wise,  that  each  of 
us  v/ho  sat  there,  thought  that  some  one  had  accused  him  to 
Bufus : — so  surely  did  he  lay  his  fimger  on  the  very  deeds  we 
did :  so  surely  display  the  faults  of  each  before  his  very  eyes. 

VI 

But  what  saith  God? — "Had  it  been  possible,  Epictetus,  I 
would  have  made  both  that  body  of  thine  and  thy  possessions 
free  and  unimpeded,  but  as  it  is,  be  not  deceived: — it  is  not 
thine  own;  it  is  but  finely  tempered  clay.  Since  then  this 
I  could  not  do,  I  have  given  thee  a  portion  of  Myself,  in  the 

^  I.  e.,  "  good  and  just  men."  •c^-.i^tj 

2  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  a  Stoic  philosopher,  whose  lectures  Epictetus  had 
attended. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  119 

power  of  desiring  and  declining  and  of  pursuing  and  avoid- 
ing, and  in  a  word  the  power  of  dealing  with  the  things  of 
sense.  And  if  thou  neglect  not  this,  but  place  all  that  thou 
hast  therein,  thou  shalt'  never  be  let  or  hindered ;  thou  shalt 
never  lament;  thou  shalt  not  blame  or  flatter  any.  What 
then?  Seemeth  this  to  thee  a  little  thing?/' — God  forbid! — ? 
"Be  content  then  therewith  !  " 
And  so  I  pray  the  Gods. 

VII 

What  saith  Antisthenes?'    Hast  thou  never  heard? — - 
It  is  a  kingly  thing,  O  Cyrus,  to  do  well  and  to  be  evil 
spoken  of. 

VIII 

"  Ay,  but  to  debase  myself  thus  were  unworthy  of  me." 
"  That,"  said  Epictetus,  "  is  for  you  to  consider,  not  for 
me.  You  know  yourself  what  you  are  worth  in  your  own 
eyes ;  and  at  what  price  you  will  sell  yourself.  For  men  sell 
themselves  at  various  prices.  This  was  why,  when  Florus 
was  deliberating  whether  he  should  appear  at  Nero's  shows, 
taking  part  in  the  performance  himself,  Agrippinus  replied, 
*  Appear  by  all  means.'  And  when  Florus  inquired,  *  But  why 
do  not  you  appear?'  he  answered,  'Because  I  do  not  even 
consider  the  question.'  For  the  man  who  has  once  stooped  to 
consider  such  questions,  and  to  reckon  up  the  value  of  ex- 
ternal things,  is  not  far  from  forgetting  what  manner  of 
man  he  is.  "Why,  what  is  it  that  you  ask  me?  Is  death 
preferable,  or  life  ?  I  reply,  Life.  Pain  or  pleasure  ?  I  re- 
ply, Pleasure." 

"  Well,  but  if  I  do  not  act,  I  shall  lose  my  head." 
"  Then  go  and  act !    But  for  my  part  I  will  not  act." 
"Why?" 

"  Because  you  think  yourself  but  one  among  the  many 
threads  which  make  up  the  texture  of  the  doublet.  You 
should  aim  at  being  like  men  in  general — just  as  your  thread 
has  no  ambition  either  to  be  anything  distinguished  compared 
with  the  other  threads.  But  I  desire  to  be  the  purple — that 
small  and  shining  part  which  makes  the  rest  seem  fair  and 
beautiful.  Why  then  do  you  bid  me  become  even  as  the 
multitude?    Then  were  I  no  longer  the  purple." 

*  The  founder  of  the  Cynic  school  of  philosophy. 


120  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EFICTETUS 


IX 

If  a  man  could  be  thoroughly  penetrated,  as  he  ought,  with 
this  thought,  that  we  are  all  in  an  especial  manner  sprung 
from  God,  and  that  God  is  the  Father  of  men  as  well  as  of 
Gods,  full  surely  he  would  never  conceive  aught  ignoble  or 
base  of  himself.  Whereas  if  Cs'sar  were  to  adopt  you,  your 
haughty  looks  would  be  intolerable ;  will  you  not  be  elated  at 
knowing  that  you  are  the  son  of  God?  Now  however  it  is 
not  so  with  us :  but  seeing  that  in  our  birth  these  two  things 
are  commingled — the  body  which  we  share  with  the  animals, 
and  the  Reason  and  Thought  which  we  share  with  the  Gods, 
many  decline  tov/ards  this  unhappy  kinship  with  the  dead, 
few  rise  to  the  blessed  kinship  with  the  Divine.  Since  then 
every  one  must  deal  with  each  thing  according  to  the  view 
which  he  forms  about  it,  those  few  who  hold  that  they  are 
born  for  fidelity,  modesty,  and  unerring  sureness  in  dealing 
with  the  things  of  sense,  never  conceive  aught  base  or  ignoble 
of  themselves :  but  the  multitude  the  contrary.  "VVhy,  what 
am  I? — A  wretched  human  creature;  with  this  miserable 
flesh  of  mine.  Miserable  indeed !  but  you  have  something 
better  than  that  paltry  flesh  of  yours.  Why  then  cling  to  the 
one,  and  neglect  the  other? 

X 

Thou  art  but  a  poor  soul  laden  with  a  lifeless  body. 

XI 

The  other  day  I  had  an  iron  lamp  placed  beside  my  house- 
hold gods.  I  heard  a  noise  at  the  door  and  on  hastening 
down  found  my  lamp  carried  off.  I  reflected  that  the  culprit 
was  in  no  very  strange  case.  "  To-morrow,  my  friend,"  I 
said,  "  you  will  find  an  earthenware  lamp ;  for  a  man  can 
only  lose  what  he  has." 

XII 

The  reason  why  I  lost  my  lamp  was  that  the  thief  was 
superior  to  me  in  vigilance.  He  paid  however  this  price  for 
the  lamp,  that  in  exchange  for  it  he  consented  to  become  a 
thief :  in  exchange  for  it,  to  become  faithless. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  121 

XIII 

But  God  hath  introduced  Man  to  be  a  spectator  of  Himself 
and  of  His  works;  and  not  a  spectator  only,  but  also  an  in- 
terpreter of  them.  Wherefore  it  is  a  shame  for  man  to  begin 
and  to  leave  off  where  the  brutes  do.  Rather  he  should  begin 
there,  and  leave  off  where  Nature  leaves  off  in  us :  and  that 
is  at  contemplation,  and  understanding,  and  a  manner  of  life 
that  is  in  harmony  with  herself. 

See  then  that  ye  die  not  without  being  spectators  of  these 
things. 

XIV 

You  journey  to  Olympia  to  see  the  work  of  Phidias;  and 
each  of  you  holds  it  a  misfortune  not  to  have  beheld  these 
things  before  you  die.  Whereas  when  there  is  no  need  even 
to  take  a  journey,  but  you  are  on  the  spot,  with  the  works 
before  you,  have  you  no  care  to  contemplate  and  study  these  ? 

Will  you  not  then  perceive  either  who  you  are  or  unto  what 
end  you  were  born:  or  for  what  purpose  the  power  of  con- 
templation has  been  bestowed  upon  you? 

"  Well,  but  in  life  there  are  some  things  disagreeable  and 
hard  to  bear." 

And  are  there  none  at  Olympia  ?  Are  you  not  scorched  by 
the  heat?  Are  you  not  cramped  for  room?  Have  you  not 
to  bathe  with  discomfort?  Are  you  not  drenched  when  it 
rains?  Have  you  not  to  endure  the  clamour  and  shouting 
and  such  annoyances  as  these?  Well,  I  suppose  you  set  all 
this  over  against  the  splendour  of  the  spectacle,  and  bear  it 
patiently.  What  then?  have  you  not  received  powers  where- 
with to  endure  all  that  comes  to  pass  ?  have  you  not  received 
greatness  of  heart,  received  courage,  received  fortitude? 
What  care  I,  if  I  am  great  of  heart,  for  aught  that  can  come 
to  pass  ?  What  shall  cast  me  down  or  disturb  me  ?  What  shall 
seem  painful?  Shall  I  not  use  the  power  to  the  end  for 
which  I  received  it,  instead  of  moaning  and  wailing  over 
what  comes  to  pass? 

XV 

If  what  philosophers  say  of  the  kinship  of  God  and  Men 
be  true  what  remains  for  men  to  do  but  as  Socrates  did: — 


122  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

never,   when   asked   one's   country,   to   answer,   "  I   am  an 
Athenian  or  a  Corinthian,"  but  "  I  am  a  citizen  of  the  world." 

XVI 

He  that  hath  grasped  the  administration  of  the  World,  who 
hath  learned  that  this  Community,  which  consists  of  God  and 
men,  is  the  foremost  and  mightiest  and  most  comprehensive 
of  all: — that  from  God  have  descended  the  germs  of  life, 
not  to  my  father  only  and  father's  father,  but  to  all  things 
that  are  born  and  grow  upon  the  earth,  and  in  an  especial 
manner  to  those  endowed  with  Reason  (for  those  only  are 
by  their  nature  fitted  to  hold  communion  with  God,  being  by 
means  of  Reason  conjoined  with  Him) — why  should  not 
such  an  one  call  himself  a  citizen  of  the  world?  Why  not  a 
son  of  God?  Why  should  he  fear  aught  that  comes  to  pass 
among  men?  Shall  kinship  with  Csesar,  or  any  other  of  the 
great  at  Rome,  be  enough  to  hedge  men  around  Vv^ith  safety 
and  consideration,  without  a  thought  of  apprehension:  while 
to  have  God  for  our  Maker,  and  Father,  and  Kinsman,  shall 
not  this  set  us  free  from  sorrows  and  fears? 

XVII 

I  do  not  think  that  an  old  fellow  like  me  need  have  been 
sitting  here  to  try  and  prevent  your  entertaining  abject 
notions  of  yourselves,  and  talking  of  yourselves  in  an  abject 
and  ignoble  way :  but  to  prevent  there  being  by  chance  among 
you  any  such  young  men  as,  after  recognising  their  kindred 
to  the  Gods,  and  their  bondage  in  these  chains  of  the  body 
and  its  manifold  necessities,  should  desire  to  cast  them  off  as 
burdens  too  grievous  to  be  borne,  and  depart  to  their  true 
kindred.  This  is  the  struggle  in  which  your  Master  and 
Teacher,  were  he  worthy  of  the  name,  should  be  engaged. 
You  would  come  to  me  and  say:  "  Epictetus,  we  can  no 
longer  endure  being  chained  to  this  wretched  body,  giving 
it  food  and  drink  and  rest  and  purification;  aye,  and  for  its 
sake  forced  to  be  subservient  to  this  man  and  that.  Are 
not  these  things  indifferent  and  nothing  to  us?  Is  it  not 
true  that  death  is  no  evil  ?  Are  we  not  in  a  manner  kinsmen 
of  the  Gods,  and  have  we  not  come  from  them?  Let  us 
depart  thither,  whence  we  came :  let  us  be  freed  from  these 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTSTUS  123 

chains  that  confine  and  press  us  down.  Here  are  thieves 
and  robbers  and  tribunals:  and  they  that  are  called  tyrants, 
who  deem  that  they  have  after  a  fashion  power  over  us,  be- 
cause of  the  miserable  body  and  what  appertains  to  it.  Let 
us  show  them  that  they  have  power  over  none." 

XVIII 

And  to  this  I  reply: — 

"Friends,  wait  for  God.  When  He  gives  the  signal,  and 
releases  you  from  this  service,  then  depart  to  Him.  But  for 
the  present,  endure  to  dv/ell  in  the  place  wherein  He  hath 
assigned  you  your  post.  Short  indeed  is  the  time  of  your 
habitation  therein,  and  easy  to  those  that  are  thus  minded. 
What  tyrant,  what  robber,  what  tribunals  have  any  terrors 
for  those  who  thus  esteem  the  body  and  all  that  belong  to  it 
as  of  no  account  ?    Stay ;  depart  not  rashly  hence !  " 

XIX 

Something  like  that  is  what  should  pass  between  a  teacher 
and  ingenuous  youths.  As  it  is,  what  does  pass?  The 
teacher  is  a  lifeless  body,  and  you  are  lifeless  bodies  your- 
selves. When  you  have  had  enough  to  eat  to-day,  you  sit 
down  and  weep  about  to-morrow's  food.  Slave !  if  you  have 
it,  well  and  good ;  if  not,  you  will  depart :  the  door  is  open — 
why  lament  ?  What  further  room  is  there  for  tears  ?  What 
further  occasion  for  flattery?  Why  should  one  envy  an- 
other? Why  should  you  stand  in  awe  of  them  that  have 
much  or  are  placed  in  power,  especially  if  they  be  also 
strong  and  passionate?  Why,  what  should  they  do  to  us? 
What  they  can  do,  we  will  not  regard:  what  does  concern 
us,  that  they  cannot  do.  Who  then  shall  still  rule  one  that 
is  thus  minded? 

XX 

Seeing  this  then,  and  noting  well  the  faculties  which  you 
have,  you  should  say, — "  Send  now,  O  God,  any  trial  that 
Thou  wilt;  lo,  I  have  means  and  powers  given  me  by  Thee 
to  acquit  myself  with  honour  through  whatever  comes  to 
pass !  " — No ;  but  there  you  sit,  trembling  for  fear  certain 
things  should  come  to  pass,  and  moaning  and  groaning  and 
lamenting  over  v^^hat  does  come  to  pass.    And  then  you  up- 


124  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

braid  the  Gods.  Such  meanness  of  spirit  can  have  but  one 
result — impiety. 

Yet  God  has  not  only  given  us  these  faculties  by  means 
of  which  we  may  bear  everything  that  comes  to  pass  without 
being  crushed  or  depressed  thereby;  but  like  a  good  King 
and  Father,  He  has  given  us  this  without  let  or  hindrance, 
placed  wholly  at  our  own  disposition,  without  reserving  to 
Himself  any  power  of  impediment  or  restraint.  Though 
possessing  all  these  things  free  and  all  your  own,  you  do 
not  use  them !  you  do  not  perceive  what  it  is  you  have  re- 
ceived nor  whence  it  comes,  but  sit  moaning  and  groaning; 
some  of  you  blind  to  the  Giver,  making  no  acknowledgment 
to  your  Benefactor ;  others  basely  giving  themselves  to  com- 
plaints and  accusations  against  God. 

Yet  what  faculties  and  powers  you  possess  for  attaining 
courage  and  greatness  of  heart,  I  can  easily  show  you ;  what 
you  have  for  upbraiding  and  accusation,  it  is  for  you  to 
show  me ! 

XXI 

How  did  Socrates  bear  himself  in  this  regard  ?  How  else 
than  as  became  one  who  was  fully  assured  that  he  was  the 
kinsman  of  the  Gods? 

XXII 

If  God  had  made  that  part  of  His  own  nature  which  He 
severed  from  Himself  and  gave  to  us,  liable  to  be  hindered 
or  constrained  either  by  Himself  or  any  other.  He  would  not 
have  been  God,  nor  would  He  have  been  taking  care  of  us 
as  He  ought.  .  .  .  H  you  choose,  you  are  free;  if  you 
choose,  you  need  blame  no  man — accuse  no  man.  Ail  things 
will  be  at  once  according  to  your  mind  and  according  to  the 
Mind  of  God. 

XXIII 

Petrifaction  is  of  two  sorts.  There  is  petrifaction  of  the 
understanding;  and  also  of  the  sense  of  shame.  This  hap- 
pens when  a  man  obstinately  refuses  to  acknowledge  plain 
truths,  and  persists  in  maintaining  what  is  self-contradictory. 
Most  of  us  dread  mortification  of  the  body,  and  would  spare 
no  pains  to  escape  anything  of  that  kind.  But  of  mortification 
of  the  soul  we  are  utterly  heedless.    With  regard,  indeed,  to 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  125 

the  soul,  if  a  man  is  in  such  a  state  as  to  be  incapable  of 
following  or  understanding  anything,  I  grant  you  we  do 
think  him  in  a  bad  way.  But  mortification  of  the  sense  of 
shame  and  modesty  we  go  so  far  as  to  dub  strength  of  mind ! 

XXIV 

If  we  were  as  intent  upon  our  own  business  as  the  old 
fellows  at  Rome  are  upon  what  interests  them,  we  too  might 
perhaps  accomplish  something.  I  know  a  man  older  than 
I  am,  now  Superintendent  of  the  Corn-market  at  Rome,  and 
I  remember  when  he  passed  through  this  place  on  his  way 
back  from  exile,  what  an  account  he  gave  me  of  his  former 
life,  declaring  that  for  the  future,  once  home  again,  his 
only  care  should  be  to  pass  his  remaining  years  in  quiet 
and  tranquillity.  "  For  how  few  years  have  I  left !  "  he  cried. 
"  That,"  I  said,  "  you  will  not  do ;  but  the  moment  the  scent 
of  Rome  is  in  your  nostrils,  you  will  forget  it  all ;  and  if  you 
can  but  gain  admission  to  Court,  you  will  be  glad  enough  to 
elbow  your  way  in,  and  thank  God  for  it."  "  Epictetus,"  he 
replied,  "  if  ever  you  find  me  setting  as  much  as  one  foot 
within  the  Court,  think  what  you  will  of  me." 

Well,  as  it  was,  what  did  he  do  ?  Ere  ever  he  entered  the 
city,  he  was  met  by  a  despatch  from  the  Emperor.  He  took 
it,  and  forgot  the  whole  of  his  resolutions.  From  that  mo- 
ment, he  has  been  piling  one  thing  upon  another.  I  should 
like  to  be  beside  him  to  remind  him  of  what  he  said  when 
passing  this  way,  and  to  add.  How  much  better  a  prophet 
I  am  than  you ! 

What  then?  do  I  say  man  is  not  made  for  an  active  life? 
Far  from  it!  .  .  .  But  there  is  a  great  difference  between 
other  men's  occupations  and  ours.  ...  A  glance  at  theirs 
will  make  it  clear  to  you.  All  day  long  they  do  nothing 
but  calculate,  contrive,  consult  how  to  wring  their  profit  out 
of  food-stuffs,  farm-plots  and  the  like.  .  .  .  Whereas,  I  en- 
treat you  to  learn  what  the  administration  of  the  World  is, 
and  what  place  a  Being  endowed  with  reason  holds  therein : 
to  consider  what  you  are  yourself,  and  wherein  your  Good 
and  Evil  consists. 


126  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

XXV 

A  man  asked  me  to  write  to  Rome  on  his  behalf  who,  as 
most  people  thought,  had  met  with  misfortune;  for  having 
been  before  wealthy  and  distinguished,  he  had  afterwards 
lost  all  and  was  living  here.  So  I  wrote  about  him  in  a 
humble  style.  He  however  on  reading  the  letter  returned 
it  to  me,  with  the  words :  "  I  asked  for  your  help,  not  for 
your  pity.    No  evil  has  happened  unto  me." 

XXVI 

True  instruction  is  this : — to  learn  to  wish  that  each  thing 
should  come  to  pass  as  it  does.  And  how  does  it  come  to 
pass?  As  the  Disposer  has  disposed  it.  Now  He  has  dis- 
posed that  there  should  be  summer  and  winter,  and  plenty 
and  dearth,  and  vice  and  virtue,  and  all  such  opposites,  for 
the  harmony  of  the  whole. 

XXVII 

Have  this  thought  ever  present  with  thee,  when  thou 
losest  any  outward  thing,  what  thou  gainest  in  its  stead; 
and  if  this  be  the  more  precious,  say  not,  I  have  suffered  loss. 

XXVIII 

Concerning  the  Gods,  there  are  who  deny  the  very  ex- 
istence of  the  Godhead;  others  say  that  it  exists,  but  neither 
bestirs  nor  concerns  itself  nor  has  forethought  for  anything. 
A  third  party  attribute  to  it  existence  and  forethought,  but 
only  for  great  and  heavenly  matters,  not  for  anything  that 
is  on  earth.  A  fourth  party  admit  things  on  earth  as  well 
as  in  heaven,  but  only  in  general,  and  not  with  respect  to 
each  individual.  A  fifth,  of  whom  were  Ulysses  and  Soc- 
rates, are  those  that  cry: — 

/  move  not  without  Thy  knowledge ! 

XXIX 

Considering  all  these  things,  the  good  and  true  man  sub- 
mits his  judgment  to  Him  that  administers  the  Universe, 
even  as  good  citizens  to  the  law  of  the  State.  And  he  that 
Is  being  instructed  should  come  thus  minded:-— How  may 
I  in  all  things  follow  the  Gods ;  and,  How  may  I  rest  satis- 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  127 

fied  with  the  Divine  Administration;  and,  How  may  I  be- 
come free?  For  he  is  free  for  whom  all  things  come  to 
pass  according  to  his  will,  and  whom  none  can  hinder.  What 
then,  is  freedom  madness?  God  forbid.  For  madness  and 
freedom  exist  not  together. 

"  But  I  wish  all  that  I  desire  to  com.e  to  pass  and  in  the 
manner  that  I  desire." 

— You  are  mad,  you  are  beside  yourself.  Know  you  not 
that  Freedom  is  a  glorious  thing  and  of  great  worth?  But 
that  what  I  desired  at  random  I  should  wish  at  random  to 
come  to  pass,  so  far  from  being  noble,  may  well  be  exceeding 
base. 

XXX 

You  must  know  that  it  is  no  easy  thing  for  a  principle 
to  becom^e  a  man's  own,  unless  each  day  he  maintain  it  and 
hear  it  maintained,  as  well  as  work  it  out  in  life. 

XXXI 

You  are  impatient  and  hard  to  please.  If  alone,  you  call  it 
solitude:  if  in  the  company  of  men,  you  dub  them  conspira- 
tors and  thieves,  and  find  fault  with  3^our  very  parents,  chil- 
dren, brothers  and  neighbours.  Whereas  when  by  yourself 
you  should  have  called  it  Tranquillity  and  Freedom:  and 
herein  deemed  yourself  like  unto  the  Gods.  And  when  in 
the  company  of  the  many,  you  should  not  have  called  it  a 
wearisome  crowd  and  tumult,  but  an  assembly  and  a  tri- 
bunal; and  thus  accepted  all  with  contentment. 

XXXII 

What  then  is  the  chastisement  of  those  wHo  accept  it  not? 
To  be  as  they  are.  Is  any  discontented  with  being  alone? 
let  him  be  in  solitude.  Is  any  discontented  with  his  parents  ? 
let  him  be  a  bad  son,  and  lament.  Is  any  discontented  with 
his  children  ?  let  him  be  a  bad  father. — "  Throw  him  into 
prison !  " — What  prison  ? — Where  he  is  already :  for  he  is 
there  against  his  will;  and  wherever  a  man  is  against  his 
v/ill,  that  to  him  is  a  prison.  Thus  Socrates  was  not  in 
prison,  since  he  was  there  with  his  own  consent. 


128  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

XXXIII 

Knowest  thou  what  a  speck  thou  art  in  comparison  with 
the  Universe  ? — That  is,  with  respect  to  the  body ;  since  with 
respect  to  Reason,  thou  art  not  inferior  to  the  Gods,  nor 
less  than  they.  For  the  greatness  of  Reason  is  not  measured 
by  length  or  height,  but  by  the  resolves  of  the  mind.  Place 
then  thy  happiness  in  that  wherein  thou  art  equal  to  the 
Gods. 

XXXIV 

Asked  how  a  man  might  eat  acceptably  to  the  Gods, 
Epictetus  replied : — If  when  he  eats,  he  can  be  just,  cheerful, 
equable,  temperate,  and  orderly,  can  he  not  thus  eat  accept- 
ably to  the  Gods?  But  when  you  call  for  warm  water,  and 
your  slave  does  not  answer,  or  when  he  answers  brings  it 
luke-warm,  or  is  not  even  found  to  be  in  the  house  at  all, 
then  not  to  be  vexed  nor  burst  with  anger,  is  not  that  accept- 
able to  the  Gods? 

"  But  how  can  one  endure  such  people  ?  " 

Slave,  will  you  not  endure  your  own  brother,  that  has 
God  to  his  forefather,  even  as  a  son  sprung  from  the  same 
stock,  and  of  the  same  high  descent  as  yourself?  And  if 
you  are  stationed  in  a  high  position,  are  you  therefore  forth- 
with  to  set  up  for  a  tyrant?  Remember  who  you  are,  and 
whom  you  rule,  that  they  are  by  nature  your  kinsmen,  your 
brothers,  the  offspring  of  God. 

"  But  I  paid  a  price  for  them,  not  they  for  me." 

Do  you  see  whither  you  are  looking — down  to  the  earth, 
to  the  pit,  to  those  despicable  laws  of  the  dead?  But  to 
the  laws  of  the  Gods  you  do  not  look. 

XXXV 

When  we  are  invited  to  a  banquet  we  take  what  is  set  be- 
fore us ;  and  were  one  to  call  upon  his  host  to  set  fish  upon 
the  table  or  sweet  things,  he  would  be  deemed  absurd.  Yet 
in  a  word,  we  ask  the  Gods  for  what  they  do  not  give;  and 
that,  although  they  have  given  us  so  many  things ! 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  129 

XXXVI 

Asked  how  a  man  might  convince  himself  that  every 
single  act  of  his  was  under  the  eye  of  God,  Epictetus  an- 
swered:— 

"  Do  you  not  hold  that  all  things  are  bound  together  in 
one?" 

"  I  do." 

"  Well,  and  do  you  not  hold  that  things  on  earth  and 
things  in  heaven  are  continuous  and  in  unison  with  each 
other?" 

"  I  do,"  was  the  reply. 

"  Else  how  should  the  trees  so  regularly,  as  though  by 
God's  command,  at  His  bidding  flower;  at  His  bidding  send 
forth  shoots,  bear  fruit  and  ripen  it;  at  His  bidding  let  it 
fall  and  shed  their  leaves,  and  folded  up  upon  themselves  lie 
in  quietness  and  rest?  How  else,  as  the  Moon  waxes  and 
wanes,  as  the  Sun  approaches  and  recedes,  can  it  be  that 
such  vicissitude  and  alternation  is  seen  in  earthly  things? 

"  If  then  all  things  that  grow,  nay  our  own  bodies  are  thus 
bound  up  with  the  whole,  is  not  this  still  truer  of  our  souls? 
And  if  our  souls  are  bound  up  and  in  contact  with  God,  as 
being  very  parts  and  fragments  plucked  from  Himself,  shall 
He  not  feel  every  movement  of  theirs  as  though  it  ,were  His 
own,  and  belonging  to  His  own  nature  ?  " 

xxxvii 
"  But,"  you  say,  "  I  cannot  comprehend  all  this  at  once." 
"  Why,   who  told  you   that  your   powers   were  equal  to 
God's?" 

Yet  God  hath  placed  by  the  side  of  each  a  man's  own 
Guardian  Spirit,*  who  is  charged  to  watch  over  him — a 
Guardian  who  sleeps  not  nor  is  deceived.  For  to  what  better 
or  more  watchful  Guardian  could  He  have  committed  each 
of  us?  So  when  you  have  shut  the  doors  and  made  a  dark- 
ness within,  remember  never  to  say  that  you  are  alone;  for 
you  are  not  alone,  but  God  is  within,  and  your  Guardian 
Spirit,  and  what  light  do  they  need  to  behold  what  you  do? 
To  this  God  you  also  should  have  sworn  allegiance,  even  as 
soldiers  unto  Caesar.    They  when  their  service  is  hired,  swear 

*To  the  Stoics  the  Guardian  Spirit  was  each  man's  Reason. 

5  HC— Vol.  2 


130  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPiCTETUS 

to  hold  the  life  of  Caesar  dearer  than  all  else :  and  \¥ill  you 
not  sv/ear  your  oath,  that  are  deemed  worthy  of  so  many  and 
great  gifts?  And  will  you  not  keep  your  oath  when  you 
have  sworn  it?  And  what  oath  will  you  swear?  Never  to 
disobey,  never  to  arraign  or  murmur  at  aught  that  comes  to 
you  from  His  hand:  never  unwillingly  to  do  or  suffer  aught 
that  necessity  lays  upon  you. 

"  Is  this  oath  like  theirs  ?  " 

They  sv/ear  to  hold  no  other  dearer  than  Caesar:  you,  to 
hold  our  true  selves  dearer  than  all  else  beside. 

XXXVIII 

"  How  shall  my  brother  cease  to  be  wroth  with  me  ?  " 
Bring  to  him  to  me,  and  I  will  tell  him.     But  to  thee  I 
have  nothing  to  say  about  his  anger. 

XXXIX 

"When  one  took  counsel  of  Epictetus,  saying,  "  What  I  seek 
is  this,  how  even  though  my  brother  be  not  reconciled  to 
me,  I  may  still  remain  as  Nature  would  have  me  to  be," 
he  replied:  "All  great  things  are  slow  of  grov/th;  nay, 
this  is  true  even  of  a  grape  or  of  a  fig.  If  then  you  say 
to  me  now,  I  desire  a  fig,  I  shall  answer.  It  needs  time :  wait 
till  it  first  flower,  then  cast  its  blossom,  then  ripen.  Whereas 
then  the  fruit  of  the  fig-tree  reaches  not  maturity  suddenly 
nor  yet  in  a  single  hour,  do  you  nevertheless  desire  so 
quickly  and  easily  to  reap  the  fruit  of  the  mind  of  m.an? — 
Nay,  expect  it  not,  even  though  I  bade  you  1  " 

XL 

Epaphroditus^  had  a  shoemaker  whom  he  sold  as  being 
good-for-nothing.  This  fellow,  by  some  accident,  was  after- 
wards purchased  by  one  of  Csesar's  men,  and  became  shoe- 
maker to  Csesar.  You  should  have  seen  what  respect  Epaph- 
roditus  paid  him  then.  "  How  does  the  good  Felicion  ? 
Kindly  let  me  know ! "  A^nd  if  any  of  us  inquired,  "  What 
is  Epaphroditus  doing?"  the  answer  was,  "He  is  consulting 
about  so  and  so  with  Felicion." — Had  he  not  sold  him  as 
good-for-nothing?  Who  had  in  a  trice  converted  him  into 
a  wiseacre? 

^A  freedman  of  Nero,  and  at  one  time  owner  of  Epictetus. 


THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS  131 

This  is  what  comes  of  holding  of  importance  anything  but 
the  things  that  depend  on  the  Will. 

XLI 

What  you  shun  enduring  yourself,  attempt  not  to  impose 
on  others.  You  shun  slavery — beware  of  enslaving  others ! 
If  you  can  endure  to  do  that,  one  would  think  you  had  been 
once  upon  a  time  a  slave  yourself.  For  Vice  has  nothing 
in  common  with  virtue,  nor  Freedom  with  slavery. 

XLII 

Has  a  man  been  raised  to  the  tribuneship?  Every  one 
that  he  meets  congratulates  him.  One  kisses  him  on  the 
eyes,  another  on  the  neck,  while  the  slaves  kiss  his  hands. 
He  goes  home  to  find  torches  burning;  he  ascends  to  the 
Capitol  to  sacrifice — Who  ever  sacrificed  for  having  had 
right  desires ;  for  having  conceived  such  inclinations  as 
Nature  would  have  him?  In  truth  we  thank  the  Gods  for 
that  wherein  yvQ  place  our  happiness. 

XLIII 

A  man  was  talking  to  me  to-day  about  the  priesthood  of 
Augustus.  I  said  to  him,  "  Let  the  thing  go,  my  good  Sir ; 
you  will  spend  a  great  deal  to  no  purpose." 

"  Well,  but  my  name  will  be  inserted  in  all  documents 
and  contracts." 

"  Will  you  be  standing  there  to  tell  those  that  read  them, 
That  is  my  name  written  there  ?  And  even  though  you  could 
now  be  there  in  every  case,  what  will  you  do  when  you  are 
dead?" 

"  At  all  events  my  name  w^ill  remain." 

"  Inscribe  it  on  a  stone  and  it  will  remain  just  as  well. 
And  think,  beyond  Nicopolis  what  memory  of  you  will  there 
be?" 

"  But  I  shall  have  a  golden  wreath  to  wear." 

"  If  you  must  have  a  wreath,  get  a  wreath  of  roses  and 
put  it  on ;  you  will  look  more  elegant !  " 

XLIV 

Above  all,  remember  that  the  door  stands  open.  Be  not 
more  fearful  than  children;  but  as  they,  when  they  weary 


132  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

of  the  game,  cry,  "  I  will  play  no  more,"  even  so,  when  thou 
art  in  the  like  case,  cry,  "  I  will  play  no  morp "'  and  depart. 
But  if  thou  stayest,  make  no  lamentation. 

XLV 

Is  there  smoke  in  the  room?  If  it  be  slight,  I  remain;  if 
grievous,  I  quit  it.  For  you  must  remember  this  and  hold 
it  fast,  that  the  door  stands  open. 

"  You  shall  not  dwell  at  Nicopolis !  " 

Well  and  good. 

"Nor  at  Athens." 

Then  I  will  not  dwell  at  Athens  either. 

"  Nor  at  Rome." 

Nor  at  Rome  either. 

"  You  shall  dwell  in  Gyara !  " ' 

Well:  but  to  dwell  in  Gyara  seems  to  me  like  a  grievous 
smoke;  I  depart  to  a  place  where  none  can  forbid  me  to 
dwell :  that  habitation  is  open  unto  all !  As  for  the  last  gar- 
ment of  all,  that  is  the  poor  body ;  beyond  that,  none  can  do 
aught  unto  me.  This  is  why  Demetrius'  said  to  Nero :  "  You 
threaten  me  with  death ;  it  is  Nature  who  threatens  you ! " 

XLVI 

The  beginning  of  philosophy  is  to  know  the  condition  of 
one's  own  mind.  If  a  man  recognises  that  this  is  in  a  weakly 
state,  he  will  not  then  want  to  apply  it  to  questions  of  the 
greatest  moment.  As  it  is,  men  who  are  not  fit  to  swallow 
even  a  morsel,  buy  whole  treatises  and  try  to  devour  them. 
Accordingly  they  either  vomit  them  up  again,  or  suffer  from 
indigestion,  whence  come  gripings,  fluxions,  and  fevers. 
Whereas  they  should  have  stopped  to  consider  their 
capacity. 

XLVII 

In  theory  it  is  easy  to  convince  an  ignorant  person:  in 
actual  life,  men  not  only  object  to  offer  themselves  to  be 
convinced,  but  hate  the  man  who  has  convinced  them. 
Whereas  Socrates  used  to  say  that  we  should  never  lead  a 
life  not  subjected  to  examination. 

6  An  island  in  the  ^gean,  used  as  a  place  of  banishment. 
''A  well-known  Cynic  philosopher. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  133 

XLVIII 

This  is  the  reason  why  Socrates,  when  reminded  that  he 
should  prepare  for  his  trial,  answered :  "  Thinkest  thou  not 
that  I  have  been  preparing  for  it  all  my  life  ?  " 

"  In  what  way  ?  " 

"  I  have  maintained  that  which  in  me  lay." 

"How  so?" 

"  I  have  never,  secretly  or  openly,  done  a  wrong  unto  any." 

XLIX 

In  what  character  dost  thou  now  come  forward? 

As  a  witness  summoned  by  God,  "  Come  thou,"  saith 
God,  "  and  testify  for  me,  for  thou  art  v/orthy  of  being 
brought  forward  as  a  witness  by  Me.  Is  aught  that  is 
outside  thy  will  either  good  or  bad  ?  Do  I  hurt  any  man  ? 
Have  I  placed  the  good  of  each  in  the  power  of  any  other 
than  himself  ?    What  witness  dost  thou  bear  to  God  ? " 

"  I  am  in  evil  state.  Master,  I  am  undone !  None  careth 
for  me,  none  giveth  me  aught:  all  men  blame,  all  speak 
evil  of  me." 

Is  this  the  witness  thou  wilt  bear,  and  do  dishonour  to 
the  calling  wherewith  He  hath  called  thee,  because  He  hath 
done  thee  so  great  honour,  and  deemed  thee  worthy  of 
being  summoned  to  bear  witness  in  so  great  a  cause? 

L 

Wouldst  thou  have  men  speak  good  of  thee?  speak  good 
of  them.  And  when  thou  hast  learned  to  speak  good  of 
them,  try  to  do  good  unto  them,  and  thus  thou  wilt  reap 
in  return  their  speaking  good  of  thee. 

LI 

When  thou  goest  in  to  any  of  the  great,  remember  that 
Another  from  above  sees  what  is  passing,  and  that  thou 
shouldst  please  Him  rather  than  man.  He  therefore  asks 
thee : — 

"  In  the  Schools,  what  didst  thou  call  exile,  imprisonment, 
bonds,  death  and  shame  ?  " 

"  I  called  them  things  indifferent." 

"  What  then  dost  thou  call  them  now  ?  Are  they  at  all 
changed  ? " 


134  THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

"  No." 

"  Is  it  then  thou  that  art  changed?  " 

"  No." 

"  Say  then,  what  are  things  indifferent  ?  " 

"  Things  that  are  not  in  our  power." 

"  Say  then,  what  follows  ?  " 

"  That  things  which  are  not  in  our  power  are  nothing 
to  me." 

"  Say  also  what  things  you  hold  to  be  good." 

"  A  will  such  as  it  ought  to  be,  and  a  right  use  of  the 
things  of  sense." 

"  And  what  is  the  end  ?  " 

"  To  follow  Thee  I  " 

LII 

"  That  Socrates  should  ever  have  been  so  treated  by  the 
Athenians !  " 

Slave !  why  say  "  Socrates  "  ?  Speak  of  the  thing  as  it  is : 
That  ever  then  the  poor  body  of  Socrates  should  have  been 
dragged  away  and  haled  by  main  force  to  prison !  That 
ever  hemlock  should  have  been  given  to  the  body  of  Socrates ; 
that  that  should  have  breathed  its  life  away ! — Do  you  marvel 
at  this?  Do  you  hold  this  unjust?  Is  it  for  this  that  you 
accuse  God  ?  Had  Socrates  no  compensation  for  this  ?  Where 
then  for  him  was  the  ideal  Good?  Whom  shall  we  hearken 
to,  you  or  him?    And  what  says  he? 

"  Anytus  and  Melitus®  may  put  me  to  death:  to  injure  me 
is  beyond  their  pov/er." 

And  again : — 

"  If  such  be  the  will  of  God,  so  let  it  be." 

LIII 

Nay,  young  man,  for  heaven's  sake;  but  once  thou  hast 
heard  these  words,  go  home  and  say  to  thyself : — '*  It  is 
not  Epictetus  that  has  told  me  these  things:  how  indeed 
should  he?  No,  it  is  some  gracious  God  through  him.  Else 
it  would  never  have  entered  his  head  to  tell  me  them — he 
that  is  not  used  to  speak  to  any  one  thus.  Well,  then,  let 
us  not  lie  under  the  wrath  of  God,  but  be  obedient  unto  Him." 
— Nay,  indeed ;  but  if  a  raven  by  its  croaking  bears  thee  any 

8  The  accusers  of  Socrates.     See  Plato's  Apology. 


THE    GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  135 

sign,  it  is  not  the  raven  but  God  that  sends  the  sign  through 
the  raven ;  and  if  He  signifies  anything  to  thee  through  human 
voice,  will  He  not  cause  the  man  to  say  these  words  to  thee, 
that  thou  mayest  know  the  power  of  the  Divine — ^how  He  sends 
a  sign  to  some  in  one  v/ay  and  to  others  in  another,  and  on 
the  greatest  and  highest  matters  of  all  signifies  His  will 
through  the  noblest  messenger? 
What  else  does  the  poet  mean: — 

I  spake  unto  him  erst  Myself,  and  sent 

Hermes  the  shining  One,  to  check  and  warn  him, 

The  husband  not  to  slay,  nor  woo  the  wife  ! 

"'  .  .   .      V 

In  the  same  way  my  friend  Heraclitus,  who  had  a  triflmg 

suit  about  a  petty  farm  at  Rhodes,  first  showed  the  judges 
that  his  cause  v/as  just,  and  then  at  the  finish  cried,  "I  will 
not  entreat  you:  nor  do  I  care  what  sentence  you  pass.  It 
is  you  who  are  on  your  trial,  not  I !  " — ^And  so  he  ended  the 


case." 


LV 

As  for  us,  we  behave  like  a  herd  of  deer.  When  they  flee 
from  the  huntsman's  feathers^"  in  affright,  which  way  do  they 
turn?  What  haven  of  safety  do  they  make  for?  Why, 
they  rush  upon  the  nets !  And  thus  they  perish  by  confound- 
ing what  they  should  fear  with  that  wherein  no  danger  lies. 
.  .  .  Not  death  or  pain  is  to  be  feared,  but  the  fear  of  death 
or  pain.    Well  said  the  poet  therefore: — 

Death  has  no  terror  ;  only  a  Death  of  shame  ! 

LVI 

How  is  it  then  that  certain  external  things  are  said  to  be 
natural,  and  others  contrary  to  Nature? 

Why,  just  as  it  might  be  said  if  we  stood  alone  and  apart 
from  others.  A  foot,  for  instance,  I  will  allow  it  is  natural 
should  be  clean.  But  if  you  take  it  as  a  foot,  and  as  a  thing 
':which  does  not  stand  by  itself,  it  will  beseem  it  (if  need  be) 
to  walk  in  the  mud,  to  tread  on  thorns,  and  sometimes  even 
to  be  cut  off,  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  body ;  else  it  is  no 

®  Or,  "  And  so  he  lost  his  case  "   (Long). 
^Colored  feathers  fixed  to  ropes  partly  surrounding  the  cover. 


136  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

longer  a  foot.  In  some  such  way  we  should  conceive  of  our- 
selves also.  What  art  thou  ? — A  man. — Looked  at  as  standing 
by  thyself  and  separate,  it  is  natural  for  thee  in  health  and 
wealth  long  to  live.  But  looked  at  as  a  Man,  and  only  as  a 
part  of  a  Whole,  it  is  for  that  Whole's  sake  that  thou  shouldst 
at  one  time  fall  sick,  at  another  brave  the  perils  of  the  sea, 
again,  know  the  meaning  of  want  and  perhaps  die  an  early 
death.  Why  then  repine?  Knowest  thou  not  that  as  the 
foot  is  no  more  a  foot  if  detached  from  the  body,  so  thou  in 
like  case  art  no  longer  a  Man  ?  For  what  is  a  Man  ?  A  part 
of  a  City: — first,  of  the  City  of  Gods  and  Men;  next,  of  that 
which  ranks  nearest  it,  a  miniature  of  the  universal  City. 
...  In  such  a  body,  in  such  a  world  enveloping  us,  among 
lives  like  these,  such  things  must  happen  to  one  or  another. 
Thy  part,  then,  being  here,  is  to  speak  of  these  things  as  is 
meet,  and  to  order  them  as  befits  the  matter. 

LVII 

That  was  a  good  reply  which  Diogenes  made  to  a  man 
who  asked  him  for  letters  of  recommendation. — "  That  you 
are  a  man,  he  will  know  when  he  sees  you ; — v/hether  a  good 
or  bad  one,  he  will  know  if  he  has  any  skill  in  discerning  the 
good  and  the  bad.  But  if  he  has  none,  he  will  never  know, 
though  I  write  to  him  a  thousand  times." — It  is  as  though  a 
piece  of  silver  money  desired  to  be  recommended  to  some  one 
to  be  tested.  If  the  man  be  a  good  judge  of  silver,  he  will 
know :  the  coin  will  tell  its  own  tale. 

LVIII 

Even  as  the  traveller  asks  his  way  of  him  that  he  meets, 
inclined  in  no  wise  to  bear  to  the  right  rather  than  to  the 
left  (for  he  desires  only  the  way  leading  whither  he  would 
go),  so  should  we  come  unto  God  as  to  a  guide;  even  as 
we  use  our  eyes  without  admonishing  them  to  show  us  some 
things  rather  than  others,  but  content  to  receive  the  images 
of  such  things  as  they  present  unto  us.  But  as  it  is  we  stand 
anxiously  watching  the  victim,  and  with  the  voice  of  sup- 
plication call  upon  the  augur : — "  Master,  have  mercy  on  me : 
vouchsafe  unto  me  a  way  of  escape !  "  Slave,  would  you  then 
have  aught  else  than  what  is  best?  is  there  anything  better 


THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS  137 

than  what  is  God's  good  pleasure?  Why,  as  far  as  in  you 
lies,  would  you  corrupt  your  Judge,  and  lead  your  Counsellor 
astray  ? 

LIX 

God  is  beneficent.  But  the  Good  also  is  beneficent.  It 
should  seem  then  that  where  the  real  nature  of  God  is,  there 
too  is  to  be  found  the  real  nature  of  the  Good.  What  then 
is  the  real  nature  of  God? — Intelligence,  Knowledge,  Right 
Reason.  Here  then  without  more  ado  seek  the  real  nature 
of  the  Good.  For  surely  thou  dost  not  seek  it  in  a  plant  or 
in  an  animal  that  reasoneth  not. 

LX 

Seek  then  the  real  nature  of  the  Good  in  that  without 
whose  presence  thou  wilt  not  admit  the  Good  to  exist  in 
aught  else. — What  then?  Are  not  these  other  things  also 
v/orks  of  God? — They  are;  but  not  preferred  to  honour,  nor 
are  they  portions  of  God.  But  thou  art  a  thing  preferred  to 
honour:  thou  art  thyself  a  fragment  torn  from  God: — thou 
hast  a  portion  of  Him  within  thyself.  How  is  it  then  that 
thou  dost  not  know  thy  high  descent — dost  not  know  whence 
thou  comest?  When  thou  eatest,  wilt  thou  not  remember 
who  thou  art  that  eatest  and  whom  thou  feedest?  In  inter- 
course, in  exercise,  in  discussion  knowest  thou  not  that  it  is 
a  God  whom  thou  feedest,  a  God  whom  thou  exercisest,  a 
God  whom  thou  bearest  about  with  thee,  O  miserable !  and 
thou  perceivest  it  not.  Thinkest  thou  that  I  speak  of  a  God 
of  silver  or  gold,  that  is  without  thee?  Nay,  thou  bearest 
Him  within  thee !  all  unconscious  of  polluting  Him  with 
thoughts  impure  and  unclean  deeds.  Were  an  image  of 
God  present,  thou  wouldst  not  dare  to  act  as  thou  dost,  yet, 
when  God  Himself  is  present  within  thee,  beholding  and  hear- 
ing all,  thou  dost  not  blush  to  think  such  thoughts  and  do 
such  deeds,  O  thou  that  art  insensible  of  thine  own  nature 
and  liest  tmder  the  wrath  of  God ! 

LXI 

Why  then  are  we  afraid  when  we  send  a  young  man 
from  the  Schools  into  active  life,  lest  he  should  indulge  his 
appetites   intemperately,   lest  he   should  debase  himself  by 


138  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

ragged  clothing,  or  be  puffed  up  by  fine  raiment?  Knows 
he  not  the  God  within  him;  knows  he  not  with  whom  he  is 
starting  on  his  way?  Have  we  patience  to  hear  him  say  to 
us.  Would  I  had  thee  with  me ! — Hast  thou  not  God  where 
thou  art,  and  having  Him  dost  thou  still  seek  for  any  other? 
Would  He  tell  thee  aught  else  than  these  things?  Why,  wert 
thou  a  statue  of  Phidias,  an  Athena  or  a  Zens,  thou  wouldst 
bethink  thee  both  of  thyself  and  thine  artificer ;  and  hadst  thou 
any  sense,  thou  wouldst  strive  to  do  no  dishonour  to  thy- 
self or  him  that  fashioned  thee,  nor  appear  to  beholders  in  un- 
befitting guise.  But  now,  because  God  is  thy  Maker,  is  that 
why  thou  carest  not  of  what  sort  thou  shalt  show  thyself  to 
be  ?  Yet  how  different  the  artists  and  their  workmanship ! 
What  human  artist's  work,  for  example,  has  in  it  the  fac- 
ulties that  are  displayed  in  fashioning  it?  Is  it  aught  but 
marble,  bronze,  gold,  or  ivory?  Nay,  when  the  Athena  of 
Phidias  has  put  forth  her  hand  and  received  therein  a 
Victory,  in  that  attitude  she  stands  for  evermore.  But  God's 
works  move  and  breathe;  they  use  and  judge  the  things  of 
sense.  The  workmanship  of  such  an  Artist,  wilt  thou  dis- 
honour Him?  Ay,  when  he  not  only  fashioned  thee,  but 
placed  thee,  like  a  ward,  in  the  care  and  guardianship  of 
thyself  alone,  wilt  thou  not  only  forget  this,  but  also  do 
dishonour  to  what  is  committed  to  thy  care !  If  God  had 
entrusted  thee  with  an  orphan,  wouldst  thou  have  thus 
neglected  him?  He  hath  delivered  thee  to  thine  own  care, 
saying,  I  had  none  more  faithful  than  myself:  keep  this  man 
for  me  such  as  Nature  hath  made  him — modest,  faithful, 
high-minded,  a  stranger  to  fear,  to  passion,  to  perturba- 
tion.  .    .    . 

Such  will  I  show  myself  to  you  all. — "  What,  exempt  from 
sickness  also:  from  age,  from  death?" — Nay,  but  accepting 
sickness,  accepting  death  as  becomes  a  God! 

LXII 

No  labour,  according  to  Diogenes,  is  good  but  that  which 
aims  at  producing  courage  and  strength  of  soul  rather  than 
of  body. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS  139 

LXIII 

A  guide,  on  finding  a  man  who  has  lost  his  way,  brings 
him  back  to  the  right  path — he  does  not  mock  and  jeer  at 
him  and  then  take  himself  off.  You  also  must  show  the 
unlearned  man  the  truth,  and  you  will  see  that  he  will  follow. 
But  so  long  as  you  do  not  show  it  him,  you  should  not  mock, 
but  rather  feel  your  own  incapacity. 

LXIV 

It  was  the  first  and  most  striking  characteristic  of  Socrates 
never  to  become  heated  in  discourse,  never  to  utter  an  in- 
jurious or  insulting  v/ord — on  the  contrary,  he  persistently 
bore  insult  from  others  and  thus  put  an  end  to  the  fray.  If 
you  care  to  know  the  extent  of  his  power  in  this  direction, 
read  Xenophon's  Banquet,  and  you  will  see  how  many  quar- 
rels he  put  an  end  to.  That  is  why  the  Poets  are  right  in  so 
highly  commending  this  faculty: — 

Quickly  and  wisely  withal  even  bitter  feuds  would  he  settle. 

Nevertheless  the  practice  is  not  very  safe  at  present, 
especially  in  Rome.  One  who  adopts  it,  I  need  not  say,  ought 
not  to  carry  it  out  in  an  obscure  corner,  but  boldly  accost, 
if  occasion  serve,  som.e  personage  of  rank  or  wealth. 

"  Can  you  tell  me,  sir,  to  whose  care  you  entrust  your 
horses  ?  " 

it  T „   " 

1  can. 

"  Is  it  to  the  first  comer,  who  knows  nothing  about  them?  " 

"Certainly  not." 

"  Well,  what  of  the  man  who  takes  care  of  your  gold, 
your  silver  or  your  raim.ent  ?  " 

"  He  must  be  experienced  also." 

"  And  your  body — have  you  ever  considered  about  entrust- 
ing it  to  any  one's  care  ?  " 

"  Of  course  I  have." 

"  And  no  doubt  to  a  person  of  experience  as  a  trainer,  a 
physician  ? 

"  Surely." 

"  Are  these  things  the  best  you  possess^  or  have  you  any- 
thing  more  precious  ?  " 

-'  What  can  you  mean  ? " 


140  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

"  I  mean  that  which  employs  these ;  which  weighs  all 
things ;  which  talces  counsel  and  resolve." 

"  Oh,  you  mean  the  soul." 

"You  take  me  rightly;  I  do  mean  the  soul.  By  Heaven, 
I  hold  that  far  more  precious  than  all  else  I  possess.  Can 
you  show  me  then  what  care  you  bestow  on  the  soul?  For 
it  can  scarcely  be  thought  that  a  man  of  your  wisdom  and 
consideration  in  the  city  would  suffer  your  most  precious 
possession  to  go  to  ruin  through  carelessness  and  neglect." 

"  Certainly  not." 

"Well,  do  you  take  care  of  it  yourself?  Did  any  one 
teach  you  the  right  method,  or  did  you  discover  it  yourself  ?  " 

Now  here  comes  in  the  danger:  first,  that  the  great  man 
may  answer,  "Why,  what  is  that  to  you,  my  good  fellow? 
are  you  my  master  ?  "  And  then,  if  you  persist  in  troubling 
him,  may  raise  his  hand  to  strike  you.  It  is  a  practice  of 
which  I  was  myself  a  warm  admirer  until  such  experiences 
as  these  befell  me. 

LXV 

When  a  youth  was  giving  himself  airs  in  the  Theatre  and 
saying,  "  I  am  wise,  for  I  have  conversed  with  many  wise 
m«n,"  Epictetus  replied,  "  I  too  have  conversed  with  many 
rich  men,  yet  I  am  not  rich ! " 


LXVI 

We  see  that  a  carpenter  becomes  a  carpenter  by  learning 
certain  things:  that  a  pilot,  by  learning  certain  things, 
becomes  a  pilot.  Possibly  also  in  the  present  case  the 
mere  desire  to  be  wise  and  good  is  not  enough.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  learn  certain  things.  This  is  then  the  object  of  our 
search.  The  Philosophers  would  have  us  first  learn  that 
there  is  a  God,  and  that  His  Providence  directs  the  Universe ; 
further,  that  to  hide  from  Him  not  only  one's  acts  but  even 
one's  thoughts  and  intentions  is  impossible;  secondly,  what 
the  nature  of  God  is.  Whatever  that  nature  is  discovered  to 
be,  the  man  who  would  please  and  obey  Him  must  strive  with 
all  his  might  to  be  made  like  unto  Him.  If  the  Divine  is 
faithful,  he  also  must  be  faithful;  if  free,  he  also  must  be 
free;   if  beneficent,  he  also  must  be  beneficent;   if  mag- 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  141 

nanimous,  he  also  must  be  magnanimous.    Thus  as  an  imita- 
tor of  God  must  he  follow  Him  in  every  deed  and  word. 

LXVII 

If  I  show  you,  that  you  lack  just  what  is  most  important 
and  necessary  to  happiness,  that  hitherto  your  attention  has 
been  bestowed  on  everything  rather  than  that  which  claims 
it  most;  and,  to  crown  all,  that  you  know  neither  what  God 
nor  Man  is — neither  what  Good  nor  Evil  is:  why,  that  you 
are  ignorant  of  everything  else,  perhaps  you  may  bear  to 
be  told;  but  to  hear  that  you  know  nothing  of  yourself,  how 
could  you  submit  to  that  ?  How  could  you  stand  your  ground 
and  suffer  that  to  be  proved?  Clearly  not  at  all.  You 
instantly  turn  away  in  wrath.  Yet  what  harm  have  I  done 
you?  Unless  indeed  the  mirror  harms  the  ill-favoured  man 
by  showing  him  to  himself  just  as  he  is;  unless  the  physician 
can  be  thought  to  insult  his  patient,  when  he  tells  him: — 
"  Friend,  do  you  suppose  there  is  nothing  wrong  with  you  ? 
why,  you  have  a  fever.  Eat  nothing  to-day,  and  drink  only 
water."  Yet  no  one  says,  "  What  an  insufferable  insult !  " 
Whereas,  if  you  say  to  a  man,  "  Your  desires  are  inflamed, 
your  instincts  of  rejection  are  weak  and  low,  your  aims  are 
inconsistent,  your  impulses  are  not  in  harmony  with  Nature, 
your  opinions  are  rash  and  false,"  he  forthwith  goes  away 
and  complains  that  you  have  insulted  him. 

LXVIII 

Our  way  of  life  resembles  a  fair.  The  flocks  and  herds 
are  passing  along  to  be  sold,  and  the  greater  part  of  the 
crowd  to  buy  and  sell.  But  there  are  some  few  who  come 
only  to  look  at  the  fair,  to  inquire  how  and  why  it  is  being 
held,  upon  what  authority  and  with  what  object.  So  too, 
in  this  great  Fair  of  life,  some,  like  the  cattle,  trouble  them- 
selves about  nothing  but  the  fodder.  Know  all  of  you,  who 
are  busied  about  land,  slaves  and  public  posts,  that  these 
are  nothing  but  fodder!  Some  few  there  are  attending  the 
Fair,  who  love  to  contemplate  what  the  world  is,  what  He 
that  administers  it.  Can  there  be  no  Administrator?  is  it 
possible,  that  while  neither  city  nor  household  could  endure 
even  for  a  moment  without  one  to  administer  and  see  to  its 


142  THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

welfare,  this  Fabric,  so  fair,  so  vast,  should  be  administered 
in  order  so  harmonious,  without  a  purpose  and  by  blind 
chance?  There  is  therefore  an  Administrator.  What  is 
His  nature  and  how  does  He  administer?  And  who  are  we 
that  are  His  children  and  what  work  were  we  born  to  per- 
form? Have  we  any  close  connection  or  relation  with  Him 
or  not? 

Such  are  the  impressions  of  the  few  of  whom  I  speak. 
And  further,  they  apply  themselves  solely  to  considering 
and  examining  the  great  assembly  before  they  depart.  Well, 
they  are  derided  by  the  multitude.  So  are  the  lookers-on 
by  the  traders :  aye,  and  if  the  beasts  had  any  sense,  they 
would  deride  those  who  thought  much  of  anything  but 
fodder  1 

LXIX 

I  think  I  know  now  what  I  never  knew  before — the  mean- 
ing of  the  common  saying,  A  fool  you  can  neither  bend  nor 
break.  Pray  heaven  I  may  never  have  a  wise  fool  for  my 
friend !  There  is  nothing  more  intractable. — "  My  resolve 
is  fixed !  " — Why,  so  madmen  say  too ;  but  the  more  firmly 
they  believe  in  their  delusions,  the  more  they  stand  in  need 
of  treatment. 

LXX 

— "  O  !  when  shall  I  see  Athens  and  its  Acropolis  again  ?  " 
— Miserable  man !  art  thou  not  contented  with  the  daily 
sights  that  meet  thine  eyes  ?  canst  thou  behold  aught  greater 
or  nobler  than  the  Sun,  Moon,  and  Stars ;  than  the  outspread 
Earth  and  Sea?  If  indeed  thou  apprehendest  Him  who 
administers  the  universe,  if  thou  bearest  Him  about  within 
thee,  canst  thou  still  hanker  after  mere  fragments  of  stone 
and  a  fine  rock  ?  When  thou  art  about  to  bid  farewell  to  the 
Sun  and  Moon  itself,  wilt  thou  sit  down  and  cry  like  a  child  ? 
Why,  what  didst  thou  hear,  what  didst  thou  learn  ?  why  didst 
thou  write  thyself  down  a  philosopher,  when  thou  mightest 
have  written  what  was  the  fact,  namely,  "  I  have  made  one 
or  two  Compendiums,  I  have  read  some  works  of  Chrysippus, 
and  I  have  not  even  touched  the  hem  of  Philosophy's  robe  " ! 


THE  GOLDEN   SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS  143 

LXXI 

Friend,  lay  hold  with  a  desperate  grasp,  ere  it  is  too  late,  on 
Freedom,  on  Tranquillity,  on  Greatness  of  soul !  Lift  up  thy 
head,  as  one  escaped  from  slavery;  dare  to  look  up  to  God, 
and  say : — "  Deal  with  me  henceforth  as  Thou  wilt ;  Thou 
and  I  are  of  one  mind.  I  am  Thine:  I  refuse  nothing  that 
seemeth  good  to  Thee ;  lead  on  whither  Thou  wilt ;  clothe  me 
in  what  garb  Thou  pleasest;  wilt  Thou  have  me  a  ruler  or 
a  subject — at  hom.e  or  in  exile — poor  or  rich?  All  these 
things  will  I  justify  unto  men  for  Thee.  I  will  show  the 
true  nature  of  each.  ..." 

Who  would  Hercules  have  been  had  he  loitered  at  home? 
no  Hercules,  but  Eurystheus.  And  in  his  wanderings 
through  the  world  how  many  friends  and  com.rades  did  he 
find?  but  nothing  dearer  to  him  than  God.  Wherefore  he 
was  believed  to  be  God's  son,  as  indeed  he  was.  So  then 
in  obedience  to  Him,  he  went  about  delivering  the  earth 
from  injustice  and  lawlessness. 

But  thou  art  not  Hercules,  thou  sayest,  and  canst  not  de- 
liver others  from  their  iniquity — not  even  Theseus,  to  deliver 
the  soil  of  Attica  from  its  monsters  ?  Purge  away  thine  own, 
cast  forth  thence — from  thine  own  mind,  not  robbers  and 
monsters,  but  Fear,  Desire,  Envy,  Malignity,  Avarice,  Ef- 
feminacy, Intemperance.  And  these  may  not  be  cast  out, 
except  by  looking  to  God  alone,  by  fixing  thy  affections  on 
Him  only,  and  by  consecrating  thyself  to  His  com.mands. 
If  thou  choosest  aught  else,  with  sighs  and  groans  thou  vnlt 
be  forced  to  follow  a  Might  greater  than  thine  own,  ever 
seeking  Tranquillity  without,  and  never  able  to  attain  unto 
her.  For  thou  seekest  her  where  she  is  not  to  be  found; 
and  where  she  is,  there  thou  seekest  her  not ! 

LXXH 

If  a  man  would  pursue  Philosophy,  his  first  task  is  to  throw 
away  conceit.  For  it  is  im.possible  for  a  man  to  begin  to 
learn  what  he  has  a  conceit  that  he  already  know<5. 

LXXIII 

Give  me  but  one  young  man,  that  has  com.e  to  the  School 
with  this  mtention,  who  stands   forth  a   champion  of  this 


144  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

cause,  and  says,  "All  else  I  renounce,  content  if  I  am  btit 
able  to  pass  my  life  free  from  hindrance  and  trouble;  to 
raise  my  head  aloft  and  face  all  things  as  a  free  man;  to 
look  up  to  heaven  as  a  friend  of  God,  fearing  nothing  that 
may  come  to  pass !  "  Point  out  such  a  one  to  me,  that  I  may 
say,  "  Enter,  young  man,  into  possession  of  that  which  is 
thine  own.  For  thy  lot  is  to  adorn  Philosophy.  Thine  are 
these  possessions ;  thine  these  books,  these  discourses !  " 

And  when  our  champion  has  dlily  exercised  himself  in 
this  part  of  the  subject,  I  hope  he  will  come  back  to  me 
and  say : — "  What  I  desire  is  to  be  free  from  passion  and 
from  perturbation;  as  one  who  grudges  no  pains  in  the 
pursuit  of  piety  and  philosophy,  what  I  desire  is  to  know  my 
duty  to  the  Gods,  my  duty  to  my  parents,  to  my  brothers, 
to  my  country,  to  strangers." 

"Enter  then  on  the  second  part  of  the  subject;  it  is 
thine  also." 

"  But  I  have  already  mastered  the  second  part ;  only  I 
wished  to  stand  firm  and  unshaken — as  firm  when  asleep 
as  when  awake,  as  firm  when  elated  with  wine  as  in  despon- 
dency and  dejection." 

"  Friend,  you  are  verily  a  God !  you  cherish  great  designs." 

LXXIV 

"  The  question  at  stake,"  said  Epictetus,  "  is  no  common 
one;  it  is  this: — Are  we  in  our  senses,  or  are  we  not?" 

LXXV 

If  you  "have  given  way  to  anger,  be  sure  that  over  and 
above  the  evil  involved  therein,  you  have  strengthened  the 
habit,  and  added  fuel  to  the  fire.  If  overcome  by  a  tempta- 
tion of  the  flesh,  do  not  reckon  it  a  single  defeat,  but  that 
you  have  also  strengthened  your  dissolute  habits.  Habits 
and  faculties  are  necessarily  affected  by  the  corresponding 
acts.  Those  that  were  not  there  before,  spring  up :  the  rest 
gain  in  strength  and  extent.  This  is  the  account  which 
Philosophers  give  of  the  origin  of  diseases  of  the  mind:— 
Suppose  you  have  once  lusted  after  money:  if  reason  sufi^i- 
cient  to  produce  a  sense  of  the  evil  be  appHed,  then  the  lust 
is  checked,  and  the  mind  at  once  regains  its  original  author- 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  145 

It}'';  whereas  if  you  have  recourse  to  no  remedy,  you  can 
no  longer  look  for  this  return — on  the  contrary,  the  next 
time  it  is  excited  by  the  corresponding  object,  the  flame  of 
desire  leaps  up  more  quickly  than  before.  By  frequent 
repetition,  the  mind  in  the  long  run  becomes  callous;  and 
thus  this  mental  disease  produces  confirmed  Avarice. 

One  who  has  had  fever,  even  when  it  has  left  him,  is  not 
in  the  same  condition  of  health  as  before,  unless  indeed  his 
cure  is  complete.  Something  of  the  sam^e  sort  is  true  also 
of  diseases  of  the  mind.  Behind,  there  remains  a  legacy 
of  traces  and  of  blisters:  and  unless  these  are  effectually 
erased,  subsequent  blows  on  the  same  spot  will  produce  no 
longer  mere  blisters,  but  sores.  If  you  do  not  wish  to 
be  prone  to  anger,  do  not  feed  the  habit;  give  it  nothing 
which  may  tend  to  its  increase.  At  first,  keep  quiet  and 
count  the  days  when  you  were  not  angry :  "  I  used  to  be 
angry  every  day,  then  every  other  day:  next  every  two, 
next  every  three  days !  "  and  if  you  succeed  in  passing  thirty 
days,  sacrifice  to  the  Gods  in  thanksgiving. 

LXXVI 

How  then  may  this  be  attained? — Resolve,  now  if  never 
before,  to  approve  thyself  to  thyself;  resolve  to  shov/  thyself 
fair  in  God's  sight;  long  to  be  pure  with  thine  own  pure 
self  and  God! 

LXXVII 

That  is  the  true  athlete,  that  trains  himself  to  resist  such 
outward  impressions  as  these. 

"  Stay,  wretched  man !  suffer  not  thyself  to  be  carried 
away ! "  Great  is  the  combat,  divine  the  task !  you  are 
fighting  for  Kingship,  for  Liberty,  for  Happiness,  for  Tran- 
quillity. Remember  God:  call  upon  Him  to  aid  thee,  like 
a  comrade  that  stands  beside  thee  in  the  fight. 

LXXVIII 

Who  then  is  a  Stoic- — in  the  sense  that  we  call  that  a 
statue  of  Phidias  which  is  modelled  after  that  master's  art? 
Show  me  a  man  in  this  sense  modelled  after  the  doctrines 
that  are  ever  upon  his  lips.  Show  me  a  man  that  is  sick — 
and  happy;  in  danger — and  happy;  on  his  death-bed-^and 


146  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

happy;  an  exile — and  happy;  in  evil  report — and  happy! 
Show  me  him,  I  ask  again.  So  help  me  Heaven,  I  long  to  see 
one  Stoic  !  Nay,  if  you  cannot  show  me  one  fully  modelled,  let 
m.e  at  least  see  one  in  whom  the  process  is  at  work — one  whose 
bent  is  in  that  direction.  Do  me  that  favour !  Grudge  it  not  to 
an  old  man,  to  behold  a  sight  that  he  has  never  yet  beheld. 
Think  you  I  vv^ish  to  see  the  Zeiis  or  Athena  of  Phidias,  be- 
decked with  gold  and  ivory? — Nay,  show  me,  one  of  you,  a 
human  soul,  desiring  to  be  of  one  mind  with  God,  no  more  to 
lay  .blame  on  God  or  man,  to  suffer  nothing  to  disappoint,  noth- 
ing to  cross  him,  to  yield  neither  to  anger,  envy,  nor  jealousy 
— in  a  word,  why  disguise  the  matter?  one  that  from  a  man 
would  fain  become  a  God;  one  that  while  still  imprisoned 
in  this  dead  body  makes  fellowship  with  God  his  aim.  Show 
me  him ! — Ah,  you  cannot !  Then  why  mock  yourselves  and 
delude  others?  why  stalk  about  tricked  out  in  other  men's 
attire,  thieves  and  robbers  that  you  are  of  names  and  things 
to  which  you  can  show  no  title ! 

LXXIX 

If  you  have  assum^ed  a  character  beyond  your  strength, 
you  have  both  played  a  poor  figure  in  that,  and  neglected 
one  that  is  within  your  powers. 

LXXX 

Fellow,  you  have  come  to  blows  at  home  with  a  slave: 
you  have  turned  the  household  upside  down,  and  thrown  the 
neighbourhood  into  confusion ;  and  do  you  come  to  me  then 
with  airs  of  assumed  modesty — do  you  sit  down  like  a  sage 
and  criticise  my  explanation  of  the  readings,  and  whatever 
idle  babble  you  say  has  come  into  my  head  ?  Have  you  come 
full  of  envy,  and  dejected  because  nothing  is  sent  you  from 
home;  and  while  the  discussion  is  going  on,  do  you  sit 
brooding  on  nothing  but  hov7  5^our  father  or  your  brother 
are  disposed  towards  you :— "  What  are  they  saying  about 
me  there?  at  this  moment  they  imagine  I  am  making  prog- 
ress and  saying,  He  will  return  perfectly  omniscient !  I  wish 
I  could  becomiC  omniscient  before  I  return;  but  that  would 
be  very  troublesome.  No  one  sends  me  anything — the  baths 
at  Nicopolis  are  dirty;  things  are  wretched  at  home  and 


THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  147 

wretched  here."  And  then  they  say,  "  Nobody  is  any  the 
better  for  the  School." — Who  comes  to  the  School  with  a 
sincere  wish  to  learn:  to  submit  his  principles  to  correction 
and  himself  to  treatment?  Who,  to  gain  a  sense  of  his 
wants  ?  Why  then  be  surprised  if  you  carry  home  from  the 
School  exactly  what  you  bring  into  it? 

LXXXI 

"  Epictetus,  I  have  often  come  desiring  to  hear  you  speak, 
and  you  have  never  given  me  any  answer;  now  if  possible, 
I  entreat  you,  say  something  to  me.'* 

"  Is  there,  do  you  think,"  replied  Epictetus,  "  an  art  of 
speaking  as  of  other  things,  if  it  is  to  be  done  skilfully  and 
with  profit  to  the  hearer  ?  " 

"  Yes." 

"  And  are  all  profited  by  what  they  hear,  or  only  some 
among  them?  So  that  it  seems  there  is  an  art  of  hearing 
as  well  as  of  speaking.  ...  To  make  a  statue  needs  skill: 
to  viev/  a  statue  aright  needs  skill  also." 

"  Admitted." 

"  And  I  think  all  will  allow  that  one  who  proposes  to  hear 
philosophers  speak  needs  a  considerable  training  in  hearing. 
Is  that  not  so?  Then  tell  me  on  what  subject  you  are  able 
to  hear  me." 

"  Why,  on  good  and  evil." 

"  The  good  and  evil  of  what  ?  a  horse,  an  ox  ?  " 

"No;  of  a  man." 

"Do  we  know  then  what  Man  is?  what  his  nature  is? 
what  is  the  idea  we  have  of  him?  And  are  our  ears  prac- 
tised in  any  degree  on  the  subject?  Nay,  do  you  understand 
what  Nature  is?  can  you  follow  me  in  any  degree  when  I 
say  that  I  shall  have  to  use  demonstration?  Do  you  under- 
stand what  Demonstration  is?  what  True  or  False  is?  .  .  , 
must  I  drive  you  to  Philosophy?  .  .  .  Show  me  what  good 
I  am  to  do  by  discoursing  with  you.  Rouse  my  desire  to 
do  so.  The  sight  of  the  pasture  it  loves  stirs  in  a  sheep 
the  desire  to  feed :  show  it  a  stone  or  a  bit  of  bread  and  it 
remains  unmoved.  Thus  we  also  have  certain  natural  de- 
sires, aye,  and  one  that  moves  us  to  speak  when  we  find  a 
.listener  that  is  worth  his  salt:  one  that  himself  stirs  the 


148  THE    GOLDEN   SAYINGS   OF   EPICTETUS 

spirit.  But  if  he  sits  by  like  a  stone  or  a  tuft  of  grass,  how 
can  he  rouse  a  man's  desire  ?  " 

"  Then  you  will  say  nothing  to  me  ?  " 

"  I  can  only  tell  you  this :  that  one  who  knows  not  who 
he  is  and  to  what  end  he  was  born;  what  kind  of  world 
this  is  and  with  whom  he  is  associated  therein ;  one  who  can- 
not distinguish  Good  and  Evil,  Beauty  and  Foulness,  ,  .  . 
Truth  and  Falsehood,  will  never  follov/  Reason  in  shaping 
his  desires  and  impulses  and  repulsions,  nor  yet  in  assent, 
denial,  or  suspension  of  judgment;  but  will  in  one  word  go 
about  deaf  and  blind,  thinking  himself  to  be  somewhat,  when 
he  is  in  truth  of  no  account.  Is  there  anything  new  in  all 
this?  Is  not  this  ignorance  the  cause  of  all  the  mistakes  and 
mischances  of  men  since  the  human  race  began?  .  .  ." 

"  This  is  all  I  have  to  say  to  you,  and  even  this  against 
the  grain.  Why?  Because  you  have  not  stirred  my  spirit. 
For  what  can  I  see  in  you  to  stir  me,  as  a  spirited  horse  will 
fetir  a  judge  of  horses?  Your  body?  That  you  maltreat. 
Your  dress  ?  That  is  luxurious.  Your  behaviour,  your  look  ? 
r^-Nothing  whatever.  When  you  want  to  hear  a  philosopher, 
do  not  say,  'You  say  nothing  to  me';  only  show  yourself 
worthy  or  fit  to  hear,  and  then  you  will  see  how  you  will 
move  the  speaker." 

LXXXII 

And  now,  when  you  see  brothers  apparently  good  friends 
and  living  in  accord,  do  not  immediately  pronounce  any- 
thing upon  their  friendship,  though  they  should  affirm  it 
with  an  oath,  though  they  should  declare,  "  For  us  to  live 
apart  is  a  thing  impossible ! "  For  the  heart  of  a  bad  man 
is  faithless,  unprincipled,  inconstant:  now  overpowered  by 
one  impression,  now  by  another.  Ask  not  the  usual  ques- 
tions, Were  they  born  of  the  same  parents,  reared  together, 
and  under  the  same  tutor;  but  ask  this  only,  in  what  they 
place  their  real  interest — whether  in  outvv^ard  things  or  in 
the  Will.  If  in  outward  things,  call  them  not  friends,  any 
more  than  faithful,  constant,  brave  or  free:  call  them 
not  even  human  beings,  if  you  have  any  sense.  .  *  .  But 
should  you  hear  that  these  men  hold  the  Good  to  lie  only 
in  the  Will,  only  in  rightly  dealing  with  the  things  of  sense, 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS   OF  EPICTETUS  149 

take  no  more  trouble  to  inquire  whether  they  are  father  and 
son  or  brothers,  or  comrades  of  long  standing;  but,  sure  of 
this  one  thing,  pronounce  as  boldly  that  they  are  friends 
as  that  they  are  faithful  and  just:  for  where  else  can  Friend- 
ship be  found  than  where  Modesty  is,  where  there  is  an 
interchange  of  things  fair  and  honest,  and  of  such  only? 

LXXXIII 

No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  Will — no  man  can  lord  it  over 
that ! 

LXXXIV 

When  disease  and  death  overtake  me,  I  would  fain  be 
found  engaged  in  the  task  of  liberating  mine  own  Will  from 
the  assaults  of  passion,  from  hindrance,  from  resentment, 
from  slavery. 

Thus  would  I  fain  be  found  employed,  so  that  I  may  say 
to  God,  "  Have  I  in  aught  transgressed  Thy  commands  ? 
Have  I  in  aught  perverted  the  faculties,  the  senses,  the 
natural  principles  that  Thou  didst  give  me?  Have  I  ever 
blamed  Thee  or  found  fault  with  Thine  administration? 
When  it  was  Thy  good  pleasure,  I  fell  sick — and  so  did 
other  men:  but  my  will  consented.  Because  it  was  Thy 
pleasure,  I  became  poor, — but  my  heart  rejoiced.  No  power 
in  the  State  was  mine,  because  Thou  wouldst  not:  such 
power  I  never  desired !  Hast  Thou  ever  seen  me  of  more 
doleful  countenance  on  that  account?  Have  I  not  ever 
drawn  nigh  unto  Thee  with  cheerful  look,  waiting  upon  Thy 
commands,  attentive  to  Thy  signals  ?  Wilt  Thou  that  I  now 
depart  from  the  great  Assembly  of  men?  I  go:  I  give  Thee 
?11  thanks,  that  Thou  hast  deemed  me  worthy  to  take  part 
with  Thee  in  this  Assembly:  to  behold  Thy  works,  to  com- 
prehend this  Thine  administration." 

Such  I  would  were  the  subject  of  my  thoughts,  my  pen, 
my  study,  when  death  overtakes  me. 

LXXXV 

Seemeth  it  nothing  to  you,  never  to  accuse,  never  to  blame 
either  God  or  Man?  to  wear  ever  the  same  countenance  in 
going  forth  as  in  coming  in?  This  was  the  secret  of  Soc- 
rates: ytt  he  never  said  that  he  knew  or  taught  anything. 


ISO         THE    GOLDEN    SAYINGS    OF    EPICTETUS 

c  o  o  Who  amongst  you  makes  this  his  aim?  V/ere  it  indeed 
so,  you  would  gladly  endure  sickness,  hunger,  aye,  death 
itself. 

LXXXVI 

How  are  we  constituted  by  Nature?  To  be  free,  to  be 
noble,  to  be  modest  (for  what  other  living  thing  is  capable 
of  blushing,  or  of  feeling  the  impression  of  shame?)  and  to 
subordinate  pleasure  to  the  ends  for  which  Nature  designed 
us,  as  a  handm.aid  and  a  minister,  in  order  to  call  forth  our 
activity;  in  order  to  keep  us  constant  to  the  path  prescribed 
by  Nature, 

LXXXVII 

The  husbandman  deals  with  land;  physicians  and  trainers 
with  the  body ;  the  wise  man  with  his  own  Mind. 

Lxxxviir 

Which  of  us  does  not  admire  what  Lycurgus  the  Spartan 
did?  A  young  citizen  had  put  out  his  eye,  and  been  handed 
over  to  him  by  the  people  to  be  punished  at  his  own  dis- 
cretion. Lycurgus  abstained  from  all  vengeance,  but  on 
the  contrary  instructed  and  made  a  good  man  of  him.  Pro- 
ducing him  in  public  in  the  theatre,  he  said  to  the  astonished 
Spartans : — "  I  received  this  young  man  at  your  hands  full 
of  violence  and  wanton  insolence ;  I  restore  him  to  you  in 
his  right  mind  and  fit  to  serve  his  country." 

LXXXIX 

A  money-changer  may  not  reject  Caesar's  coin,  nor  may 
the  seller  of  herbs,  but  must  when  once  the  coin  is  shown, 
deliver  what  is  sold  for  it,  v/hether  he  v/ill  or  nOo  So  is 
it  also  with  the  Soul.  Once  the  Good  appears,  it  attracts 
towards  itself;  evil  repels.  But  a  clear  and  certain  impres- 
sion of  the  Good  the  Soul  will  never  reject,  any  more  than 
men  do  Caesar's  coin.  On  this  hangs  every  impulse  alike  of 
Man  and  God. 

xc 

Asked  what  Common  Sense  was,  Epictetus  replied  :^ — 
As  that  may  be  called  a  Common  Ear  which  distinguishes 
only  sounds,  while  that  which  distinguishes  musical  notes 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  151 

is  not  common  but  produced  by  training;  so  there  are  certain 
things  which  men  not  entirely  perverted  see  by  the  natural 
principles  common  to  all.  Such  a  constitution  of  the  Mind 
is  called  Common  Sense. 

xci 

Canst  thou  judge  men?  .  .  .  then  make  us  imitators  of 
thyself,  as  Socrates  did.  Do  this,  do  not  do  that,  else  zvill  I 
cast  thee  into  prison;  this  is  not  governing  men  like  reason- 
able creatures.  Say  rather,  As  God  hath  ordained,  so  do; 
else  thou  wilt  suifer  chastisement  and  loss,  xA.skest  thou 
what  loss?  None  other  than  this:  To  have  left  undone 
what  thou  shouldst  have  done:  to  have  lost  the  faithfulness, 
the  reverence,  the  modesty  that  is  in  thee !  Greater  loss 
than  this  seek  not  to  find ! 

xcii 

"  His  son  is  dead." 

What  has  happened? 

"  His  son  is  dead/' 

Nothing  more? 

"  Nothing." 

"  His  ship  is  lost." 

What  has  happened? 

"  His  ship  is  lost." 

"  He  has  been  haled  to  prison/* 

What  has  happened? 

"  He  has  been  haled  to  prison." 

But  that  any  of  these  things  are  misfortunes  to  him,  Is 
an  addition  which  every  one  m.akes  of  his  own.  But  (you 
say)  God  is  unjust  in  this. — ^Why?  For  having  given  thee 
endurance  and  greatness  of  soul?  For  having  made  such 
things  to  be  no  evils?  For  placing  happiness  within  thy 
reach,  even  when  enduring  them?  For  opening  unto  thee 
a  door,  when  things  make  not  for  thy  good? — Depart,  my 
friend,  and  find  fault  no  more  1 

XCIII 

You  are  sailing  to  Rome  (you  tell  me)  to  obtain  the  post 
of  Governor  of  Cnossus."  You  are  not  content  to  stay  at 
home  with  the  honours  you  had  before ;  you  want  something 

^  In  Cret^o 


152  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

on  a  larger  scale,  and  more  conspicuous.  But  when  did  you 
ever  undertake  a  voyage  for  the  purpose  of  reviewing  your 
own  principles  and  getting  rid  of  any  of  them  that  proved 
unsound?  Whom  did  you  ever  visit  for  that  object?  What 
time  did  you  ever  set  yourself  for  that?  What  age?  Run 
over  the  times  of  your  life — ^by  yourself,  if  you  are  ashamed 
before  me.  Did  you  examine  your  principles  w^hen  a  boy? 
Did  you  not  do  everything  just  as  you  do  nov/?  Or  when 
you  were  a  stripling,  attending  the  school  of  oratory  and 
practising  the  art  yourself,  what  did  you  ever  imagine  you 
lacked?  And  when  you  were  a  young  man,  entered  upon 
public  life,  and  were  pleading  causes  and  making  a  nam.e, 
.who  any  longer  seemed  equal  to  you  ?  And  at  what  momicnt 
would  you  have  endured  another  examining  your  principles 
and  proving  that  they  were  unsound?  What  then  am  I  to 
say  to  you  ?  "  Help  me  in  this  matter !  "  you  cry.  Ah,  for 
that  I  have  no  rule !  And  neither  did  you,  if  that  was  your 
object,  come  to  me  as  a  philosopher,  but  as  you  might  have 
gone  to  a  herb-seller  or  a  cobbler. — "  What  do  philosophers 
have  rules  for,  then  ?  " — Why,  that  whatever  may  betide,  our 
ruling  faculty  may  be  as  Nature  would  have  it,  and  so 
remain.  Think  you  this  a  small  matter?  Not  so!  but  the 
greatest  thing  there  is.  Well,  does  it  need  but  a  short  time  ? 
Can  it  be  grasped  by  a  passer-by  ? — grasp  it,  if  you  can ! 
Then  you  will  say,  "  Yes,  I  met  Epictetus !  " 
Ay,  just  as  you  might  a  statue  or  a  monument.  You  saw 
me !  and  that  is  all.  But  a  man  who  meets  a  man  is  one  who 
learns  the  other's  mind,  and  lets  him  see  his  in  turn.  Learn 
my  mind — show  me  yours;  and  then  go  and  say  that  you 
met  me.  Let  us  try  each  other;  if  I  have  any  wrong  prin- 
ciple, rid  me  of  it;  if  you  have,  out  v/ith  it.  That  is  what 
meeting  a  philosopher  means.  Not  so,  you  think;  this  is 
only  a  flying  visit;  while  we  are  hiring  the  ship,  we  can 
see  Epictetus  too !  Let  us  see  what  he  has  to  say.  Then  on 
leaving  you  cry,  "  Out  on  Epictetus  for  a  worthless  fellow, 
provincial  and  barbarous  of  speech !  "  What  else  indeed  did 
you  come  to  judge  of? 

xciv 

"Whether  you  will  or  no,  you  are  poorer  than  I ! 
*•  What  then  do  I  tack?/* 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  153 

What  you  have  not:  Constancy  of  mind,  such  as  Nature 
would  have  it  to  be :  Tranquillity.  Patron  or  no  patron,  what 
care  I?  but  you  do  care.  I  am  richer  than  you:  I  am  not 
racked  with  anxiety  as  to  what  Csesar  may  think  of  me;  I 
flatter  none  on  that  account.  This  is  what  I  have,  instead 
of  vessels  of  gold  and  silver !  your  vessels  may  be  of  gold, 
but  your  reason,  your  principles,  your  accepted  views,  your 
inclinations,  your  desires  are  of  earthenware. 

xcv 
To  you,  all  you  have  seems  small :  to  me,  all  I  have  seems 
great.  Your  desire  is  insatiable,  mine  is  satisfied.  See 
children  thrusting  their  hands  into  a  narrow-necked  jar,  and 
striving  to  pull  out  the  nuts  and  figs  it  contains:  if  they 
fill  the  hand,  they  cannot  pull  it  out  again,  and  then  th-y 
fall  to  tears. — "Let  go  a  few  of  them,  and  then  you  cun 
draw  out  the  rest!" — You,  too,  let  your  desire  go!  covet 
not  many  things,  and  you  will  obtain. 

xcvi 
Pittacus,^  wronged  by  one  whom  he  had  it  in  his  power 
to  punish,  let  him  go  free,  saying.  Forgiveness  is  better  than 
revenge.      The    one    shows    native    gentleness,    the    other 
savagery. 

XCVII 

"  My  brother  ought  not  to  have  treated  me  thus." 

True :  but  he  must  see  to  that.    However  he  may  treat  me, 

I  must  deal  rightly  by  him.    This  is  what  lies  with  me,  ;what 

none  can  hinder. 

XCVIII 

Nevertheless  a  man  should  also  be  prepared  to  be  sufficient 
unto  himself — to  dwell  with  himself  alone,  even  as  God 
dwells  with  Himself  alone,  shares  His  repose  with  none, 
and  considers  the  nature  of  His  own  administration,  intent 
upon  such  thoughts  as  are  meet  unto  Himself.  So  should 
we  also  be  able  to  converse  with  ourselves,  to  need  none 
else  beside,  to  sigh  for  no  distraction,  to  bend  our  thoughts 
upon  the  Divine  Administration,  and  how  we  stand  related 

12  One  of  the  Seven  Wise  Men  of  Greece.  He  ruled  Mytilene  m.  Lesbos 
in  the  seventh  century  B.  c. 


154  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

to  all  else;  to  observe  how  human  accidents  touched  us  of 
old,  and  how  they  touch  us  now;  ;what  things  they  are  that 
still  have  power  to  hurt  us,  and  how  they  may  be  cured  or 
removed ;  to  perfect  what  needs  perfecting  as  Reason  would 
direct. 

xcix 

If  a  man  has  frequent  intercourse  with  others,  either  in 
the  way  of  conversation,  entertainment,  or  simple  familiarity, 
he  must  either  become  like  them,  or  change  them  to  his  own 
fashion.  A  live  coal  placed  next  a  dead  one  will  either 
kindle  that  or  be  quenched  by  it.  Such  being  the  risk,  it  is 
well  to  be  cautious  in  admitting  intimacies  of  this  sort,  re- 
membering that  one  cannot  rub  shoulders  with  a  soot-stained 
man  without  sharing  the  soot  oneself.  What  will  you  do, 
supposing  the  talk  turns  on  gladiators,  or  horses  or  prize- 
fighters, or  (what  is  worse)  on  persons j  condemning  this  and 
that,  approving  the  other?  Or  suppose  a  m.an  sneers  or  jeers 
or  shows  a  malignant  temper?  Has  any  among  us  the  skill 
of  the  lute-player,  v/ho  knows  at  the  first  touch  which  strings 
are  out  of  tune  and  sets  the  instrument  right:  has  any  of 
you  such  a  power  as  Socrates  had,  in  all  his  intercourse  with 
men,  of  winning  them  over  to  his  own  convictions?  Nay, 
but  you  must  needs  be  swayed  hither  and  thither  by  the  un- 
instructed.  How  comes  it  then  that  they  prove  so  much 
stronger  than  you?  Because  they  speak  from  the  fulness 
of  the  heart — their  low,  corrupt  views  are  their  real  con- 
victions :  whereas  your  fine  sentiments  are  but  from  the  lips, 
outwards;  that  is  iwhy  they  are  so  nerveless  and  dead.  It 
turns  one's  stomach  to  listen  to  your  exhortations,  and  hear 
of  your  miserable  Virtue,  that  you  prate  of  up  and  down. 
Thus  it  is  that  the  Vulgar  prove  too  strong  for  you.  Every- 
where strength,  everywhere  victory  waits  your  conviction! 

C 

In  general,  any  methods  of  discipline  applied  to  the  body 
which  tend  to  modify  its  desires  or  repulsions,  are  good — 
for  ascetic  ends.  But  if  done  for  display,  they  betray  at  once 
a  man  who  keeps  an  eye  on  outward  show;  who  has  an 
ulterior  purpose,  and  is  looking  for  spectators  to  shout,  "  Oh 
what  a  great  man ! "  This  is  why  ApoUonius  so  well  said : 


THE    GOLDEN   SAYINGS   OF   EPICTETUS  15S 

"If  you  are  bent  upon  a  little  private  discipline,  wait  till 
you  are  choking  with  heat  some  day — then  take  a  mouthful 
of  cold  water,  and  spit  it  out  again,  and  tell  no  man ! " 

CI 

Study  how  to  give  as  one  that  is  sick:  that  thou  mayest 
hereafter  give  as  one  that  is  whole.  Fast ;  drink  water  only ; 
abstain  altogether  from  desire,  that  thou  mayest  hereafter 
conform  thy  desire  to  Reason. 

CII 

Thou  wouldst  do  good  unto  men  ?  then  show  them  by  thine 
own  example  what  kind  of  men  philosophy  can  make,  and 
cease  from  foolish  trifling.  Eating,  do  good  to  them  that 
eat  with  thee;  drinking,  to  them  that  drink  with  thee; 
yield  unto  all,  give  way,  and  bear  with  them.  Thus  shalt 
thou  do  them  good:  but  vent  not  upon  them  thine  own  evil 
humour ! 

cm 

Even  as  bad  actors  cannot  sing  alone,  but  only  in  chorus : 
so  some  cannot  walk  alone, 

Man,  if  thou  art  aught,  strive  to  walk  alone  and  hold 
converse  with  thyself,  instead  of  skulking  in  the  chorus !  at 
length  think;  look  around  thee;  bestir  thyself,  that  thou 
mayest  know  who  thou  art ! 

CIV 

You  would  fain  be  victor  at  the  Olympic  games,  you  say. 
Yes,  but  weigh  the  conditions,  weigh  the  consequences ;  then 
and  then  only,  lay  to  your  hand— if  it  be  for  your  profit. 
You  must  live  by  rule,  submit  to  diet,  abstain  from  dainty 
meats,  exercise  your  body  perforce  at  stated  hours,  in  heat 
or  in  cold;  drink  no  cold  water,  nor,  it  may  be,  wine.  In 
a  word,  you  must  surrender  yourself  wholly  to  your  trainer, 
as  though  to  a  physician. 

Then  in  the  hour  of  contest,  you  will  have  to  delve  the 
ground,  it  may  chance  dislocate  an  arm,  strain  an  ankle, 
gulp  down  abundance  of  yellow  sand,  be  scourged  with  the 
whip — and  with  all  this  somictimes  lose  the  victory.  Count 
the  cost — and  then,  if  your  desire  still  holds,  try  the  wrest- 
ler's life.    Else  let  me  tell  you  that  you  will  be  behaving  like 


156  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

a  pack  of  children  playing  now  at  wrestlers,  now  at  gladia- 
tors; presently  falling  to  trumpeting  and  anon  to  stage-play- 
ing, when  the  fancy  takes  them  for  what  they  have  seen. 
And  you  are  even  the  same :  wrestler,  gladiator,  philosopher, 
orator  all  by  turns  and  none  of  them  with  your  whole  soul. 
Like  an  ape,  you  mimic  what  you  see,  to  one  thing  constant 
never;  the  thing  that  is  familiar  charms  no  more.  This  is 
because  you  never  undertook  aught  with  due  consideration, 
nor  after  strictly  testing  and  viewing  it  from  every  side ;  no, 
your  choice  vv^as  thoughtless;  the  glow  of  your  desire  had 
waxed  cold.  .  .  . 

Friend,  bethink  you  first  what  it  is  that  you  would  do,  and 
then  what  your  own  nature  is  able  to  bear.  Would  you  be 
a  wrestler,  consider  your  shoulders,  your  thighs,  your  loins — 
not  all  men  are  formed  to  the  same  end.  Think  you  to  be 
a  philosopher  while  acting  as  you  do?  think  you  to  go  on 
thus  eating,  thus  drinking,  giving  way  in  like  manner  to 
wrath  and  to  displeasure?  Nay,  you  must  watch,  you  must 
labour ;  overcome  certain  desires ;  quit  your  familiar  friends, 
submit  to  be  despised  by  your  slave,  to  be  held  in  derision 
by  them  that  meet  you,  to  take  the  lower  place  in  all  things, 
in  office,  in  positions  of  authority,  in  courts  of  law. 

Weigh  these  things  fully,  and  then,  if  you  will,  lay  to  your 
hand;  if  as  the  price  of  these  things  you  would  gain  Free- 
dom, Tranquillity,  and  passionless  Serenity. 

cv 

He  that  hath  no  musical  instruction  is  a  child  in  Music; 
he  that  hath  no  letters  is  a  child  in  Learning;  he  that  is 
untaught  is  a  child  in  Life. 

cvi 

Can  any  profit  be  derived  from  these  men  ?    Aye,  from  all. 

"  What,  even  from  a  reviler  ?  " 

Why,  tell  me  what  profit  a  wrestler  gains  from  him  who 
exercises  him  beforehand  ?  The  very  greatest :  he  trains  me 
in  the  practice  of  endurance,  of  controlling  my  temper,  of 
gentle  ways.  You  deny  it.  What,  the  man  who  lays  hold 
of  my  neck,  and  disciplines  loins  and  shoulders  does  me  good, 
.  .  .  while  he  that  trains  me  to  keep  my  temper  does  me 
none?     This  is  what  it  means,  not  knowing  how  to  gain 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  157' 

advantage  from  men!  Is  my  neighbour  bad?  Bad  to  him- 
self, but  good  to  me:  he  brings  my  good  temper,  my  gentle- 
ness into  play.  Is  my  father  bad?  Bad  to  himself,  but  good 
to  m.e.  This  is  the  rod  of  Hermes ;  touch  what  you  will  with  if, 
they  say,  and  it  becomes  gold.  Nay,  but  bring  what  you  will 
and  I  will  transm^ute  it  into  Good.  Bring  sickness,  bring  death, 
bring  poverty  and  reproach,  bring  trial  for  life — all  these 
things  through  the  rod  of  Hermes  shall  be  turned  to  profit. 

CVII 

Till  then  these  sound  opinions  have  taken  firm  root  in  you, 
and  you  have  gained  a  measure  of  strength  for  your  security, 
I  counsel  you  to  be  cautious  in  associating  with  the  unin- 
structed.  Else  whatever  impressions  you  receive  upon  the 
tablets  of  your  mind  in  the  School  will  day  by  day  melt  and 
disappear,  like  wax  in  the  sun.  Withdraw  then  somewhere 
far  from  the  sun,  while  you  have  these  waxen  sentiments. 

CVIII 

We  must  approach  this  matter  in  a  different  way;  it  is 
great  and  mystical :  it  is  no  common  thing ;  nor  given  to  every 
man.  Wisdom  alone,  it  may  be,  will  not  suffice  for  the  care 
of  youth :  a  man  needs  also  a  certain  measure  of  readiness — 
an  aptitude  for  the  office;  aye,  and  certain  bodily  qualities; 
and  above  all,  to  be  counselled  of  God  Himself  to  undertake 
this  post;  even  as  He  counselled  Socrates  to  fill  the  post  of 
one  who  confutes  error,  assigning  to  Diogenes^*  the  royal 
office  of  high  reproof,  and  to  Zeno^*  that  of  positive  instruc- 
tion. Whereas  you  would  fain  set  up  for  a  physician  pro- 
vided with  nothing  but  drugs !  Where  and  how  they  should 
be  applied  you  neither  know  nor  care. 

cix 

If  what  charms  you  is  nothing  but  abstract  principles,  sit 
down  and  turn  them  over  quietly  in  your  mind:  but  never 
dub  yourself  a  Philosopher,  nor  suffer  others  to  call  you  so. 
Say  rather :  He  is  in  error ;  for  my  desires,  my  impulses  are 
unaltered.  I  give  in  my  adhesion  to  what  I  did  before;  nor 
has  my  mode  of  dealing  with  the  things  of  sense  undergone 
any  change. 

^^  The  well-known  Cynic  philosopher. 
"Founder  of  the  Stoic  school  of  philosophy. 


158  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

ex 

When  a  friend  inclined  to  Cynic  views  asked  Epictetus, 
what  sort  of  person  a  true  Cynic  should  be,  requesting  a 
general  sketch  of  the  system,  he  answered : — "  We  will  con- 
sider that  at  leisure.  At  present  I  content  myself  with  say- 
ing this  much :  If  a  man  put  his  hand  to  so  weighty  a  matter 
without  God,  the  wrath  of  God  abides  upon  him.  That 
which  he  covets  will  but  bring  upon  him  public  shame.  Not 
even  on  finding  himself  in  a  well-ordered  house  does  a  man 
step  forward  and  say  to  himself,  I  must  be  master  here ! 
Else  the  lord  of  that  house  takes  notice  of  -it,  and  seeing  him 
insolently  giving  orders  drags  him  forth  and  chastises  him. 
So  it  is  also  in  this  great  City,  the  World.  Here  also  is  there 
a  Lord  of  the  House,  who  orders  all  things : — 

"  Thou  art  the  Sun  !  in  thhie  orbit  thou  hast  poiuer  to  make  the  year 
and  the  seasons;  to  bid  the  fruits  of  the  earth  grow  and  increase^ 
the  winds  arise  and  fall;  thou  canst  in  due  measure  cherish  with 
thy  zvarnith  the  frames  of  m.en;  go  ?nake  thy  circuit,  and  thus  min- 
ister unto  all  from  the  greatest  to  the  least!    .    .    . 

"  Thou  canst  lead  a  host  against  Troy;  be  Aga7nemnon! 

''''Thou  canst  meet  Hector  in  single  combat;  be  Achilles! 

"  But  had  Thersites  stepped  forward  and  claimed  the  chief 
command,  he  had  been  met  with  a  refusal,  or  obtained  it  only 
to  his  own  shame  and  confusion  of  face,  before  a  cloud  of 
witnesses." 

CXI 

Others  may  fence  themselves  with  walls  and  houses,  when 
they  do  such  deeds  as  these,  and  wrap  themselves  in  dark- 
ness— aye,  they  have  many  a  device  to  hide  themselves.  An- 
other may  shut  his  door  and  station  one  before  his  chamber 
to  say,  if  any  comes,  He  has  gone  forth  I  he  is  not  at  leisure  f 
But  the  true  Cynic  will  have  none  of  these  things;  instead 
of  them,  he  must  wrap  himself  in  Modesty:  else  he  will  but 
bring  himself  to  shame,  naked  and  under  the  open  sky.  That 
is  his  house;  that  is  his  door;  that  is  the  slave  that  guards 
his  chamber ;  that  is  his  darkness ! 

CXII 

Death?  let  it  come  when  it  will,  whether  it  smite  but  a 
part  or  the  whole :  Fly,  you  tell  me — fly !    But  whither  shall 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  159 

I  fly  ?  Can  any  man  cast  me  beyond  the  limits  of  the  World  ? 
It  may  not  be !  And  w^hithersoever  I  go,  there  shall  I  still 
find  Sun,  Moon,  and  Stars;  there  shall  I  find  dreams,  and 
omens,  and  converse  with  the  Gods ! 

CXIII 

Furthermore  the  true  Cynic  must  know  that  he  is  sent  as 
a  Messenger  from  God  to  men,  to  show  unto  them  that  as 
touching  good  and  evil  they  are  in  error;  looking  for  these 
where  they  are  not  to  be  found,  nor  ever  bethinking  them- 
selves where  they  are.  And  like  Diogenes  when  brought  be- 
fore Philip  after  the  battle  of  Chseronea,  the  Cynic  must 
remember  that  he  is  a  Spy.  For  a  Spy  he  really  is — to  bring 
back  word  vv'hat  things  are  on  Man's  side,  and  what  against 
him.  And  when  he  has  diligently  observed  all,  he  must  come 
back  with  a  true  report,  not  terrified  into  announcing  them 
to  be  foes  that  are  no  foes,  nor  otherwise  perturbed  or  con- 
founded by  the  things  of  sense. 

cxiv 
How  can  it  be  that  one  who  hath  nothing,  neither  raiment, 
nor  house,  nor  home,  nor  bodily  tendance,  nor  servant,  nor 
city,  should  yet  live  tranquil  and  contented?  Behold  God 
hath  sent  you  a  man  to  show  you  in  act  and  deed  that  it 
may  be  so.  Behold  me !  I  have  neither  city  nor  house  nor 
possessions  nor  servants:  the  ground  is  my  couch;  I  have 
no  wife,  no  children,  no  shelter — nothing  but  earth  and  sky, 
and  one  poor  cloak.  And  what  lack  I  yet?  am  I  not  un- 
touched by  sorrow,  by  fear  ?  am  I  not  free  ?  .  .  .  v/hen  have 
I  laid  anything  to  the  charge  of  God  or  Man?  when  have  I 
accused  any?  hath  any  of  you  seen  me  with  a  sorrowful 
countenance  ?  And  in  what  wise  treat  I  those  of  whom  you 
stand  in  fear  and  awe  ?  Is  it  not  as  slaves  ?  Who  when  he 
seeth  me  doth  not  think  that  he  beholdeth  his  Master  and 
his  King? 

cxv 

Give  thyself  more  'diligently  to  refiection:  know  thyself: 
take  counsel  with  the  Godhead :  v/ithout  God  put  thine  hand 
unto  nothing! 


160  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EFICTETUS 

CXVI 

"  But  to  marry  and  to  rear  offspring,"  said  tHe  young  man, 
"  will  the  Cynic  hold  himself  bound  to  undertake  this  as  a 
chief  duty  ?  " 

Grant  me  a  republic  of  wise  men,  answered  Epictetus,  and 
perhaps  none  will  lightly  take  the  Cynic  life  upon  him.  For 
on  whose  account  should  he  embrace  that  method  of  life? 
Suppose  however  that  he  does,  there  will  then  be  nothing 
to  hinder  his  marrying  and  rearing  offspring.  For  his  wife 
will  be  even  such  another  as  himself,  and  likewise  her  father ; 
and  in  like  manner  will  his  children  be  brought  up. 

But  in  the  present  condition  of  things,  which  resembles  an 
Army  in  battle  array,  ought  not  the  Cynic  to  be  free  from 
all  distraction  and  given  wholly  to  the  service  of  God,  so 
that  he  can  go  in  and  out  among  men,  neither  fettered  by 
the  duties  nor  entangled  by  the  relations  of  common  life? 
For  if  he  transgress  them,  he  will  forfeit  the  character  of  a 
good  man  and  true;  whereas  if  he  observe  them,  there  is 
an  end  of  him  as  the  Messenger,  the  Spy,  the  Herald  of  the 
Gods! 

CXVII 

Ask  me  if  you  choose  if  a  Cynic  shall  engage  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  State.  O  fool,  seek  you  a  nobler  adminis- 
tration than  that  in  which  he  is  engaged  ?  Ask  you  if  a  man 
shall  come  forward  in  the  Athenian  assembly  and  talk  about 
revenue  and  supplies,  when  his  business  is  to  converse  with 
all  men,  Athenians,  Corinthians,  and  Romans  alike,  not  about 
supplies,  not  about  revenue,  nor  yet  peace  and  war,  but  about 
Happiness  and  Misery,  Prosperity  and  Adversity,  Slavery 
and  Freedom? 

Ask  you  whether  a  man  shall  engage  in  the  administration 
of  the  State  who  has  engaged  in  such  an  Administration  as 
this?  Ask  me  too  if  he  shall  govern;  and  again  I  will  an- 
swer, Fool,  what  greater  government  shall  he  hold  than  that 
he  holds  already? 

CXVIII 

Such  a  man  needs  also  to  have  a  certain  habit  of  body, 
if  he  appear  consumptive,  thin  and  pale,  his  testimony  has 
no  longer  the  same  authority.    He  must  not  only  prove  to 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   SPICTETUS  161 

the  unlearned  by  showing  them  what  his  Soul  is  that  it  is 
possible  to  be  a  good  man  apart  from  all  that  they  admire; 
but  he  must  also  show  them,  by  his  body,  that  a  plain  and 
simple  manner  of  life  under  the  open  sky  does  no  harm  to 
the  body  either.  "  See,  I  am  a  proof  of  this !  and  my  body 
also."  As  Diogenes  used  to  do,  who  went  about  fresh  of 
look  and  by  the  very  appearance  of  his  body  drew  men's  eyes. 
But  if  a  Cynic  is  an  object  of  pity,  he  seem^s  a  mere  beggar; 
all  turn  away,  all  are  offended  at  him.  Nor  should  he  be 
slovenly  of  look,  so  as  not  to  scare  men  from  him  in  this 
way  either;  on  the  contrary,  his  very  roughness  should  be 
clean  and  attractive. 

CXIX 

Kings  and  tyrants  have  armed  guards  wherewith  to  chas- 
tise certain  persons,  though  they  be  themselves  evil.  But  to 
the  Cynic  conscience  gives  this  power — not  arms  and  guards. 
When  he  knows  that  he  has  watched  and  laboured  on  behalf 
of  mankind:  that  sleep  hath  found  him  pure,  and  left  him 
purer  still:  that  his  thoughts  have  been  the  thought  of  a 
Friend  of  the  Gods — of  a  servant,  yet  of  one  that  hath  a  part 
in  the  government  of  the  Supreme  God:  that  the  words  are 
ever  on  his  lips : — 

Lead  me^  0  God,  and  thou,  0  Destiny! 
as  well  as  these : — 

If  this  be  God^s  will,  so  let  it  be! 
Why  should  he  not  speak  boldly  unto  his  own  brethren,  unto 
his  children — in  a  word,  unto  all  that  are  akin  to  him ! 

cxx 

Does  a  Philosopher  apply  to  people  to  come  and  hear  him  ? 
does  he  not  rather,  of  his  ovvm  nature,  attract  those  that  will 
be  benefited  by  him — like  the  sun  that  warms,  the  food  that 
sustains  them  ?  W^hat  Physician  applies  to  men  to  come  and 
be  healed?  (Though  indeed  I  hear  that  the  Physicians  at 
Rome  do  novvadays  apply  for  patients — in  my  time  they  were 
applied  to).  I  apply  to  you  to  come  and  hear  that  you  are 
in  evil  case;  that  what  deserves  your  attention  most  is  the 
last  thing  to  gain  it ;  that  you  know  not  good  from  evil,  and 
are  in  short  a  hapless  wretch ;  a  fine  way  to  apply !  though 

6  HC— Vol.  2 


162  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

unless  the  words  of  the  Philosopher  affect  you  thus,  speaker 
and  speech  are  alike  dead. 

cxxi 

A  Philosopher's  school  is  a  Surgery:  pain,  not  pleasure, 
you  should  have  felt  therein.  For  on  entering  none  of  you 
is  whole.  One  has  a  shoulder  out  of  joint,  another  an  ab- 
scess :  a  third  suffers  from  an  issue,  a  fourth  from  pains  in 
the  head.  And  am  I  then  to  sit  dov/n  and  treat  you  to  pretty 
sentiments  and  empty  flourishes,  so  that  you  may  applaud  me 
and  depart,  with  neither  shoulder,  nor  head,  nor  issue,  nor 
abscess  a  v/hit  the  better  for  your  visit?  Is  it  then  for  this 
that  young  men  are  to  quit  their  homes,  and  leave  parents, 
friends,  kinsmen  and  substance  to  mouth  out  Bravo  to  your 
empty  phrases ! 

cxxir 

If  any  be  unhappy,  let  him  remember  that  he  is  unhappy 
by  reason  of  himself  alone.  For  God  hath  made  all  men  to 
enjoy  felicity  and  constancy  of  good. 

CXXIII 

Shall  we  never  wean  ourselves — shall  we  never  heed  the 
teachings  of  Philosophy  (unless  perchance  they  have  been 
sounding  in  our  ears  like  an  enchanter's  drone)  : — - 

This  World  is  one  great  City,  and  one  is  the  substance 
whereof  it  is  fashioned :  a  certain  period  indeed  there  needs 
must  be,  while  these  give  place  to  those;  some  must  perish 
for  others  to  succeed ;  some  move  and  some  abide :  yet  all  is 
full  of  friends — first  God,  then  Men,  whom  Nature  hath 
bound  by  ties  of  kindred  each  to  each. 

cxxiv 

Nor  did  the  hero^^  weep  and  lam.ent  at  leaving  his  children 
orphans.  For  he  knew  that  no  man  is  an  orphan,  but  it  is 
the  Father  that  careth  for  all  continually  and  for  evermore. 
Not  by  mere  report  had  he  heard  that  the  Supreme  God  is 
the  Father  of  men:  seeing  that  he  called  Him  Father  be- 
lieving Him  so  to  be,  and  in  all  that  he  did  had  ever  his 
eyes  fixed  upon  Him.  Wherefore  in  whatsoever  place  he 
was,  there  it  was  given  him  to  live  happily. 

1^  Hercules. 


•THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPiCTSTUS  163 

cxxv 
Know  you  not  that  the  thing  is  a  warfare  ?  one  man's  duty 
is  to  mount  guard,  another  m^ust  go  out  to  reconnoitre,  a 
third  to  battle ;  all  cannot  be  in  one  place,  nor  would  it  even 
be  expedient.  But  you,  instead  of  executing  your  Comman- 
der's orders,  complain  if  aught  harsher  than  usual  is  en- 
joined; not  understanding  to  what  condition  you  are  bringing 
the  army;  so  far  as  in  j^ou  lies.  If  all  were  to  follow  your 
example,  none  would  dig  a  trench,  none  v/ould  cast  a  ram- 
part around  the  camp,  none  would  keep  watch,  or  expose 
himself  to  danger ;  but  all  turn  out  useless  for  the  service  of 
war.  .  .  .  Thus  it  is  here  also.  Every  life  is  a  warfare,  and 
that  long  and  various.  You  must  fulfil  a  soldier's  duty,  and 
obey  each  order  at  your  commander's  nod :  aye,  if  it  be  pos- 
sible, divine  what  he  would  have  done;  for  between  that 
Commander  and  thisj  there  is  no  comparison,  either  in  might 
or  in  excellence. 

CXXVI 

Have  you  again  forgotten?  Know  you  not  that  a  good 
man  does  nothing  for  appearance'  sake,  but  for  the  sake  of 
having  done  right?  .  .  . 

"  Is  there  no  reward  then?  " 

RevN^ard !  do  you  seek  any  greater  reward  for  a  good  man 
than  doing  what  is  right  and  just?  Yet  at  the  Great  Games 
you  look  for  nothing  else ;  there  the  victor's  crown  you  deem 
enough.  Seems  it  to  you  so  small  a  thing  and  worthless,  to 
be  a  good  man,  and  happy  therein  ? 

CXXVII 

It  befits  thee  not  to  be  unhappy  by  reason  of  any,  but  rather 
to  be  happy  by  reason  of  all  men,  and  especially  by  reason  of 
God,  who  formed  us  to  this  end. 

CXXVIII 

What,  did  Dio'genes  love  no  man,  he  that  was  so  gentle,  'so 
true  a  friend  to  men  as  cheerfully  to  endure  such  bodily  hard- 
ships for  the  common  weal  of  all  mankind?  But  how  loved 
he  them?  As  behoved  a  minister  of  the  Supreme  God,  alike 
^ring  for  men  and  subject  unto  God. 


164  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

CXXIX 

I  am  by  Nature  made  for  my  own  good;  not  for  my  own 
evil. 

cxxx 

Remind  thyself  that  he  whom  thou  lovest  is  mortal — that 
what  thou  lovest  is  not  thine  own;  it  is  given  thee  for  the 
present,  not  irrevocably  nor  for  ever,  but  even  as  a  fig  or  a 
bunch  of  grapes  at  the  appointed  season  of  the  year.  .  .  . 

"  But  these  are  words  of  evil  omen."  .  .  . 

What,  callest  thou  aught  of  evil  omen  save  that  which 
signifies  some  evil  thing?  Cowardice  is  a  word  of  evil  omen, 
if  thou  wilt,  and  meanness  of  spirit,  and  lamentation  and 
mournine  and  shamelessness.  .  .  . 

But  do  not,  I  pray  thee,  call  of  evil  omen  a  word  that  is 
significant  of  any  natural  thing: — as  well  call  of  evil  omen 
the  reaping  of  the  corn;  for  it  means  the  destruction  of  the 
ears,  though  not  of  the  World ! — as  well  say  that  the  fall 
of  the  leaf  is  of  evil  omen ;  that  the  dried  fig  should  take  the 
place  of  the  green ;  that  raisins  should  be  made  from  grapes. 
All  these  are  changes  from  a  former  state  into  another;  not 
destruction,  but  an  ordered  economy,  a  fixed  administration. 
Such  is  leaving  home,  a  change  of  small  account;  such  is 
Death,  a  greater  change,  from  what  now  is,  not  to  what  is 
not,  but  to  what  is  not  now. 

"  Shall  I  then  no  longer  be  ?  " 

Not  so;  thou  wilt  be;  but  something  different,  of  which 
the  World  now  hath  need.  For  thou  too  v/ert  born  not  when 
thou  chosest,  but  when  the  World  had  need  of  thee. 

cxxxi 

Wherefore  a  good  man  and  true,  bearing  in  mind  who  he 
is  and  whence  he  came  and  from  whom  he  sprang,  cares  only 
how  he  may  fill  his  post  with  due  disciphne  and  obedience 
to  God. 

Wilt  thou  that  I  continue  to  live  ?  Then  will  I  live,  as  one 
that  is  free  and  noble,  as  Thou  wouldst  have  me.  For  Thou 
hast  made  me  free  from  hindrance  in  what  appertaineth  unto 
m.e.  But  hast  Thou  no  further  need  of  me  ?  I  thank  Thee ! 
Up  to  this  hour  have  I  stayed  for  Thy  sake  and  none  other's : 
and  mow  in  obedience  to  Thee  I  depart. 


THE   GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  165 

"How  dost  thou  depart?" 

Again  I  say,  as  Thou  wouldst  have  me ;  as  one  that  is  free, 
as  Thy  servant,  as  one  whose  ear  is  open  unto  what  Thou 
dost  enjoin,  what  Thou  dost  forbid. 

CXXXII 

Whatsoever  place  or  post  Thou  assignest  me,  sooner  will 
I  die  a  thousand  deaths,  as  Socrates  said,  than  desert  it. 
And  where  wilt  Thou  have  me  to  be  ?  At  Rome  or  Athens  ? 
At  Thebes  or  on  a  desert  island  ?  Only  remember  me  there ! 
Shouldst  Thou  send  me  where  man  cannot  live  as  Nature 
would  have  him,  I  will  depart,  not  in  disobedience  to  Thee, 
but  as  though  Thou  wert  sounding  the  signal  for  my  retreat: 
I  am  not  deserting  Thee — far  be  that  from  me !  I  only  per-i 
ceive  that  thou  needest  me  no  longer. 

CXXXIII 

If  you  are  in  Gyaros,  do  not  let  your  mind  dwell  upon  life 
at  Rome,  and  all  the  pleasures  it  offered  to  you  when  living 
there,  and  all  that  would  attend  your  return.  Rather  be  in- 
tent on  this — how  he  that  lives  in  Gyaros  may  live  in  Gyaros 
like  a  man  of  spirit.  And  if  you  are  at  Rome,  do  not  let 
your  mind  dwell  upon  the  life  at  Athens,  but  study  only  how 
to  live  at  Rome. 

Finally,  in  the  room  of  all  other  pleasures  put  this — the 
pleasure  which  springs  from  conscious  obedience  to  God. 

CXXXIV 

To  a  good  man  there  is  no  evil,  either  in  life  or  death. 
And  if  God  supply  not  food,  has  He  not,  as  a  wise  Comman- 
der, sounded  the  signal  for  retreat  and  nothing  more?  I 
obey,  I  follow — speaking  good  of  my  Commander,  and  prais- 
ing His  acts.  For  at  His  good  pleasure  I  came ;  and  I  depart 
when  it  pleases  Him ;  and  while  I  was  yet  alive  that  was  my 
work,  to  sing  praises  unto  God ! 

cxxxv 
Reflect  that  the  chief  source  of  all  evils   to  Man,  and 
of  baseness  and  cowardice,  is  not  death,  but  the  fear  o| 
death. 


165  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

Against  this  fear  then,  I  pray  you_,  harden  yourself; 
to  this  let  all  your  reasonings,  your  exercises,  your  read- 
ing tend.  Then  shall  you  know  that  thus  alone  are  men  set 
free. 

cxxxvi 

He  is  free  who  lives  as  he  wishes  to  live;  to  whom  none 
can  do  violence,  none  hinder  or  compel;  whose  impulses  are 
unimpeded,  whose  desires  attain  their  purpose,  who  falls  not 
into  what  he  would  avoid.  Who  then  v/ould  live  in  error  ? — 
None.  Who  would  live  deceived  and  prone  to  fall,  unjust, 
intemperate,  in  abject  whining  at  his  lot? — None.  Then 
doth  no  wicked  man  live  as  he  would,  and  therefore  neither 
is  he  free. 

CXXXVII 

Thus  do  the  more  cautious  of  travellers  act.  The  road  is 
said  to  be  beset  by  robbers.  The  traveller  will  not  venture 
alone,  but  awaits  the  companionship  on  the  road  of  an  am- 
bassador, a  qusestor  or  a  proconsul.  To  him  he  attaches  him- 
self and  thus  passes  by  in  safety.  So  doth  the  wise  men  in 
the  world.  Many  are  the  companies  of  robbers  and  tyrants, 
many  the  storms,  the  straits,  the  losses  of  all  a  man  holds 
dearest.  Whither  shall  he  fly  for  refuge — how  shall  he  pass 
by  unassailed?  What  companion  on  the  road  shall  he  await 
for  protection?  Such  and  such  a  wealthy  m^an,  of  consular 
rank?  And  how  shall  I  be  profited,  if  he  is  stripped  and 
falls  to  lamentation  and  weeping?  And  how  if  my  fellow- 
traveller  himself  turns  upon  me  and  robs  me?  What  am  I 
to  do  ?  I  will  become  a  friend  of  Caesar's !  in  his  train  none 
will  do  me  wrong!  In  the  first  place — O  the  indignities  I 
must  endure  to  win  distinction.  O  the  multitude  of  hands 
there  will  be  to  rob  me !  And  if  I  succeed,  Gsesar  too  is  but 
a  miortal.  While  should  it  come  to  pass  that  I  offend  him, 
v/hither  shall  I  flee  from  his  presence?  To  the  wilderness? 
And  may  not  fever  await  me  there?  What  then  is  to  be 
done  ?  Cannot  a  fellow-traveller  be  found  that  is  honest  and 
loyal,  strong  and  secure  against  surprise?  Thus  doth  the 
wise  man  reason,  considering  that  if  he  would  pass  through 
in  safety,  he  must  attach  himself  unto  God. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  167 

CXXXVIII 

"How  understandest  thou  attach  himself  to  God"f 

That  what  God  wills,  he  should  will  also;  that  what  God 
wills  not,  neither  should  he  will. 

"  How  then  may  this  come  to  pass  ?  " 

By  considering  the  movements  of  God,  and  His  adminis- 
tration. 

CXXXIX 

And  dost  thou  that  hast  received  all  from  another's  hands, 
repine  and  blame  the  Giver,  if  He  takes  anything  from  thee  ? 
Why,  who  art  thou,  and  to  what  end  comest  thou  here  ?  v/as 
it  not  He  that  brought  thee  into  the  world;  v/as  it  not  He 
that  made  the  Light  m.anifest  unto  thee,  that  gave  thee  fellow- 
workers,  and  senses,  and  the  power  to  reason?  And  how 
brought  He  thee  into  the  world?  Was  it  not  as  one  born 
to  die ;  as  one  bound  to  live  out  his  earthly  life  in  some  small 
tabernacle  of  flesh;  to  behold  His  administration,  and  for  a 
little  while  to  share  with  Him  in  the  mighty  march  of  this 
great  Festival  Procession?  Now  therefore  that  thou  hast 
beheld,  while  it  was  permitted  thee,  the  Solemn  Feast  and 
Assembly,  wilt  thou  not  cheerfully  depart,  when  He  sum- 
mons thee  forth,  with  adoration  arid  thanksgiving  for  v^hat 
thou  hast  seen  and  heard  ? — *'  Nay,  but  I  v/ould  fain  have 
stayed  longer  at  the  Festival." — ^Ah,  so  would  the  mystics 
fain  have  the  rites  prolonged ;  so  perchance  would  the  crowd 
at  the  Great  Games  fain  behold  more  wrestlers  still.  But  the 
Solemn  Assembly  is  over !  Come  forth,  depart  with  thanks- 
giving and  modesty — give  place  to  others  that  must  come  into 
being  even  as  thyself. 

CXL 

Why  art  thou  thus  insatiable?  why  thus  unreasonable? 
why  encumber  the  world? — "Aye,  but  I  fain  would  have 
my  wife  and  children  with  me  too."— What,  are  tl'^ey  then 
thine,  and  not  His  that  gave  them— His  that  m^ade  thee? 
Give  up  then  that  which  is  not  thine  own:  yield  it  to  One 
v>^ho  is  better  than  thou.  "  Nay,  but  why  did  He  bring  one 
into  the  world  on  these  conditions  ?  "—If  it  suits  thee  not, 
depart  1  He  hath  no  need  of  a  spectator  who  finds  fault  with 
his  lot!    Them  that  will  take  part  in  the  Feast  he  needeth— 


168  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

that  will  lift  their  voices  with  the  rest,  that  men  may  applaud 
the  more,  and  exalt  the  Great  Assembly  in  hymns  and  songs 
of  praise.  But  the  wretched  and  the  fearfiil  He  will  not  be 
displeased  to  see  absent  from  it :  for  when  they  were  present, 
thy  did  not  behave  as  at  a  Feast,  nor  fulfil  their  proper  office ; 
but  moaned  as  though  in  pain,  and  found  fault  with  their 
fate,  their  fortune  and  their  companions;  insensible  to  what 
had  fallen  to  their  lot,  insensible  to  the  powers  they  had  re- 
ceived for  a  very  different  purpose — the  powers  of  Magna- 
nimity, Nobility  of  Heart,  of  Fortitude,  of  Freedom! 

CXLI 

Art  thou  then  free?  a  man  may  say.  So  help  me  heaven, 
I  long  and  pray  for  freedom !  But  I  cannot  look  my  masters 
boldly  in  the  face;  I  still  value  the  poor  body;  I  still  set 
much  store  on  its  preservation  whole  and  sound. 

But  I  can  point  thee  out  a  free  man,  that  thou  mayest 
be  no  more  in  search  of  an  example.  Diogenes  was  free. 
How  so?  Not  because  he  was  of  free  parentage  (for  that, 
indeed,  was  not  the  case),  but  because  he  was  himself  free. 
He  had  cast  away  every  handle  whereby  slavery  might  lay 
hold  upon  him,  nor  was  it  possible  for  any  to  approach  and 
take  holu  of  him  to  enslave  him.  All  things  sat  loose  upon 
him — all  things  were  to  him  attached  by  but  slender  ties. 
Hadst  thou  seized  upon  his  possessions,  he  would  rather 
have  let  them  go  than  have  followed  thee  for  them — aye, 
had  it  been  even  a  limb,  or  mayhap  his  whole  body;  and 
in  like  manner,  relatives,  friends,  and  country.  For  he 
knew  whence  they  came — from  whose  hands  and  on  what 
terms  he  had  received  them.  His  true  forefathers,  the  Gods, 
his  true  Country,  he  never  would  have  abandoned;  nor 
would  he  have  yielded  to  any  man  in  obedience  and  submis- 
sion to  the  one  nor  in  cheerfully  dying  for  the  other.  For 
he  was  ever  mindful  that  everything  that  comes  to  pass  has 
its  source  and  origin  there;  being  indeed  brought  about  for 
the  weal  of  that  his  true  Country,  and  directed  by  Him  in 
whose  governance  it  is. 

CXLII 

Ponder  on  this— on  these  convictions,  on  these  words:  fix 
thine  eyes  on  these  examples,  if  thou  wouldst  be  free,  if  thou 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  169 

hast  thine  heart  set  upon  the  matter  according  to  its  worth. 
And  what  marvel  if  thou  purchase  so  great  a  thing  at  so 
great  and  high  a  price  ?  For  the  sake  of  this  that  men  deem 
liberty,  some  hang  themselves,  others  cast  themselves  down 
from  the  rock;  aye,  time  has  been  when  whole  cities  came 
utterly  to  an  end:  while  for  the  sake  of  the  Freedom  that  is 
true,  and  sure,  and  unassailable,  dost  thou  grudge  to  God 
what  He  gave,  when  He  claims  it?  Wilt  thou  not  study,  as 
Plato  saith,  to  endure,  not  death  alone,  but  torture,  exile, 
stripes — in  a  word,  to  render  up  all  that  is  not  thine  own? 
Else  thou  wilt  be  a  slave  amiid  slaves,  wert  thou  ten  thousand 
times  a  consul;  aye,  not  a  whit  the  less,  though  thou  climb 
the  Palace  steps.  And  thou  shalt  know  how  true  is  the 
saying  of  Cleanthes,  that  though  the  words  of  philosophy 
may  run  counter  to  the  opinions  of  the  v/orld,  yet  have  they 
reason  on  their  side. 

CXLIII 

Asked  how  a  man  should  best  grieve  his  enemy,  Epictetus 
replied,  "  By  setting  himself  to  live  the  noblest  life  himself." 

CXLIV 

I  am  free,  I  am  a  friend  of  God,  ready  to  render  Him  will- 
ing obedience.  Of  all  else  I  may  set  store  by  nothing — 
neither  by  mine  own  body,  nor  possessions,  nor  office,  nor 
good  report,  nor  in  a  word,  aught  else  beside.  For  it  is  not 
His  Will,  that  I  should  so  set  store  by  these  things.  Had 
it  been  His  pleasure.  He  v/ould  have  placed  my  Good  therein. 
But  now  He  hath  not  done  so :  therefore  I  cannot  transgress 
one  jot  of  His  commands.  In  everything  hold  fast  to  that 
which  is  thy  Good — but  to  all  else  (as  far  as  is  given  thee) 
within  the  measure  of  Reason  only,  contented  with  this  alone. 
Else  thou  wilt  meet  with  failure,  ill  success,  let  and  hindrance. 
These  are  the  Lav/s  ordained  of  God — these  are  His  Edicts; 
these  a  man  should  expound  and  interpret;  to  these  submit 
himself,  not  to  the  laws  of  Masurius  and  Cassius.^® 

CXLV 

Remember  that  not  the  love  of  power  and  v/ealth  sets  us 
under  the  heel  of  others,  but  even  the  love  of  tranquillity, 

"  Famous  Roman  jurists. 


170  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

of  leisure,  of  change  of  scene — of  learning  in  general,  it 
matters  not  what  the  outward  thing  may  be — to  set  store  by 
it  is  to  place  thyself  in  subjection  to  another.  Where  is  the 
difference  then  between  desiring  to  be  a  Senator,  and  desir- 
ing not  to  be  one:  between  thirsting  for  ofSce  and  thirsting 
to  be  quit  of  it?  Where  is  the  difference  between  crying 
Woe  is  me,  I  knozv  not  what  to  do,  bound  hand  and  foot  as 
I  am  to  my  books  so  that  I  cannot  stir!  and  crying.  Woe  is 
me,  I  have  not  time  to  read!  As  though  a  book  were  not  as 
much  an  outward  thing  and  independent  of  the  will,  as 
office  and  power  and  the  receptions  of  the  great. 

Or  what  reason  hast  thou  (tell  me)  for  desiring  to  read? 
For  if  thou  aim  at  nothing  beyond  the  mere  delight  of  it, 
or  gaining  some  scrap  of  knowledge,  thou  art  but  a  poor, 
spiritless  knave.  But  if  thou  desirest  to  study  to  its  proper 
end,  what  else  is  this  than  a  life  that  flows  on  tranquil 
and  serene?  And  if  thy  reading  secures  thee  not  serenity, 
what  profits  it  ? — "  Nay,  but  it  doth  secure  it,"  quoth  he,  "  and 
that  is  why  I  repine  at  being  deprived  of  it." — And  what 
serenity  is  this  that  lies  at  the  mercy  of  every  passer-by? 
I  say  not  at  the  mercy  of  the  Emperor  or  Emperor's  favour- 
ite, but  such  as  trembles  at  a  raven's  croak  and  piper's  din, 
a  fever's  touch  or  a  thousand  things  of  like  sort!  Whereas 
the  life  serene  has  no  more  certain  mark  than  this,  that  it 
ever  moves  with  constant  unimpeded  flow. 

CXLVI 

If  thou  hast  put  malice  and  evil  speaking  from  thee,  alto- 
gether, or  in  some  degree:  if  thou  hast  put  away  from  thee 
rashness,  foulness  of  tongue,  intemperance,  sluggishness:  if 
thou  art  not  moved  by  v/hat  once  moved  thee,  or  in  like 
manner  as  thou  once  wert  moved — then  thou  mayst  celebrate 
a  daily  festival,  to-day  because  thou  hast  done  well  in  this 
matter,  to-morrow  in  that.  How  much  greater  cause  is  here 
for  offering  sacrifice,  than  if  a  man  should  become  Consul 
or  Prefect? 

CXLVI  I 

These  things  hast  thou  from  thyself  and  from  the  Gods: 
only  remember  who  it  is  that  giveth  them-— to  whom  and  for 
what  purpose  they  were  given.    Feeding  thy  soul  on  thoughts 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS   OF  EPICTETUS  171 

like  these,  dost  thou  debate  in  what  place  happiness  awaits 
thee?  in  vv'hat  place  thou  shalt  do  God's  pleasure?  Are  not 
the  Gods  nigh  unto  all  places  alike;  see  they  not  alike  what 
everywhere  comes  to  pass? 

CXLVIII 

To  each  man  God  hath  granted  this  inward  freedom. 
These  are  the  principles  that  in  a  house  create  love,  'in  a 
city  concord,  among  nations  peace,  teaching  a  man  gratitude 
towards  .God  and  cheerful  confidence,  v/herever  he  may  be, 
in  dealing  with  outward  things  that  he  knows  are  neither 
his  nor  worth  striving  after. 

CXLIX 

If  you  seek  Truth,  you  will  not  seek  to  gain  a  victory  by 
every  possible  micans;  and  when  you  have  found  Truth, 
you  need  not  fear  being  defeated. 

CL 

What  foolish  talk  is  this?  how  can  I  any  longer  lay 
claim  to  right  principles,  if  I  am  not  content  with  being 
what  I  am,  but  am  all  aflutter  about  what  I  ami  supposed 
to  be? 

CLI 

God  hath  made  all  things  in  the  world,  nay,  the  world  it- 
self, free  from  hindrance  and  perfect,  and  its  parts  for  the 
use  of  the  whole.  No  other  creature  is  capable  of  compre- 
hending His  administration  thereof;  but  the  reasonable  be- 
ing Man  possesses  faculties  for  the  consideration  of  all  these 
things — not  only  that  he  is  himself  a  part,  but  what  part 
he  is,  and  how  it  is  meet  that  the  parts  should  give  place  to 
the  whole.  Nor  is  this  all.  Being  naturally  constituted 
noble,  magnanimous,  and  free,  he  sees  that  the  things  which 
surround  him  are  of  tvv^o  kinds.  Some  are  free  from  hin- 
drance and  in  the  pov^^er  of  the  will.  Others  are  subject  to 
hindrance,  and  depend  on  the  will  of  other  men.  If  then  he 
place  his  ov/n  good,  his  own  best  interest,  only  in  that  v/hich 
is  free  from  hindrance  and  in  his  power,  he  will  be  free, 
tranquil,  happ}^  unharmed,  noble-hearted  and  pious;  giving 
thanks  for  all  things  unto  God,  findinp-  fault  with  nothing 
that   comes   to   pass,   laying  no   charge   against   anything. 


172  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

Whereas  if  he  place  his  good  in  outward  things,  depending 
not  on  the  will,  he  must  perforce  be  subject  to  hindrance 
and  restraint,  the  slave  of  those  that  have  power  over  the 
things  he  desires  and  fears ;  he  must  perforce  be  impious,  as 
deeming  himself  injured  at  the  hands  of  God;  he  must  be 
unjust,  as  ever  prone  to  claim  more  than  his  due;  he  must 
perforce  be  of  a  mean  and  abject  spirit. 

CLII 

Whom  then  shall  I  yet  fear?  the  lords  of  the  Bed-chamber, 
lest  they  should  shut  me  out?  If  they  find  me  desirous  of 
entering  in,  let  them  shut  me  out,  if  they  will. 

"  Then  why  comest  thou  to  the  door  ?  " 

Because  I  think  it  meet  and  right,  so  long  as  the  Play 
lasts,  to  take  part  therein. 

"  In  what  sense  art  thou  then  shut  out  ?  " 

Because,  unless  I  am  admitted,  it  is  not  my  will  to  enter: 
on  the  contrary,  my  will  is  simply  that  which  comes  to  pass. 
For  I  esteem  what  God  wills  better  than  what  I  will.  To 
Him  will  I  cleave  as  His  minister  and  attendant;  having  the 
same  movements,  the  sam.e  desires,  in  a  word  the  same  Will 
as  He.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  being  shut  out  for  me,  but 
only  for  them  that  would  force  their  way  in. 

CLIII 

But  what  says  Socrates? — "One  man  finds  pleasure  in 
improving  his  land,  another  his  horses.  My  pleasure  lies 
in  seeing  that  I  myself  grow  better  day  by  day." 

CLIV 

The  dress  is  suited  to  the  craft;  the  craftsman  takes  his 
name  from  the  craft,  not  from  the  dress.  For  this  reason 
Euphrates  was  right  in  saying,  "  I  long  endeavoured  to  con- 
ceal my  following  the  philosophic  life;  and  this  profited  me 
much.  In  the  first  place,  I  knew  that  what  I  did  aright, 
I  did  not  for  the  sake  of  lookers-on,  but  for  my  own.  I  ate 
aright — unto  myself;  I  kept  the  even  tenor  of  my  walk,  my 
glance  composed  and  serene — all  unto  myself  and  unto  God. 
Then  as  I  fought  alone,  I  was  alone  in  peril.  If  I  did  any- 
thing amiss  or  shameful,  the  cause  of  Philosophy  was  not 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS  173 

in  me  endangered;  nor  did  I  v/rong  the  multitude  by  trans- 
gressing as  a  professed  philosopher.  Wherefore  those  that 
knew  not  my  purpose  marvelled  how  it  came  about,  that 
;ivhilst  all  my  life  and  conversation  was  passed  with  philos- 
ophers without  exception,  I  was  yet  none  myself.  And  what 
harm  that  the  philosopher  should  be  known  by  his  acts,  in- 
stead of  by  mere  outward  signs  and  symbols  ?  " 

CLV 

First  study  to  conceal  what  thou  art;  seek  wisdom  a  little 
while  unto  thyself.  Thus  grows  the  fruit;  first,  the  seed 
must  be  buried  in  the  earth  for  a  little  space;  there  it  must 
be  hid  and  slowly  grow,  th.at  it  may  reach  maturity.  But 
if  it  produce  the  ear  before  the  jointed  stalk,  it  is  imperfect 
— a  thing  from  the  garden  of  Adonis."  Such  a  sorry  growth 
art  thou ;  thou  hast  blossomed  too  soon :  the  winter  cold  will 
wither  thee  away ! 

CLVI 

First  of  all,  condemn  the  life  thou  art  now  leading:  but 
when  thou  hast  condemned  it,  do  not  despair  of  thyself — ^be 
not  like  them^  of  mean  spirit,  who  once  they  have  yielded, 
abandon  themselves  entirely  and  as  it  were  allow  the  torrent 
to  sweep  them  away.  No;  learn  what  the  wrestling  masters 
do.  Has  the  boy  fallen  ?  "  Rise,"  they  say,  "  wrestle  again, 
till  thy  strength  come  to  thee."  Even  thus  should  it  be  with 
thee.  For  know  that  there  is  nothing  more  tractable  than 
the  human  soul.  It  needs  but  to  will,  and  the  thing  is  done ; 
the  soul  is  set  upon  the  right  path :  as  on  the  contrary  it  needs 
but  to  nod  over  the  task,  and  all  is  lost.  For  ruin  and  re- 
covery alike  are  from  within. 

CLVII 

It  is  the  critical  moment  that  shows  the  man.  So  when 
the  crisis  is  upon  you,  remember  that  God,  like  a  trainer  of 
wrestlers,  has  matched  you  with  a  rough  and  stalwart  antag- 
onist.— "  To  what  end  ?  "  you  ask.  That  you  may  prove  the 
victor  at  the  Great  Games.  Yet  without  toil  and  sweat 
this  may  not  be ! 

1' Potted  plants  of  forced  growth  carried  in  the  processions  in  honor  of 
Adonis. 


174  THE   GOLDEN   SAYINGS  OF    EPICTETUS 

CLVIII 

I£  thou  wouldst  make  progress,  be  content  to  seem  foolish/ 
and  void  of  understanding  with  respect  to  outward  things,' 
Care  not  to  be  thought  to  know  anything.  If  any  shoul(j 
make  account  of  thee,  distrust  thyself. 

CLIX 

Remember  that  in  life  thou  shouldst  order  thy  conduct  as 
at  a  banquet.  Has  any  dish  that  is  being  served  reached 
thee?  Stretch  forth  thy  hand  and  help  thyself  modestly. 
Doth  it  pass  thee  by  ?  Seek  not  to  detain  it.  Has  it  not  yet 
come?  Send  not  forth  thy  desire  to  meet  it,  but  wait  until 
it  reaches  thee.  Deal  thus  with  children,  thus  with  wife; 
thus  with  office,  thus  with  wealth — and  one  day  thou  wilt  be 
meet  to  share  the  Banquets  of  the  Gods.  But  if  thou  dost 
not  so  much  as  touch  that  which  is  placed  before  thee,  but 
despisest  it,  then  shalt  thou  not  only  share  the  Banquets  of 
the  Gods,  but  their  Empire  also. 

CLX 

Remember  that  thou  art  an  actor  in  a  play,  and  of  such 
sort  as  the  Author  chooses,  whether  long  or  short.  If  it  be 
his  good  pleasure  to  assign  thee  the  part  of  a  beggar,  a 
ruler,  or  a  simple  citizen,  thine  it  is  to  play  it  fitly.  For 
thy  business  is  to  act  the  part  assigned  thee,  well :  to  choose 
it,  is  another's. 

CLXI 

Keep  death  and  exile  daily  before  thine  eyes,  with  all  else 
that  men  deem  terrible,  but  more  especially  Death.  Then 
wilt  thou  never  think  a  mean  thought,  nor  covet  anything 
beyond  measure. 

CLXII 

As  a  mark  is  not  set  up  in  order  to  be  missed,  so  neither 
is  such  a  thing  as  natural  evil  produced  in  the  World. 

CLXIII 

Piety  towards  the  Goids,  be  sure^  consists  chiefly  in  think- 
ing rightly  concerning  them — that  tliey  are,  and  that  they 
govern  the  Universe  with  goodness  and  justice;  and  that 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  175 

thou  thyself  art  appointed  to  obey  them,  and  to  submit  under 
all  circum.stances  that  arise;  acquiescing  cheerfully  in  what- 
ever may  happen,  sure  that  it  is  brought  to  pass  and  ac- 
complished by  the  most  Perfect  Understanding.  Thus  thou 
"wilt  never  find  fault  with  the  Gods,  nor  charge  them  with 
neglecting  thee. 

CLXIV 

Lose  no  time  in  setting  before  you  a  certain  stamp  of 
character  and  behaviour  to  observe  both  when  by  yourself 
and  in  company  with  others.  Let  silence  be  your  general 
rule;  or  say  only  what  is  necessary  and  in  few  words.  We 
shall,  hov/ever,  when  occasion  demands,  enter  into  discourse 
sparingly,  avoiding  such  common  topics  as  gladiators,  horse- 
races, athletes;  and  the  perpetual  talk  about  food  and  drink. 
Above  all  avoid  speaking  of  persons,  either  in  the  way  of 
praise  or  blame,  or  comparison. 

If  you  can,  win  over  the  conversation  of  your  company 
to  what  it  should  be  by  your  own.  But  if  you  should 
find  yourself  cut  off  without  escape  among  strangers  and 
aliens,  be  silent. 

CLXV 

Laughter  should  not  be  much,  nor  frequent,  nor  unre- 
strained. 

CLXVI 

Refuse  altogether  to  take  an  oath  if  you  can,  if  not,  as 

far  as  miay  be. 

CLXVII 

Banquets  of  the  unlearned  and  of  them  that  are  without, 
avoid.  But  if  you  have  occasion  to  take  part  in  them,  let 
not  your  attention  be  relaxed  for  a  moment,  lest  you  slip 
after  all  into  evil  ways.  For  you  may  rest  assured  that  be  a 
man  ever  so  pure  himself^  he  cannot  escape  defilement  if  his 
associates  are  impure. 

CLXVIII 

Take  what  relates  to  the  body  as  far  as  the  bare  use  war- 
rants— as  m.eat,  drink,  raiment,  house  and  servants.  But 
all  that  makes  for  show  and  luxury  reject. 


176  THE  GOLDEN   SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

CLXIX 

If  you  are  told  that  such  an  one  speaks  ill  of  you,  make/ 
no  defence  against  what  was  said,  but  answer,  He  surely 
knew  not  my  other  faults,  else  he  would  not  have  mentioned 
these  only !  / 

CLXX  I 

When  you  visit  any  of  those  in  power,  bethink  yourself 
that  you  will  not  find  him  in :  that  you  may  not  be  admitted : 
that  the  door  may  be  shut  in  your  face;  that  he  may  not 
concern  himself  about  you.  If  with  all  this,  it  is  your  duty 
to  go,  bear  what  happens,  and  never  say  to  yourself.  It  was 
not  worth  the  trouble !  For  that  would  smack  of  the  foolish 
and  unlearned  who  suffer  outward  things  to  touch  them. 

CLXXI 

In  company  avoid  frequent  and  undue  talk  about  your 
own  actions  and  dangers.  However  pleasant  it  may  be  to 
you  to  enlarge  upon  the  risks  you  have  run,  others  may  not 
find  such  pleasure  in  listening  to  your  adventures.  Avoid 
provoking  laughter  also:  it  is  a  habit  from  which  one  easily 
slides  into  the  v\^ays  of  the  foolish,  and  apt  to  diminish  the 
respect  which  your  neighbours  feel  for  you.  To  border  on 
coarse  talk  is  also  dangerous.  On  such  occasions,  if  a  con- 
venient opportunity  offer,  rebuke  the  speaker.  If  not,  at  least 
by  relapsing  into  silence,  colouring,  and  looking  annoyed, 
show  that  you  are  displeased  with  the  subject. 

CLXXII 

When  you  have  decided  that  a  thing  ought  to  be  done, 
and  are  doing  it,  never  shun  being  seen  doing  it,  even  though 
the  multitude  should  be  likely  to  judge  the  matter  amiss. 
For  if  you  are  not  acting  rightly,  shun  the  act  itself;  if 
rightly,  however,  why  fear  misplaced  censure? 

CLXXIII 

It  stamps  a  man  of  mean  capacity  to  spend  much  time  on 
the  things  of  the  body,  as  to  be  long  over  bodily  exercises, 
long  over  eating,  long  over  drinking,  long  over  other  bodily 
functions.  Rather  should  these  things  take  the  second  place, 
while  all  your  care  is  directed  to  the  understanding. 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTSTUS  177 

CLXXIV 

Everything  has  two  handles,  one  by  which  it  may  be  borne, 
the  other  by  which  it  may  not.  If  your  brother  sin  against 
you  lay  not  hold  of  it  by  the  handle  of  his  injustice,  for 
by  that  it  ma}^  not  be  borne:  but  rather  by  this,  that  he  is 
your  brother,  the  comrade  of  your  youth;  and  thus  you  will 
lay  hold  on  it  so  that  it  may  be  borne. 

CLXXV 

Never  call  yourself  a  Philosopher  nor  talk  much  among 
the  unlearned  about  Principles,  but  do  that  which  follov/s 
from  them.  Thus  at  a  banquet,  do  not  discuss  how  people 
ought  to  eat ;  but  eat  as  you  ought.  Remember  that  Socrates 
thus  entirely  avoided  ostentation.  Men  would  come  to  him 
desiring  to  be  recommended  to  philosophers,  and  he  would 
conduct  them  thither  himself — so  well  did  he  bear  being 
overlooked.  Accordingly  if  any  talk  concerning  principles 
should  arise  among  the  unlearned,  be  you  for  the  most  part 
silent.  For  you  run  great  risk  of  spewing  up  what  you  have 
ill  digested.  And  when  a  man  tells  you  that  you  know  noth- 
ing and  you  are  not  nettled  at  it,  then  you  may  be  sure  that 
you  have  begun  the  work. 

CLXXVI 

When  you  have  brought  yourself  to  supply  the  needs  o£ 
the  body  at  small  cost,  do  not  pique  yourself  on  that,  nor  if 
you  drink  only  water,  keep  saying  on  each  occasion,  /  drink 
water !  And  if  you  ever  want  to  practise  endurance  and  toil, 
tlo  so  unto  yourself  and  not  unto  others — do  not  em.brace 
statues  !^ 

CLXXVII 

When  a  man  prides  himself  on  being  able  to  understand 
and  interpret  the  writings  of  Chrysippus,^^  say  to  yourself : — 

If  Chrysippus  had  not  written  obscurely,  this  fellow 
would  have  had  nothing  to  be  proud  of.  But  what  is  it  that 
/  desire  ?  To  understand  Nature,  and  to  follow  her !  Ac- 
cordingly I  ask  who  is  the  Interpreter.  On  hearing  that  it 
is  Chrysippus,  I  go  to  him.  But  it  seems  I  do  not  understand 
what  he  wrote.    So  I  seek  one  to  interpret  that.    So  far  there 

^  As  Diogenes  is  said  to  have  done  in  winter. 

^  The  so-called  "  Second  Founder  "  of  the  Stoics. 


178  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF   EPICTETUS 

is  nothing  to  pride  myself  upon.  But  when  I  have  found 
my  interpreter,  v/haj  remains  is  to  put  in  practice  his  in- 
structions. This  itself  is  the  only  thing  to  be  proud  of. 
But  if  I  admire  the  interpretation  and  that  alone,  what  else 
have  I  turned  out  but  a  mere  commentator  instead  of  a 
lover  of  wisdom? — except  indeed  that  I  happen  to  be  inter- 
preting Chrysippus  instead  of  Homer.  So  when  any  one 
says  to  me,  Prithee,  read  me  Chrysippus,  I  am.  more  inclined 
to  blush,  when  I  cannot  show  my  deeds  to  be  in  harmony  and 
accordance  with  his  sayings. 

CLXXVIII 

At  feasts,  remember  that  you  are  entertaining  two  guests, 
body  and  soul.  What  you  give  to  the  body,  you  presentW, 
lose;  what  you  give  to  the  soul,  you  keep  for  ever. 

CLXXIX 

At  meals  see  to  it  that  those  who  serve  be  not  more  in 
number  than  those  who  are  served.  It  is  absurd  for  a  crowd 
of  persons  to  be  dancing  attendance  on  half  a  dozen  chairs. 

CLXXX 

It  is  best  to  share  with  j^our  attendants  what  is  going  for- 
ward, both  in  the  labour  of  preparation  and  in  the  enjoyment 
of  the  feast  itself.  If  such  a  thing  be  difficult  at  the  time, 
recollect  that  you  who  are  not  weary  are  being  served  by 
those  that  are,  you  who  are  eating  and  drinking  by  those 
who  do  neither ;  you  who  are  talking  by  those  who  are  silent ; 
you  who  are  at  ease  by  those  who  are  under  constraint.  Thus 
no  sudden  wrath  will  betray  you  into  unreasonable  conduct^ 
nor  will  you  behave  harshly  by  irritating  anothen 

CLXXXI 

When  Xanthippe  was  chiding  Socrates  for  making  scanty 
preparation  for  entertaining  his  friends,  he  answered : — "  If 
they  are  friends  of  ours,  they  will  not  care  for  that;  if  they 
are  not,  we  shall  care  nothing  for  them ! " 

CLXXXI  I 

Asked,  Who  is  the  rich  man?  Epictetus  replied,  "He  who 
is  content" 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS   OF  EPICTETUS  179 

CLXXXIII 

Favorinus^"  tells  us  how  Epictetus  would  also  say  that  there 
were  two  faults  far  graver  and  fouler  than  any  others — 
inability  to  bear,  and  inability  to  forbear,  when  we  neither 
patiently  bear  the  blows  that  must  be  borne,  nor  abstain 
from  the  things  and  the  pleasures  we  ought  to  abstain  from. 
"  So,"  he  went  on,  "  if  a  man  will  only  have  these  two  words 
at  heart,  and  heed  them  carefully  by  ruling  and  watching 
over  himself,  he  wall  for  the  most  part  fall  into  no  sin,  and 
his  life  will  be  tranquil  and  serene."  He  meant  the  words 
*Avs^/ou  xat  oTza'^ou — "Bear  and  Forbear." 

CLXXXIV 

On  all  occasions  these  thoughts  should  be  at  hand:— 

Lead  me,  0  Gcd,  and  Thou,  O  Destiny, "^"^ 
Be  what  it  may  the  goal  appointed  me. 
Bravely  Fll  follow;  nay,  and  if  I  would  noiy 
Pd prove  a  coward,  yet  must  follow  still!'* 

Again : 

Who  to  Necessity  doth  bow  aright^ 
Is  learn' d  in  wisdom-  and  the  things  of  God. 
Once  more: — 

Crito,  if  this  be  God's  will,  so  let  it  be.  As  for  me,  Anytus  and 
Melitus  can  indeed  put  me  to  death,  but  injure  me,  never  I 

CLXXXV 

We  shall  then  be  like  Socrates,  when  we  can  indite  hymns 
of  praise  to  the  Gods  in  prison. 

CLXXXVI 

It  is  hard  to  combine  and  unite  these  two  qualities,  the 
carefulness  of  one  who  is  affected  by  circmnstances,  and  the 
intrepidity  of  one  who  heeds  them  not.  But  it  is  not  impos- 
sible: else  were  happiness  also  impossible.  We  should  act 
as  we  do  in  sea-faring. 

"  What  can  I  do  ?  " — Choose  the  master,  the  crev/,  the  day, 
the  opportunity.  Then  comes  a  sudden  storm.  What  mat- 
ters it  to  me  ?  my  part  has  been  fully  done.    The  matter  is  in 

^  A  Roman  orator  and  sophist. 
»» These  verses  are  by  Cleanthes,  the  sttccessor  of  Zeno  as  leader  of  th6 
Stoics,  and  author  of  the  Hymn  printed  in  Appendix   B. 


,^0  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS   OF  EPICTETUS 

ths  hands  of  another — the  Master  of  the  ship.  The  ship  is 
foundering.  What  then  have  I  to  do?  I  do  the  only  thing 
that  remains  to  me — to  be  drowned  without  fear,  without  a 
cry,  without  upbraiding  God,  but  knowing  that  what  has 
been  born  must  likewise  perish.  For  I  am  not  Eternity,  but 
a  human  being, — a  part  of  the  v/hole,  as  an  hour  is  part  of 
the  day.  I  must  come  like  the  hour,  and  like  the  hour  must 
pass! 

CLXXXVII 

And  now  we  are  sending  you  to  Rome  to  spy  out  the  land ; 
but  none  send  a  coward  as  such  a  spy,  that,  if  he  hear  but 
a  noise  and  see  a  shadow  moving  anywhere,  loses  his  wits 
and  comes  flying  to  say,  The  enemy  are  upon  us! 

So  if  you  go  now,  and  come  and  tell  us :  "  Everything  at 
Rome  is  terrible:  Death  is  terrible.  Exile  is  terrible.  Slander 
is  terrible,  Want  is  terrible ;  Fly  comrades !  the  enemy  are 
upon  us  !  we  shall  reply,  Get  you  gone,  and  prophesy  to  your- 
self! we  have  but  erred  in  sending  such  a  spy  as  you. 
Diogenes,  who  was  sent  as  a  spy  long  before  you,  brought 
us  back  another  report  than  this.  He  says  that  Death  is 
no  evil;  for  it  need  not  even  bring  shame  with  it  He  says 
that  Fame  is  but  the  empty  noise  of  madmen.  And  what 
report  did  this  spy  bring  us  of  Pain,  what  of  Pleasure,  what 
of  Want?  That  to  be  clothed  in  sackcloth  is  better  than 
any  purple  robe;  that  sleeping  on  the  bare  ground  is  the 
softest  couch;  and  in  proof  of  each  assertion  he  points  to 
his  own  courage,  constancy,  and  freedom ;  to  his  own  healthy 
and  muscular  fram.e.  "There  is  no  enemy  near/'  he  cries, 
"  all  is  perfect  peace !  " 

CLXXXVIII 

If  a  man  has  this  peace — not  the  peace  proclaimed  by 
Csesar  (how  indeed  should  he  have  it  to  proclaim?)  nay,  but 
the  peace  proclaimed  by  God  through  reason,  will  not  that 
suffice  him  when  alone,  when  he  beholds  and  reflects: — Now 
can  no  evil  happen  unto  me ;  for  me  there  is  no  robber,  for  me 
no  earthquake ;  all  things  are  full  of  peace,  full  of  tranquillity; 
neither  highway  nor  city  nor  gathering  of  men,  neither  neigh- 
bour nor  comrade  can  do  me  hurt.  Another  supplies  my 
food,  whose  care  it  is;  another  my  raiment,  another  hath 


THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS  181 

givem  me  perceptions  of  sense  and  primary  conceptions.  And 
when  He  supplies  my  necessities  no  more,  it  is  that 
He  is  sounding  the  retreat,  that  He  hath  opened,  the 
<loor,  and  is  saying  to  thee.  Come  ! — Whither  ?  To  nought 
that  thou  needest  fear,  but  to  the  friendly  kindred  ele- 
ments whence  tho  didst  spring.  Whatsoever  of  fire  is  in 
thee,  unto  fire  shall  return ;  whatsoever  of  earth,  unto  earth ; 
of  spirit,  unto  spirit;  of  water,  unto  water.  There  is  no 
Hades,  no  fabled  rivers  of  Sighs,  of  Lamentation,  or  of  Fire : 
but  all  things  are  full  of  Beings  spiritual  and  divine.  With 
thoughts  like  these,  beholding  the  Sun,  Moon,  and  Stars, 
enjoying  earth  and  sea,  a  man  is  neither  helpless  nor  alone ! 


CLXXXIX 

What  wouldst  thou  be  found  doing  when  overtaken  by 
Death?  If  I  might  choose^  I  would  be  found  doing  some 
deed  of  true  humanity,  of  wide  import,  beneficent  and  noble. 
But  if  I  may  not  be  found  engaged  in  aught  so  lofty,  let 
me  hope  at  least  for  this — what  none  may  hinder,  what  is 
surely  in  my  power — that  I  may  be  found  raising  up  in  my- 
self that  which  had  fallen ;  learning  to  deal  more  wisely  with 
the  things  of  sense;  working  out  my  own  tranquillity,  and 
thus  rendering  that  which  is  its  due  to  every  relation  of 
life.    .    .    . 

If  death  surprise  me  thus  employed,  it  is  enough  if  I  can 
stretch  forth  my  hands  to  God  and  say,  "  The  faculties  which 
I  received  at  Thy  hands  for  apprehending  this  thine  Adm.in- 
istration,  I  have  not  neglected.  As  far  as  in  me  lay,  I  have 
done  Thee  no  dishonour.  Behold  how  I  have  used  the  senses, 
the  primary  conceptions  which  Thou  gavest  me.  Have  I 
ever  laid  anything  to  Thy  charge?  Have  I  ever  murmured 
at  aught  that  came  to  pass,  or  wished  it  otherwise?  Have 
I  in  anything  transgressed  the  relations  of  life?  For  that 
Thou  didst  beget  me,  I  thank  Thee  for  that  Thou  hast  given : 
for  the  time  during  which  I  have  used  the  things  that  were 
Thine,  it  suffices  me.  Take  them  back  and  place  them  where- 
ever  Thou  wilt !  They  were  all  Thine,  and  Thou  gavest  them 
me." — If  a  man  depart  thus  minded,  is  it  not  enough?  What 
life  is  fairer  or  more  nobie^  what  end  happier  than  his  ? 


(APPENDIX  A) 


ATTRIBUTED  TO  EPICTETUS 

I 

A  LIFE  entangled  with  Fortune  is  like  a  torrent.  It  is  turbulent 
and  muddy;  hard  to  pass  and  masterful  of  mood:  noisy  and  of 
brief  continuance. 

II 

The  soul  that  companies  with  Virtue  is  like  an  ever-flowing 
source.  It  is  a  pure,  clear,  and  wholesome  draught;  sweet,  rich, 
and  generous  of  its  store;  that  injures  not,  neither  destroys. 

Ill 

It  is  a  shame  that  one  who  sweetens  his  drink  with  the  gifts 
of  the  bee,  should  embitter  God's  gift  Reason  with  vice. 

IV 

Crows  pick  out  the  eyes  of  the  dead,  when  the  dead  have  no 
longer  need  of  them;  but  flatterers  mar  the  soul  of  the  living, 
and  her  eyes  they  blind. 

v 

Keep  neither  a  blunt  knife  nor  an  ill-disciplined  looseness  of 
tongue. 

VI 

Nature  hath  given  men  one  tongue  but  two  ears,  that  we  may 
hear  from  others  twice  as  much  as  we  speak. 

VII 

Do  not  give  sentence  in  another  tribunal  till  you  have  been 
yourself  judged  in  the  tribunal  of  Justice. 

182 


APPENDIX  A  183 

VIII 

It  is  shameful  for  a  Judge  to  be  judged  by  others. 

IX 

Give  me  by  all  means  the  shorter  and  nobler  life,  instead  of 
one  that  is  longer  but  of  less  account ! 

X 

Freedom  is  the  name  of  virtue :  Slavery,  of  vice.  .  .  .  None  is 
a  slave  whose  acts  are  free. 

XI 

Of  pleasures,  those  which  occur  most  rarely  give  the  most 
delight. 

XII 

Exceed  due  measure,  and  the  most  delightful  things  become 
the  least  delightful. 

XIII 

The  anger  of  an  ape — the  threat  of  a  flatterer :— these  deserve 
equal  regard. 

XIV 

Chastise  thy  passions  that  they  avenge  not  themselves  upon 
thee. 

XV 

No  man  is  free  who  is  not  master  of  himself. 

XVI 

A  ship  should  not  ride  on  a  single  anchor,  nor  life  on  a  single 
hope. 

XVII 

Fortify  th3''self  with  contentment:  that  is  an  impregnable 
stronghold. 

XVIII 

No  man  who  is  a  lover  of  mone}'-,  of  pleasure,  of  glory,  is 
likewise  a  lover  of  Men;  but  only  he  that  is  a  lover  of  what- 
soever things  are  fair  and  good. 

XIX 

Think  of  God  more  often  than  thou  breathest. 


184  THE  GOLDEN  SAYINGS  OF  EPICTETUS 

XX 

Choose  the  life  that  is  noblest,  for  custom  can  make  it  sweet 
to  thee. 

XXI 

Let  thy  speech  of  God  be  renewed  day  by  day,  aye,  rather  than 
thy  meat  and  drink. 

XXII 

Even  as  the  Sun  doth  not  wait  for  prayers  and  incantations  to 
rise,  but  shines  forth  and  is  welcomed  by  all:  so  thou  also  wait 
not  for  clapping  of  hands  and  shouts  and  praise  to  do  thy  duty; 
nay,  do  good  of  thine  own  accord,  and  thou  wilt  be  loved  like 
the  Sun. 

XXIII 

Let  no  man  think  that  he  is  loved  by  any  who  loveth  none. 

XXIV 

If  thou  rememberest  that  God  standeth  by  to  behold  and  visit 
all  that  thou  doest;  whether  in  the  body  or  in  the  soul,  thou 
surely  wilt  not  err  in  any  prayer  or  deed;  and  thou  shalt  have 
God  to  dwell  with  thee. 

Note. — Schweighseuser's  great  edition  collects  i8i  fragments  attributed 
to  Epictetus,  of  which  but  a  few  are  certainly  genuine.  Some  (as  xxi., 
xxiv.,  above)  bear  the  stamp  of  Pythagorean  origin;  others,  though  changed 
in  form,  may  well  be  based  upon  Epictetean  sayings.  Most  have  been  pre- 
served in  the  Anthology  of  John  of  Stobi  (Stobseus),  a  Byzantine  collector, 
of  whom  scarcely  anything  is  known  but  that  he  probably  wrote  towards 
the  end  of  the  fifth  century,  and  made  his  vast  body  of  extracts  from  more 
than  five  hundred  authors  for  his  son's  u^e.  The  best  examination  of  the 
authenticity  of  the  Fragm.ents  is  QucBstiones  Epicteteae,  by  R.  Asmus, 
1888.  The  above  selection  includes  some  ©f  doubtful  origin  but  intrinsic 
interest. — Crossley, 


(APPENDIX  B) 

THE 

HYMN  OF  CLEANTHES 


Chiefest  glory  of  deathless  Gods,  Almighty  for  ever, 

Sovereign  of   Nature  that  rulest  by  law,  what  Name  shall  we 

give  Thee? — 
Blessed  be  Thou!  for  on  Thee  should  call  all  things  that  are 

mortal. 
For  that  we  are  Thine  offspring;  nay,  all  that  in  myriad  motion 
Lives  for  its  day  on  the  earth  bears  one  impress— Thy  likeness 

— upon  it. 
Wherefore  my  song  is  of  Thee,  and  I  hymn  Thy  power  for  ever. 

Lo,  the  vast  orb  of  the  Worlds,  round  the  Earth  evermore  as 

it  rolleth. 
Feels    Thee    its    Ruler    and    Guide,    and    owns    Thy    lordship 

rejoicing. 
Aye,  for  Thy  conquering  hands  have  a  servant  of  living  fire — 
Sharp  is  the  bolt! — v/here  it  falls.  Nature  shrinks  at  the  shock 

and  doth  shudder. 
Thus  Thou  directest  the  Word  universal  that  pulses  through  all 

things. 
Mingling  its  life  with  Lights  that  are  great  and  Lights  that  are 

lesser. 
E'en  as  beseemeth  its  birth,  High  King  through  ages  unending. 

Nought  Is  done  that  is  done  without  Thee  in  the  earth  or  the 

waters 
Or  in  the  heights  of  heaven,  save  the  deed  of  the  fool  and  the 

sinner. 

185 


186  THE    HYMN   OF    CLEANTHES 

Thou  canst  make  rough  things  smooth;  at  Thy  Voice,  lo,  jarring 

disorder 
Moveth  to  music,  and  Love  is  born  where  hatred  abounded. 
Thus  hast  Thou  fitted  alike  things  good  and  things  evil  together, 
That  over  all  might  reign  one  Reason,  supreme  and  eternal; 
Though  thereunto  the  hearts  of  the  wicked  be  hardened  and 

heedless — 
Woe  unto  them! — for  while  ever  their  hands  are  grasping  at 

good  things. 
Blind  are  their  eyes,  yea,  stopped  are  their  ears  to  God's  Law 

universal. 
Calling  through  wise  obedience  to  live  the  life  that  is  noble. 
This  they  mark  not,  but  heedless  of  right,  turn  each  to  his 

own  way. 
Here,    a   heart    fired   with    ambition,    in    strife   and    straining 

unhallowed ; 
There,  thrusting  honour  aside,  fast  set  upon  getting  and  gaining; 
Others  again  given  over  to  lusts  and  dissolute  softness, 
y/orking  never  God's  Law,  but  that  which  warreth  upon  it. 

Nay,  but,  O  Giver  of  all  things  good,  whose  home  is  the  dark 

cloud. 
Thou  that  wieldest  Heaven's  bolt,  save  men  from  their  ignorance 

grievous ; 
Scatter  its  night  from  their  souls,  and  grant  them  to  come  to 

that  Wisdom 
Wherewithal,  sistered  with  Justice,  Thou  rulest  and  governest 

all  things; 
That  we,  honoured  by  Thee,  may  requite  Thee  with  worship  and 

honour. 
Evermore  praising  thy  works,  as  is  meet  for  men  that  shall 

perish ; 
Seeing  that  none,  be  he  mortal  or  God,  hath  privilege  nobler 
Than  without  stint,  without  stay,  to  extol  Thy  Law  universal. 


INDEX  FOR  REFERENCE 


^cAwsiV^rrEpicteteae  Philosophiae  Monumenta,   Sch-.veighffiuser,  Lips.  1799. 
S'crien^/^Epicteti  Dissertationes,  H.  Schenkl,  Ed.  Minor,  Lips.  (Teubner), 
398. 
/lj«:M5=Qusstiones  Epicteteae,  R.  Asmus,  Friburg,  1888. 


I.  Arrian,  Discourses  i.   16,    15-19 

II.  ih.  ii.  23,  36-39 

III.  ih.  iv.  4,  26 

IV.  ib.  iv.   12,   11-12 

V.  z&.  iii.  22,  29 

VI.  i&.  i.   7,   10 

VII.  i&.  iv.  6,  20 
VIIL  tfe.  i.  2,  11-18 

IX.  j&.  i.  3,   1-6 

X.  Fragment,    quoted   by   M.   Anto- 
ninus, iv.  41;  Schweigh.  clxxvi. 

XI.  Arrian,  Disc.  i.  18,  15 

XII.  ih.  i.  29,  21 

XIII.  ih.  i.  6,  19-22 

XIV.  ih.  i.  6,  23-29 

XV.  ih.  i.  9,  I 

XVI.  ih.  i.  9,  4-7 

XVII.  ih.  i.  9,  10-15 

XVIII.  ih.  i.  9,  16-17 

XIX.  ih.  i.  9,  18-22 

XX.  ih.  i.  6,  37-43     ^ 

XXI.  i&.  i.  9,  22 

XXII.  ih.  i.  17,  27-28 

XXIII.  ih.  i.  s,  3-5 

XXIV.  ih.  i.   10,   I- ID  (abbreviated) 

XXV.  ih.  i.  9,  27-28 

XXVI.  i&.  i.   12,  15-16 

XXVII.  1-&.  iv.  3,  I 

XXVIII.  t&.  i.  12,  1-3 

XXIX.  j&.  i.  12,  7-12 

XXX.  Fragment  (from  "'*  Memoirs 
of  Epict.");  Schweigh.  Ixxii.; 
Schenkl,  16 

XXXI.  Arrian,  Disc.  i.    12,   20-21 

XXXII.  ih.  i.  12,  22-23 

XXXIII.  i&.  i.  12,  26-27 


XXXIV.  ih.  I   13 

XXXV.  Fragment     (Stobs:us), 
Schweigh.   xv. ;    Schenkl,    17 

XXXVI.  Arrian,  Disc.  i.   14,   1-6 

XXXVII.  i&.  i.  14,  12-17 

XXXVIII.  ih.  i.  15,  5 

XXXIX.  ih.  i.  IS,  6-8 
XL.  ih.  i.   19,   19-23 

XLI.     Fragment,      Schweigh.     xlii.; 

Schenkl,   Gn.  Epict.   St  oh.   36 
XLII.i  Arrian,  Disc    i.  19,  24-25 
XLIII.  ih.  i.   19,  26-29 
XLIV.  ib.  i.  24,  20. 
XLV.  ih.  i.  25,   18-22 
XLVI.  ih.  1.  26,    15-16 
XLVII.  ib.  L  26,   17-18 
XLVIII.  ib.  ii.  2,  8-9 
XLIX.  ib.  i.  29,  46-49 
L.  Fragment  (Stobssus);  Schweigh,  vii, 
LI.  Arrian,  Di^c.  i.   30,   1-4 
LII.  ih.  i.  29,   16-18 
LIII.  ib.  iii.   i,  36-38 
LIV.  ib.  ii.  2,  17 
LV.  ib.  ii.   I,  8  and  13 
LVI.  i&.  ii.  5,  24-29 
LVII.  ih.  ii.  3,  1-2 
LVIII.  2&.   ii.   7,    10-14 
LIX.  {&.  ii.  8,  1-3 
LX.  t&.  ii.  8,  9-14 
LXI.  i&.  ii.  8,  15-23  and  27-28 
LXII.      Fragment       (Stobsus) ; 

Schweigh.    Ivii. 
LXIII.  ib.  ii.   12,  3-4 
LXIV.  ib.  ii.  12,  14-25 
LXV.     Fragment;     Schweigh,     clxr. 

(v.  Asmus,  p.  20) 


187 


INDEX   FOR   REFERENCE 


LXVI.  Arrian,  Disc.  ii.  14,  10-13 

LXVII.   ib.   ii.    14,    19-23 

LXVIII.  ib.   ii.    14,   23-29 

LXIX.  ib.    ii.    15,    13-14 

LXX.    ib.    ii.    165    32-34 

LXXI.   ib.   ii.    16,   41-47 

LXXII.    ib.    ii.    17,    i 

LXXIII.  ib.  ii.    17,  29-33 

LXXIV.  Fragment  (M.  Antoninus) ; 
Schweigh.    clxxviii. ;    SchenkI,    28 

LXXV.    Arrian,    Disc.    ii.    18,    5-12 

LXX VI.  ib.  ii.  18,   19 

LXX VII,  ib.  ii.   18,  27-29 

LXX VIII.  ib.  ii.   19,   23-28 

LXXIX.   Manual,   37 

LXXX.  Arrian,  Disc.   ii.   21,    11-16 

LXXXI.  i&.  ii.   24   (abbreviated) 

LXXXIL  ib.  ii.  22,  24-27,  and  29-30 

LXXXIII.    ib.    iii.    22,    105 

LXXXI V.  ib.  iii.   5,  /-n 

LXXXV.  ib.  iii.  5,  16-18  (abbrevi- 
ated) 

LXXXVL    ib.    iii.    7,    27-28 

LXXXVII,   ib.   iii.    3,    i 

LXXXVIII.  Fragment  (Stobssus) ; 
Schweigh.    Ixvii. ;    SchenkI,    5 

LXXXIX.  Arrian,  Disc,   iii,   3,   3-4 

XC.   ib.  iii.  6,   8 

XCI.   ib.  iii.   7,   30-36    (abbreviated) 

XCII.   ib.  iii.   8,    5-6 

XCIII.  ib.  iii.  9,   1-14   (abbreviated) 

XCIV.  lb.  iii.  9,   16-18 

XCV.   it',   iii.   9,   21-22 

XCVI.  Fragment  (Stobseus) ; 
Schweigh.    Ixviii. 

XCVII.  Arrian,  Disc.   iii.    10,    19-20 

XCVIII.   ib.   iii.   13,  6-8 

XCIX.  ib.   iii.    16,    1-3 

C.  ib.   iii.    12,    16-17 

CI.   ib.    iii.    13,   21 

CII.  ib.  iii.   13,  23 

cm.    ib.   iii.    14,    1-3 

CIV.   ib.   iii.    15,   2-7   and  g-f2 

CV.   i&.   iii.    19,   6 

CVI.  *&.  iii.  20,   9-12    (abbreviated) 

CVII.  ih.   iii.    16,   9-10 

CVIII.   t&.  iii    21,  17-20 

CIX.    *■&.    iii.    21,    23 

ex.   z&.    iii.   22,    1-8 

C^.  j&.  iii.  a  J,  14-1^ 


CXII.   t&.   iii.  22,  21 

CXIII.    ib.    iii.    22,    23-2^, 

CXIV.  ib.  iii.  22,  45-49 

CXV.   t&.  iii.  22,   53 

CXVI.  i&.   iii.   22,   67-69 

CXVII.  ib.  iii.  22,  83-85 

CXVIII.  ib.   iii.   22,  86-89 

CXIX.   iJ'.   iii.    22,    94-96 

CXX.   i&.    iii.    23,   27-28 

CXXI.   ib.  iii.   23,   30-32 

CXXII.   ib.    iii.    24,   2 

CXXIII.  ib.   iii.   24,   9-1 1 

CXXIV.   ib.   iii.    24,    15-16 

CXXV.  ib.  iii.   24,   31-32   and   34-35 

CXX VI.   ib.   iii.   24,    50-53    (abbrevi- 
ated) 

CXXVII.  ib.  iii.  24,  63 

CXXVIII.  ib.   iii.   24,   64 

CXXIX.  ib.   iii.  24,  83 

CXXX.    ib.    iii.    24,    86    and    89-94 
(abbreviated) 

CXXXI.   ib.   iii.   24,    95-98 

CXXXII.    ib.   iii,    24,    99-101 

CXXXIII.   ib.   iii.    24,    109-110 

CXXXIV.   ib.   iii.   26,  28-30 

CXXXV.   ib.  iii.   26,   38-39 

CXXX VI.   ib.   iv.    I,    1-3 

CXXXVII.  ib.   iv.    I,   91-98 

CXXXVIIL    ib.    iv.    I,    99-100 

CXXXIX.  ib.  iv.  I,   103-106 

CXL.  {b.  iv.    I,   106-109 

CXLI.   ib.   iv.    I,    151-155 

CXLII.   ib.   iv.    I,    170-173 

CXLIII.    Fragment    (Antonius    Mo- 
nachus) ;    Schweigh.    cxxx. 

CXLIV.  Arrian,  Disc.  iv.   3,  9-12 

CXLV.    ib.   iv.    4,    1-5 

CXLVI,  ib.  iv.  4,  46-47 

CXLVII.  «•&.   iv.   4,  47-48 

CXLVIIL   «■&.   iv.    5,   34-35 

CXLIX.  Fragment:  Schweigh. 
xxxix,;  SchenkI,  Gn.  Epict.  Stoh 
29 

CL.  Arrian,  Disc.   iv.   6,  24 

CLI.  *&.   iv.   7,   6-1 1 

CLII.  »&.  iv.  7,  19-20 

CLIII.  •:&.  iii.   S»   I4 

CLIV.    t&.    iv.    8,    16-30 

CLV.    ib.    iv.    8,    35-37 

GLVL  »&.  iv.  9>  14-1S 


INDEX  FOR  REFERENCE 


189 


CLVII.  Arrian,  Disc.  i.  23,  1-2 

CLVIII.   Manual,  xiii. 

CLIX.  ih.  XV. 

CLX.  ih.  xvii. 

CLXI.  ih.  xxi. 

CLXII.  ih.  xxvii. 

CLXIII.  ih.  xxxi. 

CLXIV.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXV.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLX VI.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXVII,  i&.  xxxiii. 

CLXVIII.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXIX.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXX.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXXI.  ih.  xxxiii. 

CLXXII.  ih.  XXXV. 

CLXXIII.  ih.  xli. 

CLXXIV.  ifc.  xliii. 

CLXXV.  ib.  xlvi. 


f  CLXXVI.  ih.  xlvii. 
CLXXVII.  f&.  xlix. 
CLXX  VIII.     Fragment;     Sch  weigh. 

xxxi.;    Schenkl,    Gn.   Epict.    Stob. 

20 
CLXXIX.  ib.  xxxiii.  and  23 
CLXXX.  ih.  xxxiv.  and  24 
CLXXXI,    ih.    attributed    to    Epict. 

by    Maximus;     Schweigh.     clxxiii. 

(v.    Asmus,    p.    20) 
CLXXXII.   ih.;    Schweigh.    clxxii. 
CLXXXIII.     ih.     (Aulus     Gellius); 

Schweigh.   clxxix. ;    Schenkl,    10 
CLXXXIV.  Manual,  lii. 
CLXXXV.  Arrian,  Disc.  ii.  6,  26 
CLXXXVI.  ih.  ii.  5,  9-13 
CLXXXVII.  ih.  i.  24,  3-9 
CLXXXVIII.  ib.  iii.  13,  12-16 
CLXXXIX.  ib.  iv.  10,  12-17 


INDEX  FOR  REFERENCE 
TO  APPENDIX  A 


I.  Schweigh.  Fragment,  i;  Schenkl, 
Gn.  Epict.  Stoh.  i. 

II.  ih.  2 — ib.  2 

III.  Schweigh.   12;   Schenkl,  22 

IV.  ib.  103 

V.  ib.  141 

VI.  ib.  142 

VII.  ih.  60;  Schenkl,  50 

VIII.  ih.  65;  ib.  55 

IX.  ib.  96  ♦ 

X.  ib.  9;  ih.  32 

XI.  t&.     54;     Schenkl,     Fragment, 
xxxiii. 

XII.  ib.  55 ;  ib.  xxkxVo 


XIII.  Schweigh.   104 

XIV.  ib.    5;    Schenkl,    Gn.    Epict. 
Stob.   5 

XV.  ih.  114;  Schenkl,  Fragment,  xxxv. 

XVI.  ih.  89;  ib.  XXX. 

XVII.  ih.   138 

XVIII.  ib.   13;  Schenkl,  G>i.  £/>»<:*, 
Stoh.  46 

XIX.  ife.   119 

XX.  ib.  144 

XXI.  i&.   118 

XXII.  ib.  88;  Schenkl,  ib.  67 

XXIII.  j&.  156 

XXIV.  ib.  120 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF 
MARCUS  AURELIUS 


TRANSLATED    BY 

GEORGE   LONG,  M. 


INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 

Marcus  Annius  Verus  was  horn  in  Rome,  A.  D.  121,  and  as- 
sumed the  name  of  Marcm  Aurelius  Antoninus,  by  which  he  is 
known  to  history,  on  his  adoption  by  the  Emperor  T.  Aurelius 
Antoninus.  He  succeeded  to  the  imperial  throne  in  161,  and  ruled 
till  his  death  in  180.  His  reign,  though  marked  by  justice  and 
moderation  at  home,  was  troubled  by  constant  warfare  on  the 
frontier's  of  the  Empire,  and  Aurelius  spent  much  of  his  later 
years  in  the  uncongenial  task  of  commanding  armies  that  no 
longer  proved  irresistible  agaitvst  the  barbarian  hordes. 

M.  Aurelius  was  educated  by  the  orator  Pronto,  but  turned 
aside  from  rhetoric  to  the  study  of  the  Stoic  philosophy,  of  which 
he  was  the  last  distinguished  representative.  The  "Meditations," 
which  he  wrote  in  Greek,  are  among  the  most  noteworthy  ex- 
pressions of  this  system,  and  exhibit  it  favorably  on  its  practical 
side.  His  own  precepts  he  carried  out  with  singular  consistency ; 
and  both  in  his  public  and  his  private  life  he  was  in  the  highest 
degree  conscientious.  He  and  his  predecessor  are  noted  as  the 
only  Roman  emperors  who  can  be  said  to  have  ruled  with  a  single 
eye  to  the  welfare  of  their  subjects. 

During  his  reign  Rome  was  visited  by  a  severe  pestilence,  and 
this,  with  reverses  suffered  by  his  armies,  threw  the  populace  into 
a  panic,  and  led  them  to  demand  the  sacrifice  of  the  Christians, 
whom  they  regarded  as  having  brought  down  the  anger  of  the 
gods.  Aurelius  seems  to  have  shared  the  panic;  and  his  record 
is  stained  by  his  sanction  of  a  cruel  persecution.  This  incident 
in  the  career  of  the  last,  and  one  of  the  loftiest,  of  the  pagan  mor- 
alists may  be  regarded  as  symbolic  of  the  dying  effort  of  heath- 
enism to  check  the  advancing  tide  of  Christianity. 

The  ''Meditations"  picture  with  faithfulness  the  mind  and 
character  of  this  noblest  of  the  Emperors.  Simple  in  style  and 
sincere  in  tone,  they  record  for  all  time  the  height  reached  by 
pagan  aspiration  in  its  effort  to  solve  the  problem  of  conduct; 
and  the  essential  agreement  of  his  practice  with  his  teaching 
proved  that  "Even  in  a  palace  life  may  be  led  well" 


THE  MEDITATIONS  C 
MARCUS    AURELIUS 
ANTONINUS 


[ROM  my  grandfather  Verus  [I  learned]  good  morals 
and  the  government  of  my  temper. 
2.  From    the    reputation    and    remembrance    of    my 
father,  modesty  and  a  manly  character. 

3.  From  my  m.other,  piety  and  beneficence,  and  abstinence, 
not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but  even  from  evil  thoughts;  and 
further  simplicity  in  my  way  of  living,  far  removed  from 
the  habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather,  not  to  have  frequented 
public  schools,  and  to  have  had  good  teachers  at  home,  and 
to  know  that  on  such  things  a  man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the  green  nor  of 
the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the  Circus,  nor  a  partizan 
either  of  the  Parmularius  or  the  Scutarius  at  the  gladiators' 
fights;  from  him  too  I  learned  endurance  of  labor,  and  to 
want  little,  and  to  work  with  my  own  hands,  and  not 
to  meddle  with  other  people's  affairs,  and  not  to  be  ready  to 
listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,  not  to  busy  myself  about  trifling 
things,  and  noc  to  give  credit  to  what  was  said  by  miracle- 
workers  and  jugglers  about  incantations  and  the  driving 
away  of  daemons  and  such  things;  and  not  to  breed  quails 
[for  fighting],  nor  to  give  myself  up  passionately  to  such 
things;  and  to  endure  freedom  of  speech;  and  to  have  be- 
come intimate  with  philosophy;  and  to  have  been  a  hearer, 
first  of  Bacchius,  then  of  Tandasis  and  Marcianus;  and  to 

193 
y  HC— Vol.  2 


194     THE   MEDITATIONS    OF    MARCUS   AURELIUS 

have  written  dialogues  in  my  youth;  and  to  have  desired  a 
plank  bed  and  skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  belongs 
to  the  Grecian  discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus  I  received  the  impression  that  my 
character  required  improvement  and  discipline;  and  from 
him  I  learned  not  to  be  led  astray  to  sophistic  emulation,  nor 
to  writing  on  speculative  matters,  nor  to  delivering  little 
hortatory  orations,  nor  to  showing  myself  off  as  a  man  who 
practises  much  discipline,  or  does  benevolent  acts  in  order 
to  make  a  display ;  and  to  abstain  from  rhetoric,  and  poetry, 
and  fine  writing;  and  not  to  walk  about  in  the  house  in 
my  outdoor  dress,  nor  to  do  other  things  of  the  kind;  and 
to  write  my  letters  with  simplicity,  like  the  letter  which 
Rusticus  wrote  from  Sinuessa  to  my  mother;  and  with  re- 
spect to  those  v^^ho  have  offended  me  by  words,  or  done  me 
wrong,  to  be  easily  disposed  to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as 
soon  as  they  have  shown  a  readiness  to  be  reconciled;  and 
to  read  carefully,  and  not  to  be  satisfied  with  a  superficial 
understanding  of  a  book;  nor  hastily  to  give  my  assent  to 
those  who  talk  overmuch;  and  I  am  indebted  to  him  for 
being  acquainted  with  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  which  he 
communicated  to  me  out  of  his  ov/n  collection. 

8.  From  Apollonius  I  learned  freedom  of  will  and  undevi- 
ating  steadiness  of  purpose;  and  to  look  to  nothing  else,  not 
even  for  a  moment,  except  to  reason;  and  to  be  always  the 
same,  in  sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of  the  loss  of  a  child, 
and  in  long  illness;  and  to  see  clearly  in  a  living  example 
that  the  same  man  can  be  both  most  resolute  and  yielding, 
and  not  peevish  in  giving  his  instruction;  and  to  have  had 
before  my  eyes  a  man  who  clearly  considered  his  experience 
and  his  skill  in  expounding  philosophical  principles  as  the 
smallest  of  his  merits;  and  from  him  I  learned  how  to  re- 
ceive from  friends  what  are  esteemed  favors,  without  being 
either  humbled  by  them  or  letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

9.  From  Sextus,  a  benevolent  disposition,  and  the  example 
of  a  family  governed  in  a  fatherly  manner,  and  the  idea  of 
living  conformably  to  nature;  and  gravity  without  affecta- 
tion, and  to  look  carefully  after  the  interests  of  friends,  and 
to  tolerate  ignorant  persons,  and  those  who  form  opinions 
without  consideration:  he  had  the  power  of  readily  accom- 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      195 

modating  himself  to  all,  so  that  intercourse  with  him  was 
more  agreeable  than  any  flattery ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  v/as 
most  highly  venerated  by  those  who  associated  with  him; 
and  he  had  the  faculty  both  of  discovering  and  ordering,  in 
an  intelligent  and  methodical  way,  the  principles  necessary 
for  life;  and  he  never  showed  anger  or  any  other  passion, 
but  was  entirely  free  from  passion,  and  also  most  affection- 
ate; and  he  could  express  approbation  without  noisy  display, 
and  he  possessed  much  knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander,  the^  grammarian,  to  refrain  from 
fault-finding,  and  not  in  a  reproachful  way  to  chide  those 
who  uttered  any  barbarous  or  solecistic  or  strange-sounding 
expression ;  but  dexterously  to  introduce  the  very  expression 
which  ought  to  have  been  used,  and  in  the  way  of  answer 
or  giving  confirm.ation,  or  joining  in  an  inquiry  about  the 
thing  itself,  not  about  the  word,  or  by  some  other  fit  sug- 
gestion. 

11.  From  Fronto  I  learned  to  observe  what  envy  and 
duplicity  and  hypocrisy  are  in  a  tyrant,  and  that  generally 
those  among  us  who  are  called  Patricians  are  rather  de- 
ficient in  paternal  affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  frequently  nor 
without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one,  or  to  write  in  a  letter, 
that  I  have  no  leisure;  nor  continually  to  excuse  the  neglect 
of  duties  required  by  our  relation  to  those  with  whom  we 
live,  by  alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,  not  to  be  indifferent  when  a  friend 
finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find  fault  without  reason,  but 
to  try  to  restore  him  to  his  usual  disposition ;  and  to  be  ready 
to  speak  well  of  teachers,  as  it  is  reported  of  Domitius  and 
Athenodotus;  and  to  love  my  children  truly. 

14.  From  my  brother  Severus,  to  love  my  kin,  and  to 
love  truth,  and  to  love  justice;  and  through  him  I  learned  to 
know  Thrasea,  Helvidius,  Cato,  Dion,  Brutus;  and  from  him 
I  received  the  idea  of  a  polity  in  which  there  is  the  same 
law  for  all,  a  polity  administered  with  regard  to  equal  rights 
and  equal  freedom  of  speech,  and  the  idea  of  a  kingly  gov- 
ernment which  respects  most  of  all  the  freedom  of  the 
governed;  I  learned  from  him  also  consistency  and  un- 
deviating  steadiness  in  my  regard  for  philosophy,   and  a 


188      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

disposition  to  do  good,  and  to  give  to  others  readily,  and 
to  cherish  good  hopes,  and  to  beheve  that  I  am  loved  by  my 
friends;  and  in  him  I  observed  no  concealment  of  his  opin- 
ions with  respect  to  those  whom  he  condemned,  and  that 
his  friends  had  no  need  to  conjecture  what  he  wished  or  did 
not  wish,  but  it  was  quite  plain. 

15.  From  Maximus  I  learned  self-government,  and  not  to 
be  led  aside  by  anything;  and  cheerfulness  in  all  circum- 
stances, as  well  as  in  illness;  and  a  just  admixture  in  the 
moral  character  of  sweetness  and  dignity,  and  to  do  what 
was  set  before  me  without  complaining.  I  observed  that 
everybody  believed  that  he  thought  as  he  spoke,  and  that 
in  all  that  he  did  he  never  had  any  bad  intention;  and  he 
never  showed  amazement  and  surprise,  and  was  never  in  a 
hurry,  and  never  put  off  doing  a  thing,  nor  was  perplexed 
nor  dejected,  nor  did  he  ever  laugh  to  disguise  his  vexation, 
nor,  on  the  other  hand,  was  he  ever  passionate  or  suspicious. 
He  was  accustomed  to  do  acts  of  beneficence,  and  was  ready 
to  forgive,  and  was  free  from  all  falsehood;  and  he  pre- 
sented the  appearance  of  a  man  who  could  not  be  diverted 
from  right  rather  than  of  a  man  who  had  been  improved.  I 
observed,  too,  that  no  man  could  ever  think  that  he  was 
despised  by  Maximus,  or  ever  venture  to  think  himself  a 
better  man.  He  had  also  the  art  of  being  humorous  in  an 
agreeable  v/ay. 

16.  In  my  father  I  observed  mildness  of  temper,  and  un- 
changeable resolution  in  the  things  which  he  had  deter- 
mined after  due  deliberation;  and  no  vainglory  in  those 
things  which  men  call  honors ;  and  a  love  of  labor  and  per- 
severance; and  a  readiness  to  listen  to  those  who  had  any- 
thing to  propose  for  the  common  weal;  and  undeviating 
firmness  in  giving  to  every  man  according  to  his  deserts; 
and  a  knowledge  derived  from  experience  of  the  occasions 
for  vigorous  action  and  for  remission.  And  I  observed  that 
he  had  overcome  all  passion  for  joys;  and  he  considered 
himself  no  more  than  any  other  citizen,  and  he  released  his 
friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him  or.  to  attend  him 
of  a  necessity  when  he  went  abroad,  and  those  who  failed 
to  accompany  him  by  reason  of  any  urgent  circumstances, 
always  found  him  the  same.     I  observed,  too,  his  habit  of 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OP   MARCUS   AURELIUS    197 

fcareful  inquiry  in  all  matters  of  deliberation,  and  his  per- 
sistency, and  that  he  never  stopped  his  investigation  through 
being  satisfied  with  appearances  which  first  present  them- 
selves; and  that  his  disposition  was  to  keep  his  friends, 
and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of  them,  nor  yet  to  be  extravagant 
in  his  affection;  and  to  be  satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and 
cheerful ;  and  to  foresee  things  a  long  way  off,  and  to  provide 
for  the  smallest  without  display;  and  to  check  immediately 
popular  applause  and  flattery,  and  to  be  ever  watchful  over 
the  things  which  were  necessary  for  the  administration  of  the 
empire,  and  to  be  a  good  manager  of  the  expenditure,  and 
patiently  to  endure  the  blame  which  he  got  for  such  conduct ; 
and  he  was  neither  superstitious  with  respect  to  the  gods, 
nor  did  he  court  men  by  gifts  or  by  trying  to  please  them, 
or  by  flattering  the  populace,;  but  he  showed  sobriety  in  all 
things  and  firmness,  and  never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action, 
nor  love  of  novelty.  And  the  things  which  conduce  in  any 
way  to  the  commodity  of  life,  and  of  which  fortune  gives 
ian  abundant  supply,  he  used  without  arrogance  and  without 
excusing  himself;  so  that  when  he  had  them,  he  enjoyed 
them  without  affectation,  and  wh«n  he  had  them  not  he 
did  not  want  them.  No  one  could  ever  say  of  him  that  he 
was  either  a  sophist  or  a  [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a 
pedant;  but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be  a  m.an  ripe, 
perfect,  above  flattery,  able  to  manage  his  own  and  other 
men's  affairs.  Besides  this,  he  honored  those  v/ho  were 
true  philosophers,  and  he  did  not  reproach  those  who  pre- 
tended to  be  philosophers,  nor  yet  was  he  easily  led  by  them. 
He  was  also  easy  in  conversation,  and  he  made  himself 
agreeable  without  any  offensive  affectation.  He  took  a 
reasonable  care  of  his  body's  health,  not  as  one  who  was 
greatly  attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  regard  to  personal  ap- 
pearance, nor  yet  in  a  careless  way,  but  so  that,  through 
his  own  attention,  he  very  seldom  stood  in  need  of  the 
physician's  art  or  of  medicine  or  external  applications.  He 
was  most  ready  to  give  way  without  envy  to  those  v/ho 
possessed  any  particular  faculty,  such  as  that  of  eloquence 
or  knowledge  of  the  law  or  of  morals,  or  of  anything  else; 
and  he  gave  them  his  help,  that  each  might  enjoy  reputation 
according  to  his  deserts;  a,nd  he  always  acted  conformably 


298     THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

to  the  institutions  of  his  country,  without  showing  any  affec- 
tation of  doing  so.  Further,  he  was  not  fond  of  change, 
nor  unsteady,  but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same  places,  and 
to  employ  himself  about  the  same  things;  and  after  his 
paroxysms  of  headache  he  came  immediately  fresh  and 
vigorous  to  his  usual  occupations.  His  secrets  were  not 
many,  but  very  few  and  very  rare,  and  these  only  about 
public  matters;  and  he  showed  prudence  and  economy  in 
the  exhibition  of  the  public  spectacles  and  the  construction 
of  public  buildings,  his  donations  to  the  people,  and  in  such 
things,  for  he  was  a  man  who  looked  to  what  ought  to  be 
done,  not  to  the  reputation  which  is  got  by  a  man's  acts.  He 
did  not  take  the  bath  at  unseasonable  hours;  he  was  not 
fond  of  building  houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he  eat,  nor 
about  the  texture  and  colour  of  his  clothes,  nor  about  the 
beauty  of  his  slaves.  His  dress  came  from  Lorium,  his 
villa  on  the  coast,  and  from  Lanuvium  generally.  We  know 
how  he  behaved  to  the  toll-collector  at  Tusculum  who  asked 
his  pardon;  and  such  was  all  his  behaviour.  There  was  in 
him  nothing  harsh,  nor  implacable,  nor  violent,  nor,  as  one 
may  say,  anything  carried  to  the  sweating  point:  but  he 
examined  all  things  severally  as  if  he  had  abundance  of 
time,  and  without  confusion,  in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously 
and  consistently.  And  that  might  be  applied  to  him  which 
is  recorded  of  Socrates,  that  he  was  able  both  to  abstain 
from,  and  to  enjoy,  those  things  which  many  are  too  weak 
to  abstain  from,  and  cannot  enjoy  without  excess.  But  to 
be  strong  enough  both  to  bear  the  one  and  to  be  sober  in 
the  other  is  the  mark  of  a  man  who  has  a  perfect  and  in- 
vincible soul,  such  as  he  showed  in  the  illness  of  Maxim.us. 
17.  To  the  gods  I  am  indebted  for  having  good  grand- 
fathers, good  parents,  a  good  sister,  good  teachers,  good 
associates,  good  kinsmen  and  friends,  nearty  everything 
good.  Further,  I  owe  it  to  the  gods  that  I  was  not  hurried 
into  any  oifence  against  any  of  them,  though  I  had  a  dis- 
position which,  if  opportunity  had  offered,  might  have  led 
me  to  do  something  of  this  kind ;  but,  through  their  favour, 
there  never  was  such  a  concurrence  of  circumstances  as  put 
me  to  the  trial.  Further,  I  am  thankful  to  the  gods  that  I 
was  not  longer  brought  up  with  my  grandfather's  concubine, 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

and  that  I  preserved  the  fiower  of  my  youth,  and  that  I  did 
not  make  proof  of  my  virility  before  the  proper  season,  but 
even  deferred  the  time;  that  I  was  subjected  to  a  ruler 
and  a  father  who  was  able  to  take  away  all  pride  from  me, 
and  to  bring  me  to  the  knowledge  that  it  is  possible  for  a 
man  to  live  in  a  palace  without  wanting  either  guards  or  em- 
broidered dresses,  or  torches  and  statues,  and  such-like 
show;  but  it  is  in  such  a  man's  power  to  bring  himself  very 
near  to  the  fashion  of  a  private  person,  without  being  for 
this  reason  either  meaner  in  thought,  or  more  remiss  in 
action,  with  respect  to  the  things  which  must  be  done  for 
the  public  interest  in  a  m.anner  that  befits  a  ruler.  I  thank 
the  gods  for  giving  me  such  a  brother,  v/lio  was  able  by 
his  moral  character  to  rouse  me  to  vigilance  over  myself, 
and  who,  at  the  same  time,  pleased  me  by  his  respect  and 
affection;  that  my  children  have  not  been  stupid  nor  dc 
formed  in  body;  that  I  did  not  make  more  proficiency  in 
rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other  studies,  in  which  I  should 
perhaps  have  been  completely  engaged,  if  I  had  seen  that 
I  was  making  progress  in  them;  that  I  made  haste  to  place 
those  who  brought  me  up  in  the  station  of  honour,  which 
they  seemed  to  desire  without  putting  them  off  with  hope 
of  my  doing  it  some  time  after,  because  they  were  then  still 
young;  that  I  knew  Apollonius,  Rusticus,  Maximus;  that  I 
received  clear  and  frequent  impressions  about  living  accord- 
ing to  nature,  and  what  kind  of  a  life  that  is,  so  that,  so  far 
as  depended  on  the  gods,  and  their  gifts  and  help,  and  in- 
spirations, nothing  hindered  me  from  forthwith  living  ac- 
cording to  nature,  though  I  still  fall  short  of  it  through  my 
own  fault,  and  though  not  observing  the  admonitions  of  the 
gods,  and,  I  may  almost  say,  their  direct  instructions;  that 
my  body  has  held  out  so  long  in  such  a  kind  of  life;  that 
I  never  touched  either  Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  and  that, 
after  having  fallen  into  amatory  passions,  I  was  cured ;  and, 
though  I  was  often  out  of  humor  v/ith  Rusticus,  I  never 
did  anything  of  which  I  had  occasion  to  repent;  that,  though 
it  was  my  mother's  fate  to  die  young,  she  spent  the  last 
years  of  her  life  with  me;  that  whenever  I  wished  to  help 
any  man  in  his  need,  or  on  any  other  occasion,  I  v/as  never 
toid  that  I  had  not  the  means  of  doing  it;  and  that  to  myself 


200      THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

the  same  necessity  never  happened,  to  receive  any  thing 
from  another;  that  I  have  such  a  wife,  so  obedient,  and 
so  affectionate,  and  so  simple;  that  I  had  abundance  of 
good  masters  for  my  children;  and  that  rem.edies  have  been 
shown  to  me  by  dreams,  both  others,  and  against  blood- 
spitting  and  giddiness;  ....  and  that,  when  I  had  an 
inclination  to  philosophy  I  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  any 
sophist,  and  that  I  did  not  waste  my  time  on  writers  [of 
histories],  or  in  the  resolution  of  syllogisms,  or  occupy  my- 
self about  the  investigation  of  appearances  in  the  heavens; 
for  all  these  things  require  the  help  of  the  gods  and  fortune. 
Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua. 


II 

EGIN  the  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I  shall  meet 
with  the  busybody,  the  ungrateful,  arrogant,  deceitful, 
envious,  unsocial.  AH  these  things  happen  to  them 
by  reason  of  their  ignorance  of  what  is  good  and  evil.  But 
I  who  have  seen  the  nature  of  the  good  that  it  is  beautiful 
and  of  the  bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and  the  nature  of  him  who 
does  wrong,  that  it  is  akin  to  me,  not  [only]  of  the  same 
blood  or  seed,  but  that  it  participates  in  [the  same]  intelli- 
gence and  [the  same]  portion  of  the  divinity,  I  can  neither 
be  injured  by  any  of  them,  for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what 
is  ugly,  nor  can  I  be  angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him. 
For  we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like 
eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act 
against  one  another  then  is  contrary  to  nature;  and  it  is 
acting  against  one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I  am,  it  is  a  little  flesh  and  breath, 
and  the  ruling  part.  Throw  away  thy  books;  no  longer 
distract  thyself:  it  is  not  allowed;  but  as  if  thou  wast  now 
dying,  despise  the  flesh,  it  is  blood  and  bones  and  a  network, 
a  contexture  of  nerves,  veins  and  arteries.  See  the  breath 
also,  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is ;  air,  and  not  always  the  same, 
l)ut  every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked  in.  The  third 
then  is  the  ruling  part :  consider  thus :  Thou  art  an  old  man ; 
no  longer  let  this  be  a  slave,  no  longer  be  pulled  by  the 


THE   MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS      201 

Strings  like  a  puppet  to  unsocial  movements,  no  longer  be 
either  dissatisfied  with  thy  present  lot,  or  shrink  from  the 
future. 

3.  Ail  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  providence.  That 
which  is  from  fortune  is  not  separated  from  nature  or  with- 
out an  interweaving  and  involution  with  the  things  which 
are  ordered  by  Providence.  From  thence  all  things  flow; 
and  there  is  besides  necessity,  and  that  which  is  for  the 
advantage  of  the  whole  universe,  of  which  thou  art  a  part. 
But  that  is  good  for  every  part  of  nature  which  the  nature 
of  the  whole  brings,  and  what  serves  to  maintain  this  nature. 
Now  the  universe  is  preserved,  as  by  the  changes  of  the 
elements  so  by  the  changes  of  things  compounded  of  the 
elements.  Let  these  principles  be  enough  for  thee;  let  them 
always  be  fixed  opinions.  But  cast  away  the  thirst  after 
books,  that  thou  miayest  not  die  murmuring,  but  cheerfully, 
truly,  and  from  thy  heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  putting  of?  these 
things,  and  how  often  thou  hast  received  an  opportunity  from 
the  gods,  and  yet  dost  not  use  it.  Thou  must  now  at  last 
perceive  of  what  universe  thou  art  a  part,  and  of  what 
administrator  of  the  universe  thy  existence  is  an  efflux,  and 
that  a  limit  of  time  is  fixed  for  thee,  which  if  thou  dost  not 
use  for  clearing  away  the  clouds  from  thy  mind,  it  will  go 
and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  never  return. 

5.  Every  moment  think  steadily  as  a  Roman  and  a  man 
to  do  what  thou  hast  in  hand  with  perfect  and  simple  dig- 
nity, and  feeling  of  affection,  and  freedom,  and  justice; 
and  to  give  thyself  relief  from  all  other  thoughts.  And  thou 
wilt  give  thyself  relief,  if  thou  doest  every  act  of  thy  life 
as  if  it  were  the  last,  laying  aside  all  carelessness  and  pas- 
sionate aversion  from  the  commands  of  reason,  and  all 
hypocrisy,  and  self-love,  and  discontent  with  the  portion 
which  has  been  given  to  thee.  Thou  seest  how  few  the 
things  are,  the  which  if  a  man  lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to 
live  a  life  which  flows  in  quiet,  and  is  like  the  existence 
of  the  gods;  for  the  gods  on  their  part  will  require  nothing 
more  from  him  who  observes  these  things. 

6.  Do  wrong  to  thj'-self,  do  wrong  to  thyself,  my  soul; 
but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the  opportunity  of  honouring 


202       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

thyself.  Every  man's  life  is  sufficient.  But  thine  is  nearly 
finished,  though  thy  soul  reverences  not  itself,  but  places  thy 
felicity  in  the  souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon  thee  distract 
thee?  Give  thyself  time  to  learn  something  new  and  good, 
and  cease  to  be  whirled  around.  But  then  thou  must  also 
avoid  being  carried  about  the  other  way.  For  those  too  are 
trifiers  who  have  wearied  themselves  in  life  by  their  activity, 
and  yet  have  no  object  to  which  to  direct  every  movement, 
and,  in  a  word,  all  their  thoughts. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  the  mind  of  another 
a  man  has  seldom  been  seen  to  be  unhappy;  but  those  who 
do  not  observe  the  movements  of  their  own  mands  must  of 
necessity  be  unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind,  what  is  the  nature 
of  the  whole,  and  what  is  my  nature,  and  how  this  is  related 

'to  that,  and  what  kind  of  a  part  it  is  of  what  kind  of  a 
whole;  and  that  there  is  no  one  who  hinders  thee  from 
always  doing  and  saying  the  things  which  are  according  to 
the  nature  of  which  thou  art  a  part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad  acts — such  a 
comparison  as  one  would  make  in  accordance  with  the  com- 
mon notions  of  mankind — says,  like  a  true  philosopher,  that 
the  offences  which  are  committed  through  desire  are  more 
blamable  than  those  which  are  committed  through  anger. 
For  he  who  is  excited  by  anger  seems  to  turn  away  from 
reason  with  a  certain  pain  and  unconscious  contraction; 
but  he  who  offends  through  desire,  being  overpowered  by 
pleasure,  seems  to  be  in  a  manner  more  intemperate  and 
more  v/omanish  in  his  oft'ences.  Rightly  then,  and  in  a 
way  worthy  of  philosophy,  he  said  that  the  offence  which  is 
committed  with  pleasure  is  more  blamable  than  that  which 
is  committed  with  pain;  and  on  the  whole  the  one  is  more 
like  a  person  who  has  been  first  wronged  and  through  pain 
is  compelled  to  be  a-ngry ;  but  the  other  is  moved  by  his  own 
impulse  to  do  v/rong,  being  carried  toward  doing  something 
by  desire. 

11.  Since  it  is  possible  that  thou  mayest  depart  from  life 
this  very  moment,  regulate  every  act  and  thought  accord- 
ingly.   But  to  go  away  from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods. 


THE  MEDITATIONS   OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       203 

Is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  involve 
thee  in  evil ;  Uut  if  indeed  they  do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have 
no  concern  about  human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in 
a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence?  But  in 
truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for  human  things,  and 
they  have  put  all  the  m^eans  in  man's  power  to  enable  him 
not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was 
anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided  for  this  also,  that 
it  should  be  altogether  in  a  m.an's  povv^er  not  to  fall  into 
it.  Now,  that  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse,  how  can 
it  make  a  man's  life  worse  ?  But  neither  through  ignorance, 
nor  having  the  knowledge,  but  not  the  power  to  guard 
against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the  nature 
of  the  universe  has  overlooked  them;  nor  is  it  possible  that 
it  has  made  so  great  a  mistake,  either  through  want  of 
power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen 
indiscriminately  to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death  cer- 
tainly, and  life,  honour  and  dishonour,  pain  and  pleasure,  all 
these  things  equally  happen  to  good  men  and  bad,  being 
things  which  make  us  neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore 
they  are  neither  good  nor  evil. 

12.  How  quickly  all  these  things  disappear,  in  the  universe 
the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time  the  rem.embrance  of  them ; 
what  is  the  nature  of  all  sensible  things,  and  particularly 
those  v/hich  attract  with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify  by 
pain,  or  are  noised  about  by  vapory  fame;  how  worthless, 
and  contemptible,  and  sordid  and  perishable,  and  dead  they 
are — all  this  it  is  the  part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to  ob- 
serve. To  observe  too  v/ho  these  are  whose  opinions  and 
voices  give  reputation;  what  death  is,  and  the  fact  that,  if 
a  man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and  by  the  abstractive  power 
of  reflection  resolves  into  their  parts  all  the  things  which 
present  themselves  to  the  imagination  in  it,  he  will  then 
consider  it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  operation  of  nature; 
and  if  any  one  is  afraid  of  an  operation  of  nature  he  is  a 
child.  This,  however,  is  not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but 
it  is  also  a  thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  nature. 
To  observe,  too,  how  man  comes  near  to  the  Deity,  and  by 
what  part  of  him,  and  when  this  part  of  man  is  so  dis' 
posed  (vi.  28), 


204      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a  man  who  traverses 
everything  in  a  round,  and  pries  into  things  beneath  the 
earth,  as  the  poet  says,  and  seeks  by  conjecture  what  is 
in  the  minds  of  his  neighbors,  without  perceiving  that  it  is 
sufficient  to  attend  to  the  daemon  within  him,  and  to  reverence 
it  sincerely.  And  reverence  of  the  daemon  consists  in  keeping 
it  pure  from  passion  and  thoughtlessness,  and  dissatisfaction 
with  what  comes  from  gods  and  men.  For  the  things  from 
the  gods  merit  veneration  for  their  excellence;  and  the 
things  from,  men  should  be  dear  to  us  by  reason  of  kinship; 
and  sometimes  even,  in  a  manner,  they  move  our  pity  by 
reason  of  men's  ignorance  of  good  and  bad;  this  defect 
being  not  less  than  that  which  deprives  us  of  the  power  of 
distinguishing  things  that  are  white  and  black. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldest  be  going  to  live  three  thou- 
sand years,  and  as  many  times  ten  thousand  years,  still  re- 
member that  no  man  loses  any  other  life  than  this  v/hich  he 
now  lives,  nor  lives  any  other  than  this  which  he  now  loses. 
The  longest  and  shortest  are  thus  brought  to  the  same.  For 
the  present  is  the  same  to  all,  though  that  which  perishes  is 
not  the  same;  and  so  that  which  is  lost  appears  to  be  a 
mere  moment.  For  a  man  cannot  lose  either  the  past  or  the 
future :  for  what  a  m.an  has  not,  how  can  any  one  take  this 
from  him?  These  two  things  then  thou  must  bear  in  mind: 
the  one,  that  all  things  from  eternity  are  of  like  forms  and 
come  round  in  a  circle,  and  that  it  makes  no  difference 
whether  a  man  shall  see  the  same  things  during  a  hundred 
years  or  two  hundred,  or  an  infinite  tim.e;  and  the  second, 
that  the  longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die  soonest  lose  just 
the  same.  For  the  present  is  the  only  thing  of  which  a  man 
can  be  deprived,  if  it  is  true  that  this  is  the  only  thing  which 
he  has,  and  that  a  man  cannot  lose  a  thing  if  he  has  it  not. 

15.  Remember  that  all  is  opinion.  For  what  was  said  by 
the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest:  and  manifest  too  is  the  use 
of  what  was  said,  if  a  man  receives  what  may  be  got  out  of 
it  as  far  as  it  is  true. 

16.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself,  first  of  all 
when  it  becomes  an  abscess  and,  as  it  were,  a  tumour  on  the 
universe,  so  far  as  it  can.  For  to  be  vexed  at  anything 
whith  happens  is  a  separation  of  ourselves  from  nature,  in 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      205 

some  part  of  which  the  natures  of  all  other  things  are  con- 
tained. In  the  next  place,  the  soul  does  violence  to  itself 
when  it  turns  away  from  any  m.an,  or  even  moves  towards 
him  with  the  intention  of  injuring,  such  as  are  the  souls 
of  those  who  are  angry.  In  the  third  place,  the  soul  does 
violence  to  itself  when  it  is  overpowered  by  pleasure  or 
by  pain.  Fourthly,  when  it  plays  a  part,  and  does  or  says 
anything  insincerely  and  untruly.  Fifthly,  when  it  allows 
any  act  of  its  own  and  any  movem.ent  to  be  without  an  aim, 
and  does  anything  thoughtlessly  and  without  considering 
what  it  is,  it  being  right  that  even  the  smallest  things  be 
done  with  reference  to  an  end;  and  the  end  of  rational  ani- 
mals is  to  follow  the  reason  and  the  law  of  the  most  ancient 
city  and  polity. 

17.  Of  the  human  life  the  time  is  a  point,  and  the  sub- 
stance is  in  a  flux,  and  the  perception  dull,  and  the  com- 
position of  the  whole  body  subject  to  putrefaction,  and  the 
soul  of  a  whirl,  and  fortune  hard  to  divine,  and  fame  a  thing 
devoid  of  judgment.  And,  to  say  all  in  a  word,  everything 
which  belongs  to  the  body  is  a  stream,  and  what  belongs  to 
the  soul  is  a  dream  and  vapour,  and  life  is  a  warfare  and  a 
stranger's  sojourn,  and  after-fame  is  oblivion.  What,  then, 
is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a  man?  One  thing,  and 
only  one — philosophy.  But  this  consists  in  keeping  the 
daemon  within  a  man  free  from  violence  and  unharmed, 
superior  to  pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a 
purpose,  nor  yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling  the 
need  of  another  man's  doing  or  not  doing  anything;  and 
besides,  accepting  all  that  happens,  and  all  that  is  allotted, 
as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it  is,  from  whence  he  him- 
self came;  and,  finally,  waiting  for  death  with  a  cheerful 
mind,  as  being  nothing  else  than  a  dissolution  of  the  elements 
of  which  every  living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there  is 
no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  continually 
changing  into  another,  why  should  a  man  have  any  appre- 
hension about  the  change  and  dissolution  of  all  the  elements  ? 
For  it  is  according  to  nature,  and  nothing  is  evil  which  is 
according  to  nature. 

This  in  Carnuntum, 


206    ■  THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 


III 

E  ought  to  consider  not  only  that  our  life  is  daily 
wasting  away  and  a  smaller  part  of  it  is  left,  but 
another  thing  also  must  be  taken  into  the  account, 
that  if  a  man  should  live  longer  it  is  quite  uncertain  whether 
the  understanding  will  still  continue  sufficient  for  the  com- 
prehension of  things,  and  retain  the  power  of  contemplation 
v/hich  strives  to  acquire  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  and  the 
human.  For  if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into  dotage,  perspiration 
and  nutrition  and  imagination  and  appetite,  and  whatever 
else  there  is  of  the  kind,  will  not  fail;  but  the  power  of 
making  use  of  ourselves,  and  filling  up  the  measure  of  our 
duty,  and  clearly  separating  all  appearances,  and  considering 
whether  a  man  should  now  depart  from  life,  and  whatever 
else  of  the  kind  absolutely  requires  a  disciplined  reason,  all 
this  is  already  extinguished.  We  must  m.ake  haste  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but  also  because 
the  conception  of  things  and  the  understanding  of  them 
cease  first. 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the  things  which 
follow  after  the  things  which  are  produced  according  to 
nature  contain  something  pleasing  and  attractive.  For  in- 
stance, when  bread  is  baked  some  parts  are  split  at  the  surface, 
and  these  parts  which  thus  open,  and  have  a  certain  fashion 
contrary  to  the  purpose  of  the  baker's  art,  are  beautiful  in 
a  manner,  and  in  a  peculiar  way  excite  a  desire  for  eating. 
And  again,  figs,  when  they  are  quite  ripe,  gape  open,  and  in 
the  ripe  olives  the  very  circum.stance  of  their  being  near  to 
rottenness  adds  a  peculiar  beauty  to  the  fruit.  And  the  ears 
of  corn  bending  down,  and  the  lion's  eyebrows,  and  the  foam 
which  flows  from  the  m.outh  of  wild  boars,  and  many  other 
things — ^though  they  are  far  from  being  beautiful,  if  a  man 
should  examine  them  severally — still,  because  they  are  con- 
sequent upon  the  things  which  are  formed  by  nature,  help  to 
adorn  them,  and  they  please  the  mind;  so  that  if  a  man 
should  have  a  feeling  and  deeper  insight  with  respect  to  the 
things  which  are  produced  in  the  universe,  there  is  hardly 
one  of  those  which  follow  by  way  of  consequence  which 


THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       207- 

will  not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a  manner  disposed  so  as  to 
give  pleasure.  And  so  he  will  see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws 
of  wild  beasts  with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which  paint- 
ers and  sculptors  show  by  im.itation;  and  in  an  old  woman 
and  an  old  man  he  will  be  able  to  see  a  certain  maturity  and 
comeliness;  and  the  attractive  loveliness  of  young  persons 
he  will  be  able  to  look  on  with  chaste  eyes;  and  many  such 
things  will  present  themselves,  not  pleasing  to  every  man, 
but  to  him  only  who  has  become  truly  familiar  with  nature 
and  her  works. 

3.  Hippocrates  after  curing  many  diseases  himself  fell  sick 
and  died.  The  Chald^i  foretold  the  deaths  of  many,  and 
then  fate  caught  them  too,  Alexander,  and  Pompeius,  and 
Caius  Caesar,  after  so  often  completely  destroying  whole 
cities,  and  in  battle  cutting  to  pieces  many  ten  thousands  of 
cavalry  and  infantry,  themselves  too  at  last  departed  from 
life.  Heraclitus,  after  so  many  speculations  on  the  con- 
flagration of  the  universe,  was  filled  with  water  internally 
and  died  smeared  all  over  with  mud.  And  lice  destroyed 
Democritus;  and  other  lice  killed  Socrates.  What  means 
all  this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the  voyage, 
thou  art  come  to  shore;  get  out.  If  indeed  to  another  life, 
there  is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even  there.  But  if  to  a  state 
w^ithout  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and 
pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the  vessel,  which  is  as  much 
inferior  as  that  which  serves  It  is  superior;  for  the  one  is 
intelligence  and  deity;  the  other  Is  earth  and  corruption. 

4.  Do  not  waste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  In  thoughts 
about  others,  when  thou  dost  not  refer  thy  thoughts  to  some 
object  of  common  utility.  For  thou  losest  the  opportunity 
of  doing  something  else  when  thou  hast  such  thoughts  as 
these,  What  Is  such  a  person  doing,  and  why,  and  what  is 
he  saying,  and  what  Is  he  thinking  of,  and  what  Is  he  con- 
triving, and  v/hatever  else  of  the  kind  makes  us  wander 
away  from  the  observation  of  our  own  ruling  power.  We 
ought  then  to  check  In  the  series  of  our  thoughts  every- 
thing that  Is  without  a  purpose  and  useless,  but  most  of 
all  the  overcurious  feeling  and  the  malignant;  and  a  man 
should  use  himself  to  think  of  those  things  only  about  which 
if  one  should  suddenly  ask.  What  hast  thou  now  in  thy 


208      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

thoughts?  with  perfect  openness  thou  mightest  imme- 
diately answer.  This  or  That;  so  that  from  thy  words 
it  should  be  plain  that  everything  in  thee  is  simple  and  be- 
nevolent, and  such  as  befits  a  social  animal,  one  that  cares 
not  for  thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual  enjoyments 
at  all,  nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy  and  suspicion,  or 
anything  else  for  which  thou  wouldst  blush  if  thou 
shouldst  say  that  thou  hadst  it  in  thy  mind.  For  the 
man  who  is  such  and  no  longer  delays  being  among  the 
number  of  the  best,  is  like  a  priest  and  minister  of  the  gods, 
using  too  the  [deity]  which  is  planted  within  him,  which 
makes  the  man  uncontaminated  by  pleasure,  unharmed  by 
any  pain,  untouched  by  any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a 
fighter  in  the  noblest  fight,  one  who  cannot  be  overpowered 
by  any  passion,  dyed  deep  with  justice,  accepting  with  all 
his  soul  everything  which  happens  and  is  assigned  to  him 
as  his  portion;  and  not  often,  nor  yet  without  great  neces- 
sity and  for  the  general  interest,  imagining  what  another 
says,  or  does,  or  thinks.  For  it  is  only  what  belongs  to 
himself  that  he  makes  the  matter  for  his  activity;  and  he 
constantly  thinks  of  that  which  is  allotted  to  himself  out 
of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and  he  makes  his  own  acts  fair, 
and  he  is  persuaded  that  his  own  portion  is  good.  For 
the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  each  man  is  carried  along 
with  him  and  carries  him  along  with  it.  And  he  remem- 
bers also  that  every  rational  animal  is  his  kinsman,  and 
that  to  care  for  all  m.en  is  according  to  man's  nature;  and 
a  man  should  hold  on  to  the  opinion  not  of  all  but  of  those 
only  v/ho  confessedly  live  according  to  nature.  But  as  to 
those  v/ho  live  not  so,  he  always  bears  in  mxind  what  kind 
of  men  they  are  both  at  home  and  from  home,  both  by 
night  and  by  day,  and  what  they  are,  and  V\^ith  what  men 
they  live  an  im.pure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not  value 
at  all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such  men,  since  they 
are  not  even  satisfied  with  themselves. 

5.  Labour  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard  to  the  com- 
mon interest,  nor  without  due  consideration,  nor  with  dis- 
traction; nor  let  studied  ornament  set  off  thy  thoughts,  and 
be  not  either  a  man  of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too  many 
things.    And  imthQX^  let  the  deity;  which  is  in  thee  be  the 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       209 

guardian  of  a  living  being,  manly  and  of  ripe  age,  and  en- 
gaged in  matter  political,  and  a  Roman,  and  a  ruler,  who  has 
taken  his  post  like  a  man  waiting  for  the  signal  which  sum- 
mons him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go,  having  need  neither  of 
oath  nor  of  any  man's  testimony.  Be  cheerful  also,  and  seek 
not  external  help  nor  the  tranquillity  which  others  give.  A 
man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be  kept  erect  by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  in  human  life  anything  better  than  justice, 
truth,  temperance,  fortitude,  and,  in  a  word,  anything  better 
than  thy  own  mind's  self-satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it 
enables  thee  to  do  according  to  right  reason,  and  in  the  con- 
dition that  is  assigned  to  thee  without  thy  own  choice;  if, 
I  say,  thou  seest  anything  better  than  this^  turn  to  it  with 
all  thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found  to  be  the 
best.  But  if  nothing  appears  to  be  better  than  the  deity 
which  is  planted  in  thee,  which  has  subjected  to  itself  all 
thy  appetites,  and  carefully  examines  all  the  impressions,  and 
as  Socrates  said,  has  detached  itself  from  the  persuasions  of 
sense,  and  has  submitted  itself  to  the  gods,  and  cares  for 
mankind;  if  thou  findest  everything  else  smaller  and  of  less 
value  than  this,  give  place  to  nothing  else,  for  if  thou  dost 
once  diverge  and  incline  to  it,  thou  wilt  no  longer  without 
distraction  be  able  to  give  the  preference  to  that  good  thing 
which  is  thy  proper  possession  and  thy  own;  for  it  is  not 
right  that  anything  of  any  other  kind,  such  as  praise  from 
the  many,  or  power,  or  enjoyment  of  pleasure,  should  come 
into  competition  with  that  which  is  rationally  and  politically 
[or,  practically]  good.  All  these  things,  even  though  they 
may  seem  to  adapt  themselves  [to  the  better  things]  in  a 
small  degree,  obtain  the  superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry 
us  away.  But  do  thou,  I  say,  simply  and  freely  choose  the 
better,  and  hold  to  it. — But  that  which  is  useful  is  the  better. — 
Well  then,  if  it  is  only  useful  to  thee  as  a  rational  being, 
keep  to  it;  but  if  it  is  only  useful  to  thee  as  an  animal, 
say  so,  and  maintain  thy  judgment  without  arrogance;  only 
take  care  that  thou  makest  the  inquiry  by  a  sure  method. 

7.  Never  value  anything  as  profitable  to  thyself  which  shall 
compel  thee  to  break  thy  promise,  to  lose  thy  self-respect,  to 
hate  any  man,  to  suspect,  to  curse,  to  act  the  hypocrite,  to 
desire  anything  which  needs  walls  and  curtains:  for  he  who 


210      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

has  preferred  to  everything  else  his  own  intelligence  and 
daemon  and  the  worship  of  its  excellence,  acts  no  tragic  part, 
does  not  groan,  will  not  need  either  solitude  or  muc?i  com- 
pany; and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he  will  live  without  either 
pursuing  or  flying  from  [death] ;  but  whether  for  a  longer 
or  a  shorter  time  he  shall  have  the  soul  inclosed  in  the  body, 
he  cares  not  at  all;  for  even  if  he  must  depart  immediately, 
he  will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were  going  to  do  anything  else 
which  can  be  done  with  decency  and  order;  taking  care  of 
this  only  all  through  life,  that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away 
from  anything  which  belongs  to  an  intelligent  animal  and 
a  member  of  a  civil  community. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and  purified  thou 
Vv^iit  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor  impurity,  nor  any  sore 
skinned  over.  Nor  is  his  life  incomplete  when  fate  over- 
takes him,  as  one  may  say  of  an  actor  v/ho  leaves  the  stage 
before  ending  and  finishing  the  play.  Besides,  there  is  in 
him  nothing  servile,  nor  affected,  nor  too  closely  bound  [to 
other  things],  nor  yet  detached  [from  other  things],  nothing 
worthy  of  blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a  hiding-place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces  opinion.  On  this 
faculty  it  entirely  depends  whether  there  shall  exist  in  thy 
ruling  part  any  opinion  inconsistent  with  nature  and  the  con- 
stitution of  the  rational  animal.  And  this  faculty  promises 
freedom  from  hasty  judgment,  and  friendship  towards  m.en, 
and  obedience  to  the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away,  then,  all  things,  hold  to  these  only 
which  are  few;  and  besides  bear  in  mind  that  every  man 
lives  only  this  present  time,  which  is  an  indivisible  point,  and 
that  all  the  rest  of  his  life  is  either  past  or  it  is  uncertain. 
Short  then  is  the  time  v/hich  every  man  lives,  and  small  the 
nook  of  the  earth  where  he  lives;  and  short  too  the  longest 
posthumous  fame,  and  even  this  only  continued  by  a  suc- 
cession of  poor  human  beings,  who  v/ill  very  soon  die,  and 
who  know  not  even  themselves,  much  less  him  who  died  long 
ago. 

11.  To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned  let  this  one 
still  be  added: — Make  for  thyself  a  definition  or  description 
of  the  thing  which  is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly 
what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  m 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS      211 

its  complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and 
the  names  of  the  things  of  which  it  has  been  compounded, 
and  into  which  it  will  be  resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  pro- 
ductive of  elevation  of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  examine  method- 
ically and  truly  every  object  v/hich  is  presented  to  thee  in 
life,  and  always  to  look  at  things  so  as  to  see  at  the  sam.e  time 
what  kind  of  universe  this  is,  and  what  kind  of  use  every- 
thing performs  in  it,  and  what  value  everything  has  with  ref- 
erence to  the  whole,  and  what  with  reference  to  man,  who 
is  a  citizen  of  the  highest  city,  of  which  all  other  cities  are 
like  families ;  what  each  thing  is,  and  of  what  it  is  composed, 
and  how  long  it  is  the  nature  of  this  thing  to  endure  which 
now  makes  an  impression  on  me,  and  what  virtue  I  have 
need  of  with  respect  to  it,  such  as  gentleness,  manliness,  truth, 
fidelity,  simplicity,  contentmicnt,  and  the  rest.  Vv^herefore, 
on  every  occasion  a  man  should  say:  This  comes  from  God; 
and  this  is  according  to  the  apportionment  and  spinning  of 
the  thread  of  destiny,  and  such-like  coincidence  and  chance; 
and  this  is  from  one  of  the  same  stock  and  a  kinsm.an  and 
partner,  one  who  knows  not  however  what  is  according  to 
his  nature.  But  I  know;  for  this  reason  I  behave  towards 
him  according  to  the  natural  law  of  fellowship  with  benev- 
olence and  justice.  At  the  same  time  hov/ever  in  things 
indifferent  I  attempt  to  ascertain  the  value  of  each. 

12.  If  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before  thee,  following 
right  reason  seriously,  vigorously,  calmly,  without  allowing 
anything  else  to  distract  thee,  but  keeping  thy  divine  part 
pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  bound  to  give  it  back  im- 
mediately ;  if  thou  boldest  to  this,  expecting  nothing,  fearing 
nothing,  but  satisfied  with  thy  present  activity  according  to 
nature,  and  with  heroic  truth  in  every  word  and  sound  which 
thou  utterest,  thou  wilt  live  happy.  And  there  is  no  man 
who  is  able  to  prevent  this. 

13.  Als  physicians  have  always  their  instruments  and 
knives  ready  for  cases  which  suddenly  require  their  skill, 
so  do  thou  have  principles  ready  for  the  understanding  of 
things  divine  and  human,  and  doing  everything,  even  the 
smallest,  with  a  recollection  of  the  bond  which  unites 
the  divine  and  human  to  one  another.  For  neither  wilt 
thou  do  anything  well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at 


212       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

the  same  time  having  a  reference  to  things  divine;  nor  the 
contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard;  for  neither  wilt  thou 
read  thy  own  memoirs,  nor  me  acts  of  the  ancient  Romans  and 
Hellenes,  and  the  selections  from  books  which  thou  wast 
reserving  for  thy  old  age.  Hasten  then  to  the  end  which 
thou  hast  before  thee,  and,  throwing  away  idle  hopes,  come 
to  thy  own  aid,  if  thou  carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while  it  is 
in  thy  power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are  signified  by  the 
words  stealing,  sov/ing,  buying,  keeping  quiet,  seeing  Vv^hat 
ought  to  be  done;  for  this  is  not  effected  by  the  eyes,  but  by 
another  kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence:  to  the  body  belong  sensations, 
to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the  intelligence  principles.  To  re- 
ceive the  impressions  of  forms  by  means  of  appearances 
belongs  even  to  animals ;  to  be  pulled  by  the  strings  of  desire 
belongs  both  to  v/ild  beasts  and  to  men  who  have  made  them- 
selves into  women,  and  to  a  Phalaris  and  a  Nero:  and  to 
have  the  intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things  which  appear 
suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do  not  believe  in  the  gods, 
and  who  betray  their  country,  and  do  their  impure  deeds 
when  they  have  shut  the  doors.  If  then  everything  else  is 
common  to  all  that  I  have  mentioned,  there  remains  that 
which  is  peculiar  to  the  good  man,  to  be  pleased  and  content 
with  v\^hat  happens,  and  with  the  thread  which  is  spun  for 
him;  and  not  to  defile  the  divinity  which  is  planted  in  his 
breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a  crowd  of  images,  but  to  preserve 
it  tranquil,  following  it  obediently  as  a  god,  neither  saying 
anything  contrary  to  the  truth,  nor  doing  anything  contrary  to 
justice.  And  if  all  men  refuse  to  believe  that  he  lives  a  simple, 
modest,  and  contented  life,  he  is  neither  angry  with  any  of 
them,  nor  does  he  deviate  from  the  way  which  leads  to  the  end 
of  life,  to  which  a  man  ought  to  come  pure,  tranquil,  ready  to 
depart,  and  without  any  compulsion  perfectly  reconciled  to 
liis  lot. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       213 


IV 

I  HAT  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  according  to 
nature,  is  so  affected  with  respect  to  the  events  v/hich 
happen,  that  it  always  easily  adapts  itself  to  that 
which  is  possible  and  is  presented  to  it.  For  it  requires  no 
definite  material,  but  it  moves  towards  its  purpose,  under 
certain  conditions  however ;  and  it  makes  a  material  for  itself 
out  of  that  which  opposes  it,  as  fire  lays  hold  of  what  falls 
into  it,  by  which  a  small  light  would  have  been  extinguished : 
but  when  the  fire  is  strong,  it  soon  appropriates  to  itself 
the  matter  which  is  heaped  on  it,  and  consumes  it,  and  rises 
higher  by  means  of  this  very  material. 

2.  Let  no  act  be  done  without  a  purpose,  nor  otherwise 
than  according  to  the  perfect  principles  of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses  in  the  country, 
sea-shores  and  mountains;  and  thou  too  art  wont  to  desire 
such  things  very  much.  But  this  is  altogether  a  mark  of  the 
most  common  sort  of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy  power  whenever 
thou  shalt  choose  to  retire  into  thyself.  For  nowhere,  either 
with  more  quiet  or  more  freedom  from  trouble,  does  a  man 
retire  than  into  his  own  soul,  particularly  v\^hen  he  has 
within  him  such  thoughts  that  by  looking  into  them  he  is 
immediately  in  perfect  tranquillity;  and  I  affirm  that  tran- 
quillity is  nothing  else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the  mind. 
Constantly  then  give  to  thyself  this  retreat,  and  renew  thy- 
self;  and  let  thy  principles  be  brief  and  fundamental,  which, 
as  soon  as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will  be  sufficient  to 
cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and  to  send  thee  back  free  from 
all  discontent  with  the  things  to  which  thou  returnest.  For 
with  what  art  thou  discontented  ?  With  the  badness  of  men  ? 
Recall  to  thy  mind  this  conclusion,  that  rational  animals 
exist  for  one  another,  and  that  to  endure  is  a  part  of  justice, 
and  that  men  do  wrong  involuntarily;  and  consider  how 
many  already,  after  mutual  enmity,  suspicion,  hatred  and 
fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced  to  ashes ;  and  be 
quiet  at  last. — But  perhaps  thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that 
which  is  assigned  to  thee  out  of  the  universe. — Recall  to 
thy  recollection  this  alternative;  either  there  is  providence 


214       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

or  atoms  [fortuitous  concurrence  of  things]  ;  or  remember 
the  arguments  by  which  it  has  been  proved  that  the  world 
is  a  kind  of  a  political  community  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. — 
But  perhaps  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten  upon  thee. — 
Consider  then  further  that  the  mind  mingles  not  with  the 
breath,  whether  moving  gently  or  violently,  when  it  has  once 
draY\^n  itself  apart  and  discovered  its  own  power,  and  think 
also  of  all  that  thou  hast  heard  and  assented  to  about  pain 
and  pleasure  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. — But  perhaps  the  desire 
of  the  thing  called  fame  will  torment  thee. — See  how  soon 
everything  is  forgotten,  and  look  at  the  chaos  of  infinite 
time  on  each  side  of  [the  present],  and  the  emptiness  of  ap- 
plause, and  the  changeableness  and  want  of  judgment  in 
those  who  pretend  to  give  praise,  and  the  narrowness  of 
the  space  within  which  it  is  circumscribed  [and  be  quiet  at 
last].  For  the  whole  earth  is  a  point,  and  how  small  a 
nook  in  it  is  this  thy  dwelling,  and  how  few  are  there  in  it, 
and  what  kind  of  people  are  they  who  will  praise  thee. 

This  then  remains :  Remember  to  retire  into  this  little  ter- 
ritory of  thy  own,  and,  above  all,  do  not  distract  or  strain 
thyself,  but  be  free,  and  look  at  things  as  a  man,  as  a  human 
being,  as  a  citizen,  as  a  mortal.  But  among  the  things 
readiest  to  thy  hand  to  which  thou  shalt  turn,  let  there  be 
these,  which  are  two.  One  is  that  things  do  not  touch  the 
soul,  for  they  are  external  and  remain  immovable ;  but  our 
perturbations  come  only  from  the  opinion  which  is  within. 
The  other  is  that  all  these  things,  which  thou  seest,  change 
immediately  and  will  no  longer  be;  and  constantly  bear  in 
mind  how  many  of  these  changes  thou  hast  already  wit- 
nessed.   The  universe  is  transformation:  life  is  opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the  reason  also,  in 
respect  of  which  we  are  rational  beings,  is  common:  if  this 
is  so,  common  also  is  the  reason  which  commands  us  what 
to  do,  and  what  not  to  do;  if  this  is  so,  there  is  a  com- 
mon law  also ;  if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens ;  if  this  is 
so,  we  are  members  of  some  political  community ;  if  this  is  so, 
the  world  is  in  a  m.anner  a  state.  For  of  what  other  common 
political  community  will  any  one  say  that  the  whole  human 
race  are  members?  And  from  thence,  from  this  common 
political  community  comes  also  our  very  intellectual  faculty 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      215 

and  reasoning  faculty  and  our  capacity  for  law;  or  whence 
do  they  come  ?  For  as  my  earthly  part  is  a  portion  given  to 
me  from  certain  earth,  and  that  which  is  watery  from  an- 
other element,  and  that  which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some 
peculiar  source  (for  nothing  comes  out  of  that  which  is 
nothing,  as  nothing  also  returns  to  non-existence),  so  also 
the  intellectual  part  comes  from  some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of  nature;  a 
composition  out  of  the  same  elements,  and  a  decomposition 
into  the  same ;  and  altogether  not  a  thing  of  which  any  man 
should  be  ashamed,  for  it  is  not  contrary  to  [the  nature  of] 
a  reasonable  animal,  and  not  contrary  to  the  reason  of  our 
constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be  done  by  such 
persons,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity;  and  if  a  man  will  not 
have  it  so,  he  will  not  allow  the  fig-tree  to  have  juice.  But 
by  all  means  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within  a  very  short  time 
both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead ;  and  soon  not  even  your  names 
will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  aw^ay  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is  taken  away 
the  complaint,  "  I  have  been  harmied."  Take  away  the  com- 
plaint, "  I  have  been  harmed,"  and  the  harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse  than  he  was, 
also  does  not  make  his  life  worse,  nor  does  it  harm  him 
either  from  vv^ithout  or  from  within. 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally]  useful  has 
been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens,  happens 
justly,  and  if  thou  observest  carefully,  thou  wilt  find  it  to  be 
so.  I  do  not  say  only  with  respect  to  the  continuity  of  the 
series  of  things,  but  with  respect  to  what  is  just,  and  as  if 
it  were  done  by  one  who  assigns  to  each  thing  its  value. 
Observe  then  as  thou  hast  begun;  and  whatever  thou  doest, 
do  it  in  conjunction  with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in  the 
sense  in  which  a  man  is  properly  understood  to  be  good. 
Keep  to  this  in  every  action. 

11.  Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things  as  he  has  who 
does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he  wishes  thee  to  have,  but 
look  at  them  as  they  are  in  truth, 

12.  A  man  should  always  have  these  two  rules  in  readi- 


216      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

ness;  the  one,  to  do  only  whatever  the  reason  of  the  ruling 
and  legislating  faculty  may  suggest  for  the  use  of  men;  the 
other,  to  change  thy  opinion,  if  there  is  any  one  at  hand 
who  sets  thee  right  and  moves  thee  from  any  opinion.  But 
this  change  of  opinion  must  proceed  only  from  a  certain 
persuasion,  as  of  what  is  just  or  of  common  advantage,  and 
the  like,  not  because  it  appears  pleasant  or  brings  reputation. 

13.  Hast  thou  reason?  I  have. — Why  then  dost  not  thou 
use  it?  For  if  this  does  its  own  work,  what  else  dost  thou 
wish? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a  part.  Thou  shalt  disappear  in 
that  which  produced  thee;  but  rather  thou  shalt  be  received 
back  into  its  seminal  principle  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same  altar;  one 
falls  before,  another  falls  after;  but  it  makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a  god  to  those  to  whom 
thou  art  now  a  beast  and  an  ape,  if  thou  wilt  return  to  thy 
principles  and  the  worship  of  reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live  ten  thousand 
years.  Death  hangs  over  thee.  While  thou  livest,  while  it 
is  in  thy  power,  be  good. 

18.  Kow  much  trouble  he  avoids  who  does  not  look  to  see 
whal  his  neighbour  says  or  does  or  thinks,  but  only  to  what 
he  does  himself,  that  it  may  be  just  and  pure;  or  as  Agathon 
says,  look  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of  others,  but 
run  straight  along  the  line  v/ithout  deviating  from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a  vehement  desire  for  posthumous  fame 
does  not  consider  that  every  one  of  those  who  remember 
him  will  himself  also  die  very  soon;  then  again  also  they 
,who  have  succeeded  them,  until  the  whole  remembrance  shall 
have  been  extinguished  as  it  is  transmitted  through  men 
who  foolishly  admire  and  perish.  But  suppose  that  those 
who  will  remember  are  even  immortal,  and  that  the  re- 
membrance will  be  immortal,  what  then  is  this  to  thee  ?  And 
I  say  not  what  is  it  to  the  dead,  but  what  is  it  to  the  living. 
What  is  praise,  except  indeed  so  far  as  it  has  a  certain 
utility.  For  thou  now  rejectest  unseasonably  the  gift  of 
nature,  clinging  to  something  else.  .  .  . 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beautiful  is  beautiful 
in  itself^  and  terminates  in  itself,  not  having  praise  as  part 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      217 

of  itself.  Neither  worse  then  nor  better  is  a  thing  made  by 
being  praised.  I  affirm  this  also  of  the  things  v/hich  are 
called  beautiful  by  the  vulgar;  for  example,  material  things 
and  works  of  art.  That  which  is  really  beautiful  has  no 
need  of  anything;  not  more  than  law,  not  more  than  truth, 
not  more  than  benevolence  or  modesty.  Which  of  these 
things  is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised,  or  spoiled  by  being 
blamed?  Is  such  a  thing  as  an  emerald  made  worse  than 
it  was,  if  it  is  not  praised?  or  gold,  ivory,  purple,  a  lyre, 
a  little  knife,  a  flower,  a  shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the  air  contain 
them  from  eternity? — But  how  does  the  earth  contain  the 
bodies  of  those  who  have  been  buried  from  time  so  remote? 
For  as  here  the  mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a  certain 
continuance,  whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  dissolution  make 
room  for  other  dead  bodies;  so  the  souls  which  are  removed 
into  the  air  after  subsisting  for  some  time  are  transmuted 
and  diffused,  and  assume  a  fiery  nature  by  being  received 
into  the  seminal  intelligence  of  the  universe,  and  in  this  way 
make  room  for  the  fresh  souls  which  come  to  dwell  there. 
And  this  is  the  answer  which  a  man  might  give  on  the  hy- 
pothesis of  souls  continuing  to  exist.  But  we  must  not  only 
think  of  the  number  of  bodies  which  are  thus  buried,  but 
also  of  the  number  of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten  by  us 
and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a  number  is  consumed, 
and  thus  in  a  manner  buried  in  the  bodies  of  those  who  feed 
on  them?  And  nevertheless  this  earth  receives  them  by 
reason  of  the  changes  [of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the 
transformations  into  the  aerial,  or  the  fiery  element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in  this  matter? 
The  division  into  that  which  is  m.aterial  and  that  which  is 
the  cause  of  form  [the  formal]    (vii.  29). 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every  movement  have 
respect  to  justice,  and  on  the  occasion  of  every  impression 
maintain  the  faculty  of  comprehension   [or  understanding]. 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which  is  harmonious 
to  thee,  O  Universe.  Nothing  for  me  is  too  early  nor  too 
late,  which  is  in  due  time  for  thee.  Everything  is  fruit  to 
me  which  thy  seasons  bring,  O  Nature:  from  thee  are  all 
things,  in  thee  are  ail  things,  to  thee  all  things  return.    The 


218      THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

poet  says,  Dear  City  of  Cecrops ;  and  wilt  not  thou  say,  Dear 
city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thyself  with  few  things,  says  the  philosopher, 
if  thou  wouldst  be  tranquil. — But  consider  if  it  would  not 
be  better  to  say.  Do  what  is  necessary,  and  whatever  the 
reason  of  the  animal  which  is  naturally  social  requires,  and 
as  it  requires.  For  this  brings  not  only  the  tranquillity 
which  comes  from  doing  wtll,  but  also  that  which  comes 
from  doing  few  things.  For  the  greatest  part  of  what  we  say 
and  do  being  unnecessary,  if  a  man  takes  this  away,  he  will 
have  more  leisure  and  less  uneasiness.  Accordingly  on  every 
occasion  a  man  should  ask  himself,  Is  this  one  of  the  un- 
necessary things?  Now  a  man  should  take  away  not  only 
unnecessary  acts  but  also  unnecessary  thoughts,  for  thus 
superfluous  acts  will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits  thee,  the  life 
of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his  portion  out  of  the  whole, 
and  satisfied  with  his  own  just  acts  and  benevolent  dispo- 
sition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things?  Look  also  at  these. 
Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thyself  all  simplicity.  Does 
any  one  do  wrong  ?  It  is  to  himself  that  he  does  the  wrong. 
Has  anything  happened  to  thee?  Well,  out  of  the  universe 
from  the  beginning  everything  which  happens  has  been  ap- 
portioned and  spun  out  to  thee.  In  a  word,  thy  life  is  short. 
Thou  must  turn  to  profit  the  present  by  the  aid  of  reason  and 
justice.    Be  sober  in  thy  relaxation. 

27.  Either  it  is  a  well  arranged  universe  or  a  chaos  hud- 
dled together,  but  still  a  universe.  But  can  a  certain  order 
subsist  in  thee,  and  disorder  in  the  All  ?  And  this,  too,  when 
all  things  are  so  separated  and  diffused  and  sympathetic. 

28.  A  black  character,  a  womanish  character,  a  stubborn 
character,  bestial,  childish,  animal,  stupid,  counterfeit,  scur- 
rilous, fraudulent,  tyrannical. 

29.  If  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  universe  who  does  not  know 
what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a  stranger  who  does  not  know 
what  is  going  on  in  it.  He  is  a  runaway,  who  flies  from  social 
reason;  he  is  blind,  who  shuts  the  eyes  of  the  understanding; 
he  is  poor,  who  has  need  of  another,  and  has  not  from  him- 
self all  things  which  are  useful  for  life.    He  is  an  abscess 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       219 

on  the  universe  who  withdraws  and  separates  himself  from 
the  reason  of  our  common  nature  through  being  displeased 
with  the  things  which  happen,  for  the  same  nature  produces 
this,  and  has  produced  thee  too;  he  is  a  piece  rent  asunder 
from  the  state,  who  tears  his  own  soul  from  that  of  reason- 
able animals,  which  is  one. 

30.  The  one  is  a  philosopher  without  a  tunic,  and  the  other 
without  a  book:  here  is  another  half -naked:  Bread  I  have 
not,  he  says,  and  I  abide  by  reason.  And  I  do  not  get  the 
means  of  living  out  of  my  learning,  and  I  abide  [by  my 
reason]. 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  v/hich  thou  hast 
learned,  and  be  content  with  it ;  and  pass  through  the  rest  of 
life  like  one  who  has  intrusted  to  the  gods  with  his  whole 
soul  all  that  he  has,  making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant  nor 
the  slave  of  any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Vespasian.  Thou 
wilt  see  all  these  things,  people  marrying,  bringing  up  chil- 
dren, sick,  dying,  warring,  feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating 
the  ground,  flattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  suspecting,  plot- 
ting, wishing  for  some  to  die,  grumbling  about  the  present, 
loving,  heaping  up  treasure,  desiring  consulship,  kingly 
power.  Well,  then,  that  life  of  these  people  no  longer  exists 
at  all.  Again,  remove  to  the  times  of  Trajan.  Again,  all 
is  the  same.  Their  life,  too,  is  gone.  ,  In  like  manner  view 
also  the  other  epochs  of  time  and  of  whole  nations,  and  see 
how  many  after  great  efforts  soon  fell  and  were  resolved 
into  the  elements.  But  chiefly  thou  shouldst  think  of  those 
whom  thou  hast  thyself  known  distracting  themselves  about 
idle  things,  neglecting  to  do  what  was  in  accordance  with 
their  proper  constitution,  and  to  hold  firmly  to  this  and  to 
be  content  with  it.  And  herein  it  is  necessary  to  remember 
that  the  attention  given  to  everything  has  its  proper  value 
and  proportion.  For  thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied,  if 
thou  appliest  thyself  to  smaller  matters  no  further  than  is  fit, 

32.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar  are  now  anti- 
quated; so  also  the  names  of  those  who  were  famed  of  old, 
are  now  in  a  manner  antiquated:  Camillus,  Caeso,  Volesus, 
Leonnatus,  and  a  little  after  also  Scipio  and  Cato,  then 
Augustus,  then   also  Hadrianus   and   Antoninus.     For  all 


220     THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

things  soon  pass  away  and  become  a  mere  tale,  and  complete 
oblivion  soon  buries  them.  And  I  say  this  of  those  who  have 
shone  in  a  wondrous  way.  For  the  rest,  as  soon  as  they 
have  breathed  out  their  breath,  they  are  gone,  and  no  man 
speaks  of  them.  And,  to  conclude  the  matter,  what  is  even 
an  eternal  remembrance?  A  mere  nothing.  V\^hat,  then, 
is  that  about  which  we  ought  to  employ  our  serious  pains? 
This  one  thing,  thoughts  just,  and  acts  social,  and  words 
which  never  lie,  and  a  disposition  which  gladly  accepts  all 
that  happens,  as  necessary,  as  usual,  as  flowing  from  a  prin- 
ciple and  source  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one  of  the  fates], 
allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  into  whatever  things  she 
pleases. 

35.  Everything  is  only  for  a  day,  both  that  which  remem- 
bers and  that  which  is  remembered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take  place  by  change, 
and  accustom  thyself  to  consider  that  the  nature  of  the  Uni- 
verse loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the  things  which 
are  and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For  everything  that 
exists  is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be.  But 
thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the  earth 
or  into  a  womb :  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet  simple,  nor 
free  from  perturbations,  nor  without  suspicion  of  being  hurt 
by  external  things,  nor  kindly  disposed  towards  all ;  nor  dost 
thou  yet  place  wisdom  only  in  acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  m.en's  ruling  principles,  even  those  of  the 
wise,  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what  kind  they 
pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  In  the  ruling  prin- 
ciple of  another ;  nor  yet  in  any  turning  and  mutation  of  thy 
corporeal  covering.  Where  is  it  then?  It  is  in  that  part  of 
thee  in  which  subsists  the  power  of  forming  opinions  about 
evils.  Let  this  power  then  not  form  [such]  opinions,  and  all 
is  well.  And  if  that  which  is  nearest  to  it,  the  poor  body,  is 
cut,  burnt,  filled  with  matter  and  rottenness,  nevertheless  let 
the  part  which  forms  opinions  about  these  things  be  quiet, 
that  is,  let  it  judge  that  nothing  is  either  bad  or  good  which 
can  happen  equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the  good.    Foe 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      221 

that  wliich  happens  equally  to  him  who  lives  contrary  to 
nature  and  to  him  who  lives  according  to  nature,  is  neither 
according  to  nature  nor  contrary  to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one  living  being, 
having  one  substance  and  one  soul;  and  observe  how  all 
things  have  reference  to  one  perception,  the  perception  of  this 
one  living  being;  and  how  all  things  act  with  one  movement; 
and  how  all  things  are  the  co-operating  causes  of  all  things 
which  exist;  observe  too  the  continuous  spinning  of  the 
thread  and  the  contexture  of  the  vv^eb. 

41.  Thou  art  a  little  soul  bearing  about  a  corpse,  as  Epic- 
tetus  used  to  say  (i.  c.  19). 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change,  and  no  good 
for  things  to  subsist  in  consequence  of  change. 

43.  Time  is  like  a  river  made  up  of  the  events  which 
happen,  and  a  violent  stream;  for  as  soon  as  a  thing  has 
been  seen,  it  is  carried  away,  and  another  comes  in  its  place, 
and  this  will  be  carried  away  too. 

44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  familiar  and  well 
known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the  fruit  in  summer;  for 
such  is  disease,  and  death,  and  calumny,  and  treachery,  and 
whatever  else  delights  fools  or  vexes  them- 

45.  In  the  series  of  things  those  which  follow  are  always 
aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have  gone  before ;  for  this  series 
is  not  like  a  mere  enumeration  of  disjointed  things,  which 
has  only  a  necessary  sequence,  but  it  is  a  rational  connection : 
and  as  all  existing  things  are  arranged  together  harmon- 
iously, so  the  things  which  come  into  existence  exhibit  no 
mere  succession,  but  a  certain  wonderful  relationship  (vi.  38; 
vii.  9;  vii.  75,  note). 

46.  Always  remember  the  sayings  of  Heraclitus,  that  the 
death  of  earth  is  to  become  vv^ater,  and  the  death  of  water 
is  to  becom.e  air,  and  the  death  of  air  is  to  become  fire,  and 
reversely.  And  think  too  of  him  who  forgets  whither  the 
way  leads,  and  that  men  quarrel  with  that  with  which  they 
are  most  constantly  in  communion,  the  reason  v/hich  governs 
the  universe;  and  the  things  which  they  daily  meet  with 
seem  to  them  strange:  and  consider  that  we  ought  not  to 
act  and  speak  as  if  we  were  asleep,  for  even  in  sleep  we 
seem  to  act  and  speak;  and  that  we  ought  not,  like  children 


222      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

who  learn  from  their  parents,  simply  to  act  and  speak  as  we 
have  been  taught. 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die  to-morrow,  or 
certainly  on  the  day  after  to-morrow,  thou  wouldst  not  care 
much  whether  it  was  on  the  third  day  or  on  the  morrow, 
unless  thou  wast  in  the  highest  degree  mean-spirited — for 
how  small  is  the  difference? — so  think  it  no  great  thing  to 
die  after  as  many  years  as  thou  canst  name  rather  than  to- 
morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians  are  dead  after 
often  contracting  their  eyebrows  over  the  sick ;  and  how  many 
astrologers  after  predicting  with  great  pretensions  the  deaths 
of  others;  and  how  many  philosophers  after  endless  dis- 
courses on  death  or  immortality ;  how  many  heroes  after  kill- 
ing thousands;  and  how  many  tyrants  who  have  used  their 
power  over  men's  lives  with  terrible  insolence  as  if  they  were 
immortal ;  and  how  many  cities  are  entirely  dead,  so  to  speak, 
Helice  and  Pompeii  and  Herculaneum,  and  others  innumer- 
able. Add  to  the  reckoning  all  whom  thou  hast  known,  one 
after  another.  One  man  after  burying  another  has  been 
laid  out  dead,  and  another  buries  him ;  and  all  this  in  a  short 
time.  To  conclude,  always  observe  how  ephemeral  and 
worthless  human  things  are,  and  what  was  yesterday  a  little 
mucus,  to-morrow  will  be  a  mummy  or  ashes.  Pass  then 
through  this  little  space  of  time  conformably  to  nature,  and 
end  thy  journey  in  content,  just  as  an  olive  falls  off  when 
it  is  ripe,  blessing  nature  who  produced  it,  and  thanking  the 
tree  on  which  it  grew. 

49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  v/hich  the  waves  con- 
tinually break,  but  it  stands  firm  and  tames  the  fury  of  the 
water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I,  because  this  has  happened  to  me — Not,  so, 
but  Happy  am  I,  though  this  has  happened  to  me,  because  I 
continue  free  from  pain,  neither  crushed  by  the  present  nor 
fearing  the  future.  For  such  a  thing  as  this  might  have  hap- 
pened to  every  man ;  but  every  man  would  not  have  continued 
free  from  pain  on  such  an  occasion.  Why,  then,  is  that 
rather  a  misfortune  than  this  a  good  fortune?  And  dost 
thou  in  all  cases  call  that  a  man's  misfortune,  v/hich  is  not  a 
deviation  from  man's  nature?    And  does  a  thing  seem  to 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      223 

thee  to  be  a  deviation  from  man's  nature,  when  it  is  not  con- 
trary to  the  will  of  man's  nature?  Well,  thou  knowest  the 
will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which  has  happened  prevent 
thee  from  being  just,  magnanimous,  temperate,  prudent,  se- 
cure against  inconsiderate  opinions  and  falsehood ;  will  it  pre- 
vent thee  from  having  modesty,  freedom,  and  everything  else, 
by  the  presence  of  which  mean's  nature  obtains  all  that  is  its 
own?  Remember,  too,  on  every  occasion  which  leads  thee 
to  vexation  to  apply  this  principle:  not  that  this  is  a  mis- 
fortune, but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is  good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a  vulgar  but  still  a  useful  help  towards  contempt  of 
death,  to  pass  in  review  those  who  have  tenaciously  stuck 
to  life.  What  more  then  have  they  gained  than  those  who 
have  died  early?  Certainly  they  lie  in  their  tombs  som.e- 
where  at  last,  Cadicianus,  Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or  any 
one  else  like  them,  who  have  carried  out  many  to  be  buried, 
and  then  were  carried  out  themselves.  Altogether  the  inter- 
val is  small  [between  birth  and  death]  ;  and  consider  with 
how  much  trouble,  and  in  company  with  what  sort  of  people, 
and  in  what  a  feeble  body  this  interval  is  laboriously  passed. 
Do  not  then  consider  life  a  thing  of  any  value.  For  look  to 
the  immensity  of  time  behind  thee,  and  to  the  tim.e  which  is 
before  thee,  another  boundless  space.  In  this  infinity  then 
what  is  the  difference  between  him  who  lives  three  days  and 
him  who  lives  three  generations? 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  way;  and  the  short  way  is  the 
natural:  accordingly  say  and  do  everything  in  conformity 
with  the  soundest  reason.  For  such  a  purpose  frees  a  man 
from  trouble,  and  warfare,  and  all  artifice  and  ostentatious 
display. 

V 

IN  THE  morning  when  thou  risest  unwillingly,  let  this 
thought  be  present — I  am  rising  to  the  work  of  a  human 
being.  Why  then  am  I  dissatisfied  if  I  am  going  to  do  the 
things  for  which  I  exist  and  for  which  I  was  brought  into 
the  world  ?  Or  have  I  been  made  for  this,  to  lie  in  the  bed- 
clothes and  keep  myself  warm? — But  this  is  more  pleasant 
—Dost  thou  exist  then  to  take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for 


224       THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUEELIUS 

action  or  exertion?  Dost  thou  not  see  the  little  plants,  tHe 
little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders,  the  bees  working  together 
to  put  in  order  their  several  parts  of  the  universe?  And 
art  thou  unwilling  to  do  the  work  of  a  human  being,  and 
dost  thou  not  make  haste  to  do  that  v/hich  is  according  to 
thy  nature? — But  it  is  necessary  to  take  rest  also. — It  is 
necessary :  however  nature  has  fixed  bounds  to  this  too :  she 
has  fixed  bounds  both  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  yet  thou 
goest  beyond  these  bounds,  beyond  what  is  sufficient;  yet  in 
thy  acts  it  is  not  so,  but  thou  stoppest  short  of  what  thou 
canst  do.  So  thou  lovest  not  thyself,  for  if  thou  didsf,  thou 
wouldst  love  thy  nature  and  her  will.  But  those  who  love 
their  several  arts  exhaust  themselves  in  working  at  them  un- 
washed and  without  food;  but  thou  valuest  thy  own  nature 
less  than  the  turner  values  the  turning  art,  or  the  dancer  the 
dancing  art,  or  the  lover  of  money  values  his  money,  or  the 
vainglorious  man  his  little  glory.  And  such  men,  when  they 
have  a  violent  affection  to  a  thing,  choose  neither  to  eat  nor 
to  sleep  rather  than  to  perfect  the  things  which  they  care 
for.  But  are  the  acts  which  concern  society  more  vile  in 
thy  eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy  labour? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away  every  impres- 
sion which  is  troublesome  or  unsuitable,  and  immediately  to 
be  in  all  tranquillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  are  according  to  na- 
ture to  be  fit  for  thee ;  and  be  not  diverted  by  the  blame  which 
follows  from  any  people,  nor  by  their  words,  but  if  a  thing  is 
good  to  be  done  or  said,  do  not  consider  it  unworthy  of  thee. 
For  those  persons  have  their  peculiar  leading  principle  and 
follow  their  peculiar  movement ;  which  things  do  not  thou  re- 
gard, but  go  straight  on,  following  thy  own  nature  and  the 
common  nature;  and  the  way  of  both  is  one. 

4.  I  go  through  the  things  which  happen  according  to 
nature  until  I  shall  fall  and  rest,  breathing  out  my  breath 
into  that  element  out  of  which  I  daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling 
upon  that  earth  out  of  which  my  father  collected  the  seed, 
and  my  mother  the  blood,  and  my  nurse  the  milk;  out  of 
which  during  so  many  5'ears  I  have  been  supplied  with  food 
and  drink;  which  bears  me  when  I  tread  on  it  and  abuse  it 
for  so  many  purposes. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       225 

•5.  Thou  sayest,  men  cannot  admire  the  sharpness  of  thy 
^its. — Be  it  so;  but  there  are  many  other  things  of  which 
thou  canst  not  say,  I  am  not  formed  for  them  by  nature. 
Show  those  quahties  then  which  are  altogether  in  thy  power : 
sincerity,  gravity,  endurance  of  labour,  aversion  to  pleasure, 
contentment  with  thy  portion  and  with  few  things,  be- 
nevolence, frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity,  freedom  from 
trifling  magnanimity.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  many  qualities 
thou  art  immediately  able  to  exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no 
excuse  of  natural  incapacity  and  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still 
remainest  voluntarily  below  the  mark?  or  art  thou  compelled 
through  being  defectively  furnished  by  nature  to  murmur, 
and  to  be  stingy,  and  to  flatter,  and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor 
body,  and  to  try  to  please  men,  and  to  make  great  display, 
and  to  be  restless  in  thy  mind?  No,  by  the  gods:  but  thou 
mightest  have  been  delivered  from  these  things  long  ago. 
Only  if  in  truth  thou  canst  be  charged  with  being  rather  slow 
and  dull  of  comprehension,  thou  must  exert  thyself  about 
this  also,  not  neglecting  it  nor  yet  taking  pleasure  in  thy 
dullness. 

6.  One  m.an,  when  he  has  done  a  service  to  another,  is 
ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account  as  a  favour  conferred. 
Another  is  not  ready  to  do  this,  but  still  in  his  own  mind  he 
thinks  of  the  man  as  his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he  has 
done.  A  third  in  a  manner  does  not  even  know  what  he  has 
done,  but  he  is  like  a  vine  which  has  produced  grapes,  and 
seeks  for  nothing  more  after  it  has  once  produced  its  proper 
fruit.  As  a  horse  when  he  has  run,  a  dog  v/hen  he  has  tracked 
the  game,  a  bee  when  it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a  man 
when  he  has  done  a  good  act,  does  not  call  out  for  others 
to  come  and  see,  but  he  goes  on  to  another  act,  as  a  vine  goes 
on  to  produce  again  the  grapes  in  season. — Must  a  man  then 
be  one  of  these,  who  in  a  manner  act  thus  without  observing 
it? — Yes. — But  this  very  thing  is  necessary,  the  observation 
of  what  a  man  Is  doing;  for  it  may  be  said,  it  is  characteristic 
of  the  social  animal  to  perceive  that  he  is  working  in  a  social 
manner,  and  indeed  to  wish  that  his  social  partner  also  should 
perceive  it. — It  is  true  what  thou  sayest,  but  thou  dost  not 
rightly  understand  what  is  now  said;  and  for  this  reason 
thou  wilt  become  one  of  those  of  whom  I  spoke  before,  for 

8  HC— Vol.  2 


226      THE  MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

even  they  are  misled  by  a  certain  show  of  reason.  But  ii: 
thou  wilt  choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is  said, 
do  not  fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt  omit  any  social  act. 

7.  A  prayer  of  the  Athenians:  Rain,  rain,  O  dear  Zeus, 
down  on  the  plowed  fields  of  the  Athenians  and  on  the  plains. — 
In  truth  we  ought  not  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray  in 
this  simple  and  noble  fashion. 

8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is  said,  That  ^scu- 
lapius  prescribed  to  this  man  horse-exercise,  or  bathing  in 
cold  water,  or  going  without  shoes,  so  we  must  understand 
it  when  it  is  said,  That  the  nature  of  the  universe  prescribed 
to  this  man  disease  or  mutilation  or  loss  or  anything  else 
of  the  kind.  For  in  the  first  case  prescribed  means  something 
like  this :  he  prescribed  this  for  this  man  as  a  thing  adapted 
to  procure  health;  and  in  the  second  case  it  means.  That 
which  happens  to  [or  suits]  every  man  is  fixed  in  a  manner 
for  him  suitably  to  his  destiny.  For  this  is  what  we  mean 
when  we  say  that  things  are  suitable  to  us,  as  the  workmen 
say  of  squared  stones  in  walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are 
suitable,  vv^hen  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some  kind  of 
connection.  For  there  is  altogether  one  fitness  [harmony]. 
And  as  the  universe  is  made  up  out  of  all  bodies  to  be  such 
a  body  as  it  is,  so  out  of  all  existing  causes  necessity  [destiny] 
is  made  up  to  be  such  a  cause  as  it  is.  And  even  those  who 
are  completely  ignorant  understand  what  I  mean,  for  they 
say,  It  [necessity,  destiny]  brought  this  to  such  a  person. 
— This,  then,  was  brought  and  this  was  prescribed  to  him. 
Let  us  then  receive  these  things,  as  well  as  those  which  TEscu- 
lapius  prescribes.  Many,  as  a  matter  of  course,  even  among 
his  prescriptions,  are  disagreeable,  but  v/e  accept  them  in 
the  hope  of  health.  Let  the  perfecting  and  accomplishment 
of  the  things,  which  the  common  nature  judges  to  be  good, 
be  judged  by  thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as  thy  health.  And 
so  accept  everything  which  happens,  even  if  it  seem  dis- 
agreeable, because  it  leads  to  this,  to  the  health  of  the 
universe  and  to  the  prosperity  and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the 
universe] .  For  he  would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what 
he  has  brought,  if  it  were  not  useful  for  the  whole.  Neithef 
does  the  nature  of  anything,  whatever  it  may  be,  cause 
anything  which  is  not  suitable  to  that  which  is  directed  by  it 


THE  MEDITATIONS   OF  MARCUS   AURELIUS      227 

For  two  reasons,  theu,  it  is  right  to  be  content  with  that 
which  happens  to  thee ;  the  one,  because  it  was  done  for  thee 
and  prescribed  for  thee,  and  in  a  manner  had  reference  to  thee, 
originally  from  the  most  ancient  causes  spun  with  thy  destiny ; 
and  the  other,  because  even  that  which  comes  severally  to 
every  man  is  to  the  power  which  administers  the  universe  a 
cause  of  felicity  and  perfection,  nay  even  of  its  very  con- 
tinuance. For  the  integrity  of  the  whole  is  mutilated,  if 
thou  cuttest  oft  anything  whatever  from  the  conjunction  and 
the  continuity  either  of  the  parts  or  of  the  causes.  And  thou 
dost  cut  off,  as  far  as  it  is  in  thy  power,  when  thou  art 
dissatisfied,  and  in  a  manner  triest  to  put  anything  out  of  the 
way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor  dissatisfied,  if 
thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing  everything  according  to  right 
principles ;  but  V\7hen  thou  hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and 
be  content  if  the  greater  part  of  what  thou  doest  is  con- 
sistent with  man's  nature,  and  love  this  to  which  thou  re- 
turnest;  and  do  not  return  to  philosophy  as  if  she  were  a 
master,  but  act  like  those  who  have  sore  eyes  and  apply  a 
bit  of  sponge  and  egg,  or  as  another  applies  a  plaster,  or 
drenching  with  water.  For  thus  thou  wilt  not  fail  to  obey 
reason  and  thou  wilt  repose  in  it.  And  remember  that  phi- 
losophy requires  only  the  things  which  thy  nature  requires; 
but  thou  wouldst  have  something  else  which  is  not  according 
to  nature.  It  may  be  objected.  Why,  what  is  more  agree- 
able  than  this  [which  I  am  doing]  ?  But  is  not  this  the  very 
reason  why  pleasure  deceives  us?  And  consider  if  magna- 
nimity, freedom,  simplicity,  equanimity,  piety  are  not  more 
agreeable.  For  what  is  m.ore  agreeable  than  wisdom  itself, 
when  thou  thinkest  of  the  security  and  the  happy  course  of 
all  things  which  depend  on  the  faculty  of  understanding 
and  knowledge? 

10.  Things  are  in  such  a  kind  of  envelopment  that  they 
have  seemed  to  philosophers,  not  a  few  nor  those  common 
philosophers,  altogether  unintelligible ;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics 
themselves  they  seem  difficult  to  understand.  And  all  our  as- 
sent is  changeable;  for  where  is  the  man  who  never  changes? 
Carry  thy  thoughts  then  to  the  objects  themselves,  and  con- 
sider how  short-lived  they  are  and  worthless,  and  that  they 


228      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

may  be  in  the  possession  of  a  filthy  wretch  or  a  whore  or  a 
robber.  Then  turn  to  the  morals  of  those  vdio  live  with 
thee,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the  most  agree- 
able of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a  man  being  hardly  able  to 
endure  himself.  In  such  darkness  then,  and  dirt,  and  in  so 
constant  a  flux,  both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of  m.otion, 
and  of  things  moved,  what  there  is  worth  being  highly  prized, 
or  even  an  object  of  serious  pursuit,  I  cannot  imagine.  But 
on  the  contrary  it  is  a  man's  duty  to  comfort  himself,  and 
to  wait  for  the  natural  dissolution  and  not  to  be  vexed  at 
the  delay,  but  to  rest  in  these  principles  only:  the  one,  that 
nothing  will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  conformable  to  the 
nature  of  the  universe ;  and  the  other,  that  it  is  in  my  power 
never  to  act  contrary  to  my  god  and  daemon:  for  there  is 
no  man  who  will  compel  me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I  now  employing  my  own  soul?  On 
every  occasion  I  must  ask  myself  this  question,  and  inquire, 
what  have  I  now  in  this  part  of  me  which  they  call  the  ruling 
principle?  and  whose  soul  have  I  now?  that  of  a  child,  or 
of  a  young  man^  or  of  a  feeble  woman,  or  of  a  tyrant,  or  of 
a  domestic  animal,  or  of  a  wild  beast 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  appear  good  to  the 
many,  we  may  learn  even  from  this.  For  if  any  man  should 
conceive  certain  things  as  being  really  good,  such  as  pru- 
dence, temperance,  justice,  fortitude,  he  would  not  after  hav- 
ing first  conceived  these  endure  to  listen  to  anything  which 
should  not  be  in  harmony  with  what  is  really  good.  But 
if  a  man  has  first  conceived  as  good  the  things  which  appear 
to  the  many  to  be  good,  he  will  listen  and  readily  receive  as 
very  applicable  that  which  v^^as  said  by  the  comic  writer. 
Thus  even  the  many  perceive  the  difference.  For  were  it 
not  so,  this  saying  would  not  offend  and  would  not  be  re- 
jected [in  the  first  case],  while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said 
of  wealth,  and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury  and  fame, 
as  said  fitly  and  wittily.  Go  on  then  and  ask  if  we  should 
value  and  think  those  things  to  be  good,  to  which  after  their 
first  conception  in  the  mind  the  words  of  the  comic  writer 
might  be  aptly  applied — that  he  who  has  them,  through  pure 
abundance  has  not  a  place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I  am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the  material;  and 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS        229 

neither  of  them  will  perish  into  non-existence,  as  neither  of 
them  came  into  existence  out  of  non-existence.  Every  part 
of  me  then  will  be  reduced  by  change  into  some  part  of  the 
universe,  and  that  again  will  change  into  another  part  of  the 
universe,  and  so  on  forever.  And  by  consequence  of  such  a 
change  I  too  exist,  and  those  who  begot  me,  and  so  on  forever 
in  the  other  direction.  For  nothing  hinders  us  from  saying 
so,  even  if  the  universe  is  administered  according  to  definite 
periods  [of  revolution]. 

14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philosophy]  are  powers 
which  are  sufficient  for  themselves  and  for  their  own  works. 
They  move  then  from  a  first  principle  which  is  their  own,  and 
they  make  their  way  to  the  end  which  is  proposed  to  them; 
and  this  is  the  reason  why  such  acts  are  named  Catorthoseis 
or  right  acts,  which  word  signifies  that  they  proceed  by  the 
right  road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a  mean's  which 
do  not  belong  to  a  man,  as  man.  They  are  not  required  ol 
a  man,  nor  does  man's  nature  promise  them,  nor  are  they  the 
means  of  man's  nature  attaining  its  end.  Neither  then  does 
the  end  of  man  lie  in  these  things,  nor  yet  that  which  aids 
to  the  accomplishment  of  this  end,  and  that  which  aids 
tow^ard  this  end  is  that  which  is  good.  Besides,  if  any  of  these 
things  did  belong  to  man,  it  would  not  be  right  for  a  man 
to  despise  them  and  to  set  himself  against  them;  nor  would 
a  man  be  worthy  of  praise  who  showed  that  he  did  not  want 
these  things,  nor  would  he  who  stinted  himself  in  any  of  them 
be  good,  if  indeed  these  things  were  good.  But  now  the 
m.ore  of  these  things  a  man  deprives  himself  of,  or  of  other 
things  like  them,  or  even  when  he  is  deprived  of  any  of  them, 
the  more  patiently  he  endures  the  loss,  just  in  the  same  de- 
gree he  is  a  better  man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such  also  will  he  the 
character  of  thy  mind;  for  the  soul  is  dyed  by  the  thoughts. 
Dye  it  then  with  a  continuous  series  of  such  thoughts  as 
these:  for  instance,  that  where  a  man  can  live,  there  he  can 
also  live  well.  But  he  must  live  in  a  palace — well  then,  he 
can  also  live  well  in  a  palace.  And  again,  consider  that  for 
whatever  purpose  each  thing  has  been  constituted,  for  this 
it  has  been  constituted,  and  toward  this  it  is  carried ;  and  its 


230      THE  MEDITATIONS   OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

end  is  in  that  toward  which  it  is  carried ;  and  where  the  end 
is,  there  also  is  the  advantage  and  the  good  of  each  thing. 
Now  the  good  for  the  reasonable  animal  is  society;  for  that 
w^e  are  made  for  society  has  been  shown  above.  Is  it  not 
plain  that  the  inferior  exist  for  the  sake  of  the  superior? 
but  the  things  which  have  life  are  superior  to  those  which 
have  not  life,  and  of  those  which  have  life  the  superior  are 
those  which  have  reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness:  and  it  is  im- 
possible that  the  bad  should  not  do  something  of  this  kind. 

18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  m^an  which  he  is  not  formed 
by  nature  to  bear.  The  same  things  happen  to  another,  and 
either  because  he  does  not  see  that  they  have  happened  or 
because  he  v/ould  show  a  great  spirit  he  is  firm  and  remains 
unharm^ed.  ,It  is  a  shame  then  that  ignorance  and  conceit 
should  be  stronger  than  vv^isdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul,  not  in  the  least 
degree;  nor  have  they  admission  to  the  soul,  nor  can  they 
turn  or  move  the  soul:  but  the  soul  turns  and  moves  itself 
alone,  and  whatever  judgm.ents  it  may  think  proper  to  make, 
such  it  makes  for  itself  the  things  which  present  themselves 
to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing  to  me,  so  far 
as  I  must  do  good  to  men  and  endure  them.  But  so  far  as 
some  men  make  themselves  obstacles  to  my  proper  acts, 
man  becomes  to  me  one  of  the  things  which  are  indifferent, 
no  less  than  the  sun  or  wind  or  a  wild  beast.  Now  it  is  true 
that  these  may  impede  my  action,  but  they  are  no  impedi- 
ments to  my  affects  and  disposition,  which  have  the  power 
of  acting  conditionally  and  changing:  for  the  mind  converts 
and  changes  every  hindrance  to  its  activity  into  an  aid ;  and  so 
that  which  is  a  hindrance  is  made  a  furtherance  to  an  act ;  and 
that  which  is  an  obstacle  on  the  road  helps  us  on  this  road. 

21.  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  universe;  and  this 
is  that  which  makes  use  of  all  things  and  directs  all  things. 
And  in  like  manner  also  reverence  that  which  is  best  in  thy- 
self; and  this  of  the  same  kind  as  that.  For  in  thyself  also, 
that  which  makes  use  of  everything  else,  is  this,  and  thy  life 
is  directed  by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state,  does  no  harm  to 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS      231 

the  citizen.  In  the  case  of  every  appearance  of  harm  apply  this 
rule :  if  the  state  is  not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I  harmed. 
But  if  the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must  not  be  angry  with  him 
who  does  harm  to  the  state.     Show  him  where  his  error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which  things  pass  by 
and  disappear,  both  the  things  which  are  and  the  things 
which  are  produced.  For  substance  is  like  a  river  in  a  con- 
tinual flow,  and  the  activities  of  things  are  in  constant 
change,  and  the  causes  work  in  infinite  varieties ;  and  there 
is  hardly  anything  which  stands  still.  And  consider  this 
which  is  near  to  thee,  this  boundless  abyss  of  the  past  and 
of  the  future  in  which  all  things  disappear.  How  then  is 
he  not  a  fool  who  is  puffed  up  with  such  things  or  plagued 
about  them  or  makes  himself  miserable?  for  they  vex  him 
only  for  a  time,  and  a  short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of  which  thou  hast 
a  very  small  portion ;  and  of  universal  time,  of  which  a  short 
and  indivisible  interval  has  been  assigned  to  thee ;  and  of  that 
which  is  fixed  by  destin}'',  and  how  small  a  part  of  it  thou  art. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong?  Let  him  look  to  it.  He 
has  his  own  disposition^  his  own  activity.  I  now  have  what 
the  universal  nature  wills  me  to  have;  and  I  do  what  my 
nature  now  wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and  governs  be 
undisturbed  by  the  movements  in  the  flesh,  v\^hether  of 
pleasure  or  of  pain;  and  let  it  not  unite  with  them,  but  let 
it  circumscribe  itself  and  limit  those  affects  to  their  parts. 
But  when  these  affects  rise  up  to  the  mind  by  virtue  of  that 
other  sympathy  that  naturally  exists  in  a  body  which  is  all 
one,  then  thou  must  not  strive  to  resist  the  sensation,  for 
it  is  natural :  but  let  not  the  ruling  part  of  itself  add  to  the 
sensation  the  opinion  that  it  is  either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the  gods 
who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied 
with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  that 
the  daemion  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man  for 
his  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself.  And  this  is 
every  man's  understanding  and  reason. 

28.  Art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  arm-pits  stink?  art 
thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth  smells  foul  ?    What  good 


232      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

will  this  anger  do  thee  ?  He  has  such  a  mouth,  he  has  such 
arm-pits:  it  is  necessary  that  such  an  emanation  must  come 
from  such  things — but  the  man  has  reason,  it  will  be  said, 
and  he  is  able,  if  he  takes  pains,  to  discover  wherein  he 
offends — I  wish  thee  well  of  thy  discovery.  Well,  then,  and 
thou  hast  reason :  by  thy  rational  faculty  stir  up  his  rational 
faculty ;  show  him.  his  error,  admonish  him.  For  if  he  listens, 
thou  wilt  cure  him,  and  there  is  no  need  of  anger.  [Neither 
tragic  actor  nor  whore.^  ] 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  are  gone  out,  .  .  . 
so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live  here.  But  if  men  do  not  permit 
thee,  then  get  away  out  of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffer- 
ing no  harm.  The  house  is  smoky,  and  I  quit  it.  Why  dost 
thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble?  But  so  long  as  nothing 
of  the  kind  drives  me  out,  I  remain,  am  free,  and  no  man 
shall  hinder  me  from  doing  what  I  choose;  and  I  choose 
to  do  what  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the  rational  and 
social  anim-al. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social.  Accordingly 
it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior, 
and  it  has  fitted  the  superior  to  one  another.  Thou  seest 
how  it  has  subordinated,  co-ordinated  and  assigned  to  every- 
thing its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought  together  into  con- 
cord with  one  another  the  things  which  are  the  best. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the  gods,  thy 
parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers,  to  those  who  looked 
after  thy  infancy,  to  thy  friends,  kinsfolk,  to  thy  slaves? 
Consider  if  thou  hast  hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a  way 
that  this  may  be  said  of  thee : 

Never  has  wronged  a  man  in  deed  or  word. 

And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things  thou  hast 
passed  through,  and  how  many  things  thou  hast  been  able 
to  endure:  and  that  the  history  of  thy  life  is  nov/  complete, 
and  thy  service  is  ended:  and  how  many  beautiful  things 
thou  hast  seen :  and  how  many  pleasures  and  pains  thou  hast 
despised;  and  how  many  things  called  honourable  thou  hast 
spurned;  and  to  how  many  ill-minded  folks  thou  hast  shown 
a  kind  disposition. 

^  This  sentence  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUREOUS       233 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls  disturb  him  who 
has  skill  and  knowledge?  What  soul  then  has  skill  and 
knowledge?  That  which  knows  beginning  and  end,  and 
knows  the  reason  which  pervades  all  substance  and  through 
all  time  by  fixed  periods  [revolutions]  administers  the  uni- 
verse. 

33.  Soon,  very  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or  a  skeleton, 
and  either  a  name  or  not  even  a  name;  but  name  is  sound 
and  echo,  and  the  things  which  are  much  valued  in  life  are 
empty  and  rotten  and  trifling,  and  [like]  little  dogs  biting 
one  another,  and  little  children  quarrelling,  laughing,  and 
then  straightv/ay  weeping.  But  fidelity  and  modesty  and  jus- 
tice and  truth  are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

Hesiod,  Works,  etc.,  v.  197. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee  here?  if 
the  objects  of  sense  are  easily  changed  and  never  stand  still, 
and  the  organs  of  perception  are  dull  and  easily  receive  false 
impressions;  and  the  poor  soul  itself  is  an  exhalation  from 
blood.  But  to  have  good  repute  amid  such  a  world  as  this 
is  an  empty  thing.  Why  then  dost  thou  not  wait  in  tran- 
quillity for  thy  end,  whether  it  is  extinction  or  removal  to 
another  state?  And  until  that  time  comes,  what  is  sufficient? 
Why,  what  else  than  to  venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them, 
and  to  do  good  to  men,  and  to  practice  tolerance  and  self- 
restraint;  but  as  to  everything  which  is  beyond  the  limits 
of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath,  to  remember  that  this  is  neither 
thine  nor  in  thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable  flow  of  happi- 
ness, if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right  way,  and  think  and  act  in 
the  right  way.  These  two  things  are  common  both  to  the 
soul  of  God  and  to  the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul  of  every 
rational  being,  not  to  be  hindered  by  another;  and  to  hold 
good  to  consist  in  the  disposition  to  justice  and  the  practice 
of  it,  and  in  this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its  termination. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor  an  effect  of  my 
own  badness,  and  the  common  weal  is  not  injured,  why  am 
I  troubled  about  it?  and  what  is  the  harm  to  the  common 
weal  ?  ^ 

36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately  by  the  appear- 


234      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

ance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to  all]  according  to  thy  ability 
and  their  fitness;  and  if  they  should  have  sustained  loss  in 
matters  wl^ch  are  indifferent,  do  not  imagine  this  to  be  a 
damage.  For  it  is  a  bad  habit.  But  as  the  old  man,  when 
he  went  away,  asked  back  his  foster-child's  top,  remember- 
ing that  it  was  a  top,  so  do  thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Rostra,  hast  thou  for- 
gotten, man,  what  these  things  are?  Yes;  but  they  are 
objects  of  great  concern  to  these  people- — wilt  thou  too  then 
be  made  a  fool  for  these  things?  I  was  once  a  fortunate 
man,  but  I  lost  it,  I  know  not  how.  But  fortunate  means 
that  a  man  has  assigned  to  himself  a  good  fortune;  and  a 
good  fortune  is  good  disposition  of  the  soul,  good  emotions, 
good  actions, 

VI 

f  I  "^HE  substance  of  the  universe  is  obedient  and  complin 
ant;  and  the  reason  which  governs  it  has  in  itself 
no  cause  for  doing  evil,  for  it  has  no  malice,  nor  does 
it  do  evil  to  anything,  nor  is  anything  harmed  by  it.  But 
all  things  are  made  and  perfected  according  to  this  reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether  thou  art  cold 
or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy  duty;  and  whether  thou  art 
drowsy  or  satisfied  with  sleep;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of 
or  praised ;  and  whether  dying  or  doing  something  else.  For 
it  is  one  of  the  acts  of  this  life,  this  act  by  which  we 
die;  it  is  sufficient  then  in  this  act  also  to  do  well  what  we 
have  in  hand  (vi.  22,  28). 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar  quality  of  any- 
thing nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and  they  will  either 
be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed  all  substance  is  one,  or  they 
will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what  its  own  dis- 
position is,  and  what  it  does,  and  on  what  material  it  works. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not  to  become  like 
[the  wrong  doer]. 

7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it,  in  passing 
from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act,  thinking  of  God. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS       235 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses  and  turns 
itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such  as  it  is  and  such  as 
it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes  everything  which  happens  appear 
to  itself  to  be  such  as  it  wills. 

9.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  universe  every  single 
thing  is  accomplished,  for  certainly  it  is  not  in  conformity 
to  any  other  nature  that  each  thing  is  accomplished,  either  a 
nature  which  externally  comprehends  this,  or  a  nature  which 
is  comprehended  within  this  nature,  or  a  nature  external 
and  independent  of  this  (xi.  i,  vi.  40,  viii.  50). 

10.  The  universe  is  either  a  confusion,  and  a  mutual  in- 
volution of  things,  and  a  dispersion ;  or  it  is  unity  and  order 
and  providence.  If  then  it  is  the  former,  why  do  I  desire 
to  tarry  in  a  fortuitous  combination  of  things  and  such  a 
disorder?  and  why  do  I  care  about  anything  else  than  how 
I  shall  at  last  become  earth?  and  why  am  I  disturbed,  for 
the  dispersion  of  my  elements  will  happen  whatever  I  do. 
But  if  the  other  supposition  is  true,  I  venerate,  and  I  am 
firm,  and  I  trust  in  him  who  governs   (iv.  27). 

11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  by  circumstances  to 
be  disturbed  in  a  manner,  quickly  return  to  thyself  and  do 
not  continue  out  of  tune  longer  than  the  com.pulsion  lasts; 
for  thou  wilt  have  more  mastery  over  the  harmony  by  con- 
tinually recurring  to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hast  a  step-mother  and  a  mother  at  the  same 
time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to  thy  step-mother,  but  still 
thou  w^ouldst  constantly  return  to  thy  mother.  Lei:  the 
court  and  philosophy  now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and  mother ; 
return  to  philosophy  frequently  and  repose  in  her,  through 
whom  what  thou  meetest  with  in  the  court  appears  to  thee 
tolerable,  and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in  the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such  eatables,  we 
receive  the  impression,  that  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a  fish, 
and  this  is  the  dead  body  of  a  bird  or  of  a  pig;  and  again, 
that  this  Falernian  is  only  a  little  grape  juice,  and  this 
purple  robe  some  sheep's  wool  dyed  with  the  blood  of  a 
shell-fish;  such  then  are  these  impressions,  and  they  reach 
the  things  themselves  and  penetrate  them,  and  so  we  see 
what  kind  of  things  they  are.  Just  in  the  same  way  ought 
we  to  act  aU  through  life,  and  where  there  are  things  which 


236      THE   MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

appear  most  worthy  of  our  approbation,  we  ought  to 
lay  them  bare  and  look  at  their  worthlessness,  and  strip 
them  of  all  the  words  by  which  they  are  exalted.  For 
outward  show  is  a  wonderful  perverter  of  the  reason, 
and  when  thou  art  most  sure  that  thou  art  employed 
about  things  worth  thy  pains,  it  is  then  that  it  cheats 
thee  most.  Consider  then  what  Crates  says  of  Xenocrates 
himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude  admire  are 
referred  to  objects  of  the  most  general  kind,  those  which 
are  held  together  by  cohesion  or  natural  organization,  such 
as  stones,  wood,  fig-trees,  vines,  olives.  But  those  which 
are  admired  by  men,  who  are  a  little  more  reasonable,  are 
referred  to  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  a  living 
principle,  as  flocks,  herds.  Those  which  are  admired  by  men 
who  are  still  more  instructed  are  the  things  which  are  held 
together  by  a  rational  soul,  not  however  a  universal  soul, 
but  rational  so  far  as  it  is  a  soul  skilled  in  some  art,  or 
expert  in  some  other  v/ay,  or  simply  rational  so  far  as  it 
possesses  a  number  of  slaves.  But  he  who  values  a  rational 
soul,  a  soul  universal  and  fitted  for  political  life,  regards 
nothing  else  except  this;  and  above  all  things  he  keeps  his 
soul  in  a  condition  and  in  an  activity  conformable  to  reason 
and  social  life,  and  he  co-operates  to  this  end  with  those  who 
are  of  the  same  kind  as  himself. 

15.  Som.e  things  are  hurrying  into  existence,  and  others 
are  hurrying  out  of  it ;  and  of  that  which  is  coming  into  ex- 
istence part  is  already  extinguished.  Motions  and  changes 
are  continually  renewing  the  world,  just  as  the  uninterrupted 
course  of  time  is  always  renewing  the  infinite  duration  of 
ages.  In  this  ilowing  stream  then,  on  which  there  is  no 
abiding,  v/hat  is  there  of  the  things  which  hurry  by  on  which 
a  man  would  set  a  high  price?  It  would  be  just  as  if  a 
man  should  fall  in  love  with  one  of  the  sparrows  which  ^y 
by,  but  it  has  already  passed  out  of  sight.  Something  of  this 
kind  is  the  very  life  of  every  man,  like  the  exhalation  of  the 
blood  and  the  respiration  of  the  air.  For  such  as  it  is  to 
have  once  drawn  in  the  air  and  to  have  given  it  back,  which 
we  do  every  moment,  just  the  same  is  it  with  the  whole 
respiratory  power,   which  thou  didst  receive   at  thy  birth 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      237 

yesterday  and  the  day  before,  to  give  it  back  to  the  element 
from  which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 

i6.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a  thing  to  be 
valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in  domesticated  animals  and  wild 
beasts,  nor  the  receiving  of  impressions  by  the  appearances 
of  things,  nor  being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets  by  strings, 
nor  assembling  in  herds,  nor  being  nourished  by  food;  for 
this  is  just  like  the  act  of  separating  and  parting  with  the 
useless  part  of  our  food.  What  then  is  worth  being  valued? 
To  be  received  with  clapping  of  hands  ?  No.  Neither  must  we 
value  the  clapping  of  tongues,  for  the  praise  which  comes  from 
the  many  is  a  clapping  of  tongues.  Suppose  then  that  thou 
hast  given  up  this  worthless  thing  called  fame,  what  remains 
that  is  worth  valuing?  This,  in  my  opinion,  to  move  thyself 
and  to  restrain  thyself  in  conformity  to  thy  proper  constitu- 
tion, to  which  end  both  all  employm^ents  and  arts  lead.  For 
every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the  thing  which  has  been  made 
should  be  adapted  to  the  work  for  which  it  has  been  made; 
and  both  the  vine-planter  who  looks  after  the  vine,  and  the 
horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  the  dog,  seek  this  end. 
But  the  education  and  the  teaching  of  youth  aim  at  some- 
thing. In  this  then  is  the  value  of  the  education  and  the 
teaching.  And  if  this  is  well,  thou  wilt  not  seek  anything 
else.  Wilt  thou  not  cease  to  value  many  other  things  too? 
Then  thou  wilt  be  neither  free,  nor  sufficient  for  thy  own 
happiness,  nor  without  passion.  For  of  necessity  thou  must 
be  envious,  jealous,  and  suspicious  of  those  who  can  take 
away  those  things,  and  plot  against  those  who  have  that 
which  is  valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a  man  must  be  alto- 
gether in  a  state  of  perturbation  who  wants  any  of  these 
things;  and  besides,  he  must  often  fimd  fault  with  the  gods. 
But  to  reverence  and  honour  thy  own  mind  will  make  thee 
content  with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society,  and  in 
agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  praising  all  that  they  give 
and  have  ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  movements  of  the 
elements.  But  the  motion  of  virtue  is  in  none  of  these;  it 
is  something  more  divine,  and  advancing  by  a  way  hardly 
observed  it  goes  happily  on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act.    They  will  not  praise  those 


238      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

who  are  living  at  the  same  time  and  living  with  themselves ; 
but  to  be  themselves  praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom 
they  have  never  seen  or  ever  will  see,  this  they  set  much 
value  on.  But  this  is  very  much  the  same  as  if  thou  shouldst 
be  grieved  because  those  who  have  lived  before  thee  did  not 
praise  thee. 

19.  If  a  thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished  by  thyself, 
do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible  for  m.an;  but  if  anything 
is  possible  for  m.an  and  conformable  to  his  nature,  think 
that  this  can  be  attained  by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that  a  man  has 
torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by  dashing  against  thy  head 
has  inflicted  a  wound.  Well,  we  neither  show  any  signs  of 
vexation,  nor  are  we  offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him  after- 
ward as  a  treacherous  fellow ;  and  yet  we  are  on  our  guard 
against  him,  not  however  as  an  enemy,  nor  yet  with  suspicion, 
but  we  quietly  get  out  of  his  way.  Something  like  this  let  thy 
behaviour  be  in  all  the  other  parts  of  life;  let  us  overlook 
many  things  in  those  who  are  like  antagonists  in  the  gym- 
nasium. For  it  is  in  our  power,  as  I  said,  to  get  out  of 
the  way,  and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred. 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and  show  me  that 
I  do  not  think  or  act  right,  I  will  gladly  change;  for  I  seek 
the  truth  by  which  no  man  was  ever  injured.  But  he  is  in- 
jured who  abides  in  his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I  do  my  duty:  other  things  trouble  me  not;  for  they 
are  either  things  without  life,  or  things  without  reason,  or 
things  that  have  rambled  and  know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animxals  which  have  no  reason,  and  generally 
all  things  and  objects,  do  thou,  since  thou  hast  reason  and 
they  have  none,  make  use  of  them  with  a  generous  and 
liberal  spirit.  But  toward  human  beings,  as  they  have 
reason,  behave  in  a  social  spirit.  And  on  all  occasions  call 
on  the  gods,  and  do  not  perplex  thyself  about  the  length 
of  time  in  which  thou  shalt  do  this;  for  even  three  hours 
so  spent  are  sufficient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom  by  death 
were  brought  to  the  same  state ;  for  either  they  were  received 
among  the  same  seminal  principles  of  the  universe,  ©r  they 
were  alike  dispersed  among  the  atoms. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS      239 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same  indivisible 
time  take  place  in  each  of  us,  things  which  concern  the  body 
and  things  which  concern  the  soul;  and  so  thou  wilt  not 
wonder  if  many  more  things,  or  rather  all  things  which  come 
into  existence  in  that  which  is  the  one  and  all,  which  we 
call  Cosmos,  exist  in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the  question,  how 
the  name  Antoninus  is  written,  wouldst  thou  with  a  straining 
of  the  voice  utter  each  letter?  What  then  if  they  grow 
angry,  wilt  thou  be  angry  too?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on  with 
composure  and  number  every  letter?  Just  so  then  in  this 
life  also  remember  that  every  duty  is  made  up  of  certain 
parts.  These  it  is  thy  duty  to  observe  and  without  being 
disturbed  or  showing  anger  toward  those  who  are  angry 
with  thee  to  go  on  thy  way  and  finish  that  which  is  set  before 
thee. 

2.y,  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive  after  the 
things  which  appear  to  them  to  be  suitable  to  their  nature 
and  profitable !  And  yet  in  a  manner  thou  dost  not  allow 
them  to  do  this,  when  thou  art  vexed  because  they  do  wrong. 
For  they  are  certainly  moved  toward  things  because  they 
suppose  them  to  be  suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable 
to  them.  But  it  is  not  so.  Teach  them  then,  and  show  them 
without  being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a  cessation  of  the  impressions  through  the 
senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which  move  the  ap- 
petites, and  of  the  discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts, 
and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh  (ii.  12). 

29.  It  is  a  shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to  give  way  in  this 
life,  when  thy  body  does  not  give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a  Caesar, 
that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye;  for  such 
things  happen.  Keep  thyself  then  simple,  good,  pure, 
serious,  free  from  affectation,  a  friend  of  justice,  a  worshiper 
of  the  gods,  kind,  affectionate,  strenuous  in  all  proper  acts. 
Strive  to  continue  to  be  such  as  philosophy  wished  to  make 
thee.  Reverence  the  gods,  and  help  men.  Short  is  life. 
There  is  only  one  fruit  of  this  terrene  life,  a  pious  disposition 
and  social  acts.  Do  everything  as  a  disciple  of  Antoninus. 
Remember  his  constancy  in  every  act  .which  was  conformable 


240      THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

to  reason,  and  his  evenness  in  all  things,  and  his  piety,  and 
the  serenity  of  his  countenance,  and  his  sweetness,  and  his 
disregard  of  empty  fame,  and  his  efforts  to  understand 
things;  and  how  he  would  never  let  anything  pass  without 
having  first  most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly  under- 
stood it;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who  blamed  him  un- 
justly without  blaming  them  in  return;  how  he  did  nothing 
in  a  hurry;  and  how  he  listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how 
exact  an  examiner  of  manners  and  actions  he  was;  and  not 
given  to  reproach  people,  nor  timid,  nor  suspicious,  nor  a 
sophist ;  and  with  how  little  he  was  satisfied,  such  as  lodging, 
bed,  dress,  food,  servants;  and  how  laborious  and  patient; 
and  how  he  was  able  on  account  of  his  sparing  diet  to  hold 
out  to  the  evening,  not  even  requiring  to  relieve  himself  by 
any  evacuations  except  at  the  usual  hour;  and  his  firmness 
and  uniformity  in  his  friendships;  and  how  he  tolerated 
freedom  of  speech  in  those  who  opposed  his  opinions; 
and  the  pleasure  that  he  had  when  any  man  showed  him 
anything  better;  and  how  religious  he  was  without 
superstition.  Imitate  all  this  that  thou  mayest  have  as 
good  a  conscience,  when  thy  last  hour  comes,  as  he  had 
(i.  i6). 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thyself  back;  and 
when  thou  hast  roused  thyself  from  sleep  and  hast  perceived 
that  they  were  only  dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy 
waking  hours  look  at  these  [the  things  about  thee]  as  thou 
didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I  consist  of  a  little  body  and  a  soul.  Now  to  this  little 
body  all  things  are  indifferent,  for  it  is  not  able  to  perceive 
differences.  But  to  the  understanding  those  things  only  are 
indifferent,  which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own  activity.  But 
whatever  things  are  the  works  of  its  own  activity,  all  these 
are  in  its  power.  And  of  these  however  only  those  which 
are  done  with  reference  to  the  present;  for  as  to  the  future 
and  the  past  activities  of  the  mind,  even  these  are  for  the 
present  indifferent. 

33.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does  nor  that  of 
the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  the  foot  does  the 
foot's  work  and  the  hand  the  hand's.  So  then  neither  to  a 
man  as  a  man  is  his  labor  contrary  to  nature,  so  long  as  it 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS       241 

does  the  things  of  a  man.    But  if  the  labor  is  not  contrary 
to  his  nature,  neither  is  it  an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  enjoyed  by  robbers, 
patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  the  handicraftsmen  accommo- 
date themselves  up  to  a  certain  point  to  those  who  are  not 
skilled  in  their  craft — nevertheless  they  cling  to  the  reason 
[the  principles]  of  their  art  and  do  not  endure  to  depart 
from  it?  Is  it  not  strange  if  the  architect  and  the  physician 
shall  have  more  respect  to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of 
their  own  arts  than  man  to  his  own  reason,  which  is  common 
to  him  and  the  gods  ? 

36.  Asia,  Europe  are  corners  of  the  universe;  all  the  sea 
a  drop  in  the  universe;  Athos  a  little  clod  of  the  universe; 
all  the  present  time  is  a  point  in  eternity.  All  things  are 
little,  changeable,  perishable.  All  things  come  from  thence, 
from  that  universal  ruling  power  either  directly  proceeding 
or  by  way  of  sequence.  And  accordingly  the  lion's  gap- 
ing jaws,  and  that  which  is  poisonous,  and  every  harmful 
thing,  as  a  thorn,  as  mud,  are  after-products  of  the  grand 
and  beautiful.  Do  not  then  imagine  that  they  are  of  another 
kind  from  that  which  thou  dost  venerate,  but  form  a  just 
opinion  of  the  source  of  all  (vii.  75). 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has  seen  all,  both 
everything  which  has  taken  place  from  all  eternity  and  every- 
thing v/hich  will  be  for  time  without  end;  for  all  things  are 
of  one  kin  and  of  one  form. 

38.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all  things  in  the 
universe  and  their  relation  to  one  another.  .  For  in  a  manner 
all  things  are  implicated  with  one  another, .  and  all  in  this 
way  are  friendly  to  one  another;  for  one  thing  comes  in 
order  after  another,  and  this  is  by  virtue  of  the  active  move- 
ment and  mutual  conspiration  and  the  unity  of  the  substance 
(ix.  I). 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which  thy  lot  has 
been  cast;  and  the  men  among  whom  thou  hast  received  thy 
portion,  love  them,  but  do  it  truly  [sincerely]. 

40.  Bvery  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does  that  for  which 
it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and  yet  he  Vi^ho  made  it  is  not 
there.    But  in  the  things  which  are  held  together  by  nature 


242      THE   MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

there  is  within  and  there  abides  in  them  the  power  which 
made  them;  wherefore  the  more  is  it  fit  to  reverence  this 
power,  and  to  think,  that,  if  thou  dost  live  and  act  according 
to  its  will,  everything  in  thee  is  in  conformity  to  intelHgence. 
And  thus  also  in  the  universe  the  things  which  belong  to 
it  are  in  conformity  to  intelligence. 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not  within  thy  power 
thou  shalt  suppose  to  be  good  for  thee  or  evil,  it  must  of 
necessity  be  that,  if  such  a  bad  thing  befall  thee  or  the  loss 
of  such  a  good  thing,  thou  wilt  blame  the  gods,  and  hate  men 
too,  those  who  are  the  cause  of  the  misfortune  or  the  loss,  or 
those  who  are  suspected  of  being  likely  to  be  the  cause;  and 
indeed  we  do  much  injustice,  because  we  make  a  difference 
between  these  things  [because  we  do  not  regard  these  things 
as  indifferent].  But  if  we  judge  only  those  things  which 
are  in  our  power  to  be  good  or  bad,  there  remains  no  reason 
either  for  finding  fault  with  God  or  standing  in  a  hostile 
attitude  to  man. 

42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end,  some  with 
knowledge  and  design,  and  others  without  knowing  what 
they  do;  as  men  also  when  they  are  asleep,  of  whom  it  is 
Heraclitus,  I  think,  who  says  that  they  are  labourers  and  co- 
operators  in  the  things  which  take  place  in  the  universe. 
But  m.en  co-operate  after  different  fashions :  and  even  those 
co-operate  abundantly,  who  find  fault  with  vdiat  happens 
and  those  who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it;  for  the 
universe  had  need  even  of  such  men  as  these.  It  remains 
then  for  thee  to  understand  among  what  kind  of  workmen 
thou  placest  thyself;  for  he  w'ho  rules  all  things  will  cer- 
tainly make  a  right  use  of  thee,  and  he  w^ill  receive  thee 
among  some  part  of  the  co-operators  and  of  those  whose 
labours  conduce  to  one  end.  But  be  not  thou  such  a  part 
as  the  mean  and  ridiculous  verse  in  the  play,  which  Chrysip- 
pus  speaks  of. 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work  of  the  rain, 
or  ^sculapius  the  work  of  the  Fruit-bearer  [the  earth]  ? 
And  how  is  it  with  respect  to  each  of  the  stars,  are  they  not 
different,  and  yet  they  work  together  to  the  same  end? 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me  and  about  the 
things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they  have  determined  well. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS       243 

for  it  is  not  easy  even  to  imagine  a  deity  without  fore- 
thought; and  as  to  doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have 
any  desire  towards  that?  for  what  advantage  would  result 
to  them  from  this  or  to  the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object 
of  their  providence  ?  But  if  they  have  not  determined  about 
me  individually,  they  have  certainly  determined  about  the 
whole  at  least,  and  the  things  which  happen  by  way  of 
sequence  in  this  general  arrangement  I  ought  to  accept  with 
pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them.  But  if  they  determine 
about  nothing — which  it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do 
believe  it,  let  us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  sv/ear  by 
them,  nor  do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were 
present  and  lived  with  us — but  if  however  the  gods  deter- 
mine about  none  of  the  things  which  concern  us,  I  am  able 
to  determine  about  myself,  and  I  can  inquire  about  that 
which  is  useful;  and  that  is  useful  to  every  man  which  is 
conformable  to  his  ov/n  constitution  and  nature.  But  my 
nature  is  rational  and  social;  and  my  city  and  country,  so 
far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far  as  I  am  a  man, 
it  is  the  world.  The  things  then  which  are  useful  to  these 
cities  are  alone  useful  to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is  for  the  in- 
terest of  the  universal ;  this  might  be  sufficient.  But  further 
thou  wilt  observe  this  also  as  a  general  truth,  if  thou  dost 
observe,  that  whatever  is  profitable  to  any  man  is  profitable 
also  to  other  m.en.  But  let  the  word  profitable  be  taken  here 
in  the  common  sense  as  said  of  things  of  the  middle  kind 
[neither  good  nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre  and  such 
places,  that  the  continual  sight  of  the  same  things  and  the 
uniformity  make  the  spectacle  wearisome,  so  it  is  in  the 
whole  of  life;  for  all  things  above,  below,  are  the  same  and 
from  the  same.  How  long  then  ? 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men  and  of  all 
kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are  dead,  so  that  thy 
thoughts  come  down  even  to  Philistion  and  Phoebus  and 
Origanion.  Now  turn  thy  thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of 
men}.  To  that  place  then  we  must  rem.ove,  where  there 
are  so  many  great  orators,  and  so  many  noble  philosophers, 
Heraclitus,  Pythagoras^  Socrates;  so  many  heroes  of  for- 


244      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

mer  days,  and  so  many  generals  after  them,  and  tyrants; 
besides  these,  Eudoxus,  Hipparchus,  Archimedes,  and  other 
men  of  acute  natural  talents,  great  minds,  lovers  of  labor, 
versatile,  confident,  mockers  even  of  the  perishable  and 
ephemeral  life  of  man,  as  Menippus  and  such  as  are  like 
him.  As  to  all  these  consider  that  they  have  long  been  in 
the  dust  What  harm  then  is  this  to  them;  and  what  to 
those  whose  names  are  altogether  unknown?  One  thing 
here  is  worth  a  great  deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in  truth  and 
justice,  with  a  benevolent  disposition  even  to  liars  and  un- 
just men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thyself,  think  of  the 
virtues  of  those  who  live  with  thee ;  for  instance,  the  activity 
of  one,  and  the  modesty  of  another,  and  the  liberality  of  a 
third,  and  some  other  good  quality  of  a  fourth.  For  nothing 
delights  so  much  as  the  examples  of  the  virtues,  when  they 
are  exhibited  in  the  morals  of  those  who  live  with  us  and 
present  themselves  in  abundance,  as  far  as  is  possible. 
Wherefore  we  must  keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I  suppose,  because  thou 
weighest  only  so  many  litre  and  not  three  hundred.  Be 
not  dissatisfied  then  that  thou  must  live  only  so  many  years 
and  not  more;  for  as  thou  art  satisfied  with  the  amount  of 
substance  which  has  been  assigned  to  thee,  so  be  content 
with  the  time. 

50.  Let  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men].  But  act  even 
against  their  will,  when  the  principles  of  justice  lead  that 
way.  If,  however,  any  man  by  using  force  stands  in  thy 
,way,  betake  thyself  to  contentment  and  tranquillity,  and  at 
the  same  time  employ  the  hindrance  toward  the  exercise 
of  some  other  virtue;  and  remember  that  thy  attempt  was 
with  a  reservation  [conditionally],  that  thou  didst  not  desire 
to  do  impossibilities.  What  then  didst  thou  desire?  Some 
such  effort  as  this.  But  thou  attainest  thy  object,  if  the 
things  to  which  thou  wast  moved  are  [not]  accomplished. 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another  man'ii  activity 
to  be  his  own  good ;  and  he  who  loves  pleasure,  his  own  sen- 
sations ;  but  he  who  has  understanding,  considers  his  own 
acts  to  be  his  own  good. 

^2.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion  about  a  thing. 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      245 

and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our  soul,  for  things  themselves 
have  no  natural  power  to  form  our  judgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefully  to  what  is  said 
by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is  possible,  be  in  the  speaker's 
mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm,  neither  is  it 
good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman  or  the  sick  the  doctor, 
would  they  listen  to  anybody  else;  or  how  could  the  helms- 
man secure  the  safety  of  those  in  the  ship  or  the  doctor  the 
health  of  those  whom  he  attends? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I  came  into  the  world 
are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter,  and  to  those 
bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes  fear;  and  to  little  children 
the  ball  is  a  fine  thing.  Why  then  am  I  angry?  Dost  thou 
think  that  a  false  opinion  has  less  power  than  the  bile  in 
the  jaundiced  or  the  poison  in  him  who  is  bitten  by  a  mad 
dog? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  according  to  the 
reason  of  thy  own  nature :  nothing  will  happen  to  thee  con- 
trary to  the  reason  of  the  universal  nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom  men  wish  to 
please,  and  for  what  objects,  and  by  what  kind  of  acts? 
How  soon  will  time  cover  all  things,  and  how  many  it  has 
covered  already, 

VII 

HAT  is  badness?  It  is  that  which  thou  hast  often 
seen.  And  on  the  occasion  of  everything  which  hap- 
pens keep  this  in  mind,  that  it  is  that  which  thou 
hast  often  seen.  Everywhere  up  and  down  thou  wilt  find  the 
same  things,  with  which  the  old  histories  are  filled,  those 
of  the  middle  ages  and  those  of  our  own  day;  with  whicH 
cities  and  houses  are  filled  now.  There  is  nothing  new; 
all  things  are  both  familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  unless  the  im- 
pressions [thoughts]  which  correspond  to  them  are  extin- 
guished?   But  it  is  in  thy  power  continuously  to  fan  these 


246        THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

thoughts  into  a  flame.  I  can  have  that  opinion  about  any- 
thing, which  I  ought  to  have.  If  I  can,  why  am  I  disturbed? 
The  things  which  are  external  to  my  mind  have  no  relation 
at  all  to  my  mind.  Let  this  be  the  state  of  thy  affects,  and 
thou  standest  erect.  To  recover  thy  life  is  in  thy  power. 
Look  at  things  again  as  thou  didst  use  to  look  at  them;  for 
in  this  consists  the  recovery  of  thy  life. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the  stage,  flocks  of 
sheep,  herds,  exercises  with  spears,  a  bone  to  cast  to  little  dogs, 
a  bit  of  bread  into  fish-ponds,  laborings  of  ants  and  burden- 
carrying,  runnings  about  of  frightened  little  mice,  puppets 
pulled  by  strings — [all  alike].  It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the  midst 
of  such  things  to  show  good  humour  and  not  a  proud  air;  to 
understand,  however,  that  every  m.an  is  worth  just  so  much 
as  the  things  are  worth  about  which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is  said,  and  in 
every  movem.ent  thou  must  observe  what  is  doing.  And  in 
the  one  thou  shouldst  see  immediately  to  Vv^hat  end  it  refers, 
but  in  the  other  watch  carefully  what  is  the  thing  signified. 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufficient  for  this  or  not?  If  it  is 
sufficient  I  use  it  for  the  work  as  an  instrument  given  by 
the  universal  nature.  But  if  it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I 
retire  from  the  work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is  able  to  do 
it  better,  unless  there  be  some  reason  why  I  ought  not  to  do 
so ;  or  I  do  it  as  well  as  I  can,  taking  to  help  me  the  man  who 
with  the  aid  of  my  ruling  principle  can  do  what  is  now  fit 
and  useful  for  the  general  good.  For  whatsoever  either  by 
myself  or  with  another  I  can  do,  ought  to  be  directed  to  this 
only,  to  that  which  is  useful  and  well-suited  to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame  have  been 
given  up  to  oblivion ;  and  how  many  who  have  celebrated  the 
fame  of  others  have  long  been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped;  for  it  is  thy  business  to 
do  thy  duty  like  a  soldier  in  the  assault  on  a  town.  How 
then,  if  being  lame  thou  canst  not  mount  up  on  the  battle- 
ments alone,  but  with  the  help  of  another  it  is  possible? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for  thou  wilt  come 
to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary,  having  with  thee  the  same 
reason  which  now  thou  usest  for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another,  and  the 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      247 

bond  is  holy ;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  unconnected  with 
any  other  thing.  For  things  have  been  co-ordinated,  and 
they  combine  to  form  the  same  universe  [order].  For  there 
in  one  universe  made  up  of  all  things,  and  one  god  who 
pervades  all  things,  and  one  substance,  and  one  law,  [one] 
common  reason  in  all  intelligent  animals,  and  one  truth;  if 
indeed  there  is  also  one  perfection  for  all  animals  which  are 
of  the  same  stock  and  participate  in  the  same  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in  the  substance 
of  the  whole;  and  everything  formal  [causal]  is  very  soon 
taken  back  into  the  universal  reason;  and  the  memory  of 
everything  is  very  soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

11.  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  is  according  to 
nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect  (iii.  5). 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the  members  in  those  bodies  which 
are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with  rational  beings  which  exist 
separate,  for  they  have  been  constituted  for  one  co-operation. 
And  the  perception  of  this  will  be  more  apparent  to  thee, 
if  thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that  I  am  a  member  [/xe/lo?] 
of  the  system  of  rational  beings.  But  if  [using  the  letter  r] 
thou  sayest  that  thou  art  a  part  [/af/909],  thou  dost  not  yet 
love  men  from  thy  heart ;  beneficence  does  not  yet  delight  thee 
for  its  own  sake ;  thou  still  doest  it  barely  as  a  thing  of  pro- 
priety, and  not  yet  as  doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on  the  parts  which 
can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fail.  For  those  parts  which  have 
felt  will  complain,  if  they  choose.  But  I,  unless  I  think 
that  what  has  happened  is  an  evil,  am  not  injured.  And  it 
is  in  my  povv^er  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  m.ust  be  good,  just 
as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or  the  purple  were  always  say- 
ing this.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I  must  be  emerald 
and  keep  my  color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  itself;  I  mean, 
does  not  frighten  itself  or  cause  itself  pain.  But  if  any  one 
else  can  frighten  or  pain  it,  let  him  do  so.  For  the  faculty 
itself  will  not  by  its  own  opinion  turn  into  such  ways.  Let 
the  body  itself  take  care,  if  it  can,  that  it  suffer  nothing,  and 
let  it  speak,  if  it  suffers.    But  the  soul  itself,  that  which  is 


248      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

subject  to  fear,  to  pain,  which  has  completely  the  power  of 
forming  an  opinion  about  these  things,  will  suffer  nothing, 
for  it  will  never  deviate  into  such  a  judgment.  The  leading 
principle  in  itself  v/ants  nothing,  unless  it  makes  a  want 
for  itself;  and  therefore  it  is  both  free  from  perturbation  and 
unimpeded,  if  it  does  not  disturb  and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a  good  daemon,  or  a  good 
thing.  What  then  art  thou  doing  here,  O  imagination?  go 
away,  I  entreat  thee  by  the  gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for 
I  want  thee  not.  But  thou  art  come  according  to  thy  old 
fashion.     I  am.  not  angry  with  thee;  only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change?  Why  what  can  take 
place  without  change  ?  What  then  is  more  pleasing  or  more 
suitable  to  the  universal  nature  ?  And  canst  thou  take  a  bath 
unless  the  wood  undergoes  a  change?  And  canst  thou  be 
nourished,  unless  the  food  undergoes  a  change?  And  can 
anything  else  that  is  useful  be  accomplished  without  change? 
Dost  thou  not  see  then  that  for  thyself  also  to  change  is  just 
the  same,  and  equally  necessary  for  the  universal  nature? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as  through  a  furious 
torrent  all  bodies  are  carried,  being  by  their  nature  united 
with  and  co-operating  with  the  whole,  as  the  parts  of  our 
body  with  one  another.  How  many  a  Chrysippus,  how  many 
a  Socrates,  how  many  an  Epictetus  has  time  already  swal- 
lowed up  ?  And  let  the  same  thought  occur  to  thee  with  ref- 
erence to  every  man  and  thing  (v.  23;  vi.  15). 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I  should  do  something 
which  the  constitution  of  man  does  not  allow,  or  in  the 
way  which  it  does  not  allow,  or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things;  and  near  the 
forgetfulness  of  thee  by  all. 

22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those  who  do  wrong. 
And  this  happens,  if  when  they  do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee 
that  they  are  kinsmen,  and  that  they  do  wrong  through  igno- 
rance and  unintentionally,  and  that  soon  both  of  you  will  die ; 
and  above  all,  that  the  wrong-doer  has  done  thee  no  harm, 
for  he  has  not  made  thy  ruling  faculty  worse  than  it  was 
before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal  substance, 
as  if  it  were  v/ax,  now  moulds  a  horse,  and  when  it  has  broken 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       249 

this  up,  it  uses  the  material  for  a  tree,  then  for  a  man,  then 
for  something  else;  and  each  of  these  things  subsists  for  a 
very  short  time.  But  it  is  no  hardship  for  the  vessel  to  be 
broken  up,  just  as  there  was  none  in  its  being  fastened  to- 
gether (viii.  50). 

24.  A  scov/ling  look  is  altogether  unnatural;  v/hen  it  is 
often  assumed,  the  result  is  that  all  comeliness  dies  away, 
and  at  last  is  so  completely  extinguished  that  it  cannot  be 
again  lighted  up  at  all.  Try  to  conclude  from  this  very  fact 
that  it  is  contrary  to  reason.  For  if  even  the  perception  of 
doing  wrong  shall  depart,  what  reason  is  there  for  living 
any  longer? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will  soon  change 
all  things  which  thou  seest,  and  out  of  their  substance  will 
make  other  things,  and  again  other  things  from  the 
substance  of  them,  in  order  that  the  world  may  be  ever 
new  (xii.  23). 

26.  When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  immediately 
consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or  evil  he  has  done 
wrong.  For  when  thou  hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and 
wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry.  For  either  thou  thyself 
thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be  good  that  he  does,  or  another 
thing  of  the  same  kind.  It  is  thy  duty  then  to  pardon  him. 
But  if  thou  dost  not  think  such  things  to  be  good  or  evil, 
thou  wilt  more  readily  be  well  disposed  to  him  who  is  in 
error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast  not  as  of  what 
thou  hast :  but  of  the  things  which  thou  hast  select  the  best, 
and  then  reflect  how  eagerly  they  would  have  been  sought,  if 
thou  hadst  them  not.  At  the  same  time,  however,  take  care 
that  thou  dost  not  through  being  so  pleased  with  them  ac- 
custom thyself  to  overvalue  them,  so  as  to  be  disturbed  if 
ever  thou  shouldst  not  have  them. 

28.  Retire  into  thyself.  The  rational  principlb  which  rules 
has  this  nature,  that  it  is  content  with  itself  when  it  does 
what  is  just,  and  so  secures  tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.  Stop  the  pulling  of  the 
strings.  Confine  thyself  to  the  present.  Understand  well 
what  happens  either  to  thee  or  to  another.  Divide  and  dis- 
tribute every  object  into  the  casual  [formal]  and  the  material. 


250      THE  MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

Think  of  thy  last  hour.    Let  the  wrong  which  is  done  by  a 
man  stay  there  where  the  wrong  was  done  (viii.  29). 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said.  Let  thy  under- 
standing enter  into  the  things  that  are  doing  and  the 
things  which  do  them  (vii.  4). 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and  modesty  and  with 
indifference  towards  the  things  which  lie  between  virtue  and 
vice.  Love  mankind.  Follow  God.  The  poet  says  that  Law 
rules  all.    And  it  is  enough  to  remember  that  law  rules  all.^ 

32.  About  death:  whether  it  is  a  dispersion,  or  a  reso- 
lution into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is  either  extinction  or 
change. 

33.  About  pain:  the  pain  which  is  intolerable  carries  us 
off;  but  that  which  lasts  a  long  time  is  tolerable;  and  the 
mind  maintains  its  own  tranquillity  by  retiring  into  itself, 
and  the  ruling  faculty  is  not  made  worse.  But  the  parts 
which  are  harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if  they  can,  give  their 
opinion  about  it. 

34.  About  fame:  look  at  the  minds  [of  those  who  seek 
fame],  observe  what  they  are,  and  what  kind  of  things  they 
avoid,  and  what  kind  of  things  they  pursue.  A.nd  consider 
that  as  the  heaps  of  sand  piled  on  one  another  hide  the 
former  sands,  so  in  life  the  events  which  go  before  are  soon 
covered  by  those  which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato:  the  man  who  lias  an  elevated  mind  an{ 
takes  a  view  of  all  time  and  of  all  substance,  dost  thou  sup< 
pose  it  possible  for  him  to  think  that  human  life  is  anything 
great?  It  is  not  possible,  he  said.  Such  a  man  then  will 
think  that  death  also  is  no  evil.     Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Antisthenes:  It  is  royal  to  do  good  and  to  be 
abused. 

37.  It  is  a  base  thing  for  the  countenance  to  be  obedient 
and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself  as  the  mind  comm.ands, 
and  for  the  mind  not  to  be  regulated  and  composed  by  itself. 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things. 
For  they  care  nought  about  it. 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Life  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of  corns; 
One  man  is  born;  another  dies. 

^The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS       251 

41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  for  my  children, 

There  is  a  reason  for  it. 
(42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just. 
43-  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no  violent  emotion. 

44.  From  Plato :  But  I  would  make  this  man  a  sufficient 
answer,  which  is  this:  Thou  sayest  not  well,  if  thou  think- 
est  that  a  man  who  is  good  for  anything  at  all  ought  to  com- 
pute the  hazard  of  life  or  death,  and  should  not  rather  look 
to  this  only  in  all  that  he  does,  whether  he  is  doing  what  is 
just  or  unjust,  and  the  works  of  a  good  or  a  bad  man. 

45.  For  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth;  wherever  a 
man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it  the  best  place  for  him, 
or  has  been  placed  by  a  commander,  there  in  my  opinion  he 
ought  to  stay  and  to  abide  the  hazard,  taking  nothing  into 
the  reckoning,  either  death  or  anything  else,  before  the  base- 
ness [of  deserting  his  post]. 

46.  But,  m.y  good  friend,  reflect  whether  that  which  is 
noble  and  good  is  not  som.ething  different  from  saving  and 
being  saved;  for  as  to  a  man  living  such  or  such  a  time,  at 
least  one  who  is  really  a  man,  consider  if  this  is  not  a  thing 
to  be  dismissed  from  the  thoughts:  and  there  must  be  no 
love  of  life :  but  as  to  these  matters  a  man  must  intrust  them 
to  the  deity  and  believe  what  the  women  say,  that  no  man  can 
escape  his  destiny,  the  next  inquiry  being  how  he  may  best 
live  the  time  that  he  has  to  live. 

47.  Look  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars,  as  if  thou  wert 
going  along  with  them;  and  constantly  consider  the  changes 
of  the  elements  into  one  another;  for  such  thoughts  purge 
away  the  filth  of  the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a  fine  saying  of  Plato:  That  he  who  is  dis- 
coursing about  men  should  look  also  at  earthly  things  as  if 
he  viewed  them  from  some  higher  place;  should  look  at 
them  in  their  assemblies,  armies,  agricultural  labours,  mar- 
riages, treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise  of  the  courts  of  justice, 
desert  places,  various  nations  of  barbarians,  feasts,  lamen- 
tations, markets,  a  mixture  of  all  things  and  an  orderly  com- 
bination of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  past;  such  great  changes  of  political  su- 
premacies. Thou  mayest  foresee  also  the  things  which  will  be. 
'For  they  will  certainly  be  of  like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible 


252      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

that  they  should  deviate  from  the  order  of  the  things  which 
take  place  now:  accordingly  to  have  contemplated  human 
life  for  forty  years  is  the  same  as  to  have  contemplated  it 
for  ten  thousand  years.     For  what  m.ore  wilt  thou  see? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to  the  earth. 
But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly  seed, 
Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns. 

This  is  either  a  dissolution  of  the  mutual  involution  of  the 
atoms,  or  a  similar  dispersion  of  the  unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  cunning  magic  arts 
Turning  the  channel's  course  to  'scape  from  death. 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has  sent 
We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  comxplaining. 

52.  Another  miay  be  more  expert  in  casting  his  opponent; 
but  he  is  not  more  social,  nor  more  modest,  nor  better  dis- 
ciplined to  m.eet  all  that  happens,  nor  more  considerate  with 
respect  to  the  faults  of  his  neighbours. 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conformably  to  the 
reason  which  is  common  to  gods  and  men,  there  we  have 
nothing  to  fear ;  for  where  we  are  able  to  get  profit  by  means 
of  the  activity  which  is  successful  and  proceeds  according  to 
our  constitution,  there  no  harm  is  to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy  power  piously 
to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  condition,  and  to  behave  justly  to 
those  who  are  about  thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy 
present  thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into  them  without 
being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover  other  men's  ruling 
principles,  but  look  straight  to  this,  to  what  nature  leads  thee, 
both  the  universal  nature  through  the  things  which  happen  to 
thee,  and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts  which  must  be 
done  by  thee.  But  every  being  ought  to  do  that  which  is 
according  to  its  constitution;  and  all  other  things  have  been 
constituted  for  the  sake  of  rational  beings,  just  as  among  ir- 
rational things  the  inferior  for  the  sake  of  the  superior,  but 
the  rational  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 

The  prime  principle  then  in  man's  constitution  is  the  social. 
And  the  second  is  not  to  yield  to  the  persuasions  of  the  body, 
for  it  is  the  peculiar  office  of  the  rational  ami  intelligent 
motion  to  circumscribe  itself,  and  never  to  be  overpowered 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      253 

either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses  or  of  the  appetites,  for 
both  are  animal ;  but  the  intelligent  motion  claims  superiority 
and  does  not  permit  itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the  others. 
And  with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed  by  nature  to  use  all 
of  them.  The  third  thing  in  the  rational  constitution  is 
freedom  from  error  and  from  deception.  Let  then  the  ruling 
principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go  straight  on,  and  it 
has  what  is  its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead^  and  to  have  completed  thy 
life  up  to  the  present  time ;  and  live  according  to  nature  the 
remainder  which  is  allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee  and  is  spun  with 
the  thread  of  thy  destiny.     For  what  is  more  suitable? 

58.  In  everything  which  happens  keep  before  thy  eyes 
those  to  whom  the  same  things  happened,  and  how  they  were 
vexed,  and  treated  them  as  strange  things,  and  found  fault 
with  them ;  and  now  where  are  they  ?  Nowhere.  Why  then 
dost  thou  too  choose  to  act  in  the  same  way?  and  why  dost 
thou  not  leave  these  agitations  which  are  foreign  to  nature, 
to  those  who  cause  them  and  those  who  are  m.oved  by  them? 
And  why  art  thou  not  altogether  intent  upon  the  right 
way  of  making  use  of  the  things  which  happen  to  thee? 
for  then  thou  wilt  use  them  Vv^ell,  and  they  will  be  a  m.ate- 
rial  for  thee  [to  w^ork  on].  Only  attend  to  thyself,  and 
resolve  to  be  a  good  man  in  every  act  which  thou  doest; 
and  remember.   .    . 

59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of  good,  and  it 
will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt  ever  dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to  show  no  irreg- 
ularity either  'in  motion  or  attitude.  For  what  the  mind 
shows  in  the  face  by  maintaining  in  it  the  expression  of  in- 
telligence and  propriety,  that  ought  to  be  required  also  in  the 
whole  body.  But  all  these  things  should  be  observed  with- 
out affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler's  art  than  the 
dancer's,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it  should  stand  ready  and 
firm  to  meet  onsets  which  are  sudden  and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose  approbation 
thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what  ruling  principles  they  possess. 
For  then  thou  wilt  neither  blame  those  who  offend  invol- 


254      THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

untarily,  nor  wilt  thou  want  their  approbation,  if  thou  lookest 
to  the  sources  of  their  opinions  and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  involuntarily  de- 
prived of  truth ;  consequently  in  the  same  way  it  is  deprived 
of  justice  and  temperance  and  benevolence  and  everything 
of  the  kind.  It  is  most  necessary  to  bear  this  constantly  in 
mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more  gentle  towards  all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  present,  that  there 
is  no  dishonour  in  it,  nor  does  it  make  the  governing  intelli- 
gence worse,  for  it  does  not  damage  the  intelligence  either 
so  far  as  the  intelligence  is  rational  or  so  far  as  it  is  social. 
Indeed  in  the  case  of  most  pains  let  this  remark  of  Epicurus 
aid  thee,  that  pain  is  neither  intolerable  nor  everlasting,  if 
thou  bearest  in  mind  that  it  has  its  limits,  and  if  thou 
addest  nothing  to  it  in  imagination:  and  remember  this  too, 
that  we  do  not  perceive  that  many  things  which  are  disagree- 
able to  us  are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive  drowsiness, 
and  the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and  the  having  no  appetite. 
When  then  thou  art  discontented  about  any  of  these  things, 
say  to  thyself,  that  thou  art  yielding  to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhuman,  as  they 
feel  towards  men. 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not  superior  in 
character  to  Socrates?  for  it  is  not  enough  that  Socrates 
died  a  more  noble  death,  and  disputed  more  skilfully  with 
the  sophists,  and  passed  the  night  in  the  cold  with  more 
endurance,  and  that  when  he  was  bid  to  arrest  Leon  of  Sala- 
mis,  he  considered  it  more  noble  to  refuse,  and  that  he 
walked  in  a  swaggering  way  in  the  streets — though  as  to 
this  fact  one  may  have  great  doubts  if  it  was  true.  But  we 
ought  to  inquire,  what  kind  of  a  soul  it  was  that  Socrates 
possessed,  and  if  he  was  able  to  be  content  with  being  just 
towards  men  and  pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly  vexed 
on  account  of  men's  villainy,  nor  yet  making  himself  a  slave 
to  any  man's  ignorance,  nor  receiving  as  strange  anything 
that  fell  to  his  share  out  of  the  universal,  nor  enduring  it  as 
intolerable  nor  allowing  his  understanding  to  sympathise 
with  the  affects  of  the  miserable  flesh. 

6y.  Nature  has  not  so  mingled  [the  intelligence]  with  the 
composition  of  the  body,  as  not  to  have  allowed  thee  the 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      255 

power  of  circumscribing  thyself  and  of  bringing  under  sub- 
jection to  thyself  ail  that  is  thy  own;  for  it  is  very  possible 
to  be  a  divine  man  and  to  be  recognized  as  such  by  no  one. 
Always  bear  this  in  mind;  and  another  thing  too,  that  very 
little  indeed  is  necessary  for  living  a  happy  life.  And  be- 
cause thou  hast  despaired  of  becoming  a  dialectician  and 
skilled  in  the  knowledge  of  nature,  do  not  for  this  reason 
renounce  the  hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest  and  social 
and  obedient  to  God. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from  all  compulsion  in 
the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind,  even  if  all  the  world  cry 
out  against  thee  as  much  as  they  choose,  and  even  if  wild 
beasts  tear  in  pieces  the  members  of  this  kneaded  miatter 
which  has  grown  around  thee.  For  what  hinders  the  mind 
in  the  midst  of  all  this  from  maintaining  itself  in  tranquillity, 
and  in  a  just  judgment  of  all  surrounding  things,  and  in  a 
ready  use  of  the  objects  which  are  presented  to  it,  so  that 
the  judgment  may  say  to  the  thing  which  falls  under  its 
observation:  This  thou  art  in  substance  [reality],  though 
in  men's  opinion  thou  mayest  appear  to  be  of  a  different 
kind ;  and  the  use  shall  say  to  that  which  falls  under  the  hand : 
Thou  art  the  thing  that  I  was  seeking ;  for  to  me  that  which 
presents  itself  is  always  a  material  for  virtue,  both  rational 
and  political,  and,  in  a  word,  for  the  exercise  of  art,  v/hich 
belongs  to  man  or  God.  For  everything  v/hich  happens  has 
a  relationship  either  to  God  or  m.an,  and  is  neither  new 
nor  difficult  to  handle,  but  usual  and  apt  matter  to  work  on, 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  consists  in  this,  in 
passing  every  day  as  the  last,  and  in  being  neither  violently 
excited,  nor  torpid,  nor  playing  the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not  vexed  because 
during  so  long  a  time  they  must  tolerate  continually  men 
such  as  they  are  and  so  many  of  them  bad ;  and  besides  this, 
they  also  take  care  of  them  in  all  ways.  But  thou,  who  art 
destined  to  end  so  soon,  art  thou  wearied  of  enduring  the 
bad,  and  this  too  when  thou  art  one  of  them? 

71.  It  is  a  ridiculous  thing  for  a  man  not  to  fly  from  his 
own  badness,  which  is  indeed  possible,  but  to  fly  from  other 
men's  badness,  which  is  impossible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political   [social]   faculty 


256      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUEELIUS 

finds  to  be  neither  intelligent  nor  social,  it  properly  judges 
to  be  inferior  to  itself. 

"j^i.  When  thou  hast  done  a  good  act  and  another  has 
received  it,  why  dost  thou  still  look  for  a  third  thing  be- 
sides these,  as  fools  do,  either  to  have  the  reputation  of 
having  done  a  good  act  or  to  obtain  a  return  ? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is  useful.  But  it 
is  useful  to  act  according  to  nature.  Do  not  then  be  tired 
of  receiving  what  is  useful  by  doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make  the  universe. 
But  nov7  either  everything  that  takes  place  comes  by 
way  of  consequence  or  [continuity] ;  or  even  the  chief 
things  towards  which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe 
directs  its  own  movement  are  governed  by  no  rational 
principle.  If  this  is  remxembered  it  will  make  thee  more 
tranquil  in  many  things  (vi.  44;  ix.  28). 


VIII 

HIS  reflection  also  tends  to  the  removal  of  the  desire 

of  empty  fame,  that  it  is  no  longer  in  thy  power  to 
have  lived  the  whole  of  thy  life,  or  at  least  thy  life 
from  thy  youth  upwards,  like  a  philosopher ;  but  both  to  many 
others  and  to  thyself  it  is  plain  that  thou  art  far  from  philos- 
ophy. Thou  hast  fallen  into  disorder  then,  so  that  it  is  no 
longer  easy  for  thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a  philosopher ; 
and  thy  plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If  then  thou  hast  truly 
seen  where  the  matter  lies,  throw  away  the  thought.  How 
thou  shalt  seem  [to  others],  and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live 
the  rest  of  thy  life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature  wills.  Observe 
then  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing  else  distract  thee;  for 
thou  hast  had  experience  of  many  wanderings  without  hav- 
ing found  happiness  anywhere,  not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in 
wealth,  nor  in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment,  nor  anywhere. 
Where  is  it  then?  In  doing  what  man's  nature  requires. 
How  then  shall  a  man  do  this?  If  he  has  principles  from 
which  come  his  affects  and  his  acts.  What  principles? 
Those  which  relate  to  good  and  bad:  the  belief  that  there 
is  nothing  good  for  man,  which  does  not  make  him  just, 


THE  MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      257 

temperate,  manly,  free ;  and  that  there  is  nothing  bad,  which 
does  not  do  the  contrary  to  what  has  been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  thyself,  How  is  this 
with  respect  to  me?  Shall  I  repent  of  it?  A  little  time 
and  I  am  dead,  and  all  is  gonCo  What  more  do  I  seek,  if 
what  I  am  doing  now  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  living 
being,  and  a  social  being,  and  one  who  is  under  the  same  law 
with  God? 

3.  Alexander  and  Cains  and  Pompeius,  what  are  they  in 
comparison  with  Diogenes  and  Heraclitus  and  Socrates? 
For  they  were  acquainted  with  things,  and  their  causes 
[forms],  and  their  matter,  and  the  ruling  principles  of  these 
men  were  the  same  [or  conformable  to  their  pursuits].  But 
as  to  the  others,  how  many  things  had  they  to  care  for,  and 
to  how  many  things  were  they  slaves. 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same  things  never- 
theless, even  though  thou  shouldst  burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing:  Be  not  perturbed,  for  all  things 
are  according  to  the  nature  of  the  universal ;  and  in  a  little 
time  thou  wilt  be  nobody  and  nowhere,  like  Hadrianus  and 
Augustus.  In  the  next  place  having  fixed  thy  eyes  steadily 
on  thy  business  look  at  it,  and  at  the  same  time  remembering 
that  it  is  thy  duty  to  be  a  good  man,  and  what  man's  nature 
demands,  do  that  without  turning  aside;  and  speak  as  it 
seems  to  thee  most  just,  only  let  it  be  with  a  good  disposi- 
tion and  with  modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work  to  do,  to 
remove  to  that  place  the  things  which  are  in  this,  to  change 
them,  to  take  them  away  hence,  and  to  carry  them  there.  All 
things  are  change,  yet  we  need  not  fear  anything  new.  All 
things  are  familiar  [to  us] ;  but  the  distribution  of  them  still 
remains  the  same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself  when  it  goes  on 
its  way  well;  and  a  rational  nature  goes  on  its  way  well, 
when  in  its  thoughts  it  assents  to  nothing  false  or  uncertain, 
and  when  it  directs  its  movements  to  social  acts  only,  and 
when  it  confines  its  desires  and  aversions  to  the  things  which 
are  in  its  power,  and  when  it  is  satisfied  with  everything 
that  is  assigned  to  it  by  the  common  nature.  For  of  this 
common  nature  every  particular  nature  is  a  part,  as  the 

9  HC— Vol.  Z 


258      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

nature  of  the  leaf  is  a  part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant;  ex- 
cept that  in  the  plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  part  of  a 
nature  which  has  not  perception  or  reason,  and  is  subject 
to  be  impeded;  but  the  nature  of  man  is  part  of  a  nature 
which  is  not  subject  to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent  and 
just,  since  it  gives  to  everything  in  equal  portions  and  accord- 
ing to  its  worth,  times,  substance,  cause  [form],  activity,  and 
incident.  But  examine,  not  to  discover  that  any  one  thing 
compared  with  any  other  single  thing  is  equal  in  all  respects, 
but  by  taking  all  the  parts  together  of  one  thing  and  com- 
paring them  v/ith  all  the  parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  abihty]  to  read.  But  thou 
hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arrogance :  thou  hast  leisure 
to  be  superior  to  pleasure  and  pain;  thou  hast  leisure  to 
be  superior  to  love  of  fame,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  stupid 
and  ungrateful  people,  nay  even  to  care  for  them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding  fault  with  the 
court  life  or  with  thy  own  (v.  16). 

10.  Repentance  is  a  kind  of  self-reproof  for  having  neg- 
lected something  useful;  but  that  which  is  good  must  be 
something  useful,  and  the  perfect  good  man  should  look  after 
it.  But  no  such  man  would  ever  repent  of  having  any  sen- 
sual pleasure.     Pleasure  then  is  neither  good  nor  useful. 

11.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own  constitu- 
tion? What  is  its  substance  and  material?  And  what  its 
causal  nature  [or  form]  ?  And  what  is  it  doing  in  the 
.world?    And  how  long  does  it  subsist? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluctance,  remem- 
ber that  it  is  according  to  thy  constitution  and  according  to 
human  nature  to  perform  social  acts,  but  sleeping  is  common 
also  to  irrational  animals.  But  that  which  is  according  to 
each  individual's  nature  is  also  more  peculiarly  its  own,  and 
more  suitable  to  its  nature,  and  indeed,  also  more  agreeable 
(v.  1). 

13.  Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the  occasion  of 
every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to  it  the  principles  of 
Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of  Dialectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  immediately  say  to 
thyself:  What  opinions  has  this  man  about  good  and  bad? 
For  if  with  respect  to  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      259 

each',  and  with  respect  to  fame  and  ignominy,  death  and  life 
he  has  such  and  such  opinions,  it  will  seem  nothing  wonder- 
ful or  strange  to  me,  if  he  does  such  and  such  things;  and 
I  shall  bear  in  mind  that  he  is  compelled  to  do  so. 

15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a  shame  to  be  surprised  if  the 
fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to  be  surprised  if  the  world 
produces  such  and  such  things  of  which  it  is  productive; 
and  for  the  physician  and  the  helmsman  it  is  a  shame  to  be 
surprised,  if  a  man  has  a  fever,  or  if  the  wind  is  unfa- 
vourable. 

16.  Remicmber  that  to  change  thy  opinion  and  to  follow 
him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as  consistent  with  freedom 
as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy  error.  For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity 
which  is  exerted  according  to  thy  ov/n  movement  and  judg- 
ment, and  indeed  according  to  thy  own  understanding  too. 

17.  If  a  thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost  thou  do  it? 
but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another,  whom  dost  thou  blame? 
the  atoms  [chance]  or  the  gods?  Both  are  foolish.  Thorn 
must  blame  nobody.  For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that  which 
is  the  cause] ;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  this,  correct  at  least 
the  thing  itself;  but  if  thou  canst  not  do  even  this,  of  what 
use  is  it  to  thee  to  find  fault?  for  nothing  should  be  done 
without  a  purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the  universe.  If 
it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here,  and  is  dissolved  into  its 
proper  parts,  which  are  elements  of  the  universe  and  of  thy- 
self.   And  these  too  change,  and  they  murmur  not. 

19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end,  a  horse,  a  vine.  Why 
dost  thou  wonder?  Even  the  sun  will  say,  I  am  for  some 
purpose,  and  the  rest  of  the  gods  will  say  the  same.  For 
what  purpose  then  art  thou?  to  enjoy  pleasure?  See  if 
common  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no  less  to  the 
end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the  continuance,  just  like  the 
man  who  throws  up  a  ball.  What  good  is  it  then  for  the 
ball  to  be  thrown  up,  or  harm  for  it  to  come  down,  or  even 
to  have  fallen?  and  what  good  is  it  to  the  bubble  while 
it  holds  together,  or  v/nat  harm  when  it  is  burst  ?  The  same 
may  be  said  of  a  light  also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see  what  kind  of 


260      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

thing  it  is ;  and  when  it  has  grown  old,  what  kind  of  thing 
it  becomes,  and  when  it  is  diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the  praised,  and  the 
rememberer  and  the  remembered:  and  all  this  in  a  nook  of 
this  part  of  the  world;  and  not  even  here  do  all  agree,  no, 
not  any  one  with  himself :  and  the  whole  earth  too  is  a  point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  thee,  whether 
it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a  word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly:  for  thou  choosest  rather  to 
become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be  good  to-day. 

23.  Am  I  doing  anything?  I  do  it  with  reference  to  the 
good  of  mankind.  Does  anything  happen  to  me  ?  I  receive 
it  and  refer  it  to  the  gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things, 
from  which  all  that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee — oil,  sweat,  dirt,  filthy 
water,  all  things  disgusting — so  is  every  part  of  life  and 
everything. 

25.  Lucilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  Lucilla  died.  Secunda 
saw  Maximus  die,  and  then  Secunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw 
Diotimus  die,  and  then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus  saw 
Faustina  die,  and  then  Antoninus  died.  Such  is  everything. 
Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die,  and  then  Celer  died.  And  those 
sharp-witted  men,  either  seers  or  men  inflated  with  pride, 
where  are  they?  for  instance,  the  sharp-witted  men,  Charax 
and  Demetrius  the  Platonist  and  Eudsemon,  and  any  one  else 
like  them.  All  ephemeral,  dead  long  ago.  Some  indeed  have 
not  been  remembered  even  for  a  short  time,  and  others  have 
become  the  heroes  of  fables,  and  again  others  have  disap- 
peared even  from  fables.  Remember  this,  then,  that  this  little 
compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved,  or  thy  poor 
breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be  removed  and  placed 
elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a  man  to  do  the  proper  works  of 
a  man.  Now  it  is  a  proper  work  of  a  man  to  be  benevolent 
to  his  own  kind,  to  despise  the  movements  of  the  senses,  to 
form  a  just  judgment  of  plausible  appearances,  and  to  take 
a  survey  of  the  nature  of  the  universe  and  of  the  things 
which  happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [between  thee  and  other 
things]:  the  one  to  the  body  which  surrounds  thee;  the 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      261 

second  to  the  divine  cause  from  which  all  things  come  to  all ; 
and  the  third  to  those  who  live  with  thee, 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  body — then  let  the  body 
say  what  it  thinks  of  it— or  to  the  soul;  but  it  is  in  the 
power  of  the  soul  to  maintain  its  own  serenity  and  tran- 
quillity, and  not  to  think  that  pain  is  an  evil.  For  every 
judgment  and  movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is  within, 
and  no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often  saying  to  thyself: 
now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let  no  badness  be  in  this  soul,  nor 
desire,  nor  any  perturbation  at  all;  but  looking  at  all  things 
I  see  what  is  their  nature,  and  I  use  each  according  to  its 
value. — Remember  this  power  which  thou  hast  from  nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every  man,  whoever 
he  may  be,  appropriately,  not  with  any  affectation:  use 
plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus'  court,  wife,  daughter,  descendants,  an- 
cestors, sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen,  intimates,  friends,,  Areius, 
Mcecenas,  physicians  and  sacrificing  priests — the  whole  court 
is  dead.  Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  considering  the  death  of 
a  single  man,  [but  of  a  whole  race],  as  of  the  Pompeii; 
and  that  which  is  inscribed  on  the  tombs—the  last  of  his 
race.  Then  consider  what  trouble  those  before  them  have 
had  that  they  might  leave  a  successor;  and  then,  that  of 
necessity  some  one  must  be  the  last.  Again  here  consider 
the  deatii  of  a  whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in  every  single 
act;  and  if  every  act  does  its  duty,  as  far  as  is  possible,  be 
content;  and  no  one  is  able  to  hinder  thee  so  that  each  act 
shall  not  do  its  duty. — But  something  external  will  stand  in 
the  way. — Nothing  will  stand  in  the  way  of  thy  acting 
justly  and  soberly  and  considerately,  but  perhaps  some  other 
active  power  will  be  hindered.  Well,  but  by  acquiescing  in 
the  hindrance  and  by  being  content  to  transfer  thy  efforts 
to  that  which  is  allowed,  another  opportunity  of  action  is 
immediately  put  before  thee  in  place  of  that  which  was 
hindered,  and  one  which  will  adapt  itself  to  this  ordering 
of  which  we  are  speaking. 

33.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without  arrogance  | 
and  be  read^  to  let  it  go. 


262      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a  hand  cut  off,  or  a  foot,  or  a 
head,  lying  anyv/here  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  body,  such 
does  a  man  make  himself,  as  far  as  he  can,  who  is  not  con- 
tent with  what  happens,  and  separates  himself  from  others, 
or  does  anything  unsocial.  Suppose  that  thou  hast  detached 
thyself  from  the  natural  unit}^ — for  thou  wast  made  by 
nature  a  part,  but  now  thou  hast  cut  thyself  off — ^yet  here 
there  is  this  beautiful  provision,  that  it  is  in  thy  power  again 
to  unite  thyself.  God  has  allovv^ed  this  to  no  other  part,  after 
it  has  been  separated  and  cut  asunder,  to  come  together 
again.  But  consider  the  kindness  by  which  he  has  dis- 
tinguished man,  for  he  has  put  it  in  his  power  not  to  be 
separated  at  all  from  the  universal;  and  when  he  has  been 
separated,  he  has  allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be  united 
and  to  resume  his  place  as  a  part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given  to  every 
rational  being  all  the  other  powers  that  it  has,  so  we  have 
received  from  it  this  pov/er  also.  For  as  the  universal 
nature  converts  and  fixes  in  its  predestined  place  everything 
which  stands  in  the  way  and  opposes  it,  and  makes  such 
things  a  part  of  itself,  so  also  the  rational  animal  is  able  to 
make  every  hindrance  its  own  material,  and  to  use  it  for 
such  purposes  as  it  may  have  designed. 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of  the  whole  of  thy 
life.  Let  not  thy  thoughts  at  once  embrace  all  the  various 
troubles  which  thou  mayest  expect  to  befall  thee:  but  on 
every  occasion  ask  thyself.  What  is  there  in  this  which  is 
intolerable  and  past  bearing?  for  thou  wilt  be  ashamed  to 
confess.  In  the  next  place  remember  that  neither  the  future 
nor  the  past  pains  thee,  but  only  the  present.  But  this  is 
reduced  to  a  very  little,  if  thou  only  circumscribest  it,  and 
chidest  thy  m.ind,  if  it  is  unable  to  hold  out  against  even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by  the  tomb  o£ 
Verus?  Does  Chaurias  or  Diotimus  sit  by  the  tomb  of 
Hadrianus?  That  would  be  ridiculous.  Well,  suppose  they 
did  sit  there,  would  the  dead  be  conscious  of  it?  and  if  the 
dead  were  conscious,  would  they  be  pleased?  and  if  they 
were  pleased,  would  that  make  them  immortal?  Was  it 
not  in  the  order  of  destiny  that  these  persons  too  should  first 
become  old  women  and  old  men  and  then  die?    What  then 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      263 

would  those  do  after  these  were  dead  ?    All  this  is  foul  smell 
and  blood  in  a  bag. 

38.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge  v/isely,  says 
the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal  I  see  no 
virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice;  but  I  see  a  virtue  which 
is  opposed  to  love  of  pleasure,  and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about  that  which  ap- 
pears to  give  thee  pain,  thou  thyself  standest  in  perfect 
security.  Who  is  this  self?  The  reason.  But  I  am  not 
reason.  Be  it  so.  Let  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble 
itself.  But  if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers,  let  it  have  its 
own  opinion  about  itself  (vii.  16). 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is  an  evil  to 
the  animal  nature.  Hindrance  to  the  movements  [desires] 
is  equally  an  evil  to  the  animal  nature.  And  something  else 
also  is  equally  an  impediment  and  evil  to  the  constitution 
of  plants.  So  then  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  the  intelli- 
gence is  an  evil  to  the  intelligent  nature.  Apply  all  these 
things  then  to  thyself.  Does  pain  or  sensuous  pleasure  affect 
thee?  The  senses  will  look  to  that.  Has  any  obstacle 
opposed  thee  in  thy  efforts  towards  an  object?  if  indeed  thou 
wast  making  this  effort  absolutely  [unconditionally,  or  with- 
out any  reservation],  certainly  this  obstacle  is  an  evil  to 
thee  considered  as  a  rational  animal.  But  if  thou  takest 
[into  consideration]  the  usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast 
not  yet  been  injured  nor  even  impeded.  The  things  however 
which  are  proper  to  the  understanding  no  other  man  is 
used  to  impede,  for  neither  fire,  nor  iron,  nor  tyrant,  nor 
abuse,  touches  it  in  any  way.  When  it  has  been  made  a 
sphere,  it  continues  a  sphere  (xi.  12). 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I  should  give  myself  pain,  for  I  have 
never  intentionally  given  pain  even  to  another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people.  But  it  is 
my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty  sound  without  turning 
away  either  from  any  man  or  from  any  of  the  things  which 
happen  to  m.en,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  -all  with  wel- 
come eyes  and  using  everything  according  to  its  value. 

44.  See  that  you  secure  this  present  time  to  thyself;  for 
those  who  rather  pursue  posthumous  fame  do  not  consider  that 


264       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

the  men  of  after  time  will  be  exactly  such  as  these  whom 
they  cannot  bear  now;  and  both  are  mortal.  And  what  is  it 
in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of  after  time  utter  this  or 
that  sound,  or  have  this  or  that  opinion  about  thee  ? 

45.  Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt;  for  there  I 
shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil,  that  is,  content,  if  it  can 
feel  and  act  conformably  to  its  proper  constitution.  Is  this 
[change  of  place]  sufficient  reason  v^^hy  my  soul  should  be 
unhappy  and  worse  than  it  was,  depressed,  expanded,  shrink- 
ing, affrighted?  and  what  wilt  thou  find  which  is  sufficient 
reason  for  this? 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  \\^hich  is  not  human 
accident,  nor  to  an  ox,  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature 
of  an  ox,  nor  to  a  vine  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature 
of  a  vine,  nor  to  a  stone  which  is  not  proper  to  a  stone.  If 
then  there  happens  to  each  thing  both  what  is  usual  and 
natural,  why  shouldst  thou  complain?  For  the  common 
nature  brings  nothing  which  m^ay  not  be  borne  by  thee. 

47.  If  thou  art  pained  by  any  external  thing,  it  is  not  this 
that  disturbs  thee,  but  thy  own  judgment  about  it.  And  it 
is  in  thy  power  to  wipe  out  this  judgment  now.  But  if 
anything  in  thy  own  disposition  gives  thee  pain,  who  hinders 
thee  from  correcting  thy  opinion?  And  even  if  thou  art 
pained  because  thou  art  not  doing  some  particular  thing 
which  seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why  dost  thou  not  rather 
act  than  complain?  But  some  insuperable  obstacle  is  in 
tbe  way?  Do  not  be  grieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its 
not  being  done  depends  not  on  thee.  But  it  is  not  [worth 
while  to  live,  if  this  cannot  be  done.  Take  thy  departure 
then  from  life  contentedly,  just  as  he  dies  who  is  in  full 
activity,  and  well  pleased  too  with  the  things  which  are 
obstacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  invincible,  when 
self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with  itself,  if  it  does  nothing 
which  it  does  not  choose  to  do,  even  if  it  resist  from  mere 
obstinacy.  What  then  will  it  be  when  it  forms  a  judgment 
about  anything  aided  by  reason  and  deliberately?  Therefore 
the  mind  which  is  free  from  passions  is  a  citadel,  for  man 
has  nothing  more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly  for  refuge  and 
for  the  future  be  inexpugnable.    He  then  who  has  not  seen 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS        265 

this  is  an  ignorant  man;  but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does 
not  fly  to  this  refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thyself  than  what  the  first  ap- 
pearances report.  Suppose  that  it  has  been  reported  to 
thee  that  a  certain  person  speaks  ill  of  thee.  This  has  been 
reported;  but  that  thou  hast  been  injured,  that  has  not  been 
reported.  I  see  that  my  child  is  sick.  I  do  see;  but  that  he 
is  in  danger,  I  do  not  see.  Thus  then  always  abide  by  the 
first  appearances,  and  add  nothing  thyself  from  within,  and 
then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or  rather  add  something, 
like  a  man  who  knows  everything  that  happens  in  the  world. 

50.  A  cucumber  is  bitter — Throw  it  away. — There  are 
briars  in  the  road — Turn  aside  from  them. — This  is  enough. 
Do  not  add.  And  why  were  such  things  made  in  the  world? 
For  thou  wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a  man  who  is  acquainted  with 
nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be  ridiculed  by  a  carpenter  and  shoe- 
maker if  thou  didst  find  fault  because  thou  seest  in  their 
workshop  shavings  and  cuttings  from  the  things  .which  they 
make.  And  yet  they  have  places  into  which  they  can  throw 
these  shavings  and  cuttings,  and  the  universal  nature  has  no 
external  space;  but  the  wondrous  part  of  her  art  is  that 
though  she  has  circumscribed  herself,  everything  within  her 
which  appears  to  decay  and  to  grow  old  and  to  be  useless 
she  changes  into  herself,  and  again  makes  other  new  things 
from  these  very  same,  so  that  she  requires  neither  substance 
from  without  nor  wants  a  place  into  which  she  may  cast 
that  which  decays.  She  is  content  then  with  her  own  space, 
and  her  own  matter,  and  her  own  art. 

51.  Neither  in  thy  actions  be  sluggish,  nor  in  thy  con- 
versation without  method,  nor  [wandering  in  thy  thoughts, 
nor  let  there  be  in  thy  soul  inward  contention  nor  external 
effusion,  nor  in  life  be  so  busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

Svippose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in  pieces,  curse 
thee.  What  then  can  these  things  do  to  prevent  thy  mind 
from  remaining  pure,  wise,  sober,  just?  For  instance,  if 
a  man  should  stand  by  a  limpid  pure  spring,  and  curse  it, 
the  spring  never  ceases  sending  up  potable  water;  and  if  he 
should  cast  clay  into  it  or  filth,  it  will  speedily  disperse  them 
and  wash  them  out,  and  will  not  be  at  all  polluted.  How 
then  shalt  thou  possess  a  perpetual  fountain  [and  not  a  mere 


266       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MAECUS  AURELIUS 

well]  ?    By  forming  thyself  hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with 
contentment,  simplicity  and  modesty. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world  is,  does  not 
know  where  he  is.  And  he  who  does  not  know  for  what 
purpose  the  world  exists,  does  not  know  who  he  is,  nor  what 
the  world  is.  But  he  who  has  failed  in  any  one  of  these 
things  could  not  even  say  for  what  purpose  he  exists  him- 
self. What  then  dost  thou  think  of  him  who  [avoids  or] 
seeks  the  praise  of  those  who  applaud,  of  men  who  know 
not  either  where  they  are  or  who  they  are  ? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a  man  who  curses 
himself  thrice  every  hour?  Wouldst  thou  v^^ish  to  please 
a  man  who  does  not  please  himself?  Does  a  man  please 
himself  who  repents  of  nearly  everything  that  he  does  ? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in  concert  with 
the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but  let  thy  intelligence  also 
now  be  in  harmony  with  the  intelligence  which  embraces 
all  things.  For  the  intelligent  power  is  no  less  diffused  in 
all  parts  and  pervades  all  things  for  him  who  is  willing  to 
draw  it  to  him  than  the  aerial  power  for  him  who  is  able  to 
respire  it. 

55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  not  harm  at  all  to  the  uni- 
verse; and  particularly,  the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does 
no  harm  to  another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it 
in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it,  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose. 

56.  To  my  own  free  will  the  free  will  of  my  neighbour  is 
just  as  indifferent  as  his  poor  breath  and  flesh.  For  though 
we  are  made  especially  for  the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the 
ruling  power  of  each  of  us  has  its  own  office,  for  otherwise 
my  neighbour's  wickedness  would  be  my  harm,  which  God  has 
not  willed  in  order  that  my  unhappiness  may  not  depend 
on  another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and  in  all  direc- 
tions indeed  it  is  diffused,  yet  it  is  not  effused.  For  this 
diffusion  is  extension:  Accordingly  its  rays  are  called  Exten- 
sions [^xrTve?]  because  they  are  extended  [^dnd  rod  ixTe[v£<7dai,'j, 
But  one  may  judge  what  kind  of  a  thing  a  ray  is,  if  he  looks 
at  the  sun's  light  passing  through  a  narrow  opening  into 
a  darkened  room,  for  it  is  extended  in  a  right  line,  and, 
as  it  were,  is  divided  when  it  meets  with  any  solid  body 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      267 

which  stands  in  the  way  and  intercepts  the  air  beyond;  but 
there  the  hght  remains  fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fail  off. 
Such  then  ought  to  be  the  outpouring  and  diffusion  of  the 
understanding,  and  it  should  in  no  way  be  an  effusion,  but 
an  extension,  and  it  should  make  no  violent  or  impetuous 
collision  with  the  obstacles  which  are  in  its  way;  nor  yet 
fall  down,  but  be  fixed  and  enlighten  that  which  receives 
it.  For  a  body  will  deprive  itself  of  the  illumination,  if 
it  does  not  admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss  of  sensation 
or  a  different  kind  of  sensation.  But  if  thou  shalt  have  no 
sensation,  neither  wilt  thou  feel  any  harm ;  and  if  thou  shalt 
acquire  another  kind  of  sensation,  thou  wilt  be  a  different 
kind  of  living  being,  and  thou  wilt  not  cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another.  Teach  them 
then  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another  way  the  mind,. 
The  mind,  indeed,  both  when  it  exercises  caution  and  when 
it  is  employed  about  inquiry,  moves  straight  ©nward  not  the 
less,  and  to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man's  ruling  faculty;  and  also  let 
every  other  man  enter  into  thine. 


IX 

'E  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For  since  the 
universal  nature  has  made  rational  animals  for  the 
sake  of  one  another  to  help  one  another  according  to 
their  deserts,  but  in  no  way  to  injure  one  another,  he  who 
transgresses  her  will,  is  clearly  guilty  of  impiety  towards  the 
highest  divinity.  And  he  too  who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to 
the  same  divinity;  for  the  universal  nature  is  the  nature  of 
things  that  are;  and  things  that  are  have  a  relation  to  all 
things  that  come  into  existence.  And  further,  his  universal 
nature  is  named  truth,  and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things 
that  are  true.  He  then  who  lies  intentionally  is  guilty  of 
impiety  inasmuch  as  he  acts  unjustly  by  deceiving;  and  he 
also  who  lies  unintentionally,  inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance 
with  the  universal  nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs  the 


268      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

order  by  fighting  against  the  nature  of  the  world ;  for  he  fights 
against  it,  who  is  moved  of  himself  to  that  which  is  contrary 
to  truth,  for  he  had  received  powers  from  nature  through  the 
neglect  of  which  he  is  not  able  now  to  distinguish  falsehood 
from  truth.  And  indeed  he  who  pursues  pleasure  as  good, 
and  avoids  pain  as  evil,  is  guilty  of  impiety.  For  of  neces- 
sity such  a  man  must  often  find  fault  with  the  universal  nature, 
alleging  that  it  assigns  things  to  the  bad  and  the  good  con- 
trary to  their  deserts,  because  frequently  the  bad  are  in  the 
enjoyment  of  pleasure  and  possess  the  things  which  procure 
pleasure,  but  the  good  have  pain  for  their  share  and  the 
things  which  cause  pain.  And  further,  he  who  is  afraid  of 
pain  will  sometimes  also  be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things 
which  will  happen  in  the  v/orld,  and  even  this  is  impiety. 
And  he  who  pursues  pleasure  will  not  abstain  from  injustice, 
and  this  is  plainly  impiety.  Now,  with  respect  to  the  things 
towards  which  the  universal  nature  is  equally  affected — for 
it  would  not  have  made  both,  unless  it  was  equally  affected 
towards  both — towards  these  they  who  wish  to  follow  nature 
should  be  of  the  same  mind  with  it,  and  equally  affected. 
With  respect  to  pain,  then,  and  pleasure,  or  death  and  life, 
or  honour  and  dishonour,  which  the  universal  nature  employs 
equally,  whoever  is  not  equally  affected  is  manifestly  acting 
impiously.  And  I  say  that  the  universal  nature  employs  them 
equally,  instead  of  saying  that  they  happen  alike  to  those 
who  are  produced  in  continuous  series  and  to  those  who 
come  after  them  by  virtue  of  a  certain  original  movement  of 
Providence,  according  to  which  it  moved  from  a  certain  be- 
ginning to  this  ordering  of  things,  having  conceived  certain 
principles  of  the  things  which  were  to  be,  and  having  deter- 
mined powers  productive  of  beings  and  of  changes  and  of 
•such  like  successions  (vii.  75). 

2.  It  would  be  a  man's  happiest  lot  to  depart  from  man- 
kind without  having  had  any  taste  of  lying  and  hypocrisy  and 
luxury  and  pride.  However  to  breathe  out  one's  life  when 
a  man  has  had  enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best  voy- 
age, as  the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  determined  to  abide  with 
vice,  and  has  not  experience  yet  induced  thee  to  fly  from  this 
pestilence?  For  the  destruction  of  the  understanding  is  a 
pestilence,  much  more  indeed  than  any  such  corruption  and 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      269 

change  of  this  atmosphere  which  surrounds  us.  For  this 
corruption  is  a  pestilence  of  animals  so  far  as  they  are 
animals ;  but  the  other  is  a  pestilence  of  men  so  far  as  they 
are  men. 

3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content  with  it,  since 
this  too  is  one  of  those  things  which  nature  wills.  For  such 
as  it  is  to  be  young  and  to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and  to 
reach  maturity,  and  to  have  teeth  and  beard  and  gray  hairs, 
and  to  beget,  and  to  be  pregnant,  and  to  bring  forth,  and  all 
the  other  natural  operations  which  the  seasons  of  thy  life 
bring,  such  also  is  dissolution.  This,  then,  is  consistent  with 
the  character  of  a  reflecting  man,  to  be  neither  careless  nor 
impatient  nor  contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but  to 
wait  for  it  as  one  of  the  operations  of  nature.  As  thou  now 
waitest  for  the  time  when  the  child  shall  come  out  of  thy 
wife's  womb,  so  be  ready  for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall  fall 
out  of  this  envelope.  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a  vulgar  kind 
of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy  heart,  thou  wilt  be  made  best 
reconciled  to  death  by  observing  the  objects  from  which  thou 
art  going  to  be  removed,  and  the  morals  of  those  with  whom 
thy  soul  will  no  longer  be  mingled.  For  it  is  no  way  right 
to  be  offended  with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty  to  care  for  them 
and  to  bear  with  them  gently;  and  yet  to  remember  that  thy 
departure  will  be  not  from  men  who  have  the  same  principles 
as  thyself.  For  this  is  the  only  things  if  there  be  any,  whicH 
could  draw  us  the  contrary  way  and  attach  us  to  life,  to  be 
permitted  to  live  with  those  who  have  the  same  prin- 
ciples as  ourselves.  But  now  thou  seest  how  great  is  the 
trouble  arising  from  the  discordance  of  those  who  live  to- 
gether, so  that  thou  mayst  say.  Come  quick,  O  death,  lest 
perchance  I,  too,  should  forget  myself. 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against  himsell  He 
who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to  himself,  because  he  makes 
himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a  certain  thing; 
not  only  he  who  does  a  certain  thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  understanding,  and  thy 
present  conduct  directed  to  social  good,  and  thy  present  dis- 
position of  contentment  with  everything  which  hapgens — that 
is  enough. 


270      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUEELIUS 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination:  check  desire:  extinguish  ap- 
petite :  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its  own  power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason  one  life  is 
distributed;  but  among  reasonable  animals  one  intelligent 
soul  is  distributed:  just  as  there  is  one  earth  of  all  things 
which  are  of  an  earthy  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light,  and 
breathe  one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the  faculty  of  vision  and 
all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  Vv^hich  participate  in  anything  which  is  com- 
mon to  them  all  move  towards  that  which  is  of  the  same 
kind  with  themselves.  Everything  v/hich  is  earthy  turns 
towards  the  earth,  everything  which  is  liquid  flows  together, 
and  everything  w^hich  is  of  an  aerial  kind  does  the  same, 
so  that  they  require  something  to  keep  them  asunder,  and  the 
application  of  force.  Fire  indeed  moves  upwards  on  account 
of  the  elemental  fire,  but  it  is  so  ready  to  be  kindled  together 
with  all  the  fire  which  is  here,  that  even  every  substance 
which  is  somewhat  dry,  is  easily  ignited,  because  there  is 
less  mingled  with  it  of  that  which  is  a  hindrance  to  ignition. 
Accordingly,  then  everything  also  which  participates  in  the 
common  intelligent  nature  moves  in  like  manner  towards  that 
which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  itself,  or  moves  even  more. 
For  so  much  as  it  is  superior  in  comparison  with  all  other 
things,  in  the  same  degree  also  is  it  more  ready  to  mingle 
with  and  to  be  fused  with  that  which  is  akin  to  it.  Accord- 
ingly among  animals  devoid  of  reason  we  find  swarms  of 
bees,  and  herds  of  cattle,  and  the  nurture  of  young  birds,  and 
in  a  manner,  loves;  for  even  in  animals  there  are  souls,  and 
that  power  which  brings  them  together  is  seen  to  exert  itself 
in  the  superior  degree,  and  in  such  a  way  as  never  has  been 
observed  in  plants  nor  in  stones  nor  in  trees.  But  in  rational 
animals  there  are  political  communities  and  friendships,  and 
families  and  meetings  of  people;  and  in  wars,  treaties  and 
armistices.  But  in  the  things  which  are  still  superior,  even 
though  they  are  separated  from  one  another,  unity  in  a  man- 
ner exists,  as  in  the  stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to  the  higher  de- 
gree is  able  to  produce  a  sympathy  even  in  things  which  are 
separated.  See  then  what  now  takes  place.  For  only  in- 
telligent animals  have  now  forgotten  this  mutual  desire  and 
inclination,  and  in  them  alone  the  property  of  flowing  to- 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      271 

^ether  is  not  seen.  But  still,  though  men  strive  to  avoid 
[this  union],  they  are  caught  and  held  by  it,  for  their  nature 
is  too  strong  for  them ;  and  thou  wilt  see  what  I  say,  if  thou 
(inly  observest.  Sooner  then  v/ill  one  find  anything  earthy 
which  com.es  in  contact  with  no  earthy  thing  than  a  man  al- 
together separated  from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  produce  fruit;  at 
the  proper  seasons  each  produces  it.  But  if  usage  has  es- 
pecially fixed  these  terms  to  the  vine  and  like  things,  this 
is  nothing.  Reason  produces  fruit  both  for  all  and  for  itself, 
and  there  are  produced  from  it  other  things  of  the  same  kind 
as  reason  itself. 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching  those  who  do 
wrong;  but  if  thou  canst  not,  remember  that  indulgence  is 
given  to  thee  for  this  purpose.  And  the  gods,  too,  are  indul- 
gent to  such  persons ;  and  for  some  purposes  they  even  help 
them  to  get  health,  wealth,  reputation;  so  kind  they  are. 
And  it  is  in  thy  power  also;  to  say,  who  hinders  thee? 

12.  Labour  not  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor  yet  as  one  who 
would  be  pitied  or  admired;  but  direct  thy  will  to  one  thing 
only,  to  put  thyself  in  motion  and  to  check  thyself,  as  the 
social  reason  requires. 

13.  To-day  I  have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or  rather  I  have 
cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not  outside,  but  within  and 
in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  experience,  and 
ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless  in  the  matter.  Everything 
now  is  just  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  those  whom  we  have 
buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves  by  themselves, 
neither  knowing  aught  of  themselves,  nor  expressing  any 
judgment.  What  is  it,  then,  which  does  judge  about  them? 
The  ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity  lie  the  evil  and  the 
good  of  the  rational  social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and  his 
vice  lie  not  In  passivity,  but  in  activity. 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up  it  is  no  evil 
to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good  to  have  been  carried  up 
(viii.  20). 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men's  leading  principles,  ^d 


272      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

thou  wilt  see   what  judges  thou  art  afraid  of,   and  what 
kind  of  judges  they  are  of  themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing;  and  thou  thyself  art  in  cori- 
tinuous  mutation  and  in  a  manner  in  continuous  destruction, 
and  the  whole  universe  too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man's  wrongful  act 
there  where  it  is  (vii.  29,  ix.  38). 

21.  Termination  of  activity^  cessation  from  movement  and 
opinion,  and  in  a  sense  their  death,  is  no  evil.  Turn  thy 
thoughts  now  to  the  consideration  of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a 
child,  as  a  youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in  these  also 
every  change  was  a  death.  Is  this  anything  to  fear  ?  Turn 
thy  thoughts  now  to  thy  life  under  thy  grandfather,  then  to 
thy  life  under  thy  mother,  then  to  thy  life  under  thy  father ; 
and  as  thou  findest  many  other  differences  and  changes  and 
terminations,  ask  thyself,  Is  this  anything  to  fear?  In  like 
manner,  then,  neither  are  the  termination  and  cessation  and 
change  of  thy  whole  life  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling  faculty  and  that 
of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy  neighbour;  thy  own 
that  thou  mayst  make  it  just;  and  that  of  the  universe, 
that  thou  mayst  remember  of  what  thou  art  a  part;  and 
that  of  thy  neighbour,  that  thou  mayst  know  whether  he 
has  acted  ignorantly  or  with  knowledge,  and  that  thou 
mayst  also  consider  that  his  ruling  faculty  is  akin  to 
thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a  component  part  of  a  social  sys- 
tem, so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a  component  part  of  social 
life.  Whatever  act  of  thine  then  has  no  reference,  either 
immediately  or  remotely,  to  a  social  end,  this  tears  asunder 
thy  life,  and  does  not  allow  it  to  be  one,  and  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  mutiny,  just  as  ,when  in  a  popular  assembly  a 
man  acting  by  himself  stands  apart  from  the  general  agree- 
ment. 

24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their  sports,  and  poor 
spirits  carrying  about  dead  bodies  [such  is  everything]  ;  and 
so  what  is  exhibited  in  the  representation  of  the  mansions 
of  the  dead  strikes  our  eyes  more  clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of  an  object,  and 
detach  it  altogether  from  its  material  part,  and  then  con* 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      273 

emplate  it;  then  determine  the  time,  the  longest  which  a 
filing  of  this  pecuHar  form  is  naturally  made  to  endure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  inj&nite  troubles  through  not  being 
contented  with  thy  ruling  faculty,  when  it  does  the  things 
which  it  is  constituted  by  nature  to  do.  But  enough  [of 
this]. 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee,  or  when 
men  say  about  thee  anything  injurious,  approach  their 
poor  souls,  penetrate  within,  and  see  what  kind  of  men 
they  are.  Thou  wilt  discover  that  there  is  no  reason  to  take 
any  trouble  that  these  men  may  have  this  or  that  opinion 
about  thee.  However  thou  must  be  well-disposed  towards 
them,  for  by  nature  they  are  friends.  And  the  gods  too  aid 
them  in  all  ways,  by  dreams,  by  signs,  towards  the  attainment 
of  those  things  on  which  they  set  a  value. 

28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe  are  the  same, 
up  and  down  from  age  to  age.  And  either  the  universal 
intelligence  puts  itself  in  motion  for  every  separate  effect, 
and  if  this  is  so,  be  thou  content  with  that  which  is  the  result 
of  its  activity ;  or  it  puts  itself  in  motion  once,  and  everything 
else  comes  by  way  of  sequence  in  a  manner;  or  indivisible 
elements  are  the  origin  of  all  things.  In  a  word,  if  there 
is  a  god,  all  is  well ;  and  if  chance  rules,  do  not  thou  also  be 
governed  by  it  (vi.  44,  vii.  75).  y  . 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all:  then  the  earth,  too,  will 
change,  and  the  things  also  which  result  from  change  will 
continue  to  change  forever,  and  these  again  forever.  For 
if  a  man  reflects  on  the  changes  and  transformations  which 
follow  one  another  like  wave  after  wave  and  their  rapidity, 
he  will  despise  everything  which  is  perishable  (xii.  21). 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a  winter  torrent :  it  carries 
everything  along  with  it.  But  how  worthless  are  all  these 
poor  people  v/ho  are  engaged  in  matters  political,  and,  as 
they  suppose,  are  playing  the  philosopher!  All  drivelers. 
Well  then,  man:  do  what  nature  now  requires.  Set  thyself 
in  motion,  if  it  is  in  thy  power,  and  do  not  look  about  thee 
to  see  if  any  one  will  observe  it;  nor  yet  expect  Plato's  Re- 
public: but  be  content  if  the  smallest  thing  goes  on  well, 
and  consider  such  an  event  to  be  no  small  matter.  For 
who  can  change  men's  opinions?    And  without  a  change  of 


274      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

opinions  what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery  of  men  who 
groan  while  they  pretend  to  obey?  Come  now  and  tell  m^ 
of  Alexander  and  Philippus  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerun:. 
They  themselves  shall  judge  whether  they  discovered  whst 
the  common  nature  required,  and  trained  themselves  ac- 
cordingly. But  if  they  acted  like  tragedy  heroes,  no  one  has 
condemned  me  to  imitate  them.  Simple  and  modest  is  the 
work  of  philosophy.  Draw  me  not  aside  to  insolence  and 
pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless  herds  of  men 
and  their  countless  solemnities,  and  the  infinitely  varied 
voyagings  in  storms  and  calms,  and  the  differences  among 
those  who  are  born,  who  live  together,  and  die.  And  con- 
sider, too,  the  life  lived  by  others  in  olden  time,  and  the  life 
of  those  who  will  live  after  thee,  and  the  life  now  lived 
among  barbarous  nations,  and  how  many  know  not  even  thy 
name,  and  how  many  will  soon  forget  it,  and  how  they  who 
perhaps  now  are  praising  thee  will  very  soon  blame  thee, 
and  that  neither  a  posthumous  name  is  of  any  value,  nor 
reputation,  nor  anything  else. 

31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations  with  respect 
to  the  things  which  come  from  the  external  cause;  and  let 
there  be  justice  in  the  things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal 
cause,  that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  terminating 
in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many  useless  things 
among  those  which  disturb  thee,  for  they  lie  entirely  in  thy 
opinion;  and  thou  wilt  then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by 
comprehending  the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind,  and  by  con- 
templating the  eternity  of  time,  and  observing  the  rapid 
change  of  every  several  thing,  how  short  is  the  time  from 
birth  to  dissolution,  and  the  illimitable  time  before  birth 
as  well  as  the  equally  boundless  time  after  dissolution. 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish,  and  those  who 
have  been  spectators  of  its  dissolution  v/ill  very  soon  perish 
too.  And  he  v/ho  dies  at  the  extremest  old  age  will  be 
brought  into  the  same  condition  with  him  v/ho  died  pre- 
maturely. 

34.  What  are  these  men's  leading  principles,  and  about 
what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy,  and  for  v/hat  kind  of 


THE  MEDITATIONS   OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       275 

reasons  do  they  love  and  honour?  Imagine  that  thou  seest 
their  poor  souls  laid  bare.  When  they  think  that  they  do 
harm  by  their  blame  or  good  by  their  praise,  what  an  idea ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But  the  universal 
nature  delights  in  change,  and  in  obedience  to  her  all  things 
are  now  done  well,  and  from  eternity  have  been  done  in 
like  form,  and  will  be  such  to  time  without  end.  What  then 
dost  thou  say?  That  all  things  have  been  and  all  things 
always  will  be  bad,  and  that  no  povv^er  has  ever  been  found 
in  so  many  gods  to  rectify  these  things,  but  the  world  has 
been  condemned  to  be  bound  in  never-ceasing  evil?  (iv.  45, 
vii.  18.) 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is  the  foundation 
of  ever3'-thing !  water,  dust,  bones,  filth;  or  again,  marble 
rocks,  the  callosities  of  the  earth;  and  gold  and  silver,  the 
sediments;  and  garments,  only  bits  of  hair;  and  purple  dye, 
blood;  and  everything  else  is  of  the  same  kind.  And  that 
which  is  of  the  nature  of  breath,  is  also  another  thing  of  the 
same  kind,  changing  from  this  to  that. 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  murmuring  and 
apish  tricks.  Why  art  thou  disturbed?  What  is  there  new 
in  this?  What  unsettles  thee?  Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing? 
Look  at  it.  Or  is  it  the  matter?  Look  at  it.  But  besides 
these  there  is  nothing.  Towards  the  gods,  then,  now  become 
at  last  more  simple  and  better.  It  is  the  same  whether  we 
examine  these  things  for  a  hundred  years  or  three. 

38.  If  any  man  has  done  wrong,  the  harm  is  his  own.  But 
perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  intelligent  source 
and  com.e  together  as  in  one  body,  and  the  part  ought  not 
to  find  fault  with  what  is  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole;, 
or  there  are  only  atoms,  and  nothing  else  than  mixture  and 
dispersion.  Why  then  art  thou  disturbed?  Say  to  the 
ruling  faculty.  Art  thou  dead,  art  thou  corrupted,  art  thou 
playing  the  hypocrite,  art  thou  become  a  beast,  dost  thou 
herd  and  feed  with  the  rest? 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they  Have  power. 
If  then  they  have  no  power,  w^hy  dost  thou  pray  to  them? 
But  if  they  have  power,  why  dost  thou  not  pray  for  them 
to  give  thee  the  faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things 


276       THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

which  thou  fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  o£  the  things 
which  thou  desirest,  or  not  being  pained  at  anything,  rather 
than  pray  that  any  of  these  things  should  not  happen  or 
happen?  for  certainly  if  they  can  co-operate  with  men^  they 
can  co-operate  for  these  purposes.  But  perhaps  thou  wilt 
say,  the  gods  have  placed  them  in  thy  power.  Well,  then, 
is  it  not  better  to  use  what  is  in  thy  power  like  a  free  man 
than  to  desire  in  a  slavish  and  abject  way  what  is  not  in 
thy  power?  And  who  has  told  thee  that  the  gods  do  not 
aid  us  even  in  the  things  which  are  in  our  power?  Begin, 
then,  to  pray  for  such  things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man 
prays  thus :  How  shall  I  be  able  to  lie  with  that  woman  ? 
Do  thou  pray  thus :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to  lie  with  her  ? 
Another  prays  thus :  How  shall  I  be  released  from  this  ?  An- 
other prays :  How  shall  I  not  desire  to  be  released  ?  Another 
thus :  How  shall  I  not  lose  my  little  son  ?  Thou  thus :  How 
shall  I  not  be  afraid  to  lose  him?  In  fine,  turn  thy  prayers 
this  way,  and  see  what  comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says,  In  my  sickness  my  conversation  was 
not  about  my  bodily  sufferings,  nor,  says  he,  did  I  talk  on 
such  subjects  to  those  who  visited  me;  but  I  continued  to 
discourse  on  the  nature  of  things  as  before,  keeping  to  this 
main  point,  how  the  mind,  while  participating  in  such  move- 
ments as  go  on  in  the  poor  flesh,  shall  be  free  from  per- 
turbations and  maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did  I,  he 
says,  give  the  physicians  an  opportunity  of  putting  on 
solemn  looks,  as  if  they  were  doing  something  great,  but  my 
life  went  on  well  and  happily.  Do  then  the  same  that  he 
did  both  in  sickness,  if  thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other  cir- 
cumstances; for  never  to  desert  philosophy  in  any  events 
that  may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold  trifling  talk  either  with  an 
ignorant  man  or  with  one  unacquainted  with  nature,  is  a 
principle  of  all  schools  of  philosophy;  but  to  be  intent  only 
on  that  which  thou  art  now  doing  and  on  the  instrument 
by  which  thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man's  shameless 
conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself.  Is  it  possible  then  that 
shameless  men  should  not  be  in  the  world?  It  is  not  pos- 
sible. Do  not  then  require  what  is  impossible.  For  this 
man  also  is  one  of  those  shameless  men  who  must  of  neces- 


THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       277 

sity  be  in  the  world.  Let  the  same  considerations  be  present 
to  thy  mind  in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and  the  faithless  m.an, 
and  of  every  man  who  does  wrong  in  any  way.  For,  at  the 
same  time,  that  thou  dost  remind  thyself  that  it  is  impossible 
that  such  kind  of  m.en  should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  become 
more  kindly  disposed  towards  every  one  individually.  It  is 
useful  to  perceive  this,  too,  immediately  when  the  occasion 
arises,  v/hat  virtue  nature  has  given  to  man  to  oppose  to 
every  wrongful  act.  For  she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  anti- 
dote against  the  stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against  another 
kind  of  m.an  some  other  power.  And  in  all  cases  it  is  pos- 
sible for  thee  to  correct  by  teaching  the  man  who  is  gone 
astray;  for  every  man  who  errs  misses  his  object  and  is  gone 
astray.  Besides  Vv'herein  hast  thou  been  injured?  For  thou 
wilt  find  that  no  one  among  those  against  whom  thou  art 
irritated  has  done  anything  by  which  thy  mind  could  be  made 
worse;  but  that  which  is  evil  to  thee  and  harmful  has  its 
foundation  only  in  the  mind.  And  what  harm  is  done  or 
what  is  there  strange,  if  the  man  who  has  not  been  instructed 
does  the  acts  of  an  unlnstructed  man?  Consider  whether 
thou  shouldst  not  rather  blame  thyself,  because  thou  didst 
not  expect  such  a  man  to  err  in  such  a  way.  For  thou  hadst 
means  given  thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose  that  it  was  likely 
that  he  would  commit  this  error,  and  yet  thou  hast  forgotten 
and  art  amazed  that  he  has  erred.  But  most  of  all  when 
thou  blamest  a  man  as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn  to  thy- 
self. For  the  fault  is  manifestly  thy  own,  whether  thou  didst 
trust  that  a  man  who  had  such  a  disposition  would  keep 
his  promise,  or  when  conferring  thy  kindness  thou  didst  not 
confer  it  absolutely,  nor  yet  in  such  way  as  to  have  received 
from  thy  very  act  all  the  profit.  For  what  more  dost  thou 
want  when  thou  hast  done  a  mian  a  service?  Art  thou  not 
content  that  thou  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy 
nature,  and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ?  Just  as  if  the 
eye  demanded  a  recompense  for  seeing,  or  the  feet  for  walk- 
ing. For  as  these  members  are  formed  for  a  particular  pur- 
pose, and  by  working  according  to  their  several  constitutions 
obtain  what  is  their  own ;  so  also  as  man  is  formed  by  nature 
to  acts  of  benevolence,  when  he  has  done  anything  benevo- 
lent or  in  any  other  way  conducive  to  the  common  interest^ 


278      THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

he  has  acted  conformably  to  his  constitution,  and  he  gets 
what  is  his  own. 


'ILT  thou  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good  and  simple 
and  one  and  naked,  more  manifest  than  the  body 
which  surrounds  thee?  Wilt  thou  never  enjoy  an 
affectionate  and  contented  disposition?  Wilt  thou  never  be 
full  and  without  a  want  of  any  kind,  longing  for  nothing 
more,  nor  desiring  anything,  either  animate  or  inanimate, 
for  the  enjoyment  of  pleasures?  nor  yet  desiring  time 
wherein  thou  shalt  have  longer  enjoyment,  or  place,  or  pleas- 
ant climate,  or  society  of  men  with  whom  thou  mayst  live 
in  harmony  ?  but  wilt  thou  be  satisfied  with  thy  present  con- 
dition, and  pleased  with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt  thou 
convince  thyself  that  thou  hast  everything  and  that  it  comes 
from  the  gods,  that  everything  is  well  for  thee,  and  will  be 
well  whatever  shall  please  them,  and  v^^hatever  they  shall 
give  for  the  conservation  of  the  perfect  living  being,  the 
good  and  just  and  beautiful,  which  generates  and  holds  to- 
gether all  things,  and  contains  and  embraces  all  things  which 
are  dissolved  for  the  production  of  other  like  things?  Wilt 
thou  never  be  such  that  thou  shalt  so  dwell  in  community 
with  gods  and  men  as  neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all, 
nor  to  be  condemned  by  them? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far  as  thou  art 
governed  by  nature  only;  then  do  it  and  accept  it,  if  thy 
nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being,  shall  not  be  made 
worse  by  it.  And  next  thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature 
requires  so  far  as  thou  art  a  living  being.  And  all  this  thou 
mayst  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art  a 
rational  animal,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it.  But  the 
rational  animal  is  consequently  also  a  political  [social]  ani- 
mal. Use  these  rules  then,  and  trouble  thyself  about  noth- 
ing else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens  in  such  wise 
as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  or  as  thou  art  not 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  it.  If  then  it  happens  to  thee 
in  such  way  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not 


THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       279 

complain,  but  bear  it  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear 
it.  But  if  it  happens  in  such  wise  as  thou  art  not  formed 
by  nature  to  bear  it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will  perish  after 
it  has  consumed  thee.  Remember,  however,  that  thou  art 
formed  by  nature  to  bear  everything,  with  respect  to  which  it 
depends  on  thy  ovv^n  opinion  to  make  it  endurable  and  toler- 
able, by  thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest  or  thy  duty 
to  do  this. 

4.  If  a  man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly  and  show  him 
his  error.  But  if  thou  art  not  able,  blame  thyself,  or  blame 
not  even  thyself. 

5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  prepared  for  thee 
from  all  eternity;  and  the  implication  of  causes  was  from 
eternity  spinning  the  thread  of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which 
is  incident  to  it  (iii.  11 ;  iv.  26), 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms,  or 
nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be  established,  that  I  am 
a  part  of  the  whole  which  is  governed  by  nature;  next,  I 
am  in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are 
of  the  same  kind  with  myself.  For  remembering  this,  in- 
asmuch as  I  am  a  part,  I  shall  be  discontented  with  none 
of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to  me  out  of  the  whole; 
for  nothing  is  injurious  to  the  part,  if  it  is  for  the  advantage 
of  the  whole.  For  the  whole  contains  nothing  which  is  not 
for  its  advantage;  and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  common 
principle,  but  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  this  principle 
besides,  that  it  cannot  be  compelled  even  by  any  external 
cause  to  generate  anything  harmful  to  itself.  By  remem- 
bering then  that  I  am  a  part  of  such  a  whole,  I  shall  be 
content  with  everything  that  happens.  And  inasmuch  as  I 
am  in  a  manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which  are 
of  the  same  kind  with  myself,  I  shall  do  nothing  unsocial, 
but  I  shall  rather  direct  myself  to  the  things  which  are  of 
the  same  kind  with  m^yself,  and  I  shall  turn  all  my  efforts 
to  the  common  interest,  and  divert  them  from  the  contrary. 
Now,  if  these  things  are  done  so,  life  must  flow  on  happily, 
just  as  thou  mayst  observe  that  the  life  of  a  citizen  is 
happy,  who  continues  a  course  of  action  which  is  advanta- 
geous to  his  fellow-citizens,  and  is  content  with  whatever  the 
state  may  assign  to  him. 


280      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUKELIUS 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything,  I  mean,  which  i§ 
naturally  comprehended  in  the  universe,  must  of  necessity 
perish;  but  let  this  be  understood  in  this  sense,  that  they 
must  undergo  change.  But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an  evil 
and  a  necessity  for  the  parts,  the  whole  would  not  continue 
to  exist  in  a  good  condition,  the  parts  being  subject  to  change 
and  constituted  so  as  to  perish  in  various  ways.  For  whether 
did  nature  herself  design  to  do  evil  to  the  things  which  are 
parts  of  herself,  and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of 
necessity  fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened  without 
her  knowing  it?  .Both  these  suppositions,  indeed,  are  in- 
credible. But  if  a  man  should  even  drop  the  term  Nature 
[as  an  efficient  power],  and  should  speak  of  these  things 
as  natural,  even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  affirm  at  the 
same  time  that  the  parts  of  the  whole  are  in  their  nature 
subject  to  change,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  surprised  or 
vexed  as  if  something  were  happening  contrary  to  nature, 
particularly  as  the  dissolution  of  things  is  into  those  things 
of  which  each  thing  is  composed.  For  there  is  either  a 
dispersion  of  the  elements  out  of  which  every  thing  has  been 
compounded,  or  a  change  from  the  solid  to  the  earthy  and 
from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that  these  parts  are  taken 
back  into  the  universal  reason,  whether  this  at  certain 
periods  is  consumed  by  fire  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes. 
And  do  not  imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy  part  belong 
to  thee  from  the  time  of  generation.  For  all  this  received 
its  accretion  only  yesterday,  and  the  day  before,  as  one 
may  say,  from  the  food  and  the  air  which  is  inspired.  This 
then,  which  has  received  [the  accretion],  changes,  not  that 
which  thy  mother  brought  forth.  But  suppose  that  this 
[which  thy  mother  brought  forth]  implicates  thee  very  much 
with  that  other  part,  which  has  the  peculiar  quality  [of 
change],  this  is  nothing  in  fact  in  the  way  of  objection  to 
what  is  said. 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names,  good,  modesty 
true,  rational,  a  man  of  equanimity,  and  magnanimous,  take 
care  thou  dost  not  change  these  names ;  and  if  thou  shouldst 
lose  them,  quickly  return  to  them.  And  remember  that  tha 
term  Rational  was  intended  to  signify  a  discriminating  at^ 
tention  to  every  several  thing  and  freedom  from  negligencej 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       281 

and  tliat  Equanimity  is  the  voluntary  acceptance  of  the 
things  which  are  assigned  to  thee  by  the  common  nature; 
and  that  Magnanimity  is  the  elevation  of  the  intelligent  part 
above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations  of  the  flesh,  and 
above  that  poor  thing  called  fame,  and  death,  and  all  such 
things.  If,  then,  thou  maintainest  thyself  in  the  possession 
of  these  nam.es,  without  desiring  to  be  called  by  these  names 
by  others,  thou  wilt  be  another  person  and  wilt  enter  on 
another  life.  For  to  continue  to  be  such  as  thou  hast 
hitherto  been,  and  to  be  torn  in  pieces  and  defiled  in  such 
a  life,  is  the  character  of  a  very  stupid  man  and  one  over- 
fond  of  his  life,  and  like  those  half-devoured  fighters  with 
wild  beasts,  who,  though  covered  with  w^ounds  and  gore, 
still  entreat  to  be  kept  to  the  following  day,  though  they  will 
be  exposed  in  the  same  state  to  the  same  claws  and  bites. 
Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these  few  names: 
and  if  thou  art  able  to  abide  in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast 
removed  to  certain  islands  of  the  Happy.  But  if  thou  shalt 
perceive  that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and  dost  not  maintain 
thy  hold,  go  courageously  into  some  nook  where  thou  shalt 
maintain  them,  or  even  depart  at  once  from  life,  not  in 
passion,  but  with  simplicity  and  freedom  and  modesty,  after 
doing  this  one  [laudable]  thing  at  least  in  thy  life,  to  have 
gone  out  of  it  thus.  In  order,  however,  to  the  rem.embrance 
of  these  nam.es,  it  will  greatly  help  thee,  if  thou  rememberest 
the  gods,  and  that  they  wish  not  to  be  flattered,  but  wish 
all  reasonable  beings  to  be  made  like  themselves ;  and  if  thou 
rememberest  that  what  does  the  work  of  a  fig-tree  is  a  fig- 
tree,  and  that  what  does  the  v/ork  of  a  dog  is  a  dog,  and 
that  what  does  the  work  of  a  bee  is  a  bee,  and  that  what  does 
the  work  of  a  man  is  a  man. 

9.  Mimi,  w^ar,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery,  will  daily 
wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of  thine.  How  many  things 
without  studying  nature  dost  thou  imagine,  and  how  many 
dost  thou  neglect?  But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look  on  and  so 
to  do  everything,  that  at  the  same  time  the  pov/er  of  dealing 
with  circumstances  is  perfected,  and  the  contemplative  fac- 
ulty is  exercised,  and  the  confidence  which  comes  from  the 
knowledge  of  each  several  thing  is  maintained  without  show- 
ing it,  but  yet  not  concealed.     For  yvhen  wilt  thou  enjoy 


282      THE   MEDITATIONS   OF    MARCUS    AUEELIUS 

simplicity,  when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge  of  every 
several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  substance,  and  what  place 
it  has  in  the  universe,  and  how  long  it  is  formed  to  exist, 
and  of  what  things  it  is  compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can 
belong,  and  who  are  able  both  to  give  it  and  take  it 
away? 

10.  A  spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a  fly,  and  an- 
other v/hen  he  has  caught  a  poor  hare,  and  another  when 
he  has  taken  the  little  fish  in  a  net,  and  another  when  he 
has  taken  wild  boars,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  bears, 
and  another  when  he  has  taken  Sarmatians.  Are  not  these 
robbers,  if  thou  examinest  their  opinions? 

11.  Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing  How  all 
things  change  into  one  another,  and  constantly  attend  to  it, 
and  exercise  thyself  about  this  part  [of  philosophy].  For 
nothing  is  so  much  adapted  to  produce  magnanimity.  Such 
a  man  has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he  sees  that  he  must, 
no  one  knows  how  soon,  go  away  from  among  men  and  leave 
everything  here,  he  gives  himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing 
in  all  his  actions,  and  in  everything  else  that  happens  be 
resigns  himself  to  the  universal  nature.  But  as  to  what  any 
man  shall  say  or  think  about  him,  or  do  against  him,  he 
never  even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself  contented  with  these 
two  things,  3vith  acting  justly  in  what  he  now  does,  and 
being  satisfied  with  what  is  now  assigned  to  him'  and  lie 
lays  aside  all  distracting  and  busy  pursuits,  and  desires 
nothing  else  than  to  accomplish  the  straight  course  through 
the  law,  and  by  accomplishing  the  straight  course  to  follow 
God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear,  since  it  Is 
in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought  to  be  done?  And  if 
thou  seest  clear,  go  by  this  way  content,  without  turning 
back:  but  if  thou  dost  not  see  clear,  stop  and  take  the  best 
advisers.  But  if  any  other  things  oppose  thee^  go  on  ac- 
cording to  thy  powers  with  due  consideration,  keeping  to 
that  which  appears  to  be  just.  For  it  is  best  to  reach  this 
object,  and  if  thou  dost  fail,  let  thy  failure  be  in  attempting 
this.  He  who  follows  reason  in  all  things  is  both  tranquil 
and  active  at  the  same  time,  and  also  cheerful  and  collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest  from  sleep 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      283 

whether  it  will  make  any  difference  to  thee,  i£  another  does 
what  is  just  and  right.  It  will  make  no  difference  (vi. 
32;  viii.  55). 

Thou  has  not  forgotten,  I  suppose,  that  those  who  assume 
arrogant  airs  in  bestowing  their  praise  or  blame  on  others, 
arc  such  as  they  are  at  bed  and  at  board,  and  thou  hast  not 
forgotten  what  they  do,  and  what  they  avoid  and  what  they 
pursue,  and  how  they  steal  and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands 
and  feet,  but  with  their  most  valuable  part,  by  means  of 
which  there  is  produced,  when  a  man  chooses,  fidelity,  mod- 
esty, truth,  lav/,  a  good  daemon  [happiness]?  (vii.  17). 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to  nature,  the 
man  who  is  instructed  and  modest  says,  Give  what  thou  wilt ; 
take  back  what  thou  v/ilt.  And  he  says  this  not  proudly, 
but  obediently  and  well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee  of  life.  Live 
as  on  a  mountain.  For  it  makes  no  difference  whether  a 
man  lives  there  or  here,  if  he  lives  everywhere  in  the  world 
as  in  a  state  [political  community].  Let  men  see,  let  them 
know  a  real  man  who  lives  according  to  nature.  If  they 
cannot  endure  him,  let  them  kill  him.  For  that  is  better 
than  to  live  thus  [as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of  man  that  a 
good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 

17.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time  and  the 
whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that  all  individual  things 
as  to  substance  are  a  grain  of  a  fig,  and  as  to  time  the 
turning  of  a  gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  everything  that  exists,  and  observe  that  it 
is  already  in  dissolution  and  in  change,  and  as  it  v/ere  putre- 
faction or  dispersion,  or  that  everything  is  so  constituted 
by  nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eating,  sleeping, 
generating,  easing  themselves  and  so  forth.  Then  what  kind 
of  men  they  are  when  they  are  imxperious  and  arrogant,  or 
angry  and  scolding  from  their  elevated  place.  But  a  short 
time  ago  to  hov/  many  they  were  slaves  and  for  what  things : 
and  after  a  little  time  consider  in  what  a  condition  they 
will  be. 

20.  Xhat  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which  the  universal 


284     THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

nature  brings  to  each.    And  it  is  for  its  good^at  tHe  time 
jvhen  nature  brings  it. 

21.  "  The  earth  loves  the  shower;  "  and  "  the  solemn  aether 
loves : "  and  the  universe  loves  to  make  whatever  is  about  to 
be.  I  say  then  to  the  universe,  that  I  love  as  thou  lovest. 
And  is  not  this  too  said^  that  "  this  or  that  loves  [is  wont]  to 
be  produced." 

22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already  accustomed 
thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going  away,  and  this  was  thy  own 
will:  or  thou  art  dying  and  hast  discharged  thy  duty.  But 
besides  these  things  there  is  nothing.    Be  of  good  cheer,  then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that  this  piece  of  land 
is  like  any  other;  and  that  all  things  here  are  the  same  with 
things  on  the  top  of  a  mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or 
wherever  thou  choosest  to  be.  For  thou  wilt  find  just  what 
Plato  says.  Dwelling  vs^ithin  the  walls  of  a  city  as  in  a  shep- 
herd's fold  on  a  mountain.  [The  three  last  words  are  omitted 
in  the  translation.] 

24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me?  and  of  what 
nature  am  I  now  making  it  ?  and  for  what  purpose  am  I  now 
using  it?  is  it  void  of  understanding?  is  it  loosed  and  rent 
asunder  from  social  life  ?  is  it  melted  into  and  mixed  with  the 
poor  flesh  so  as  to  move  together  with  it? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a  runaway;  but  the 
law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks  the  law  is  a  runaway.  And 
he  also  who  is  grieved  or  angry  or  afraid,  is  dissatisfied  be- 
cause something  has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of  the  things 
which  are  appointed  by  him  who  rules  all  things,  and  he  is 
Lav/,  and  assigns  to  every  man  what  is  fit.  He  then  who 
fears  or  is  grieved  or  is  angry  is  a  runaway. 

26.  A  man  deposits  seed  in  a  womb  and  goes  away,  and 
then  another  cause  takes  it,  and  labours  on  it  and  makes  a 
child.  What  a  thing  from  such  a  material !  Again,  the 
child  passes  food  down  through  the  throat,  and  then  another 
cause  takes  it  and  makes  perception  and  motion,  and  in  fine 
life  and  strength  and  other  things;  how  many  and  how 
strange !  Observe  then  the  things  which  are  produced  in 
such  a  hidden  way,  and  see  the  power  just  as  we  see  the 
power  which  carries  things  downwards  and  upwards,  not  with 
the  eyes,  but  still  no  less  plainly  (vii.  75). 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AUEELIUS       285 

27.  Constancy  consider  how  all  things  such  as  they  now 
are,  in  time  past  also  were;  and  consider  that  they  will  he 
the  same  again.  And  place  before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas 
and  stages  of  the  same  form,  whatever  thou  hast  learne4 
from  thy  experience  or  from  older  history;  for  example,  the 
whole  court  of  Hadrianus,  and  the  whole  court  of  Antoninus^ 
and  the  whole  court  of  Philippus,  Alexander,  Croesus;  for 
all  those  were  such  dramas  as  we  see  now,  only  with  different 
actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at  anything  or  dis- 
contented to  be  like  a  pig  which  is  sacrificed  and  kicks  and 
screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in  silence  laments 
the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held.  And  consider  that  only 
to  the  rational  animal  is  it  given  to  follow  voluntarily  what 
happens ;  but  sim.ply  to  follow  is  a  necessity  imposed  on  all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything  that  thou  doest, 
pause  and  ask  thyself,  if  death  is  a  dreadful  thing  because 
it  deprives  thee  of  this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man's  fault,  forthwith 
turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in  what  like  manner  thou  dost  err 
thyself;  for  example,  in  thinking  that  money  is  a  good  thing, 
or  pleasure,  or  a  bit  of  reputation,  and  the  like.  For  by 
attending  to  this  thou  wilt  quickly  forget  thy  anger,  if  this 
consideration  also  is  added,  that  the  man  is  compelled;  for 
what  else  could  he  do?  or,  if  thou  art  able,  take  away  from 
him  the  compulsion. 

31.  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron  the  Socratic,  think  of 
either  Eutyches  or  Hymen,  and  w^hen  thou  hast  seen  Eu- 
phrates, think  of  Eutychion  or  Silvanus,  and  when  thou  hast 
seen  Alciphron  think  of  Tropaeophorus,  and  when  thou  hast 
seen  Xenophon  think  of  Crito  or  Severus,  and  when  thou  hast 
looked  on  thyself,  think  of  any  other  Caesar,  and  in  the  case 
of  every  one  do  in  like  manner.  Then  let  this  thought  be  in 
thy  mind,  Where  then  are  those  men?  Nowhere,  or  nobody 
knows  where.  For  thus  continuously  thou  wilt  look  at  hu- 
man things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all;  especially  if  thou 
reflectest  at  the  same  time  that  what  has  once  changed  will 
never  exist  again  in  the  infinite  duration  of  time.  But  thou. 
m  what  a  brief  space  of  time  is  thy  existence  ?    And  why  art 


286      THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

thou  not  content  to  pass  through  this  short  time  in  an  orderly 
way?  What  matter  and  opportunity  [for  thy  activity]  art 
thou  avoiding?  For  what  else  are  all  these  things,  except 
exercises  for  the  reason,  when  it  has  viewed  carefully  and  by 
examination  into  their  nature  the  things  which  happen  in 
life  ?  Persevere  then  until  thou  shalt  have  made  these  things 
thy  own,  as  the  stomach  which  is  strengthened  makes  all  things 
its  own,  as  the  blazing  fire  makes  flame  and  brightness  out 
of  everything  that  is  thrown  into  it„ 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  any  mean's  power  to  say  truly  of  thee 
that  thou  art  not  simple,  or  that  thou  art  not  good;  but  let 
him  be  a  liar  whoever  shall  think  anything  of  this  kind  about 
thee;  and  this  is  altogether  in  thy  power.  For  who  is  he 
that  shall  hinder  thee  from  being  good  and  simple  ?  Do  thou 
only  determine  to  live  no  longer,  unless  thou  shalt  be  such. 
For  neither  does  reason  allow  [thee  to  live],  if  thou  art 
not  such. 

33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material  [our  life]  can  be 
done  or  said  in  the  way  most  conformable  to  reason.  For 
whatever  this  may  be,  it  is  in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it. 
and  do  not  make  excuses  that  thou  art  hindered.  Thou  wilt 
not  cease  to  lament  till  thy  mind  is  in  such  a  condition  that, 
what  luxury  is  to  those  who  enjoy  pleasure,  such  shall  be 
to  thee,  in  the  matter  which  is  subjected  and  presented  to 
thee,  the  doing  of  the  things  v/hich  are  conformable  to  man's 
constitution;  for  a  man  ought  to  consider  as  an  enjo3'-ment 
everything  which  it  is  in  his  power  to  do  according  to  his 
own  nature.  And  it  is  in  his  power  everywhere.  Now,  it 
is  not  given  to  a  cylinder  to  move  everywhere  by  its  own 
motion,  nor  yet  to  water  nor  to  fire  nor  to  anything  else 
which  is  governed  by  nature  or  an  irrational  soul,  for  the 
things  which  check  them  and  stand  in  the  way  are  many. 
But  intelligence  and  reason  are  able  to  go  through  everything 
that  opposes  them,  and  in  such  manner  as  they  are  formed 
by  nature  and  as  they  choose.  Place  before  thy  eyes  this 
facility  with  which  the  reason  will  be  carried  through  all 
things,  as  fire  upwards,  as  a  stone  downwards,  as  a  cylinder 
down  an  inclined  surface,  and  seek  for  nothing  further.  For 
all  other  obstacles  either  affect  the  body  which  is  a  dead 
thing;  or,  except  through  opinion  and  the  yielding  of  the 


THE   MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS       287 

reason  itself,  they  do  not  crush  nor  do  any  harm  of  any  kind ; 
for  if  they  did,  he  who  felt  it  would  immediately  become  bad. 
Now,  in  the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a  certain  con- 
stitution, v/hatever  harm  may  happen  to  any  of  them,  that 
which  is  so  affected  becomes  consequently  worse;  but  in  the 
like  case,  a  man  becomes  both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and 
more  worthy  of  praise  by  making  a  right  use  of  these  ac- 
cidents. And  finally  remember  that  nothing  harms  him  who 
is  really  a  citizen,  v/hich  does  not  harm  the  state ;  nor  yet  does 
anything  harm  the  state  which  does  not  harm  law  [order]  ; 
and  of  these  things  which  are  called  misfortunes  not  one 
harms  law.  What  then  does  not  harm  law  does  not  harm 
either  state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  principles  even  the 
briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and  any  common  precept,  to  re- 
mind him  that  he  should  be  free  from  grief  and  fear.  For 
example : 

Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground- 
So  is  the  race  of  men. 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children;  and  leaves,  too,  are  they  who 
cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of  credit  and  bestow  their 
praise,  or  on  the  contrary  curse,  or  secretly  blame  and  sneer ; 
and  leaves,  in  like  manner,  are  those  who  shall  receive  and 
transmit  a  man's  fam.e  to  after-times.  For  all  such  things 
as  these  "  are  produced  in  the  season  of  spring,"  as  the  poet 
says;  then  the  wind  casts  them  down;  then  the  forest  pro- 
duces other  leaves  in  their  places.  But  a  brief  existence  is 
common  to  all  things,  and  yet  thou  avoidest  and  pursuest  all 
things  as  if  they  would  be  eternal.  A  little  time,  and  thou 
shalt  close  thy  eyes;  and  him  who  has  attended  thee  to  thy 
grave  another  soon  will  lam.ent. 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ought  to  see  all  visible  things  and  not 
to  say,  I  wish  for  green  things ;  for  this  is  the  condition  of  a 
diseased  eye.  And  the  healthy  hearing  and  smelling  ought 
to  be  ready  to  perceive  all  that  can  be  heard  and  smelled. 
And  the  healthy  stomach  ought  to  be  with  respect  to  all  food 
just  as  the  mill  with  respect  to  all  things  which  it  is  formed 
to  grind.  And  accordingly  the  healthy  understanding  ought 
to  be  prepared  for  everything  which  happens ;  but  that  which 
says,  Let  my  dear  children  live,  and  let  all  men  praise  what- 


288      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

ever  I  may  do,  is  an  eye  which  seeks  for  green  things,  or 
teeth  which  seek  for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there  shall  not  be 
by  him  when  he  is  dying  some  who  are  pleased  with  what  is 
going  to  happen.  Suppose  that  he  was  a  good  and  wise 
man,  will  there  not  be  at  last  some  one  to  say  to  himself. 
Let  us  at  last  breathe  freely  being  relieved  from  this  school- 
master? It  is  true  that  he  was  harsh  to  none  of  us,  but  I 
perceived  that  he  tacitly  condemns  us.  This  is  what  is  said 
of  a  good  man.  But  in  our  own  case  how  many  other  things 
are  there  for  which  there  are  many  who  wish  to  get  rid  of 
uSo  Thou  wilt  consider  this  then  when  thou  art  dying,  and 
thou  wilt  depart  more  contentedly  by  reflecting  thus:  I  am 
going  av/ay  from  such  a  life,  in  which  even  my  associates  in 
behalf  of  whom  I  have  striven  so  much,  prayed,  and  cared, 
themselves  wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  perchance  to  get  some 
little  advantage  by  it.  Why,  then,  should  a  man  cling  to  a 
longer  stay  here  ?  Do  not,  however,  for  this  reason  go  away 
less  kindly  disposed  to  them,  but  preserving  thy  own  char- 
acter, and  friendly  and  benevolent  and  mild,  and  on  the 
other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast  torn  away;  but  as  when  a 
man  dies  a  quiet  death,  the  poor  soul  is  easily  separated 
from  the  body,  such  also  ought  thy  departure  from  men  to  be, 
for  nature  united  thee  to  them  and  associated  thee.  But  does 
she  now  dissolve  the  union?  Well,  I  am  separated  as  from 
kinsmen,  not  however  dragged  resisting,  but  without  compul- 
sion; for  this  too  is  one  of  the  things  according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on  the  occasion 
of  anything  being  done  by  any  person  to  inquire  with  thyself, 
For  what  object  is  this  man  doing  this?  but  begin  with  thy- 
self, and  examine  thyself  first. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the  strings  is  the  thing 
which  is  hidden  within :  this  is  the  power  of  persuasion,  this 
is  life;  this,  if  one  may  so  say,  is  man.  In  contemplating 
thyself  never  include  the  vessel  which  surrounds  thee,  and 
these  instruments  v/hich  are  attached  about  it.  For  they  are 
like  to  an  ax,  differing  only  in  this  that  they  grow  to  the 
body.  For  indeed  there  is  no  more  use  in  these  parts  without 
the  cause  which  moves  and  checks  them  than  in  the  weaver's 
shuttle,  and  the  writer's  pen,  and  the  driver's  whip. 


THE   MEDITATIONS  OF  MAHCUS  AURELIUS      289 


XI 

THESE  are  the  properties  of  the  rational  soul:  it  sees 
itself,  analyzes  itself,  and  makes  itself  such  as  it 
chooses;  the  fruit  which  it  bears  itself  enjoys — for  the 
fruits  of  plants  and  that  in  animals  which  corresponds  to 
fruits  others  enjoy — it  obtains  its  own  end,  wherever  the 
limit  of  life  may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a  dance  and  in  a  play 
and  in  such  like  things,  where  the  whole  action  is  incomplete, 
if  anything  cuts  it  short;  but  in  every  part  and  wherever  it 
may  be  stopped,  it  makes  what  has  been  set  before  it  full  and 
complete,  so  that  it  can  say,  I  have  what  is  my  own.  And 
further  it  traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the  surrounding 
vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and  it  extends  itself  into  the 
infinity  of  time,  and  embraces  and  comprehends  the  periodical 
renovation  of  all  things,  and  it  comprehends  that  those  who 
come  after  us  will  see  nothing  new,  nor  have  those  before 
us  seen  anything  more^  but  in  a  manner  he  who  is  forty  years 
old,  if  he  has  any  understanding  at  all,  has  seen  by  virtue  of 
the  uniformity  that  prevails  all  things  which  have  been  and 
all  that  will  be.  This  too  is  a  property  of  the  rational  soul, 
love  of  one's  neighbour,  and  truth  and  modesty,  and  to  value 
nothing  more  than  itself,  which  is  also  the  property  of  Law. 
Thus  then  right  reason  differs  not  at  all  from  the  reason  of 
justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing  song  and  dancing 
and  the  pancratium,  if  thou  wilt  distribute  the  melody  of  the 
voice  into  its  several  sounds,  and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if 
thou  art  mastered  by  this;  for  thou  wilt  be  prevented  by 
shame  from  confessing  it:  and  in  the  matter  of  dancing,  if 
at  each  movement  and  attitude  thou  wilt  do  the  same;  and 
the  like  also  in  the  matter  of  the  pancratium.  In  all  things 
then,  except  virtue  and  the  acts  of  virtue,  remember  to  apply 
thyself  to  their  several  parts,  and  by  this  division  to  come 
to  value  them  little :  and  apply  this  rule  also  to  thy  whole  life. 

3.  What  a  soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at  any  moment  it 
must  be  separated  from  the  body,  and  ready  either  to  be  ex- 
tinguished or  dispersed  or  continue  to  exist;  but  so  that  this 
readiness  comes  from  a  man's  own  judgment,  not  from  mere 

IQ  Hc— Vol.  2 


290      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELiUS 

obstinacy,  as  with  the  Christians,  but  considerately  and  with 
dignity  and  in  a  way  to  persuade  another,  without  tragic 
show, 

4.  Have  I  done  something  for  the  general  interest?  Well 
then  I  have  had  my  reward.  Let  this  always  be  present  to 
thy  mind,  and  never  stop  [doing  such  good]. 

5.  What  is  thy  art?  to  be  good.  And  how  is  this  accom- 
plished well  except  by  general  principles,  some  about  the 
nature  of  the  universe,  and  others  about  the  proper  con- 
stitution of  man  ? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the  stage  as  means 

of  reminding  men  of  the  things  which  happen  to  them,  and 

that  it  is  according  to  nature  for  things  to  happen  so,  and 

that,  if  you  are  delighted  with  what  is  shown  on  the  stage, 

you  should  not  be  troubled  with  that  which  takes  place  on 

the  larger  stage.     For  you  see  that  these  things  must  be 

accomplished  thus,  and  that  even  they  bear  them  who  cry 

out,  "  O  Cithaeron."    And,  indeed,  some  things  are  said  well 

by  the  dramatic  writers,   of  which  kind  is  the   following 

especially — 

Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect, 
This  has  its  reason  too. 

And  again — 

We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens. 

And — 

Life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat's  fruitful  ear. 

And  other  things  of  the  same  kind. 

After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  introduced,  which  had 
a  magisterial  freedom  of  speech,  and  by  its  very  plainness 
of  speaking  was  useful  in  reminding  men  to  beware  of  inso- 
lence; and  for  this  purpose  too  Diogenes  used  to  take  from 
these  writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy  which  came  next,  observe 
what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what  object  the  new  comedy  was 
introduced,  which  gradually  sunk  down  into  a  mere  mimic 
artifice.  That  some  good  things  are  said  even  by  these 
writers,  everybody  knows :  but  the  whole  plan  of  such  poetry 
and  dramaturgy,  to  what  end  does  it  look ! 
7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not  another  con- 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS       291 

ditlon  of  life  so  well  suited  for  philosophizing  as  this  in 
which  thou  now  happenest  to  be. 

8.  A  branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch  must  of 
necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole  tree  also.  So  too  a  man 
when  he  is  separated  from  another  man  has  fallen  off  from 
the  whole  social  community.  Now  as  to  a  branch,  another 
cuts  it  oft*^  but  a  man  by  his  own  act  separates  himself  from 
his  neighbour  when  he  hates  him  and  turns  away  from  him, 
and  he  does  not  know  that  he  has  at  the  same  time  cut  him- 
self off  from  the  whole  social  system.  Yet  he  has  this  priv- 
ilege certainly  from  Zeus  who  framed  society,  for  it  is  in  our 
power  to  grow  again  to  that  which  is  near  to  us,  and  again  to 
become  a  part  which  helps  to  make  up  the  whole.  However, 
if  it  often  happens,  this  kind  of  separation,  it  makes  it  diffi- 
cult for  that  which  detaches  itself  to  be  brought  to  unity  and 
to  be  restored  to  its  former  condition.  Finally,  the  branch, 
which  from  the  first  grew  together  with  the  tree,  and  has 
continued  to  have  one  life  with  it,  is  not  like  that  which  after 
being  cut  off  is  then  ingrafted,  for  this  is  something  like  what 
the  gardeners  mean  when  they  say  that  it  grows  with  the 
rest  of  the  tree,  but  that  it  has  not  the  same  mind  with  it. 

9.  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way  when  thou  art 
proceeding  according  to  right  reason,  will  not  be  able  to 
turn  thee  aside  from  thy  proper  action,  so  neither  let  them, 
drive  thee  from  thy  benevolent  feelings  tov^rards  them,  but 
be  on  thy  guard  equally  in  both  matters,  not  only  in  the  mat- 
ter of  steady  judgment  and  action,  but  also  in  the  matter 
of  gentleness  towards  those  who  try  to  hinder  or  otherwise 
trouble  thee.  For  this  also  is  a  weakness,  to  be  vexed  at 
them,  as  well  as  to  be  diverted  from  thy  course  of  action  and 
to  give  way  through  fear ;  for  both  are  equally  deserters  from 
their  post,  the  man  who  does  it  through  fear,  and  the  man 
who  is  alienated  from  him  who  is  by  nature  a  kinsman  and 
a  friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to  art,  for  the 
arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things.  But  if  this  is  so,  that 
nature  which  is  the  most  perfect  and  the  most  comprehensive 
of  all  natures,  cannot  fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art.  Now  all 
arts  do  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake  of  the  superior ;  there- 
fore the  universal  nature  does  so  too.    And,  indeed;  hence  is 


292      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

the  origin  of  justice,  and  in  justice  the  other  virtues  have 
their  foundation:  for  justice  will  not  be  observed,  if  we 
either  care  for  middle  things  [things  indifferent],  or  are 
easily   deceived   and   careless   and   changeable    (v.    i6,   30; 

vii.  55)- 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the  pursuits  and 
avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee,  still  in  a  manner  thou 
goest  to  them.  Let  then  thy  judgment  about  them  be  at 
rest,  and  they  will  remain  quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen 
either  pursuing  or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains  its  figure, 
when  it  is  neither  extended  towards  any  object,  nor  contracted 
inwards,  nor  dispersed  nor  sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by 
light,  by  which  it  sees  the  truth,  the  truth  of  all  things  and 
the  truth  that  is  in  itself  (viii.  41,  45;  xii.  3). 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.  Let  him  look  to 
that  himself.  But  I  will  look  to  this,  that  I  be  not  discovered 
doing  or  saying  anything  deserving  of  contempt.  Shall  any 
man  hate  me?  Let  him  look  to  it.  But  I  will  be  mild  and 
benevolent  towards  every  man,  and  ready  to  show  even  him 
his  mistake,  not  reproachfully,  nor  yet  as  making  a  display 
of  my  endurance,  but  nobly  and  honestly,  like  the  great  Pho- 
cion,  unless  indeed  he  only  assumed  it.  For  the  interior 
[parts]  ought  to  be  such,  and  a  man  ought  to  be  seen  by  the 
gods  neither  dissatisfied  with  anything  nor  complaining.  For 
what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou  art  now  doing  what  is  agree- 
able to  thy  own  nature,  and  art  satisfied  with  that  which  at 
this  moment  is  suitable  to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  since 
thou  art  a  human  being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order  that  what 
is  for  the  comm^on  advantage  may  be  done  in  some  way? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one  another;  and 
men  wish  to  raise  themselves  above  one  another,  and  crouch 
before  one  another. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who  says,  I  have 
determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a  fair  way. — What  art  thou 
doing,  man?  There  is  no  occasion  to  give  this  notice.  It 
will  soon  show  itself  by  arts.  The  voice  ought  to  be  plainly 
written  on  the  forehead.  Such  as  a  man's  character  is,  he 
immediately  shows  it  in  his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is  beloved 
forthwith  reads  everything  in  the  eyes  of  lovers.    The  man 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MAKCUS  AURELIUS       293 

who  is  honest  and  good  ought  to  be  exactly  like  a  man  who 
smells  strong,  so  that  the  bystander  as  soon  as  he  comes  near 
him  must  smell  vv^hether  he  choose  or  not.  But  the  affecta- 
tion of  simplicity  is  like  a  crooked  stick.  Nothing  is  more 
disgraceful  than  a  wolfish  friendship  [false  friendship]. 
Avoid  this  most  of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and  benevolent 
show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and  there  is  no  mistaking 

1 6.  As  to  living  in  the  best  way,  this  power  is  in  the  soul, 
if  it  be  indifferent  to  things  which  are  indifferent.  And  it 
will  be  indifferent,  if  it  looks  on  each  of  these  things  sepa- 
rately and  all  together,  and  if  it  remembers  that  not  one  of 
them  produces  in  us  an  opinion  about  itself,  nor  comes  to  us ; 
fcut  these  things  remain  immovable,  and  it  is  we  ourselves 
who  produce  the  judgments  about  them,  and,  as  we  may  say, 
write  them  in  ourselves,  it  being  in  our  power  not  to  write 
them,  and  it  being  in  our  power,  if  perchance  these  judgments 
have  imperceptibly  got  admission  to  our  minds,  to  wipe  them 
out;  and  if  we  remember  also  that  such  attention  will  only 
be  for  a  short  time,  and  then  life  will  be  at  an  end.  Besides, 
what  trouble  is  there  at  all  in  doing  this?  For  if  these 
things  are  according  to  nature,  rejoice  in  them,  and  they  will 
be  easy  to  thee:  but  if  contrary  to  nature,  seek  what  is  con- 
formable to  thy  own  nature^  and  strive  towards  this,  even  if  it 
bring  no  reputation;  for  every  man  is  allowed  to  seek  his 
own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come,  and  of  what  it 
consists,  and  into  what  it  changes,  and  what  kind  of  a  thing 
it  will  be  when  it  has  changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain  no 
harm. 

18.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  consider  first]  : 
What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and  that  we  are  made  for  one 
another;  and  in  another  respect,  I  was  made  to  be  set  over 
them,  as  a  ram  over  the  flock  or  a  bull  over  the  herd.  But 
examine  the  matter  from  first  principles,  from  this:  If  all 
things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it  is  nature  which  orders  all 
things :  if  this  is  so,  the  inferior  things  exist  for  the  sake  of 
the  superior,  and  these  for  the  sake  of  one  another  (ii.  i ; 
ix.  39;  V.  16;  iii.  4). 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are  at  table,  in 
bed,  and  so  forth;  and  particularly,  under  what  compulsions 


294        THE   MEDITATION   OF   MARCUS    AURELIUS 

in  respect  of  opinions  they  are ;  and  as  to  their  acts,  consider 
with  vv^hat  pride  they  do  what  they  do  (viii.  14;  ix.  34). 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do,  we  ought 
not  to  be  displeased ;  but  if  they  do  not  right,  it  is  plain  that 
they  do  so  involuntarily  and  in  ignorance.  For  as  every  soul 
is  unwillingly  deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it  unwillingly 
deprived  of  the  power  of  behaving  to  each  rnan  according  to  his 
deserts.  Accordingly  men  are  pained  when  they  are  called 
unjust,  ungrateful,  and  greedy^  and  in  a  word  wrong-doers 
to  their  neighbours  (vii.  62,  63;  ii.  i;  vii.  26;  viii.  29). 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  many  things  wrong, 
and  that  thou  art  a  man  like  others;  and  even  if  thou  dost 
abstain  from  certain  faults,  still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to 
commit  them,  though  either  through  cov/ardice,  or  concern 
about  reputation  or  some  such  mean  motive,  thou  dost 
abstain  from  such  faults  (i.  17). 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even  understand  vv^hether 
men  are  doing  wrong  or  not,  for  many  things  are  done  with 
a  certain  reference  to  circumstances.  And,  in  short,  a  man 
must  learn  a  great  deal  to  enable  him  to  pass  a  correct  judg- 
ment on  another  man's  acts  (ix.  38;  iv.  51). 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed  or  grieved,  that 
man's  life  is  only  a  m^oment,  and  after  a  short  time  we  are 
all  laid  out  dead  (vii.  58;  iv.  48). 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men's  acts  which  disturb  us,  for 
those  acts  have  their  foundation  in  men's  ruling  principles, 
but  it  is  our  own  opinions  which  disturb  us.  Take  away 
these  opinions  then,  and  resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judgment 
about  an  act  as  if  it  were  something  grievous,  and  thy  anger 
is  gone.  How  then  shall  I  take  away  these  opinions?  By 
reflecting  that  no  wrongful  act  of  another  brings  shame  on 
thee:  for  unless  that  which  is  shameful  is  alone  bad,  thou 
also  must  of  necessity  do  many  things  wrong,  and  become  a 
robber  and  everything  else  (v.  25;  vii.  16). 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is  brought  on  us 
by  the  anger  and  vexation  caused  by  such  acts  than  by  the 
acts  themselves,  at  which  we  are  angry  and  vexed  (iv, 
39,  49;  vii.  24). 

Ninth,  consider  that  a  good  disposition  is  invincible,  if  it  be 
genuine,  and  not  an  affected  smile  and  acting  a  part^    For 


THE  MEDITATIONS   OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS      295 

what  will  the  most  violent  man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest 
to  be  of  a  kind  disposition  towards  him,  and  if,  as  opportunity 
offers,  thou  gently  admonishest  him  and  calmly  correctest  his 
errors  at  the  very  time  when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm, 
ssying.  Not  so,  my  child:  we  are  constituted  by  nature  for 
somiCthing  else:  I  shall  certainly  not  be  injured,  but  thou  art 
injuring  thyself,  my  child. — And  show  him  with  gentle  tact 
and  by  general  principles  that  this  is  so,  and  that  even  bees 
do  not  do  as  he  does,  nor  any  animals  which  are  formed  by 
nature  to  be  gregarious.  And  thou  must  do  this  neither 
with  any  double  meaning  nor  in  the  way  of  reproach,  but 
affectionately  and  without  any  rancour  in  thy  soul;  and  not 
as  if  thou  wert  lecturing  him.,  nor  yet  that  any  bystander  may 
admire,  but  either  when  he  is  alone,  and  if  others  are  present.^ 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst  received  them 
as  a  gift  from  the  Muses,  and  begin  at  last  to  be  a  man 
v/hile  thou  livest.  But  thou  must  equally  avoid  flattering 
men  and  being  vexed  at  them,  for  both  are  unsocial  and  lead 
to  harm.  And  let  this  truth  be  present  to  thee  in  the  excite- 
ment of  anger,  that  to  be  moved  by  passion  is  not  manly, 
but  that  mildness  and  gentleness,  as  they  are  more  agreeable 
io  hum.an  nature,  so  also  are  they  more  manly;  and  he  who 
possesses  these  qualities  possesses  strength,  nerves  and  cour- 
age, and  not  the  man  who  is  subject  to  fits  of  passion  and 
discontent.  For  in  the  same  degree  in  which  a  man's  mind 
is  nearer  to  freedom  from  all  passion,  in  the  same  degree 
also  is  it  nearer  to  strength:  and  as  the  sense  of  pain  is 
a  characteristic  of  weakness,  so  also  is  anger.  For  he  who 
yields  to  pain  and  he  who  yields  to  anger,  both  are  wounded 
and  both  submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a  tenth  present  from  the 
leader  of  the  [Muses  Apollo],  and  it  is  this— that  to  expect 
bad  men  not  to  do  wrong  is  m^adness,  for  he  who  expects  this 
desires  an  impossibility.  But  to  allow  men  to  behave  so  to 
others,  and  to  expect  them  not  to  do  thee  any  wrong,  is 
irrational  and  tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of  the  superior 
faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst  be  constantly  on  thy 
guard,  and  when  thou  hast  detected  them,  thou  shouldst  wipe 

1  It  appears  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  text  here. 


295      THE  MEDITATIONS   OF  MARCUS  A^TRELIUS 

them  out  and  say  on  each  occasion  thus :  this  thought  is  not 
necessary:  this  tends  to  destroy  social  union:  this  Wi^hich 
thou  art  going  to  say  comes  not  from  the  real  thoughts ;  for 
thou  shouldst  consider  it  among  the  most  absurd  of  things 
for  a  man  not  to  speak  from  his  real  thoughts.  But  the 
fourth  is  when  thou  shalt  reproach  thyself  for  anything,  for 
this  is  an  evidence  of  the  diviner  part  within  thee  being 
overpowered  and  yielding  to  the  less  honourable  and  to  the 
perishable  part,  the  body,  and  to  its  gross  pleasures  (iv. 
24;  ii.  16). 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts  which  are  mingled 
in  thee,  though  by  nature  they  have  an  upward  tendency, 
still  in  obedience  to  the  disposition  of  the  universe  they  are 
overpowered  here  in  the  compound  mass  [the  body].  And 
also  the  whole  of  the  earthly  part  in  thee  and  the  watery, 
though  their  tendency  is  downwards,  still  are  raised  up  and 
occupy  a  position  which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In  this 
manner  then  the  elemental  parts  obey  the  universal,  for  when 
they  have  been  fixed  in  any  place  perforce  they  remain  there 
until  again  the  universal  shall  sound  the  signal  for  dissolution. 
Is  it  not  then  strange  that  thy  intelligent  part  only  should 
be  disobedient  and  discontented  with  its  own  place?  And 
yet  no  force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those  things  which 
are  conformable  to  its  nature :  still  it  does  not  submit,  but  is 
carried  in  the  opposite  direction.  For  the  movement  towards 
injustice  and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and  fear 
is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who  deviates  from  nature. 
And  also  when  the  ruling  faculty  is  discontented  with  any- 
thing that  happens,  then  too  it  deserts  its  post:  for  it  is  con- 
stituted for  piety  and  reverence  toward  the  gods  no  less  than 
for  justide.  For  these  qualities  also  are  comprehended 
under  the  generic  term  of  contentment  with  the  constitution 
of  things,  and  indeed  they  are  prior  to  acts  of  justice. 

21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the  same  object  in 
life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  all  through  his  life.  But 
what  I  have  said  is  not  enough,  unless  this  also  is  added, 
what  this  object  ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the  same 
opinion  about  all  the  things  which  in  some  way  or  other 
are  considered  by  the  majority  to  be  good,  but  only  about 
some  certain  things,  that  is,  things  which  concern  the  com- 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS       297 

mon  interest;  so  also  ought  we  to  propose  to  ourselves  an 
object  which  shall  be  of  a  common  kind  [social]  and  political. 
For  he  who  directs  all  his  own  efforts  to  this  object,  will 
make  all  his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will  always  be  the  same. 

22.  Think  of  the  country  mouse  and  of  the  town  mouse, 
and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation  of  the  town  mouse. 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the  many  by  the 
name  of  Lamiae,  bugbears  to  frighten  children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public  spectacles  used 
to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for  strangers,  but  themselves  sat 
down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccas  for  not  going 
to  him,  saying,  It  is  because  I  would  not  perish  by  the  worst 
of  all  ends,  that  is,  I  would  not  receive  a  favour  and  then 
be  unable  to  return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Ephesians]  there  was  this 
precept,  constantly  to  think  of  some  one  of  the  men  of  for- 
mer times  who  practiced  virtue. 

2"/.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning  look  to  the 
heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded  of  those  bodies  which  con- 
tinually do  the  same  things  and  in  the  same  manner  perform 
their  work,  and  also  be  reminded  of  their  purity  and  nudity. 
For  there  is  no  veil  over  a  star. 

28.  Consider  what  a  man  Socrates  was  when  he  dressed 
himself  in  a  skin,  after  Xanthippe  had  taken  his  cloak  and 
gone  out,  and  v/hat  Socrates  said  to  his  friends  who  were 
ashamed  of  him  and  drew  back  from  him  when  they  saw 
him  dressed  thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt  thou  be  able 
to  lay  down  rules  for  others  before  thou  shalt  have  first 
learned  to  obey  rules  thyself.    Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A  slave  thou  art:  free  speech  is  not  for  thee. 

31.  — And  my  heart  laughed  within  (Od.  ix.  413). 

32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse  speaking  harsh  words 
'^(Hesiod,  "Works  and  Days,"  184). 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a  madman's  act:  such 
IS  he  who  looks  for  his  child  when  it  is  no  longer  allowed 
(Epictetus,  iii.  24,  87). 

34.  When  a  man  kisses  his  child,  said  Epictetus,  he  should 
whisper  to  himself,  "  To-morrow  perchance  thou  wilt  die." 


298      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF   MARCUS  AURELIUS 

But  those  are  words  of  bad  omen.  "  No  word  is  a  word  of 
bad  omen,"  said  Epictetus,  "  which  expresses  any  work  of 
nature;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is  also  a  word  of  bad  omen  to  speak 
of  the  ears  of  corn  being  reaped"  (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  88). 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the  dried  grape  all 
are  changes,  not  into  nothing,  but  into  something  which 
exists  not  yet  (Epictetus,  iii.  24). 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will  (Epictetus,  iii. 
22,  105). _ 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a  man  m.ust  discover  an  art  [or 
rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  assent;  and  in  respect  to 
his  movements  he  must  be  careful  that  they  be  made  with 
regard  to  circumstances,  that  they  be  consistent  with  social 
interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the  value  of  the  object; 
and  as  to  sensual  desire,  he  should  altogether  keep  away  from 
it;  and  as  to  avoidance  [aversion]  he  should  not  show  it  with 
respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  power. 

38.  The  dispute  then,  he  said,  is  not  about  any  comm.on 
matter,  but  about  being  mad  or  not. 

39.  Socrates  used  to  say,  What  do  you  want?  Souls  of 
rational  men  or  irrational? — Souls  of  rational  men. — Of 
what  rational  men?  Sound  or  unsound? — Sound. — Why 
then  do  you  not  seek  for  them? — Because  we  have  them. — 
VV'hy  then  do  you  fight  and  quarrel? 


XII 

LL  those  things  at  which  thou  v/ishest  to  arrive  by  a 
circuitous  road,  thou  canst  have  now,  if  thou  dost 
not  refuse  them  to  thyself.  And  this  means,  if  thou 
wilt  take  no  notice  of  all  the  past,  and  trust  the  future  to 
providence,  and  direct  the  present  only  conformably  to  piety 
and  justice.  Conformably  to  piety,  that  thou  mayest  be 
content  with  the  lot  which  is  assigned  to  thee,  for  nature 
designed  it  for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Conformably  to  justice, 
that  thou  mayest  always  speak  the  truth  freely  and  without 
disguise,  and  do  the  things  which  are  agreeable  to  law  and 
according  to  the  worth  of  each.  And  let  neither  another 
man's  y/ickedness  hinder  thee,  nor  opinion  nor  voice,  nor 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS        299 

yet  the  sensations  of  the  poor  flesh  which  has  grown  about 
thee;  for  the  passive  part  will  look  to  this.  If  then,  what- 
ever the  time  may  be  when  thou  shalt  be  near  to  thy  de- 
parture, neglecting  everything  else  thou  shalt  respect  only 
thy  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within  thee,  and  if  thou 
shalt  be  afraid  not  because  thou  must  some  time  cease  to 
live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear  never  to  have  begun  to  live 
according  to  nature — then  thou  wilt  be  a  man  worthy  of 
the  universe  which  has  produced  thee,  and  thou  wilt  cease 
to  be  a  stranger  in  thy  native  land,  and  to  wonder  at  things 
which  happen  daily  as  if  they  were  something  unexpected, 
and  to  be  dependent  on  this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  (ruling  principles)  of  all  men 
bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind  and  impurities.  For 
w^ith  his  intellectual  part  alone  he  touches  the  intelligence 
only  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into 
these  bodies.  And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to  do  this, 
thou  wilt  rid  thyself  of  thy  much  trouble.  For  he  who  re- 
gards not  the  poor  flesh  which  envelops  him,  surely  will  not 
trouble  himself  by  looking  after  raiment  and  dwelling  and 
fame  and  such  like  externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art  composed,  a 
little  body,  a  little  breath  [life],  intelligence.  Of  these  the 
first  two  are  thine,  so  far  as  it  is  thy  duty  to  take  care  of 
them;  but  the  third  alone  is  properly  thine.  Therefore,  if 
thou  shalt  separate  from  thyself,  that  is,  from  thy  under- 
standing, whatever  others  do  or  say,  and  whatever  thou 
hast  done  or  said  thyself,  and  whatever  future  things  trouble 
thee  because  they  may  happen,  and  whatever  in  the  body 
which  envelops  thee,  or  in  the  breath  [life],  which  is  by 
nature  associated  with  the  body,  is  attached  to  thee  inde- 
pendent of  thy  will,  and  whatever  the  exernal  circumfluent 
vortex  whirls  round,  so  that  the  intellectual  power  exempt 
from  the  things  of  fate  can  live  pure  and  free  by  itself, 
doing  what  is  just  and  accepting  what  happens  and  saying 
the  truth:  if  thou  wilt  separate,  I  say,  from  this  ruling 
faculty  the  things  which  are  attached  to  it  by  the  impres- 
sions of  sense,  and  the  things  of  time  to  come  and  of  time 
that  is  past,  and  v/ilt  make  thyself  like  Empedocles'  sphere, — 

All  round,  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing; 


300      THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS 

and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what  is  really  thy 
life,  that  is,  the  present,  then  thou  wilt  be  able  to  pass  that 
portion  of  life  which  remains  for  thee  up  to  the  time  of 
thy  death,  free  from  perturbations,  nobly,  and  obedient  to 
thy  own  daemon  [to  the  god  that  is  within  thee]  (ii.  13,  17; 
iii.  5,  6;  xi.  12). 

4.  I  have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that  every  man  loves 
himself  more  than  all  the  rest  of  men,  but  yet  sets  less 
value  on  his  own  opinion  of  himself  than  on  the  opinion 
of  others.  If  then  a  god  or  a  wise  teacher  should  present 
himself  to  a  man  and  bid  him  to  think  of  nothing  and  to 
design  nothing  which  he  would  not  express  as  soon  as  he 
conceived  it,  he  could  not  endure  it  even  for  a  single  day. 
So  much  more  respect  have  we  to  what  our  neighbours  shall 
think  of  us  than  to  what  we  shall  think  of  ourselves. 

5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  after  having  arranged 
all  things  well  and  benevolently  for  mankind,  have  over- 
looked this  alone,  that  some  men  and  very  good  men,  and 
men  who,  as  we  may  say,  have  had  most  communion  with 
the  divinity,  and  through  pious  acts  and  religious  observ- 
ances have  been  most  intimate  with  the  divinity,  when  they 
have  once  died  should  never  exist  again,  but  should  be 
completely  extinguished? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought  to  have  been 
otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  done  it.  For  if  it  were  just, 
it  would  also  be  possible;  and  if  it  were  according  to 
nature,  nature  would  have  had  it  so.  But  because  it  is 
not  so,  if  in  fact  it  is  not  so,  be  thou  convinced  that  it  ought 
not  to  have  been  so : — for  thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in 
this  inquiry  thou  art  disputing  with  the  deity ;  and  we  should 
not  thus  dispute  with  the  gods,  unless  they  were  most  ex- 
cellent and  most  just ; — but  if  this  is  so,  they  would  not  have 
allowed  anything  in  the  ordering  of  the  universe  to  be 
neglected  unjustly  and  irrationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which  thou  de- 
spairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even  the  left  hand,  which 
is  ineffectual  for  all  other  things  for  want  of  practice,  holds 
the  bridle  more  vigorously  than  the  right  hand;  for  it 
has  been  practised  in  this. 

7.  Consider  in  wj^at  condition,  both  in  body  and  soul,  a 


THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS  AURELIUS      301 

man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken  by  death ;  and  consider 
the  shortness  of  Hfe,  the  boundless  abyss  of  time,  past  and 
future,  the  feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles  [forms]  of  things 
bare  of  their  coverings;  the  purposes  of  actions;  consider 
what  pain  is,  what  pleasure  is,  and  death,  and  fame;  who 
is  to  himself  the  cause  of  his  uneasiness;  how  no  man  is 
hindered  by  another ;  that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  In  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou  must  be  like 
the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladiator;  for  the  gladiator 
lets  fall  the  sword  which  he  uses  and  is  killed;  but  the 
other  always  has  his  hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else 
than  use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves,  dividing  them  into 
matter,  form  and  purpose. 

11.  What  a  power  man  has  to  do  nothing  except  what 
God  will  approve,  and  to  accept  all  that  God  may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  conformably  to 
nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither  gods,  for  they  do  nothing 
wrong  either  voluntarily  or  involuntarily,  nor  men,  for  they 
do  nothing  wrong  except  involuntarily.  Consequently  we 
should  blame  nobody  (ii.  11,  12,  13;  vii.  62;  viii.  17). 

13.  How  ridiculous  and  what  a  stranger  he  is  who  is 
surprised  at  anything  which  happens  in  life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a  fatal  necessity  and  invincible  order, 
or  a  kind  providence,  or  a  confusion  without  a  purpose 
and  without  a  director  (iv.  27).  If  then  there  is  an  in- 
vincible necessity,  why  dost  thou  resist?  But  if  there  is  a 
providence  which  allows  itself  to  be  propitiated,  make 
thyself  worthy  of  the  help  of  the  divinity.  But  if  there 
is  a  confusion  without  a  governor,  be  content  that  in  such 
a  tempest  thou  hast  in  thyself  a  certain  ruling  intelligence. 
And  even  if  the  tempest  carry  thee  away,  let  it  carry  away 
the  poor  flesh,  the  poor  breath,  everything  else;  for  the 
intelligence  at  least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without  losing  its 
Splendour  until  it  is  extinguished;  and  shall  the  truth  which 
is  in  thee  and  justice  and  temperance  be  extinguished  [before 
thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a  man  has  presented  the  appearance  of  having 


302      THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS 

done  wrong,  [say].  How  then  do  I  know  i£  this  is  a  wrong- 
ful act?  And  even  if  he  has  done  wrong,  how  do  I  know 
that  he  has  not  condemned  himself?  and  so  this  is  like  tear;? 
ing  his  own  face.  Consider  that  he,  who  would  not  hav€ 
the  bad  man  do  wrong,  is  like  the  man  who  would  not  Have 
the  fig  tree  to  bear  juice  in  the  figs  and  infants  to  cry  and 
the  horse  to  neigh,  and  whatever  else  must  of  necessity  be. 
For  what  must  a  man  do  who  has  such  a  character?  If 
then  thou  art  irritable,  cure  this  man's  disposition, 

17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it:  if  it  is  not  true,  do 
not  say  it.     [For  let  thy  efforts  be.~ ]^ 

18.  In  everything  always  observe  what  the  thing  is  which 
produces  for  thee  an  appearance,  and  resolve  it  by  dividing 
it  into  the  formal,  the  material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time 
within  which  it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee  something 
better  and  more  divine  than  the  things  which  cause  the 
various  effects,  and  as  it  were  pull  thee  by  the  strings. 
What  is  there  now  in  my  mind?  is  it  fear,  or  suspicion,  or 
desire,  or  anything  of  the  kind?  (v.  11). 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderately,  nor  without  a  pur- 
pose. Second,  make  thy  acts  refer  to  nothing  else  than  to 
a  social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be  nobody  and 
nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the  things  exist  which  thou  now 
seest,  nor  any  of  those  who  are  now  living.  For  all  things 
are  formed  by  nature  to  change  and  be  turned  and  to  perish 
in  order  that  other  things  in  continuous  succession  may 
exist  (ix.  28  )e 

22.  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and  opinion  is 
in  thy  power.  Take  away  then,  when  thou  choosest,  thy 
opinion,  and  like  a  mariner,  who  has  doubled  the  promontory, 
thou  wilt  find  calm,  everything  stable,  and  a  waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity,  whatever  it  may  be,  when  it  has 
ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  because  it  has 
ceased;  nor  he  who  has  done  this  act,  does  he  suffer  any 
evil  for  this  reason  that  the  act  has  ceased.  In  like  manner 
then  the  whole  which  consists  of  all  the  acts,  which  is  our 
life,  if  it  cease  at  its  proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this 

^There  Is  somethiag  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


THE   MEDITATIONS    OF   MARCUS   AURELIUS       SaS 

reason  that  it  has  ceased;  nor  he  who  has  terminated  this 
series  at  the  proper  time,  has  he  been  ill  dealt  with.  But 
the  proper  time  and  the  limit  nature  fixes,  sometimes  as  in 
old  age  the  peculiar  nature  of  man,  but  always  the  universal 
nature,  by  the  change  of  whose  parts  the  whole  universe 
continues  ever  young  and  perfect.  And  everything  which 
is  useful  to  the  universal  is  always  good  and  in  season. 
Therefore  the  term.ination  of  life  for  every  man  is  no  evil, 
because  neither  is  it  shameful,  since  it  is  both  independent 
of  the  will  and  not  opposed  to  the  general  interest,  but  it 
is  good,  since  it  is  seasonable  and  profitable  to  and  con- 
gruent with  the  universal.  For  thus  too  he  is  moved  by 
the  deity  who  is  moved  in  the  same  manner  with  the  deity 
and  moved  towards  the  same  things  in  his  mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in  readiness. 
In  the  things  which  thou  doest  do  nothing  either  inconsid* 
erately  or  otherv/ise  than  as  justice  herself  w^ould  act;  but 
with  respect  to  what  may  happen  to  thee  from  without 
consider  that  it  happens  either  by  chance  or  according  to 
providence,  and  thou  must  neither  blame  chance  nor  accuse 
providence.  Second,  consider  what  every  being  is  from  the 
seed  to  the  time  of  its  receiving  a  soul,  and  from  the  reception 
of  a  soul  to  the  giving  back  of  the  sam.e,  and  of  what  things 
every  being  is  compounded  and  into  what  things  it  is  re- 
solved. Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly  be  raised  up  above 
the  earth,  and  shouldst  look  dov/n  on  human  beings,  and 
observe  the  variety  of  them  how  great  it  is,  and  at  the  same 
time  also  shouldst  see  at  a  glance  how  great  is  the  number 
of  beings  v/ho  dwell  all  around  in  the  air  and  the  aether, 
consider  that  as  often  as  thou  shouldst  be  raised  up,  thou 
wouldst  see  the  same  things,  sameness  of  form  and  shortness 
of  duration.    Are  these  things  to  be  proud  of? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion :  thou  art  saved.  Who  then  hinders 
thee  from  casting  it  away? 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled  about  anything,  thou  hast 
forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen  according  to  the 
universal  nature;  and  forgotten  this,  that  a  man's  wro-ngful 
act  is  nothing  to  thee;  and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this, 
that  everything  v/hich  happens,  alvvrays  happened  so  and  will 
happen  so,  and  now  happens  so  everywhere;  forgotten  this 


304       THE  MEDITATIONS  OF  MARCUS    AURELIUS 

too,  how  close  is  the  kinship  between  a  man  an(i  the  whole 
human  race,  for  it  is  a  community,  not  of  a  little  blood  or 
seed,  but  of  intelligence.  And  thou  hast  forgotten  this  too, 
that  every  man's  intelligence  is  a  god,  and  is  an  efflux  of 
the  deity;  and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  a  man's  own, 
but  that  his  child  and  his  body  and  his  very  soul  came  from 
the  deity;  forgotten  this,  that  everything  is  opinion;  and 
lastly  thou  hast  forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present 
time  only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection  those  who  have 
complained  greatly  about  anything,  those  who  have  been 
most  conspicuous  by  the  greatest  fame  or  misfortunes  or 
enmities  or  fortunes  of  any  kind :  then  think  where  are  they 
all  now?  Smoke  and  ash  and  a  tale,  or  not  even  a  tale. 
And  let  there  be  present  to  thy  mind  also  everything  of  this 
sort,  how  Fabius  Catullinus  lived  in  the  country,  and  Lucius 
Lupus  in  his  gardens,  and  Stertinius  at  Baiae,  and  Tiberius 
at  Capreae,  and  Velius  Rufus  [or  Rufus  at  Velia]  ;  and  in 
fine  think  of  the  eager  pursuit  of  anything  conjoined  with 
pride;  and  how  worthless  everything  is  after  which  men 
violently  strain;  and  how  much  more  philosophical  it  is 
for  a  man  in  the  opportunities  presented  to  him  to  show 
himself  just,  temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to  do 
this  with  all  simplicity:  for  the  pride  which  is  proud  of 
its  want  of  pride  is  the  most  intolerable  of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask.  Where  hast  thou  seen  the  gods, 
or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  so  wor- 
shipest  them,  I  answer,  in  the  first  place,  they  may  be  seen 
even  with  the  eyes;  in  the  second  place  neither  have  I 
seen  even  my  own  soul  and  yet  I  honour  it.  Thus  then  with 
respect  to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of 
their  power,  from  this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  I 
venerate  them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine  everything  all 
through,  what  it  is  itself,  what  is  its  material,  what  the 
formal  part;  with  all  thy  soul  to  do  justice  and  to  say  the 
truth.  What  remains  except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining  one 
good  thing  to  another  so  as  not  to  leave  even  the  smallest 
intervals  between. 

3O0  There  is  one  light  o£  the  sun,  though  it  is  interrupted 


:THE   meditations   of    MARCUS   AURELIUS     305 

by  walls,  mountains,  and  other  things  infinite.  There  is  one 
common  substance,  though  it  is  distributed  among  countless 
bodies  which  have  their  several  qualities.  There  is  one  soul, 
though  it  is  distributed  am^ong  infinite  natures  and  individual 
circumscriptions  [or  individuals].  There  is  one  intelligent 
soul,  though  it  seems  to  be  divided.  Now  in  the  things 
which  have  been  mentioned  all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those 
which  are  air  and  matter,  are  without  sensation  and  have  no 
fellowship :  and  yet  even  these  parts  the  intelligent  principle 
holds  together,  and  the  gravitation  towards  the  same.  But 
intellect  in  a  peculiar  manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  th^ 
same  kin,  and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling  for  com* 
munion  is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish?  to  continue  to  exist?  Well, 
dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensation?  movement?  growth?  and 
then  again  to  cease  to  grow?  to  use  thy  speech?  to  think? 
What  is  there  of  all  these  things  which  seem  to  thee  worth 
desiring?  But  if  it  is  easy  to  set  little  value  on  all  these 
things,  turn  to  that  which  remains,  which  is  to  follow  reason 
and  god.  But  it  is  inconsistent  with  honouring  reason  and 
god  to  be  troubled  because  by  death  a  m.an  will  be  deprived 
of  the  other  things. 

32.  How  small  a  part  of  the  boundless  and  unfathomable 
time  is  assigned  to  every  man?  for  it  is  very  soon  swal- 
lowed up  in  the  eternal.  And  how  small  a  part  of  the  whole 
substance?  and  how  small  a  part  of  the  universal  soul? 
and  on  what  a  small  clod  of  the  whole  earth  thou  creepest? 
Reflecting  on  all  this  consider  nothing  to  be  great,  except 
to  act  as  thy  nature  leads  thee,  and  to  endure  that  which 
the  common  nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use  of  itself?  for 
all  lies  in  this.  But  everything  else,  whether  it  is  in  the 
power  of  thy  will  or  not,  is  only  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move  us  to  contempt 
of  death,  that  even  those  who  think  pleasure  to  be  a  good 
and  pain  an  evil  still  have  despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good  which  comes  in 
due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is  the  same  thing  whether  he 
has  done  more  or  fewer  acts  conformable  to  right  reason, 
and  to  whom  it  makes  no  difference  whether  he  contemplates 


306     THE    MEDITATIONS   OF    MARCUS    AURELIUS 

the  world  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter  time — for  this  man  neither 
is  death  a  terrible  thing  (iii.  7;  vi.  23;  x.  20;  xiL  23). 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a  citizen  in  this  great  state  [the 
world]  :  what  difference  does  it  make  to  thee  whether  for 
five  years  [or  three]  ?  for  that  which  is  conformable  to  the 
laws  is  just  for  all.  Where  is  the  hardship  then,  if  no  tyrant 
nor  yet  an  unjust  judge  sends  thee  away  from  the  state,  but 
nature  who  brought  thee  into  it?  the  same  as  if  a  praetor 
who  has  employed  an  actor  dismisses  him  from  the  stage. 
"  But  I  have  not  finished  the  five  acts,  but  only  three  of  them," 
—Thou  sayest  well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts  are  the  whole 
drama;  for  what  shall  be  a  complete  drama  is  determined 
by  him  who  was  once  the  cause  of  its  composition,  and  now 
of  its  dissolution :  but  thou  art  the  cause  of  neither.  Depart 
then  satisfied,  for  he  also  who  releases  thee  is  satisfied* 


BY   GEORGE   LONG,  M,  A. 

ANTONINUS  was  born  at  Rome  a.d.  121,  on  the 
26th  of  April.  His  father  Annius  Verus  died  while 
•  he  was  praetor.  His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla 
also  named  Lucilla.  The  Emperor  T.  Antoninus  Pius 
married  Annia  Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister  of  Annius  Verus, 
and  was  consequently  the  uncle  of  M.  Antoninus.  When 
Hadrian  adopted  Antoninus  Pius  and  declared  him  his  suc- 
cessor in  the  empire,  Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both  L.  Ceio- 
nius  Commodus,  the  son  of  Aelius  Caesar,  and  M.  Antoninus, 
whose  original  name  was  M.  Annius  Verus.  Antoninus 
then  took  the  name  of  M.  Aelius  Aurelius  Verus  to  which 
was  added  the  title  of  Caesar  in  a.d,  139:  the  nam^e  Aelius 
belonged  to  Hadrian's  family,  and  Aurelius  was  the  name 
of  Antoninus  Pius.  When  M.  Antoninus  became  Augustus, 
he  dropped  the  name  of  Verus  and  took  the  name  of  Anto- 
ninus. Accordingly  he  is  generally  named  Mo  Aurelius 
Antoninus  or  simply  M.  Antoninus, 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up.  He  thanks  the 
gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good  grandfathers,  good  parents,  a 
good  sister,  good  teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen 
and  friends,  nearly  everything  good.  He  had  the  happy 
fortune  to  witness  the  exam^ple  of  his  uncle  and  adoptive 
father  Antoninus  Pius,  ?nd  he  has  recorded  in  his  v/ork  (i. 
16;  VI.  30)  the  virtues  of  this  excellent  man  and  prudent 
ruler»  Like  m.any  young  Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at  poetry 
and  studied  rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus  and  M.  Cornelius 
Fronto  were  his  teachers  in  eloquence.  There  are  extant 
letters  between  Fronto  and  Marcus,^  which  show  the  great 
affection  of  the  pupil  for  the  master,  and  the  master's  great 

^M.  Cornelii  Frontonis  Reliquiae,  Berlin,  1816.  There  are  a  few  letters 
between  Fronto   and  Antoninus  Pius. 

307 


308  M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil.  M.  Antoninus  mentions 
Fronto  (i.  ii)  among  those  to  whom  he  was  indebted  for 
his  education. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed  the  dress  of 
philosophers,  something  plain  and  coarse,  became  a  hard 
student,  and  lived  a  most  laborious  abstemious  life,  even  so 
far  as  to  injure  his  health.  Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry 
and  rhetoric  for  philosophy,  and  he  attached  himself  to  the 
sect  of  the  Stoics.  But  he  did  not  neglect  the  study  of  law, 
which  was  a  useful  preparation  for  the  high  place  which  he 
was  designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was  L.  Volusianus  Mae- 
cianus  a  distinguished  jurist.  We  must  suppose  that  he 
learned  the  Roman  discipline  of  arms,  which  was  a  necessary 
part  of  the  education  of  a  man  who  afterwards  led  his  troops 
to  battle  against  a  warlike  race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the  names  of  his 
teachers  and  the  obligations  which  he  owed  to  each  of  them. 
The  way  in  which  he  speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them 
might  seem  to  savour  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look 
carelessly  at  the  way  in  which  he  has  expressed  himself;  but 
if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion,  he  will  be  mistaken.  Anto- 
ninus means  to  commemorate  the  merits  of  his  several 
teachers,  what  they  taught  and  what  a  pupil  might  learn 
from  them.  Besides,  this  book  like  the  eleven  other  books 
was  for  his  own  use,  and  if  we  may  trust  the  note  at  the  end 
of  the  first  book,  it  was  written  during  one  of  M.  Antoninus' 
campaigns  against  the  Quadi,  at  a  time  when  the  commemo- 
ration of  the  virtues  of  his  illustrious  teachers  might  remind 
him  of  their  lessons  and  the  practical  uses  which  he  might 
derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus  of  Chae- 
roneia  a  grandson  of  Plutarch.  What  he  learned  from  this 
excellent  man  is  told  by  himself  (i.  9).  His  favourite 
teacher  was  Q.  Junius  Rusticus  (i.  7),  a  philosopher  and  also 
a  man  of  practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs.  Rusticus 
was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus  after  he  became  emperor. 
Young  men  who  are  destined  for  high  places  are  not  often 
fortunate  in  those  who  are  about  them,  their  companions  and 
teachers;  and  I  do  not  know  any  example  of  a  young  prince 
"having  had  an  education  which  can  be  compared  with  that 


M.   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS  309 

of  M.  Antoninus.  Such  a  body  of  teachers  distinguished  by 
their  acquirements  and  their  character  will  hardly  be  col- 
lected again;  and  as  to  the  pupil,  we  have  not  had  one  like 
him  since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July  a.d,  138,  and  was  succeeded  by  Anto- 
ninus Pius.  M.  Antoninus  married  Faustina,  his  cousin, 
the  daughter  of  Pius,  probably  about  a.d.  146,  for  he  had  a 
daughter  born  in  147.  He  received  from  his  adoptive 
father  the  title  of  Caesar  and  was  associated  with  him  in  the 
administration  of  the  state.  The  father  and  the  adopted 
son  lived  together  in  perfect  friendship  and  confidence. 
Antoninus  was  a  dutiful  son,  and  the  emperor  Pius  loved 
and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March  a.d.  161.  The  Senate,  it  is 
said,  urged  M'.  Antoninus  to  take  the  sole  administration  of 
the  empire,  but  he  associated  with  himself  the  other  adopted 
son  of  Pius,  L.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is  generally  called 
L.  Verus.  Thus  Rome  for  the  first  time  had  two  emperors. 
Verus  was  an  indolent  man  of  pleasure  and  unworthy  of  his 
station.  Antoninus  however  bore  with  him,  and  it  is  said 
that  Verus  had  sense  enough  to  pay  to  his  colleague  the  re- 
spect due  to  his  character.  A  virtuous  emperor  and  a  loose 
partner  lived  together  in  peace,  and  their  alliance  was 
strengthened  by  Antoninus  giving  to  Verus  for  wife  his 
daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by  a  Parthian 
war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  command,  but  he  did  noth- 
ing, and  the  success  that  was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in 
Armenia  and  on  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his 
generals.  This  Parthian  war  ended  in  a.d.  165.  Aurelius 
and  Verus  had  a  triumph  (a.d.  166)  for  the  victories  in 
the  east.  A  pestilence  followed  which  carried  off  great 
numbers  in  Rome  and  Italy,  and  spread  to  the  west  of 
Europe. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the  rude  people 
beyond  the  Alps  from  the  borders  of  Gallia  to  the  eastern 
side  of  the  Hadriatic.  These  barbarians  attempted  to  break 
into  Italy,  as  the  Germanic  nations  had  attempted  near  three 
hundred  years  before;  and  the  rest  of  the  life  of  Antoninus 
Svith  some  intervals  was  employed  in  driving  feack  the  m^ 


310  M.   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

vaders.  In  169  Verus  suddenly  died,  and  Antoninus  ad- 
ministered the  state  alone. 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided  for  three 
years  on  the  Danube  at  Carnuntum.  The  Marcomanni  were 
driven  out  of  Pannonia  and  almost  destroyed  in  their  retreat 
across  the  Danube;  and  in  a.d.  174  the  emperor  gained  a 
great  victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  A.D.  175  Avidius  Cassius  a  brave  and  skilful  Roman 
commander  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  troops  in  Asia  re- 
volted and  declared  himself  Augustus.  But  Cassius  was 
assassinated  by  some  of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebellion 
came  to  an  end.  Antoninus  showed  his  humanity  by  his 
treatment  of  the  family  and  the  partisans  of  Cassius,  and 
his  letter  to  the  senate  in  which  he  recommends  mercy  is 
extant.     (Vulcatius,  Avidius  Cassius,  c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  east  on  hearing  of  Cassius*  re- 
volt Though  he  appears  to  have  returned  to  Rome  in  a.d. 
174,  he  went  back  to  prosecute  the  war  against  the  Germans, 
and  it  is  probable  that  he  marched  direct  to  the  east  from 
the  German  war.  His  wife  Faustina  who  accompanied  him 
into  Asia  died  suddenly  at  the  foot  of  the  Taurus  to  the 
great  grief  of  her  husband.  Capitolinus,  who  has  written 
the  life  of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius  accuse  the 
empress  of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband  and  of 
abominable  lewdness.  But  Capitolinus  says  that  Antoninus 
either  knew  it  not  or  pretended  not  to  know  it.  Nothing  is 
so  comm.on  as  such  malicious  reports  in  all  ages,  and  the 
history  of  imperial  Rome  is  full  of  them.  Antoninus  loved 
his  wife  and  he  says  that  she  was  "obedient,  affectionate 
and  simple."  The  same  scandal  had  been  spread  about 
Faustina's  mother,  the  wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he 
too  was  perfectly  satisfied  with  his  wife.  Antoninus  Pius 
says  after  her  death  in  a  letter  to  Fronto  that  he  would 
rather  have  lived  in  exile  with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace 
at  Rome  without  her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  would 
give  their  wives  a  better  character  than  these  two  emperors, 
Capitolinus  wrote  in  the  time  of  Diocletian.  He  may  have 
intended  to  tell  the  truth,  but  he  is  a  poor  feeble  biographer. 
Dion  Cassius,  the  most  malignant  of  historians,  always  re- 
ports and  perhaps  he  believed  any  scandal  against  anybody. 


M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS  311 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria  and  Egypt,  and 
on  his  return  to  Italy  through  Athens  he  was  initiated  into 
the  Eleusinian  mysteries.  It  was  the  practice  of  the  emperor 
to  conform  to  the  established  rites  of  the  age  and  to  perform 
religious  ceremonies  with  due  solemnity.  We  cannot  con- 
clude from  this  that  he  was  a  superstitious  m.an,  though  we 
might  perhaps  do  so,  if  his  book  did  not  show  that  he  was 
not.  But  this  is  only  one  among  many  instances  that  a 
ruler's  public  acts  do  not  always  prove  his  real  opinions.  A 
prudent  governor  will  not  roughly  oppose  even  the  super- 
stitions of  his  people,  and  though  he  may  wish  that  they  were 
wiser,  he  will  know  that  he  cannot  make  them  so  by  offend- 
ing their  prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered  Rome  in  tri- 
umph, perhaps  for  some  German  victories,  on  the  23rd  of 
Decem^ber  a.d.  176.  In  the  following  year  Commodus  was 
associated  with  his  father  in  the  empire  and  took  the  name 
of  Augustus.  This  year  a.d.  177  is  memorable  in  ecclesias- 
tical history.  Attains  and  others  were  put  to  death  at  Lyon 
for  their  adherence  to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evidence 
of  this  persecution  is  a  letter  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H. 
v.  I ;  printed  in  Routh^s  "Reliquiae  Sacrae,*'  vol.  I.  with 
notes).  The  letter  is  from  the  Christians  of  Vienna  and 
Lugdunum  in  Gallia  (Vienne  and  Lyon)  to  their  Christian 
brethren  in  Asia  and  Phrygia;  and  it  is  preserved  perhaps 
nearly  entire.  It  contains  a  very  particular  description  of 
the  tortures  inflicted  on  the  Christians  in  Gallia,  and  it  states 
that  while  the  persecution  was  going  on,  Attains  a  Christian 
and  a  Roman  citizen  was  loudly  demanded  by  the  populace 
and  brought  into  the  amphitheatre,  but  the  governor  ordered 
him  to  be  reserved  with  the  rest  who  were  in  prison,  until  he 
had  received  instructions  from  the  emperor.  Many  had  been 
tortured  before  the  governor  thought  of  applying  to  Anto- 
ninus. The  imperial  rescript,  says  the  letter,  was  that  the 
Christians  should  be  punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their 
faith,  they  m.ust  be  released.  On  this  the  work  began  again. 
The  Christians  who  were  Roman  citizens  were  beheaded: 
the  rest  were  exposed  to  the  wild  beasts  in  the  amphitheatre. 
Some  modern  writers  on  ecclesiastical  history,  when  they 
use  this  letter,  say  nothing  of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the 


312  M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

martyrs*  sufiFerings.  Sancttis,  as  the  letter  says,  was  burnt 
with  plates  of  hot  iron  till  his  body  was  one  sore  and  had 
lost  all  human  form,  but  on  being  put  to  the  rack  he  re- 
covered his  former  appearance  under  the  torture,  which  was 
thus  a  cure  instead  of  a  punishment.  He  was  afterwards 
torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron  chair  and  roasted.  He 
died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The  writer,  whoever 
he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name  of  the  Gallic  Christians,  is 
our  evidence  both  for  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinary 
circumstances  of  the  story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his  evi- 
dence for  one  part  and  reject  the  other.  We  often  receive 
small  evidence  as  a  proof  of  a  thing  which  we  believe  to  be 
within  the  limits  of  probability  or  possibility,  and  we  reject 
exactly  the  same  evidence,  when  the  thing  to  which  it  re- 
fers, appears  very  improbable  or  impossible.  But  this  is  a 
false  method  of  inquiry,  though  it  is  followed  by  some 
modern  writers,  who  select  what  they  like  from  a  story  and 
reject  the  rest  of  the  evidence;  or  if  they  do  not  reject  it, 
they  dishonestly  suppress  it.  A  man  can  only  act  con- 
sistently by  accepting  all  this  letter  or  rejecting  it  all,  and 
we  cannot  blame  him  for  either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may 
still  admit  that  such  a  letter  may  be  founded  on  real  facts; 
and  he  would *make  this  admission  as  the  most  probable  way 
of  accounting  for  the  existence  of  the  letter:  but  if,  as  he 
would  suppose,  the  writer  has  stated  some  things  falsely,  he 
cannot  tell  what  part  of  his  story  is  worthy  of  credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to  have  been 
uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of  Antoninus  to  the  East,  and 
on  his  return  the  emperor  again  left  Rome  to  oppose  the 
barbarians.  The  Germanic  people  were  defeated  in  a 
great  battle  a.d.  179.  During  this  campaign  the  emperor 
was  seized  with  some  contagious  malady,  of  which  he  died 
in  the  camp  at  Sirmium  (Mitrovitz)  on  the  Save  in  Lower 
Pannonia,  but  at  Vindobona  (Vienna)  according  to  other 
authorities,  on  the  17th  March  a.d.  180,  in  the  fifty-ninth 
year  of  his  age.  His  son  Commodus  was  with  him.  The 
body  or  the  ashes  probably  of  the  emperor  were  carried  to 
Rome,  and  he  received  the  honour  of  deification.  Those 
^vho  could  afford  it  had  his  statue  or  bust,  and  when  Capito- 


M.  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS  isij 

lijius  wrote,  many  people  still  had  statues  of  !Sntoninus 
among  the  Dei  Penates  or  household  deities.  He  was  in  a 
manner  made  a  saint.  Commodus  erected  to  the  memory  of 
his  father  the  Antonine  column  which  is  now  in  the  Piazza 
Colonna  at  Rome.  The  bas-reliefs  which  are  placed  in  a 
spiral  line  round  the  shaft  commemorate  the  victories  of 
Antoninus  over  the  Marcomanni  and  the  Quadi,  and  the 
miraculous  shower  of  rain  which  refreshed  the  Roman 
soldiers  and  discomfited  their  enemies.  The  statue  of  Anto- 
ninus was  placed  on  the  capital  of  the  column,  but  it  was 
removed  at  some  time  unknown,  and  a  bronze  statue  of  St. 
Paul  was  put  in  the  place  by  Pope  Sixtus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  Antoninus  is  very 
defective,  and  some  of  that  which  remains  is  not  credible  The 
most  curious  is  the  story  about  the  miracle  which  happened 
in  A.D.  174  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi.  The  Roman  army 
was  in  danger  of  perishing  by  thirst,  but  a  sudden  storei 
drenched  them  with  rain,  while  it  discharged  fire  and  hail 
on  their  enemies,  and  the  Romans  gained  a  great  victory. 
All  the  authorities  which  speak  of  the  battle  speak  also  of 
the  miracle.  The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their  gods,  and 
the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the  Christian  legion  in 
the  emperor's  army.  To  confirm  the  Christian  statement  it 
is  added  that  the  emperor  gave  the  title  of  Thundering  to 
this  legion;  but  Dacier  and  others  who  maintain  the  Chris- 
tian report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this  title  of  Thunder- 
ing or  Lightnmg  was  not  given  to  this  legion  because  the 
Quadi  were  struck  with  lightning,  but  because  there  was  a 
figure  of  lightning  on  their  shields,  and  that  this  title  of  the 
legion  existed  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was  called 
Thundering  {y.epao\>o^6Xo<Sj  or  xe^auwo^o^o?)  before  the  reign  of 
Antoninus.  We  learn  this  from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23, 
"and  the  note  ot  Reimarus)  who  enumerates  all  the  legions  of 
Augustus'  time.  The  name  Thundering  or  Lightning  also 
occurs  on  an  inscription  of  the  reign  of  Trajan,  which  was 
found  at  Trieste.  Eusebius  (v.  5)  when  he  relates  the 
miracle,  quotes  Apolinarius,  bishop  of  Hierapolis,  as 
authority  for  this  name  being  given  to  the  legion  Melitene 
by  the  emperor  in  consequence  of  the  success  which  he  QJbr- 


314  M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

tained  through  their  prayers;  from  which  we  may  estimate 
the  value  of  Apolinarius'  testimony.  Eusebius  does  not  say 
in  what  book  of  Apolinarius  the  statement  occurs.  Dion 
says  that  the  Thundering  legion  was  stationed  in  Cappadocia 
in  the  time  of  Augustus.  Valesius  also  observes  that  in  the 
Notitia  of  the  Imperium  Romanum  there  is  mentioned  under 
the  commander  of  Armenia  the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth 
legion  named  "Thundering  Melitene;"  and  this  position  in 
Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  says  of  its  position  in 
Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesius  concludes  that  Melitene 
was  not  the  name  of  the  legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which 
it  was  stationed.  Melitene  was  also  the  name  of  the  dis- 
trict in  which  this  town  was  situated.  The  legions  did  not, 
he  says,  take  their  name  from  the  place  where  they  were  on 
duty,  but  from  the  country  in  which  they^  were  raised,  and 
therefore,  what  Eusebius  says  about  the  Melitene  does  not 
seem  probable  to  him.  Yet  Valesius  on  the  authority  of 
Apolinarius  and  Tertullian  believed  that  the  miracle  was 
worked  through  the  prayers  of  the  Christian  soldiers  in  the 
emperor's  army.  Rufinus  does  not  give  the  name  of  Meli- 
tene to  this  legion,  says  Valesius,  and  probably  he  purposely 
omitted  it,  because  he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the  namxC  of 
a  town  in  Armenia  Minor,  where  the  legion  was  stationed 
in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a  report  of  his  victory  to 
the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe,  for  such  was  the  practice ; 
but  we  do  not  know  what  he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not 
extant.  Dacier  assumes  that  the  emperor's  letter  was  pur- 
posely destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  enemies  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  so  honourable  a  testimony  to  the  Christians  and 
their  religion  might  not  be  perpetuated.  The  critic  has  how- 
ever not  seen  that  he  contradicts  himself  when  he  tells  us 
the  purport  of  the  letter,  for  he  says  that  it  was  destroyed, 
and  even  Eusebius  could  not  find  it.  But  there  does  exist 
a  letter  in  Greek  addressed  by  Antoninus  to  the  Roman 
people  and  the  sacred  Senate  after  this  memorable  victory. 
It  is  sometimes  printed  after  Justin's  first  Apology,  but  rt 
is  totally  unconnected  with  the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one 
of  the  most  stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist,  and 
it  cannot  be  possibly  founded  even  on  the  genuine  report  of 


M.  AURELIXJS  ANTONINUS  315 

Antoninus  to  the  Senate.  If  it  were  genuine,  it  would  free 
the  emperor  from  the  charge  of  persecuting  men  because 
they  were  Christians,  for  he  says  in  this  false  letter  that  if 
a  man  accuse  another  only  of  being  a  Christian  and  the  ac- 
cused confess  and  there  is  nothing  else  against  him,  he  must 
be  set  free;  with  this  monstrous  addition,  made  by  a  man 
inconceivably  ignorant,  that  the  informer  must  be  burnt 
alive. 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Marcus  Anto- 
ninus there  appeared  the  first  Apology  of  Justinus,  and  undec 
M.  Antoninus  the  Oration  of  Tatian  against  the  Greeks, 
which  was  a  fierce  attack  on  the  established  religions;  the 
address  of  Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on  behalf  of  the 
Christians,  and  the  Apology  of  Melito,  bishop  of  Sardes, 
also  addressed  to  the  emperor,  and  that  of  Apolinarius.  The 
first  Apology  of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  T.  Antoninus  Pius 
and  his  two  adopted  sons  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus;  but 
we  do  not  know  whether  they  read  it.^  The  second 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  intitled  "to  the  Roman  Senate;"  but 
this  superscription  is  from  some  copyist.  In  the  first  chap- 
ter Justinus  addresses  the  Romans.  In  the  second  chapter  he 
speaks  of  an  affair  that  had  recently  happened  in  the  time  of 
M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  as  it  seems ;  and  he  also  directly 
addresses  the  emperor,  saying  of  a  certain  woman,  "she  ad- 
dressed a  petition  to  thee  the  emperor,  and  thou  didst  grant 
the  petition."  In  other  passages  the  writer  addresses  the 
two  emperors,  from  which  we  must  conclude  that  the  Apol- 
ogy was  directed  to  them.  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  i8)  states 
that  the  second  Apology  was  addressed  to  the  successor  of 
Antoninus  Pius,  and  he  names  him  Antoninus  Verus,  mean- 
ing M".  Antoninus.  In  one  passage  of  this  second  Apology 
(c.  8),  Justinus,  or  the  writer,  whoever  he  m.ay  be,  says  that 
even  men  who  followed  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when  they 
ordered  their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason,  were  hated 
and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus,  Musonius  in  his  own 
times,  and  others ;  for  all  those  who  in  any  way  laboured  to 
live  according  to  reason  and  avoided  wickedness  were  always 
hated ;  and  this  was  the  effect  of  the  work  of  daemons. 

2  Orosius,  VII.  14,  says  that  Justinus  the  philosopher  presented  to  An- 
toninus Pius  his  work  in  defence  of  the  Christian  Religion,  and  made  him 
tnerciful  to  the  Christians. 


316  M.   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to  death  at  Rome, 
because  he  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  It  cannot  have 
been  in  the  reign  of  Hadrian,  as  one  authority  states;  nor 
in  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius,  if  the  second  Apology  was 
v/ritten  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus;  and  there  is  evidence 
that  this  event  took  place  under  M.  Antoninus  and  L.  Verus, 
when  Rusticus  was  praefect  of  the  city. 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suffered  at  Smyrna 
belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus.  The  evidence  for  it 
is  the  letter  of  the  church  of  Smyrna  to  the  churches  of 
Philomelium  and  the  other  Christian  churches,  and  it  is  pre- 
served by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  15).  But  the  critics  do  not 
agree  about  the  time  of  Polycarp's  death,  differing  in  the  two 
extremes  to  the  amount  of  twelve  years.  The  circumstances 
of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  were  accompanied  by  miracles,  one 
of  which  Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has  omitted,  but  it  appears  in 
the  oldest  Latin  version  of  the  letter,  which  Usher  published, 
and  it  is  supposed  that  this  version  was  made  not  long  after 
the  time  of  Eusebius.  The  notice  at  the  end  of  the  letter 
states  that  it  was  transcribed  by  Caius  from  the  copy  of 
Irenaeus,  the  disciple  of  Polycarp,  then  transcribed  by 
Socrates  at  Corinth;  "after  which  I  Pionius  again  wrote  it 
out  from  the  copy  above  mentioned,  having  searched  it  out 
by  the  revelation  of  Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,  etc." 
The  story  of  Polycarp's  martyrdom  is  embellished  with 
miraculous  circumstances  which  some  modern  writers  on 
ecclesiastical  history  take  the  liberty  of  omitting.^ 

In  order  to  form  a  proper  notion  of  the  condition  of  the 
Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we  must  go  back  to  Trajan's 
time.  When  the  younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia, 
the  Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and  the  wor- 
shippers of  the  old  religion  were  falling  off.  The  temples 
were  deserted,  the  festivals  neglected,  and  there  were  no 
purchasers  of  victims  for  sacrifice.  Those  who  were  inter- 
ested in  the  maintenance  of  the  old  religion  thus  found  that 

8  Conyers  Middleton,  "An  Inquiry  into  the  Miraculous  Powers,"  etc.,  p. 
126.  Middleton  says  that  Eusebius  omitted  to  mention  the  dove,  which  flew 
out  of  Polycarp's  body,  and  Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake  have  done  the 
same.  Wake  says  "I  am  so  little  a  friend  to  such  miracles  that  I  thought 
it  better  with  Eusebius  to  omit  that  circumstance  than  to  mention  it  from 
Bp.  Usher's  Manuscript,"  which  manuscript,  however,  says  Middleton,  he 
afterwards  declares  to  be  so  well  attested  that  we  need  not  any  further 
assurance  of  the  truth  of  it. 


M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS  317 

their  profits  were  in  danger.  Christians  of  both  sexes  and 
of  all  ages  were  brought  before  the  governor,  who  did  not 
know  what  to  do  with  them.  He  could  come  to  no  other 
conclusion  than  this,  that  those  who  confessed  to  be  Chris- 
tians and  persevered  in  their  religion  ought  to  be  punished; 
if  for  nothing  else,  for  their  invincible  obstinacy.  He  found 
no  crimes  proved  against  the  Christians,  and  he  could  only 
characterize  their  religion  as  a  depraved  and  extravagant 
superstition,  which  might  be  stopped,  if  the  people  were 
allowed  the  opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this  in 
a  letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He  asked  for  the 
emperor's  directions,  because  he  did  not  know  what  to  do: 
He  remarks  that  he  had  never  been  engaged  in  judicial  in- 
quiries about  the  Christians,  and  that  accordingly  he  did  not 
know  what  to  inquire  about  or  how  far  to  inquire  and  punish. 
This  proves  that  it  was  not  a  new  thing  to  examine  into  a 
man's  profession  of  Christianity  and  to  punish  him  for  it. 
Trajan's  Rescript  is  extant.  He  approved  of  the  governor's 
judgment  in  the  matter ;  but  he  said  that  no  search  must  be 
made  after  the  Christians;  if  a  man  was  charged  with  the 
new  religion  and  convicted,  he  must  not  be  punished  if  he 
affirmed  that  he  was  not  a  Christian  and  confirmed  his  denial 
by  showing  his  reverence  to  the  heathen  gods.  He  added 
that  no  notice  must  be  taken  of  anonymous  informations, 
for  such  things  were  of  bad  example.  Trajan  was  a  mild 
and  sensible  man,  and  both  motives  of  mercy  and  policy 
probably  also  induced  him  to  take  as  little  notice  of  the 
Christians  as  he  could;  to  let  them  live  in  quiet,  if  it  were 
possible.  Trajan's  Rescript  is  the  first  legislative  act  of  the 
head  of  the  Roman  state  with  reference  to  Christianity 
which  is  known  to  us.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Chris- 
tians were  further  disturbed  under  his  reign.  The  martyr- 
dom of  Ignatius  by  the  order  of  Trajan  himself  is  not  uni- 
versally admxitted  to  be  an  historical  fact.* 

In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  the 
Roman  government  to  overlook  the  great  increase  of  the 
Christians  and  the  hostility  of  the  common  sort  to  them. 
If  the  governors  in  the  provinces  were  willing  to  let  them 

■*  The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  published  in  Latin  by  Archbishop  Usher, 
is  the  chief  evidence  for  the  circumstances  of  Ignatius'  death. 


318  M.   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

alone,  they  could  not  resist  the  fanaticism  of  the  heathen 
community,  who  looked  on  the  Christians  as  atheists.  The 
Jews,  too,  who  were  settled  all  over  the  Roman  Empire,  v/ere 
as  hostile  to  the  Christians  as  the  Gentiles  were.^  With  the 
time  of  Hadrian  begin  the  Christian  Apologies,  which  show 
'  plainly  what  the  popular  feeling  towards  the  Christians  then 
was,  A  rescript  of  Hadrian  to  Minucius  Fundanus,  the 
Proconsul  of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end  of  Justin's  first 
Apology,"  instructs  the  governor  that  innocent  people  must 
not  be  troubled,  and  false  accusers  must  not  be  allowed  to 
extort  money  from  them;  the  charges  against  the  Christians 
must  be  made  in  due  form,  and  no  attention  must  be  paid  to 
popular  clamours ;  when  Christians  v/ere  regularly  prosecuted 
and  convicted  of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished  accord- 
ing to  their  deserts ;  and  false  accusers  also  must  be  punished. 
■Antoninus  Pius  is  said  to  have  published  Rescripts  to  the 
same  effect.  The  terms  of  Hadrian's  Rescript  seem  very 
favourable  to  the  Christians ;  but  if  we  understand  it  in  this 
sense,  that  they  were  only  to  be  punished  like  other  people 
'for  illegal  acts,  it  would  have  had  no  meaning,  for  that 
could  have  been  done  without  asking  the  emperor's  advice. 
The  real  purpose  of  the  Rescript  is  that  Christians  must  be 
punished  if  they  persisted  in  their  belief,  and  would  not 
prove  their  renunciation  of  it  by  acknowledging  the  heathen 
religion.  This  was  Trajan's  rule,  and  we  have  no  reason 
for  supposing  that  Hadrian  granted  more  to  the  Christians 
than  Trajan  did.  There  is  also  printed  at  the  end  of  Jus- 
tin's first  Apology  a  Rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Com- 
mune of  Asia  (to  xoivov  T^g  'Aijiag),  and  it  is  also  in  Eusebius 
|(E.  H.  IV.  13).  The  date  of  the  Rescript  is  the  third  con- 
isulship  of  Antoninus  Pius.  The  Rescript  declares  that  the 
Christians,  for  they  are  meant,  though  the  name  Christians 

^We  have  the  evidence  of  Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  5)  to  this  effect: 
''the  Christians  are  attacked  by  the  Jews  as  if  they  were  men  of  a  different 
race,  and  are  persecuted  by  the  Greeks;  and  those  who  hate  them  caxmot 
give  the  reason  of  their  enmity." 

^  And  in  Eusebius,  E.  H.  iv.  8,  9.  Orosius  (vii.  13)  says  that  Hadrian 
sent  the  rescript  to  Minucius  Fundanus,  proconsul  of  Asia,  after  being  in- 
structed in  bocks  written  on  the  Christian  religion  by  Quadratus,  a  disciple 
of  the  Apostles,  and  Aristides,  an  Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise  man,  and 
Serenus  Granius.  In  the  Greek  text  of  Hadrian's  rescript  there  is  men- 
tioned Serenius  Granianus,  the  predecessor  of  Minucius  Fundanus  in  the 
government  of  Asia. 

This  rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to  the  Apology  hy  some 
editor.    The  Apology  ends  v/ith  the  words:    o  <|>iAoi' tw  eew,  toSto  •yes'effSw. 


M.   AUREEIUS   ANTONINUS  319 

does  not  occur  in  the  Rescript,  were  not  to  be  disturbed  un- 
less they  were  attempting  something  against  the  Roman  rule, 
and  no  man  was  to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a  Christian. 
But  this  Rescript  is  spurious.  Any  man  moderately  ac- 
quainted with  Roman  history  will  see  by  the  style  and  tenor 
that  it  is  a  clumsy  forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition  between  the 
old  and  tlie  new  belief  was  still  stronger,  and  the  adherents 
of  the  heathen  religion  urged  those  in  authority  to  a  more 
regular  resistance  to  the  invasions  of  the  Christian  faith. 
Melito  in  his  apology  to  M.  Antoninus  represents  the  Chris- 
tians of  Asia  as  persecuted  under  new  imperial  orders. 
Shameless  informers,  he  says,  men  v/ho  were  greedy  after 
the  property  of  others,  used  these  orders  as  a  means  of  rob- 
bing those  who  were  doing  no  harm.  He  doubts  if  a  just 
emperor  could  have  ordered  anything  so  unjust;  and  if  the 
last  order  was  really  not  from  the  emperor,  the  Christians 
entreat  him  not  to  give  them  up  to  their  enemies.  We  con- 
clude from  this  that  there  were  at  least  imperial  Rescripts 
or  Constitutions  of  M.  Antoninus,  which  were  made  the 
foundation  of  these  persecutions.  The  fact  of  being  a  Chris- 
tian was  now  a  crime  and  punished,  unless  the  accused  denied 
their  religion.  Then  come  the  persecutions  at  Smyrna, 
which  some  modern  critics  place  in  a.d.  167,  ten  years  before 
the  persecution  of  Lyon.  The  governors  of  the  provinces 
under  M.  Antoninus  might  have  found  enough  even  in 
Trajan's  Rescript  to  warrant  them  in  punishing  Christians, 
and  the  fanaticism  of  the  people  would  drive  them  to  perse- 
cution, even  if  they  were  unwilling.  But  besides  the  fact 
of  the  Christians  rejecting  all  the  heathen  ceremonies,  we 
must  not  forget  that  they  plainly  maintained  that  all  the 
heathen  religions  were  false.  The  Christians  thus  declared 
war  against  the  heathen  rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
observe  that  this  was  a  declaration  of  hostility  against  the 
Roman  government,  which  tolerated  all  the  various  forms 
of  superstition  that  existed  in  the  empire,  and  could  not  con- 
sistently tolerate  another  religion,  which  declared  that  all  the 
rest  were  false  and  all  the  splendid  ceremonies  of  the  empire 
only  a  worship  of  devils. 

If  we  had  a  true  ecclesiastical  history,  we  should  know 


320  M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

how  the  Roman  emperors  attempted  to  check  the  new  re- 
ligion, how  they  enforced  their  principle  of  finally  punish- 
ing Christians,  simply  as  Christians,  which  Justin  in  his 
Apology  affirms  that  they  did,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he 
tells  the  truth;  how  far  popular  clamour  and  riots  went  in 
this  matter,  and  how  far  many  fanatical  and  ignorant  Chris- 
tians, for  there  were  many  such,  contributed  to  excite  the 
fanaticism  on  the  other  side  and  to  embitter  the  quarrel  be- 
tween the  Roman  government  and  the  new  religion.  Our  ex- 
tant ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestly  falsified,  and  Vv^hat 
truth  they  contain  is  grossly  exaggerated;  but  the  fact  is 
certain  that  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  heathen  popu- 
lations were  m  open  hostility  to  the  Christians,  and  that 
under  Antoninus'  rule  men  were  put  to  death  because  they 
were  Christians.  Eusebius  in  the  preface  to  his  fifth  book 
remarks  that  in  the  seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus*  reign,  in 
some  parts  of  the  world  the  persecution  of  the  Christians 
became  more  violent  and  that  it  proceeded  from  the  populace 
in  the  cities;  and  he  adds  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggeration, 
that  we  may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a  single  nation 
that  myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in  the  habitable  earth. 
The  nation  which  he  alludes  to  is  Gallia;  and  he  then  pro- 
ceeds to  give  the  letter  of  the  churches  of  Vienna  and  Lug- 
dunum.  It  is  probable  that  he  has  assigned  the  true  cause 
of  the  persecutions,  the  fanaticism  of  the  populace,  and  that 
both  governors  and  emperor  had  a  great  deal  of  trouble  with 
these  disturbances.  How  far  Marcus  was  cognizant  of  these 
cruel  proceedings  we  do  not  know,  for  the  historical  records 
of  his  reign  are  very  defective.  He  did  not  make  the  rule 
against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did  that;  and  if  we  admit 
that  he  would  have  been  willing  to  let  the  Christians  alone, 
we  cannot  affirm  that  it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a 
great  mistake  to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  unlimited 
authority,  which  some  modern  sovereigns  have  had.  His 
power  was  limited  by  certain  constitutional  forms,  by  the 
senate,  and  by  the  precedents  of  his  predecessors.  We  can- 
not admit  that  such  a  man  was  an  active  persecutor,^  for 

''  Except  that  of  Oroslus  (vii.  15),  wlio  says  that  during  the  Parthian 
war  there  were  grievous  persecutions  of  the  Christians  in  Asia  and  Gallia 
under  the  orders  of  Marcus  Cpraecepto  ejus),  and  "many  were  crowneii 
with  the  martyrdom  of  saints." 


M,   AUREXIUS   ANTONINUS  321 

there  is  no  evidence  that  he  was,  though  it  is  certain  that 
he  had  no  good  opinion  of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from 
his  own  words.  But  he  knew  nothing  of  them  except  their 
hostihty  to  the  Rom.an  religion,  and  he  probably  thought  that 
they  were  dangerous  to  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  pro- 
fessions false  or  true  of  some  of  the  Apologists.  So  much 
I  have  said,  because  it  would  be  unfair  not  to  state  all  that 
can  be  urged  against  a  man  whom  his  contemporaries  and 
subsequent  ages  venerated  as  a  model  of  virtue  and  benevo- 
lence. If  I  admitted  the  genuineness  of  some  documents,  he 
would  be  altogether  clear  from  the  charge  of  even  allowing 
any  persecutions;  but  as  I  seek  the  truth  and  am  sure  that 
they  are  false, 'I  leave  him  to  bear  whatever  blame  is  his 
due.*  I  add  that  it  is  quite  certain  that  Antoninus  did  not 
derive  any  of  his  Ethical  principles  from  a  religion  of  which 
he  knew  nothing.^ 

There  is  no  doubt  that, the  Emperor's  "Reflections"  or  his 
"Meditations,"  as  they  are  generally  named,  is  a  genuine 
work.  In  the  first  book  he  speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and 
his  teachers ;  and  in  other  books  he  mentions  himself.  Suidas 
(v.  i/a^xo?),  notices  a  work  of  Antoninus  in  twelve  books, 
which  he  names  the  "conduct  of  his  own  life;"  and  he  cites 
the  book  under  several  words  in  his  Dictionary,  giving  the 
emperor's  name,  but  not  the  title  of  the  work.  There  are 
also  passages  cited  by  Suidas  from  Antoninus  without  men- 
tion of  the  emperor's  name.  The  true  title  of  the  work  is 
unknown.  Xy lander  who  published  the  first  edition  of  this 
book  (Ziirich,  1558,  8vo.)  with  a  Latin  version,  used  a 
manuscript,  which  contained  the  twelve  books,  but  it  is  not 
known  where  the  manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other  com- 
plete manuscript  which  is  known  to  exist  is  in  the  Vatican 
library,  but  it  has  no  title  and  no  inscriptions  of  the  several 
books:  the  eleventh  only  has  the  inscription  Mdpxoo  auroxpd- 
ropo<s  marked  with  an  asterisk  The  other  Vatican  manu- 
scripts and  the  three  Florentine  contain  only  excerpts  from 

^  Dr,  F.  C.  Baur  in  his  work  entitled  "Das  Christenthum  und  die 
Christliche  Kirche  der  drei  ersten  Jahrhunderte,"  etc.,  has  examined  this 
question  with  great  good  sense  and  fairness,  and  I  believe  he  has  stated 
^he  truth  as  near  as  our  authorities  enable  us  to  reach  it. 

*  In  the  Digest,  48,  19,  30,  there  is  the  following  excerpt  from  Modesti- 
nus:  "Si  quis  aiiquid  fecerit,  quo  leves  hominum  animi  superstitione  numi- 
nis  terrerentur,  divus  Marcus  hujusmodi  homines  ia  insulam  relegari 
tescripsit." 

11  HC— Vol.  2 


322  M.  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS 

the  emperor's  book.  AH  the  titles  of  the  excerpts  nearly 
agree  with  that  which  Xylander  prefixed  to  his  edition  Mdpxo9 
^Avt(jDv(voo  AuToxpdropo?  raiv  ei?  iaozov  ^i^X(a  tjS.  This  title 
has  been  used  by  all  subsequent  editors.  We  cannot  tell 
whether  Antoninus  divided  his  work  into  books  or  some- 
body else  did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of  the 
first  and  second  books  are  genuine,  he  may  have  made  the 
division  himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his  thoughts  or 
reflections  as  the  occasions  arose;  and  since  they  were  in- 
tended for  his  o~wn  use,  it  is  no  improbable  conjecture  that 
he  left  a  complete  copy  behind  him  written  with  his  own 
hand ;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  so  diligent  a  man  would  use  the 
labour  of  a  transcriber  for  such  a  purpose,  and  expose  his 
most  secret  thoughts  to  any  other  eye.  He  may  have  also 
intended  the  book  for  his  son  Commodus,  who  however  had 
no  taste  for  his  father's  philosophy.  Some  careful  hand 
preserved  the  precious  volume;  and  a  work  by  Antoninus 
is  mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  laboured  on  the  text  of  Antoninus. 
The  most  complete  edition  is  that  by  Thomas  Gataker,  1652, 
4to.  The  second  edition  of  Gataker  was  superintended  by 
George  Stanhope,  1697,  4to.  There  is  also  an  edition  of 
1704.  Gataker  made  and  suggested  many  good  corrections, 
and  he  also  made  a  new  Latin  version,  which  is  not  a  very 
good  specimen  of  Latin,  but  it  generally  expresses  the  sense 
of  the  original  and  often  better  than  some-of  the  more  recent 
translations.  He  added  in  the  margin  opposite  to  each  para- 
graph references  to  the  other  parallel  passages ;  and  he  wrote 
a  commentary,  one  of  the  most  com.plete  that  has  been  writ- 
ten on  any  ancient  author.  This  commentary  contains  the 
editor's  exposition  of  the  m.ore  difficult  passages,  and  quo- 
tations from,  all  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers  for  the  illus- 
tration of  the  text.  It  is  a  wonderful  monument  of  learning 
and  labour,  and  certainly  no  Englishman  has  yet  done  any- 
thing like  it.  At  the  end  of  his  preface  the  editor  says  that 
he  wrote  it  at  Rotherhithe  near  London  in  a  severe  winter, 
when  he  was  in  the  seventy-eighth  year  of  his  age,  1651,  a 
time  when  Milton,  Selden  and  other  great  men  of  the  Com- 
fnonwealth  time  were  living;  and  the  great  French  scholar 


M.   AURELIUS   ANTONINUS  323 

Saumaise  (Salmasius),  with  whom  Gataker  corresponded 
and  received  help  from  him  for  his  edition  of  Antoninus. 
The  Greek  text  has  also  been  edited  by  J.  M.  Schultz,  Leip- 
zig, 1802,  8vo. ;  and  by  the  learned  Greek  Adamantinus 
Corais,  Paris,  1816,  8vo.  The  text  of  Schultz  was  republished 
by  Tauchnitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian,  and  Spanish 
translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and  there  may  be  others.  I 
have  not  seen  all  the  English  translations.  There  is  one  by 
Jeremy  Collier,  1702,  8vo.,  a  most  coarse  and  vulgar  copy  of 
the  original.  The  latest  French  translation  by  Alexis  Pier- 
ron  in  the  collection  of  Charpentier  is  better  than  Dacier's, 
which  has  been  honoured  with  an  Italian  version  (Udine, 
1772).  There  is  an  Italian  version  (1675)  which  I  have  not 
seen.  It  is  by  a  cardinal.  "A  man  illustrious  in  the  church, 
the  Cardinal  Francis  Barberini  the  elder,  nephew  of  Pope 
Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the  last  years  of  his  life  in  translating 
into  his  native  language  the  thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor, 
in  order  to  diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and 
vivifying  seeds.  He  dedicated  this  translation  to  his  soul, 
to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his  energetic  style,  redder  than  his 
purple  at  the  sight  of  the  virtues  of  this  Gentile"  (Pierron, 
Preface). 

I  have  made  this  translation  at  intervals  after  having  used 
the  book  for  many  years.  It  is  made  from  the  Greek,  but 
I  have  not  always  followed  one  text ;  and  I  have  occasionally 
compared  other  versions  with  my  own.  I  made  this  transla- 
tion for  my  own  use,  because  I  found  that  it  was  worth  the 
labour;  but  it  may  be  useful  to  others  also  and  therefore  I 
determined  to  print  it.  As  the  original  is  sometimes  very 
difficult  to  understand  and  still  more  difficult  to  translate,  it 
is  not  possible  that  I  have  always  avoided  error.  But  I  be- 
lieve that  I  have  not  often  missed  the  meaning,  and  those 
who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare  the  translation  with  the 
original  should  not  hastily  conclude  that  I  am  wrong,  if 
they  do  not  agree  with  me.  Some  passages  do  give  the 
meaning,  though  at  first  sight  they  may  not  appear  to  do  so ; 
and  when  I  differ  from  the  translators,  I  think  that  in  some 
places  they  are  wrong,  and  in  other  places  I  am  sure  that 
thejr  are.    I  have  placed  in  some  passages  a  f ,  which  indi- 


324  M.  AURELIUS   ANTONINUS 

cates  corruption  in  the  text  or  great  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning.  I  could  have  made  the  language  more  easy  and 
flowing,  but  I  have  preferred  a  ruder  style  as  being  better 
suited  to  express  the  character  of  the  original;  and  some- 
times the  obscurity  which  may  appear  in  the  version  is  a 
fair  copy  of  the  obscurity  of  the  Greek.  If  I  have  not  given 
the  best  words  for  the  Greek,  I  have  done  the  best  that  I 
could ;  and  in  the  text  I  have  always  given  the  same  transla- 
tion of  the  sam.e  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy  that  I  have 
observed  is  in  Simplicius'  "Commentary  on  the  Enchiridion 
of  Epictetus."  Simplicius  was  not  a  Christian,  and  such  a 
man  was  not  likely  to  be  converted  at  a  time  when  Chris- 
tianity was  grossly  corrupted.  But  he  was  a  really  religious 
man,  and  he  concludes  his  commentary  with  a  prayer  to  the 
Deity  which  no  Christian  could  improve.  From  the  time  of 
Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a  period  of  about  nine  hundred  years, 
the  Stoic  philosophy  formed  the  characters  of  some  of  the 
best  and  greatest  men.  Finally  it  became  extinct,  and  we 
hear  no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters  in  Italy.  Angelo 
Poliziano  met  with  two  very  inaccurate  and  incomplete 
manuscripts  of  Epictetus'  Enchiridion,  which  he  translated 
into  Latin  and  dedicated  to  his  great  patron  Lorenzo  de' 
Medici  in  whose  collection  he  had  found  the  book.  Poli- 
ziano's  version  was  printed  in  the  first  Bale  edition  of  the 
Enchiridion,  a.d.  1531  (apud  And.  Cratandrum).  Poliziano 
recommends  the  Enchiridion  to  Lorenzo  as  a  work  well 
suited  to  his  temper,  and  useful  in  the  difficulties  by  which 
he  was  surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers  ever  since  they 
were  first  printed.  The  little  book  of  Antoninus  has  been 
the  companion  of  some  great  men.  Machiavelli's  "Art  of 
War"  and  "Marcus  Antoninus"  were  the  two  books  which 
were  used  when  he  was  a  young  man  by  Captain  John  Smith, 
and  he  could  not  have  found  two  writers  better  fitted  to  form 
the  character  of  a  soldier  and  a  man.  Smith  is  almost  un- 
known and  forgotten  in  England  his  native  country,  but  not 
in  America  where  he  saved  the  young  colony  of  Virginia. 
He  was  great  in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds  in  arms,  but 
greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  character.    For  a  man's 


M.  AURSLIUS   ANTONINUS  325 

greatness  lies  not  in  wealth  and  station,  as  the  vulgar  be- 
lieve, nor  yet  in  his  intellectual  capacity,  which  is  often  asso- 
ciated with  the  meanest  moral  character,  the  most  abject 
servility  to  those  in  high  places  and  arrogance  to  the  poor 
and  lowly;  but  a  man's  true  greatness  lies  in  the  conscious-, 
ness  of  an  honest  purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a  just  estimate 
of  himself  and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self-examina- 
tion, and  a  steady  obedience  to  the  rule  which  he  knows  to  be 
right,  without  troubling  himself,  as  the  emperor  says  he 
should  not,  about  what  others  may  think  or  say,  or  whether 
they  do  or  do  not  do  that  which  he  thinks  and  says  and  does. 


BY    GEORGE  LONG^  M.  A. 

IT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy  first  showed 
its  real  value  v/hen  it  passed  from  Greece  to  Rome.  The 
doctrines  of  Zeno  and  his  successors  were  well  suited  to 
the  gravity  and  practical  good  sense  of  the  Romans;  and 
even  in  the  Republican  period  we  have  an  example  of  a  man, 
M.  Cato  Uticensis,  who  lived  the  life  of  a  Stoic  and  died 
consistently  with  the  opinions  which  he  professed.  He  was 
a  man,  says  Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic  philosophy  from 
conviction;  not  for  the  purpose  of  vain  discussion,  as  most 
did,  but  in  order  to  make  his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic 
precepts.  In  the  wretched  times  from  the  death  of  Augustus 
to  the  murder  of  Domitian,  there  was  nothing  but  the  Stoic 
philosophy  which  could  console  and  support  the  followers  of 
the  old  religion  under  imperial  tyranny  and  amidst  universal 
corruption.  There  were  even  then  noble  minds  that  could 
dare  and  endure,  sustained  by  a  good  conscience  and  an  ele- 
vated idea  of  the  purposes  of  man's  existence.  Such  were 
Paetus  Thrasea,  Helvidius  Priscus,  Cornutus,  C.  Musonius 
Rufus,*  and  the  poets  Persius  and  Juvenal,  whose  energetic 
language  and  manly  thoughts  may  be  as  instructive  to  us 
now  as  they  might  have  been  to  their  contemporaries,  Per- 
sius died  under  Nero's  bloody  reign,  but  Juvenal  had  the 
good  fortune  to  survive  the  tyrant  Domitian  and  to  see  the 

*I  have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero's  preceptor.  He  was  in  a  sens®  a  Stoic 
and  he  has  said  many  good  things  in  a  very  fine  way.  There  is  a  judgment 
of  Gellius  (xii.  2)  on  Seneca,  or  rather  a  statement  of  what  some  people 
thought  of  his  philosophy,  and  it  is  not  favourable.  His  writings  and  his 
life  must  be  taken  together,  and  I  have  nothing  more  to  say  of  him  here. 
The  reader  will  find  a  notice  of  Seneca  and  his  philosophy  in  *'SeekefS 
after  God,'*  by  the  Kev,  Fo  W,  Farraxo    Macmillan  and  Co. 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  32? 

better  times  of  Nerva,  Trajan,  and  Hadrian,^  His  best  pre- 
cepts are  derived  from  the.  Stoic  school,  and  they  are  en- 
forced in  his  finest  verses  by  the  unrivalled  vigour  of  the 
Latin  language. 

The  two  best  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical  philosophy 
were  a  Greek  slave  and  a  Roman  emperor,  Epictetus,  a 
Phrygian  Greek,  vv^as  brought  to  Rome,  we  know  not  how, 
but  he  was  there  the  slave  and  afterwards  the  freedman  of 
an  unworthy  master,  Epaphroditus  by  name,  himself  a  freed- 
man and  a  favourite  of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have  been  a 
hearer  of  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  while  he  was  still  a  slave,  but 
he  could  hardly  have  been  a  teacher  before  he  was  made 
free.  He  was  one  of  the  philosophers  whom  Domitian's 
order  banished  from  Rome.  He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in 
Epirus,  and  he  may  have  died  there.  Like  other  great 
teachers  he  wrote  nothing,  and  we  are  indebted  to  his  grate- 
ful pupil  Arrian  for  what  we  have  of  Epictetus'  discourses. 
Arrian  wrote  eight  books  of  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  of 
which  only  four  remain  and  somx  fragments.  We  have  also 
from  Arrian's  hand  the  small  Enchiridion  or  Manual  of  the 
chief  precepts  of  Epictetus.  There  is  a  valuable  commen- 
tary on  the  Enchiridion  by  Simplicius,  who  lived  in  the  time 
of  the  emperor  Justinian.* 

Antoninus  in  his  first  book  (1.7),  in  which  he  gratefully 
commemorates  his  obligations  to  his  teachers,  says  that  he  was 
m.ade  acquainted  by  Junius  Rusticus  with  the  discourses  of 
Epictetus,  whom  he  mentions  also  in  other  passages  (iv.  41; 
XI.  34.  36).  Indeed  the  doctrines  of  Epictetus  and  Anto- 
ninus are  the  samiC,  and  Epictetus  is  the  best  authority  for 
the  explanation  of  the  philosophical  language  of  Antoninus 
and  the  exposition  of  his  opinions.  But  the  method  of  the 
two  philosophers  is  entirely  different.  Epictetus  addressed 
himself  to  his  hearers  in  a  continuous  discourse  and  in  a 
familiar  and  simple  m.anner.  Antoninus  wrote  down  his  re- 
flections for  his  own  use  only,  in  short  unconnected  para- 
graphs, which  are  often  obscure. 

2Ribbeck  has  laboured  to  prove  that  those  Satires,  which  contaia  phi]o« 
sophical  precepts,  are  not  the  work  of  the  real,  but  of  a  false  Juvenal,  a 
Declamator.  ^  Still  the  verses  exist,  and  were  written  by  somebody  who  was 
acquainted  with  the  Stoic  doctrines. 

3There  is  a  complete  edition  of  Arrian's  Epictetus  with  the  commentary 
»i  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweighauser,  6  vols.  8vo.  1799.  iSoo. 


328  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philosophy,  Physic 
(^u<Tr/.d>)^  Ethic  (:j9cz6>)^  and  Logic  (Ao^cxdv)  (viii.  13).  This 
division,  we  are  told  by  Diogenes,  vv^as  made  by  Zeno  of 
Citium,  the  founder  of  the  Stoic  sect  and  by  Chrysippus;  but 
these  philosophers  placed  the  three  divisions  in  the  following 
order.  Logic,  Physic,  Ethic.  It  appears  however  that  this 
division  was  made  before  Zeno's  time  and  acknowledged  by 
Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad.  Post.  i.  5).  Logic  is  not 
synonymous  with  our  term  Logic  in  the'  narrower  sense  of 
that  word. 

Cleanthes,  a  Stoic,  subdivided  the  three  divisions,  and  made 
six:  Dialectic  and  Rhetoric,  comprised  in  Logic;  Ethic  and 
Politic;  Physic  and  Theology.  This  division  was  merely  for 
practical  use,  for  all  Philosophy  is  one.  Even  among  the 
earliest  Stoics  Logic  or  Dialectic  does  not  occupy  the  same 
place  as  in  Plato :  it  is  considered  only  as  an  instrument 
which  is  to  be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of  Philosophy. 
An  exposition  of  the  earlier  Stoic  doctrines  and  of  their 
modifications  would  require  a  volume.  My  object  is  to  ex- 
plain only  the  opimons  of  Antoninus,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
collected  from  his  book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes  Physic  and 
Theology  go  together,  or  the  study  of  the  nature  of  Things, 
and  the  study  of  the  nature  of  the  Deity,  so  far  as  man  can 
understand  the  Deity,  and  of  his  government  of  the  universe. 
This  division  or  subdivision  is  not  formally  adopted  by  Anto- 
ninus, for  as  already  observed,  there  is  no  method  in  his 
book;  but  it  is  virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleanthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or  the  study  of 
the  principles  of  morals  and  the  study  of  the  constitution  of 
civil  society;  and  undoubtedly  he  did  well  in  subdividing 
Ethic  into  tv/o  parts,  Ethic  in  the  narrower  sense  and  Poli- 
tic, for  though  the  two  are  intimately  connected,  they  are 
also  very  distinct,  and  many  questions  can  only  be  properly 
discussed  by  carefully  observing  the  distinction.  Antoninus 
does  not  treat  of  Politic.  Llis  subject  is  Ethic,  and  Ethic 
in  its  practical  application  to  his  own  conduct  in  life  as  a 
man  and  as  a  governor.  His  Ethic  is  founded  on  his  doc- 
trines about  man's  nature,  the  Universal  Nature,  and  the  re- 
lation of  every  man  to  everything  else.    It  is  therefore  inti- 


THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    ANTONINUS  329 

tnately  and  inseparably  connected  with  Physic  or  the  nature 
of  Things  and  with  Theology  or  the  Nature  of  the  Deity. 
He  advises  us  to  examine  well  all  the  impressions  on  our 
minds  (^avTaaiai)  and  to  form  a  right  judgment  of  them,  to 
make  just  conclusions,  and  to  inquire  into  the  meanings  of 
words,  and  so  far  to  apply  Dialectic,  but  he  has  no  attempt 
at  any  exposition  of  Dialectic,  and  his  philosophy  is  in  sub- 
stance purely  moral  and  practical.  He  says  (viii.  13), 
"Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the  occasion  of  every 
impression  on  the  soul,  apply  to  it  the  principle  of  Physic, 
of  Ethic  and  of  Dialectic:"  which  is  only  another  way  of 
telling  us  to  examine  the  impression  in  every  possible  way. 
In  another  passage  (iii.  11)  he  says,  "To  the  aids  which  have 
been  mentioned  let  this  one  still  be  added:  make  for  thyself 
a  definition  or  description  of  the  object  (ro  <pavra<jr6v)  which 
is  presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a 
thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete  en- 
tirety, and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the 
things  of  which  it  has  been  compounded,  and  into  which  it 
will  be  resolved."  Such  an  examination  implies  a  use  of 
Dialectic,  which  Antoninus  accordingly  employed  as  a  means 
towards  establishing  his  Physical,  Theological  and  Ethical 
principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical,  Theological, 
and  Ethical  principles,  which  are  contained  in  the  work  of 
Antoninus;  and  more  expositions  than  I  hare  read.  Ritter 
("Geschichte  der  Philosophic,"  iv.  241)  after  explaining 
the  doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats  very  briefly  and  insuffi- 
ciently those  of  Antoninus.  But  he  refers  to  a  short  essay, 
in  which  the  work  is  done  better.^  There  is  also  an  essay 
on  the  Philosophical  Principles  of  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus  by 
J.  M.  Schultz,  placed  at  the  end  of  his  German  translation 
of  Antoninus  (Schleswig,  1799).  With  the  assistance  of 
these  two  useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent  study  a  man  may 
form  a  sufficient  notion  of  the  principles  of  Antoninus;  but 
he  will  find  it  more  difficult  to  expound  them  to  others.  Be- 
sides the  want  of  arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  connec- 
tion am_ong  the  numerous  paragraphs,  the  corruption  of  the 

-  "De    Marco    Aurelio   Antonino  .       .  ex  ipsitis   Commentariis.    Scriptio 
Ehiiologica."     Instituit  Nicolaus  Bachius,  Lipsiae,  1826. 


330  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

text,  the  obscurity  of  the  language  and  the  style,  and  some- 
times perhaps  the  confusion  in  the  writer's  own  ideas, — 
besides  all  this  there  is  occasionally  an  apparent  contradic- 
tion in  the  emperor's  thoughts,  as  if  his  principles  were  some- 
times unsettled,  as  if  doubt  sometimes  clouded  his  mind.  A 
man  who  leads  a  life  of  tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is 
not  disturbed  at  home  and  meddles  not  with  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  may  keep  his  mind  at  ease  and  his  thoughts  in  one 
even  course.  But  such  a  man  has  not  been  tried.  All  his 
Ethical  philosophy  and  his  passive  virtue  might  turn  out  to 
be  idle  words,  if  he  were  once  exposed  to  the  rude  realities 
of  human  existence.  Fine  thoughts  and  moral  dissertations 
from  men  who  have  not  worked  and  suffered  may  be  read, 
but  they  will  be  forgotten.  No  religion,  no  Ethical  philos- 
ophy is  worth  anything,  if  the  teacher  has  not  lived  the  ''life 
of  an  apostle,"  and  been  ready  to  die  "the  death  of  a 
martyr."  "Not  in  passivity  (the  passive  effects)  but  m 
activity  lie  the  evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal, 
just  as  his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  passivity,  but  in 
activity"  (ix.  i6).  The  emperor  Antoninus  was  a  practical 
moralist.  From  his  youth  he  followed  a  laborious  discipline, 
and  though  his  high  station  placed  him  above  all  v/ant  or  the 
fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  frugally  and  temperately  as  the  poorest 
philosopher.  Epictetus  wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he 
always  had  the  little  that  he  wanted  and  he  was  content  with 
it,  as  he  had  been  with  his  servile  station.  But  Antoninus 
after  his  accession  to  the  empire  sat  on  an  uneasy  seat.  He 
had  the  administration  of  an  empire  which  extended  from  the 
Euphrates  to  the  Atlantic,  from  the  cold  mountains  of  Scot- 
land to  the  hot  sands  of  Africa ;  and  we  may  imagine,  though 
we  cannot  know  it  by  experience,  what  must  be  the  trials, 
the  troubles,  the  anxiety  and  the  sorrows  of  him  who  has  the 
world's  business  on  his  hands  with  the  wish  to  do  the  best 
that  he  can,  and  the  certain  knowledge  that  he  can  do  very 
little  of  the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy,  general  cor- 
ruption and  with  the  weight  of  so  unwieldy  an  empire  upon 
him,  we  may  easily  comprehend  that  Antoninus  often  had 
need  of  all  his  fortitude  to  support  him.  The  best  and  the 
bravest  men  have  moments  of  doubt  and  of  weakness,  but  if 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  331 

they  are  the  best  and  the  bravest,  they  rise  again  from  their 
depression  by  recurring  to  first  principles,  as  Antoninus  does. 
The  emperor  says  that  life  is  smoke,  a  vapour,  and  St.  James 
in  his  Epistle  is  of  the  same  mind;  that  the  world  is  full  of 
envious,  jealous,  malignant  people,  and  a  man  might  be  well 
content  to  get  out  of  it.    He  has  doubts  perhaps  sometimes 
even  about  that  to  which  he  holds  most  firmly.    There  are 
only  a  few  passages  of  this  kind,  but  they  are  evidence  of  the 
struggles  which  even  the  noblest  of  the  sons  of  men  had  to 
maintain  against  the  hard  realities  of  his  daily  life.    A  poor 
remark  it  is  which  I  have  seen  som.ewhere,  and  made  in  a 
disparaging  way,  that  the  emperor's  reflections  show  that  he 
had  need  of  consolation  and  comfort  in  life,  and  even  to 
prepare  him  to  meet  his  death.    True  that  he  did  need  com- 
fort and  support,  and  we  see  how  he  found  it.   He  constantly 
recurs  to   his   fundamental   principle   that   the   universe   is 
wisely  ordered,  that  every  man  is  a  part  of  it  and  must  con- 
form to  that  order  which  he  cannot  change,  that  v/hatever 
the  Deity  has  done  is  good,  that  all  mankind  are  a  mean's 
brethren,  that  he  must  love  and  cherish  them  and  try  to 
make  them  better,   even  those  who  v/ould  do   him  harm. 
This  is  his  conclusion  (ii,  17)  :  "What  then  is  that  which  is 
able  to  conduct  a  man  ?   One  thing  and  only  one.  Philosophy. 
But  this  consists  in  keeping  the  divinity  within  a  man  free 
from  violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and  pleasures, 
doing  nothing  without  a  purpose  nor  yet  falsely  and  with 
hypocrisy,  nor  feeling  the  need  of  another  man's  doing  or 
not  doing  anything;  and  besides,  accepting  all  that  happens 
and  all  that  Is  allotted,  as  coming  from  thence,  wherever  it 
is,  from  whence  he  himself  came;  and  finally  waiting  for 
death  with  a  cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing  else  than  a  dis- 
solution of  the  elem^ents,  of  which  every  living  being  is  com- 
pounded.    But  if  there  is  no  harm  to  the  elements  them- 
selves in  each  continually  changing  into  another,  why  should 
a  man  have  any  apprehension  about  the  change  and  dis- 
solution of  all  the  elements    [himself]  ?   for  it  is  accord- 
ing to   nature;   and   nothing   is   evil   that   is   according   to 
nature." 

The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge  of  the  Nature 
of  the  Universe,  of  its  government,  and  of  the  relation  of 


332  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

man's  nature  to  both.  He  names  the  universe  {y]  rcDv  oXmv  ohaioy 
VI.  i),  "the  universal  substance,"  and  he  adds  that  "reason" 
{Xoyo^)  governs  the  universe.  He  also  (vi.  9)  uses  the  terms 
"universal  nature"  or  "nature  of  the  universe."  He  (vi.  25) 
calls  the  universe  "the  one  and  all,  which  we  name  Cosmus 
or  Order"  {xoaiio^y  If  he  ever  seems  to  use  these  general 
terms  as  significant  of  the  All,  of  all  that  man  can  in  any 
way  conceive  to  exist,  he  still  on  other  occasions  plainly  dis- 
tinguishes between  Matter,  Material  things  {oXtj^  hXixov)^  and 
Cause,  Origin,  Reason  (ahia^  ahicBde?,  Xoyo?).  This  is  con- 
formable to  Zeno's  doctrine  that  there  are  two  original 
principles  (a^/a:')  of  all  things,  that  w^hich  acts  (ro  ttocow)  and 
that  which  is  acted  upon  (rd  Ttdd^^ov).  That  which  is  acted  on  is 
the  formless  matter  {oXr^)  that  M^hich  acts  is  the  reason  {X6yo<s)^ 
God,  who  is  eternal  and  operates  through  all  matter,  and 
produces  all  things.  So  Antoninus  (v.  32)  speaks  of  the 
reason  (Aw^'o?)  which  pervades  all  substance  (^ovaia)^  and 
through  all  time  by  fixed  periods  (revolutions)  administers 
the  universe  {rb  Tcav).  God  is  eternal,  and  Matter  is  eternal. 
It  is  God  who  gives  form  to  matter,  but  he  is  not  said  to  have 
created  matter.  According  to  this  view,  which  is  as  old  as 
Anaxagoras,  God  and  matter  exist  independently,  but  God 
governs  matter.  This  doctrine  is  simply  the  expression  of 
the  fact  of  the  existence  both  of  matter  and  of  God.  The 
Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves  with  the  insoluble  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  and  nature  of  matter.  Antoninus  also 
assumes  a  beginning  of  things,  as  we  now  know  them;  but 
his  language  is  sometimes  very  obscure.  I  have  endeavoured 
to  explain  the  meaning  of  one  difficult  passage,  (vii.  75, 
and  the  note.) 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  (ffrot^sTa)  of  which  all 
material  objects  are  made.  But  nothing  is  permanent  in 
form.  The  nature  of  the  universe,  according  to  Antoninus, 
Expression  (iv.  36),  "loves  nothing  so  much  as  to  change  the 
things  which  are,  and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For 
everything  that  exists  is  in  a  manner  the  see'd  of  that  which 
will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking  only  of  seeds  which  are  cast 
into  the  earth  or  into  a  womb:  but  this  is  a  very  vulgar 
notion."  All  things  then  are  in  a  constant  flux  and  change: 
some  things  are  dissolved  into  the  elements,  others  come  in 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  333 

their  places;   and  so   the  "whole   universe  continues  ever 
young  and  perfect."    (xii.  23.) 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions  about  what  he  calls 
^'seminal  principles"  {ffaspfiaruoi  Xoyoc).  He  opposes  them 
to  the  Epicurean  atoms  (vi.  24),  and  consequently  his  "semi- 
nal principles"  are  not  material  atoms  which  wander  about 
at  hazard,  and  com.bine  nobody  knows  how.  In  one  passage 
(iv.  21)  he  speaks  of  living  principles,  souls  (^y;/ a))  after  the 
dissolution  of  their  bodies  being  received  into  the  "seminal 
principle  of  the  universe."  Schultz  thinks  that  by  "seminal 
principles  Antoninus  means  the  relations  of  the  various  ele- 
mental principles,  which  relations  are  determined  by  the  deity 
and  by  which  alone  the  production  of  organized  beings  is 
possible."  This  may  be  the  meaning,  but  if  it  is,  nothing  of 
any  value  can  be  derived  from  it.  Antoninus  often  uses  the 
word  "Nature"  (^ipufft?),  and  we  must  attempt  to  fix  its  mean- 
ing. The  simple  etymological  sense  of  fU(n<s  is  "production," 
the  birth  of  what  we  call  Things,  The  Romans  used  Natura, 
which  also  means  "birth"  originally.  But  neither  the  Greeks 
.  nor  the  Romans  stuck  to  this  simple  meaning,  nor  do  w^e. 
Antoninus  says  (x.  6)  :  "Whether  the  universe  is  [a  con- 
course of]  atoms  or  Nature  [is  a  system],  let  this  first  be 
established  that  I  am  a  part  of  the  whole  which  is  governed 
by  nature."  Here  it  might  seem  as  if  nature  were  personi- 
fied and  viewed  as  an  active,  efficient  power,  as  something 
which,  if  not  independent  of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a  power 
which  is  given  to  it  by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I  understand  the 
expression  right,  is  the  way  in  which  the  word  Nature  is 
often  used  now,  though  it  is  plain  that  many  writers  use  ttfe 
word  without  fixing  any  exact  m.eaning  to  it.  It  is  the  same 
with  the  expression  Laws  of  Nature,  which  some  writers 
may  use  in  an  intelligible  sense,  but  others  as  clearly  use  in 
no  definite  sense  at  all.  There  is  no  meaning  in  this  word 
Nature,  except  that  which  Bishop  Butler  assigns  to  it,  when 
he  says,  "The  only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is 
Stated,  Fixed  or  Settled;  since  what  is  natural  as  much  re- 
quires and  presupposes,  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so, 
i.e.  to  effect  it  continually  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  super- 
natural or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  at  once."  This  is 
Plato's  meaning  (De  Leg.  iv.  715),  when  he  says,  that  God 


334  THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    ANTONINUS 

holds  the  beginning  and  end  and  middle  of  all  that  exists,  and 
proceeds  straight  on  his  course,  making  his  circuit  ac- 
cording to  nature  (that  is,  by  a  fixed  order) ;  and  he  is 
continually  accompanied  by  justice  who  punishes  those  who 
deviate  from  the  divine  law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course 
which  God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets,  the  action 
of  what  we  call  gravitation,  the  elemental  combination  of 
unorganized  bodies  and  their  resolution,  the  production  of 
plants  and  of  living  bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and 
their  dissolution,  which  we  call  their  death,  we  observe  a 
regular  sequence  of  phaenomena,  which  within  the  limits  of 
experience  present  and  past,  so  far  as  we  know  the  past,  is 
fixed  and  invariable.  But  if  this  is  not  so,  if  the  order  and 
sequence  of  phaenomena,  as  known  to  us,  are  subject  to 
change  in  the  course  of  an  infinite  progression, — and  such 
change  is  conceivable, — we  have  not  discovered,  nor  shall 
we  ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order  and  sequence  of 
phaenomena,  in  which  sequence  there  may  be  involved  ac- 
cording to  its  very  nature,  that  is,  according  to  its  fixed 
order,  some  variation  of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or 
Nature  of  Things.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  such  changes 
have  taken  place,  changes  in  the  order  of  things,  as  we  are 
compelled  by  the  imperfection  of  language  to  call  them,  but 
which  are  no  changes;  and  further  it  is  certain,  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  true  sequence  of  all  actual  phaenomena,  as 
for  instance,  the  phaenomena  of  generation,  growth,  and  dis- 
solution, is  and  ever  must  be  imperfect. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak  of  Causes  and 
Effects  than  when  we  speak  of  Nature.  For  the  practical 
purposes  of  life  we  may  use  the  terms  cause  and  effect  con- 
veniently, and  we  may  fix  a  distinct  meaning  to  them,  dis- 
tinct enough  at  least  to  prevent  all  misunderstanding.  But 
the  case  is  different  when  we  speak  of  causes  and  effects  as 
of  Things.  All  that  we  know  is  phaenomena,  as  the  Greeks 
call  them,  or  appearances  which  follow  one  another  in  a 
regular  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one  phae- 
nomenon  should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive  that  there 
must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or  that  some- 
,  thing  else  will  appear  after  the  phaenomenon  which  has 


THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    ANTONINUS  335 

failed  to  appear,  and  will  occupy  the  vacant  place ;  and  so  the 
series  in  its  progression  may  be  modified  or  totally  changed. 
Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing  in  the  sequence  of  natural 
phaenomena  beyond  what  I  have  said;  and  the  real  cause, 
or  the  transcendent  cause,  as  some  would  call  it,  of  each 
successive  phaenomenon  is  in  that  which  is  the  cause  of  all 
things  which  are,  which  have  been,  and  which  will  be  for 
ever.  ^Thus  the  word  Creation  may  have  a  real  sense  if  we 
consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we  can  conceive  a  first,  in  the 
present  order  of  natural  phaenomena;  but  in  the  vulgar 
sense  a  creation  of  all  things  at  a  certain  time,  followed  by 
a  quiescence  of  the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment  of  all 
sequences  of  Phaenomena  to  the  laws  of  Nature,  or  to  the 
other  words  that  people  may  use,  is  absolutely  absurd.* 

Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  understanding  all 
the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in  which  he  speaks  of  Nature,  of 
the  changes  of  things,  and  of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I 
am  convinced  that  his  sense  of  Nature  and  Natural  is  the 
same  as  that  which  I  have  stated ;  and  as  he  was  a  man  who 
knew  how  to  use  words  in  a  clear  way  and  with  strict  con- 
sistency, we  ought  to  assume,  even  if  his  meaning  in  some 
, passages  is  doubtful,  that  his  view  of  Nature  was  in  har- 
mony with  his  fixed  belief  in  the  all-pervading,  ever  present, 
and  ever  active  energy  of  God.  (ii.  4;  iv.  40;  x.  i ;  vi.  40; 
and  other  passages.  Compare  Seneca,  De  Benef.,  iv.  7. 
Swedenborg,  "Angelic  Wisdom,"  349-357.) 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to  understand, 
and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did  not  fully  comprehend  all 
that  he  wrote;  which  would  however  be  in  no  way  re- 
markable, for  it  happens  now  that  a  man  may  write  v/hat: 
neither  he  nor  anybody  can  understand.  Antoninus  tells  us 
(xii.  10)  to  look  at  things  and  see  what  they  are,  resolving 
them  into  the  material  {oXt))^  the  causal  (al'Ttov)^  and  the  rela- 

^Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought;  but  time  infinite 
and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects  of  thought,  except  in  a  very  imperfect 
way.  Time  and  space  must  not  in  any  way  be  thought  of,  when  v/e  think 
of  the  Deity.  Swedenborg  says,  "The  natural  man  may  believe  that  he 
would  have  no  thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  things  ma- 
terial were  taken  away;  for  upon  those  is  founded  all  the  thought  that 
man  has.  But  let  him  know  that  the  thoughts  are  limited  and  confined  in 
proportion  as  they  partake  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  what  is  material;  and 
that  they  are  not  limited  and  are  extended,  in  proportion  as  they  do  not 
partake  of  those  things;  since  the  mind  is  so  far  elevated  above  the  things 
corporeal  and  v/orldly."— ("Concersing  Heaven  and  Hell,"  169.) 


336  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

tion  {ava<popd),  or  the  purpose,  by  which  he  seems  to  mean 
something  in  the  nature  of  what  we  call  effect,  or'  end. 
The  word  Cause  (^ahca)  is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the 
same  word  in  the  Sanscrit  {hetu)  ;  and  the  subtle  philoso- 
phers of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less  subtle  philosophers 
of  modern  times,  have  all  used  this  word,  or  an  equivalent 
word,  in  a  vague  way.  Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may 
be  in  the  inevitable  am-biguity  of  language  rather  than  in  the 
mind  of  the  writer,  for  I  cannot  think  that  some  of  the 
wisest  of  men  did  not  know  what  they  intended  to  say. 
When  Antoninus  says  (iv.  36),  "that  everything  that  exists 
is  in  a  manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be,'''  he  might  be 
supposed  to  say  what  some  of  the  Indian  philosophers  have 
said,  and  thus  a  profound  truth  might  be  converted  into  a 
gross  absurdity.  But  he  says,  "in  a  manner,"  and  in  a  man- 
ner he  said  true ;  and  in  a.nother  manner,  if  you  mistake  his 
meaning,  he  said  false.  When  Plato  said,  "Nothing  ever  is, 
but  is  always  becoming"  (ds).  ytyveTai)^  he  delivered  a  text,  out 
of  which  we  may  derive  something;  for  he  destroys  by  it  not 
all  practical,  but  all  speculative  notions  of  cause  and  effect. 
The  whole  series  of  things,  as  they  appear  to  us,  must  be 
contemplated  in  time,  that  is,  in  succession,  and  we  conceive 
or  suppose  intervals  between  one  state  of  things  and  another 
state  of  things,  so  that  there  is  priority  and  sequence,  and 
interval,  and  Being,  and  a  ceasing  to  Be,  and  beginning  and 
ending.  But  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in  the  Nature  of 
Things.  It  is  an  everlasting  continuity,  (iv.  45;  vii.  75,) 
When  Antoninus  speaks  of  generation  (x.  26),  he  speaks  of 
one  cause  (alria)  acting,  and  then  another  cause  taking  up 
the  work,  which  the  former  left  in  a  certain  state,  and  so 
on;  and  we  might  conceive  that  he  had  some  notion  like 
what  has  been  called  "the  self-evolving  power  of  nature;"  a 
fine  phrase  indeed,  the  full  import  of  which  I  believe  that 
the  writer  of  it  did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid  himself  open  to 
the  imputation  of  being  a  follower  of  one  of  the  Hindu  sects, 
which  makes  all  things  come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or 
matter,  or  out  of  something  which  takes  the  place  of  Deity, 
but  is  not  Deity.  I  would  have  all  men  think  as  they  please, 
or  as  they  can,  and  I  only  claim  the  same  freedom  which  I 
live.    When  a  man  writes  anything,  we  may  fairly  try  to 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  337 

find  out  all  that  his  words  must  mean,  even  if  the  result  is 
that  they  mean  what  he  did  not  mean;  and  if  we  find  this 
contradiction,  it  is  not  our  fault,  but  his  misfortune.  Now 
Antoninus  is  perhaps  somewhat  in  this  condition  in  what  he 
says  (x.  26),. though  he  speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph 
of  the  power  which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less 
clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage  (x.  26)  he  means  that 
the  power  is  conceived  to  be  in  the  different  successive 
causes  (^ahtac')^  or  in  something  else,  nobody  c3-n  tell.  From 
other  passages,  however,  I  do  collect  that  his  notion  of  the 
phaenomena  of  the  universe  is  v/hat  I  have  stated.  The 
Deity  works  unseen,  if  we  may  use  such  language,  and  per- 
haps I  may,  as  Job  did,  or  he  v/ho  wrote  the  book  of  Job. 
"In  him  we  live  and  move  and  are,"  said  St.  Paul  to  the 
Athenians,  and  to  show  his  bearers  that  this  was  no  new 
doctrine,  he  quoted  the  Greek  poets.  One  of  these  poets 
was  the  Stoic  Cleanthes,  whose  noble  hymn  to  Zeus  or  God 
is  an  elevated  expression  of  devotion  and  philosophy.  It 
deprives  Nature  of  her  power  and  puts  her  under  the  im- 
mediate government  of  the  Deity. 

"Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest.— 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth, 
Nor  in  the  aethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea, 
Save  what  the  wicked  through  their  folly  do." 

Antoninus'  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  divine  powef 
and  government  was  founded  on  his  perception  of  the  order 
of  the  uniA^erse.  Like  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.,  iv.  3,  13,  etc.), 
he  says  that  though  v\^e  cannot  see  the  forms  of  divine  powers 
we  know  that  they  exist  because  we  see  their  works. 

"To  those  who  ask.  Where  hast  thou'  seen  the  gods,  or  how 
dost  thou  comprehend  that  they  exist  and  so  worshipest 
them?  I  answer,  in  the  first  place,  that  they  may  be  seen 
even  with  the  eyes ;  in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I  seen 
m.y  own  soul,  and  yet  I  honour  it.  Thus  then  with  respect 
to  the  gods,  from  what  I  constantly  experience  of  their 
power,  from  this  I  comprehend  that  they  exist,  and  I 
venerate  them."  (xii.  28,  and  the  note.  Comp.  Aristotle, 
de  Mundo,  c.  6;  Xen.  Mem.,  i.  4,  9;  Cicero,  TuscuL,  i,  28^ 
29;  Sto  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Romans,  i.  19^  20;  and  Mon- 


338  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF   ANTONINUS 

taigne^s  "Apology  for  Ralmond  de  Sebonde/'  ii.  C.  12.) 
This  is  a  very  old  argument  which  has  always  had  great 
weight  with  most  people,  and  has  appeared  sufEcient.  It 
does  not  acquire  the  least  additional  strength  by  being  de- 
veloped in  a  learned  treatise.  It  is  as  intelligible  in  its 
simple  enunciation  as  it  can  be  made.  If  it  is  rejected,  there 
is  no  arguing  with  him  who  rejects  it:  and  i£  it  is  worked 
out  into  innumerable  particulars,  the  value  of  the  evidence 
runs  the  risk  of  being  buried  under  a  mass  of  words. 

Man  being  conscious  that  he  is  a  spiritual  power  or  in- 
tellectual power,  or  that  he  has  such  a  power,  in  whatever 
way  he  conceives  that  he  has  it — for  I  wish  simply  to  state 
a  fact — from  this  power  which  he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led, 
as  Antoninus  says,  to  believe  that  there  is  a  greater  power, 
which  as  the  old  Stoics  tell  us,  pervades  the  whole  universe 
as  the  intellect  (voD?)  pervades  man.  (Compare  Epictetus' 
Discourses,  i.  14;  and  "Voltaire  a  Mad^  Necker,"  vol.  lxvii. 
p.  278,  ed.  Lequien.) 

God  exists  then,  but  what  do  we  know  of  his  Nature? 
Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of  man  is  an  efflux  from  the 
divinity.  We  have  bodies  like  animals,  but  we  have  reason, 
intelligence  as  the  gods.  Animals  have  life  {(po/7j),  and  what 
we  call  instincts  or  natural  principles  of  action:  but  the 
rational  animal  man  alone  has  a  rational,  intelligent  soul 
{(pu^ij  XopxTJj  vospdy  Antoninus  insists  on  this  continually :  God 
is  in  man,®  and  so  we  mxust  constantly  attend  to  the  divinity 
within  us,  for  it  is  only  in  this  way  that  we  can  have  any 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God.  The  human  soul  is  in  a 
sense  a  portion  of  the  divinity;  and  the  soul  alone  has  any 
communication  with  the  Deity,  for  as  he  says  (xii.  2)  : 
"With  his  intellectual  part  alone  God  touches  the  intelligence 
only  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into 
these  bodies."  In  fact  he  says  that  which  is  hidden  within 
a  man  is  life,  that  is  the  man  himself.  All  the  rest  is  vesture, 
covering,  organs,  instrument,  which  the  living  man,  the  real 
man,  uses  for  the  purpose  of  his  present  existence.  The  air 
is  universally  diffused  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire,  and  so 
for  him  who  is  willing  to  partake  of  it  the  intelligent  power, 

^Comp.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,    i.    3,   17,  and  James  iv.  8,  "Draw   nigb 

to  God  and  he  will   draw  nigh  to  you." 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  339 

which  holds  within  it  all  things,  is  diffused  as  wide  and  free 
as  the  air.  (viii.  54.)  It  is  by  living  a  divine  life  that  man 
approaches  to  a  knowledge  of  the  divinity.  It  is  by  following 
the  divinity  within,  dat/x<ov  or  6s6?  as  Antoninus  calls  it,  that 
man  comes  nearest  to  the  Deity,  the  supreme  good,  for  man 
can  never  attain  to  perfect  agreement  with  his  internal  guide 
(to  ■^ysfiovr/.6>).  ''Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with 
the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his  own  soul  is 
satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does 
all  the  daem^on  (^daqj.iov')  wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to 
every  man  for  his  guardian  and  guide,  a  portion  of  himself. 
And  this  daemon  is  every  man's  understanding  and  reason." 
(v.  27).  ^    ^ 

There  is  in  man,  that  is  in  the  reason,  the  intelligence,  a 
superior  faculty  which  if  it  is  exercised  rules  all  the  rest. 
This  is  the  ruling  faculty  {rb  ^^e/jiovtxdv)  which  Cicero  (De 
Natura  Deorum,  11.  11)  renders  by  the  Latin  word  Princi- 
patus,  "to  which  nothing  can  or  ought  to  be  superior."  Anto- 
ninus often  uses  this  term,  and  others  which  are  equivalent. 
He  names  it  (vii.  64)  "the  governing  intelligence."  The 
governing  faculty  is  the  master  of  the  soul.  (v.  26.)  A 
man  must  reverence  only  his  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity 
within  him.  As  we  must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme 
in  the  universe,  so  we  must  reverence  that  which  is  supreme 
in  ourselves,  and  this  is  that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that 
which  is  supreme  in  the  universe,  (v.  21.)  So,  as  Plotinus 
says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know  the  divine,  so  far  as  it 
knows  itself.  In  one  passage  (xi.  19)  Antoninus  speaks  of 
a  man's  condemnation  of  himself,  when  the  diviner  part 
within  him  has  been  ovcrpov/ered  and  yields  to  the  less  hon- 
ourable and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and  its  gross 
pleasures.  In  a  word,  the  views  of  Antoninus  on  this  mat- 
ter, however  his  expressions  may  vary,  are  exactly  what 
f^ishop  Butler  expresses,  when  he  speaks  of  "the  natural 
supremacy  of  reflection  or  conscience/'  of  the  faculty  "which 
surveys,  approves  or  disapproves  the  several  affections  of 
our  mind  and  actions  of  our  lives." 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Antoninus  on  the 
notion  of  the  universe  being  one  animated  Being.  But  all 
that  he  says  amounts  to  no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than 


340  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

this:  the  soul  of  man  is  most  intimately  united  to  his  body 
and  together  they  make  one  animal,  which  we  call  man;  so 
the  Deity  is  most  intimately  united  to  the  world  or  the  ma- 
terial universe,  and  together  they  form  one  whole.  But 
Antoninus  did  not  view  God  and  the  material  universe  as 
the  same,  any  more  than  he  viewed  the  body  and  soul  of  man 
as  one.  Antoninus  has  no  speculations  on  the  absolute 
nature  of  the  deity.  It  was  not  his  fashion  to  waste  his  time 
on  what  man  cannot  understand.'^  He  v/as  satisfied  that 
God  exists,  that  he  governs  all  things,  that  man  can  only 
have  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he  must 
attain  this  imperfect  knowledge  by  reverencing  the  divinity 
which  is  within  him,  and  keeping  it  pure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  it  follows  that  the  universe  is 
administered  by  the  Providence  of  God  {jtpovoia^)  and  that  all 
things  are  wisely  ordered.  There  are  passages  in  which 
Antoninus  expresses  doubts,  or  states  different  possible 
theories  of  the  constitution  and  government  of  the  universe, 
but  he  always  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle,  that  if 
we  admit  the  existence  of  a  Deity,  we  must  also  admit  that 
he  orders  al^  things  wisely  and  well.  (iv.  27;  vi.  i;  ix.  28; 
XII.  5,  and  many  other  passages.)  Epictetus  says  (i.  6)  that 
we  can  discern  the  providence  which  rules  the  world,  if  we 
possess  two  things,  the  pov/er  of  seeing  all  that  happens  with 
respect  to  each  thing,  and  a  grateful  disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is  the  world  so 
full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical  and  moral?  If  instead  of 
saying  that  there  is  evil  in  the  world,  we  use  the  expression 
which  I  have  used,  "what  we  call  evil,"  we  have  partly  anti- 
cipated the  emperor's  answer.  We  see  and  feel  and  know 
imperfectly  very  few  things  in  the  few  years  that  we  live, 
and  all  the  knowledge  and  all  the  experience  of  all  the  human 
race  is  positive  ignorance  of  the  whole,  which  is  infinite. 
Now  as  our  reason  teaches  us  that  everything  is  in  some 
way  related  to  and  connected  with  every  other  thing,  all 
notion  of  evil  as  being  in  the  universe  of  things  is  a  contra- 
diction, for  if  the  whole  comes  from  and  is  governed  by  an 
intelligent  being,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  anything  in 

^"God   who   is    infinitely    beyond    the    reach    of   our   narrow    capacities.'* 
Locke,  "Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding."  jvj.,  chap.  17. 


THE   PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  341 

it  which  tends  to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole. 
(viii.  55;  X.  6.)  Everything  is  in  constant  mutation,  and 
yet  the  whole  subsists.  We  might  imagine  the  solar  system 
resolved  into  its  elemental  parts,  and  yet  the  whole  would 
still  subsist  "ever  young  and  perfect." 

All  things,  all  form.s,  are  dissolved  and  new  forms  appear. 
All  living  things  undergo  the  change  which  we  call  death. 
If  we  call  death  an  evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living 
beings  also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of  all,  for  he 
suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body  and  by  his  intelligent  part. 
Men  suffer  also  from  one  another,  and  perhaps  the  largest 
part  of  human  suffering  comes  to  man  from  those  whom  he 
calls  his  brothers.  Antoninus  says  (viii.  55),  "Generally, 
wickedness  does  no  harm  at  all  to  the  universe;  and  par- 
ticularly, the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  an- 
other. It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his  power  to 
be  released  from  it  as  soon  as  he  shall  choose."  The  first 
part  of  this  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  doctrine  that  the 
whole  can  sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  second  part  must 
be  explained  by  the  Stoic  principle  that  there  is  no  evil  in 
anything  which  is  not  in  our  power.  What  wrong  we  suffer 
from  another  is  his  evil,  not  ours.  But  this  is  an  admission 
that  there  is  evil  in  a  sort,  for  he  who  does  wrong  does  evil, 
and  if  others  can  endure  the  wrong,  still  there  is  evil  in  the 
wrong-doer.  Antoninus  (xi.  18)  gives  many  excellent  pre- 
cepts with  respect  to  wrongs  and  injuries,  and  his  precepts 
are  practical.  He  teaches  us  to  bear  what  we  cannot  avoid, 
and  his  lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who  denies  the 
being  and  the  government  of  God  as  to  him  who  believes  in 
both.  There  is  no  direct  answer  in  Antoninus  to  the  objec- 
tions which  may  be  made  to  the  existence  and  providence  of 
God  because  of  the  moral  disorder  and  suffering  which  are 
in  the  world,  except  this  answer  which  he  makes  in  reply 
to  the  supposition  that  even  the  best  men  may  be  extinguished 
by  death.  He  says  if  it  is  so,  we  may  be  sure  that  if  it 
ought  to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have  ordered 
it  otherwise,  (xii.  5.)  His  conviction  of  the  wisdom  which 
we  may  observe  in  the  government  of  the  world  is  too  strong 
to  be  disturbed  by  any  apparent  irregularities  in  the  order 
of  things.    That  these  disorders  exist  is  a  fact,  and  those 


342  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

who  would  conclude  from  them  against  the  being  and  govern- 
ment of  God  conclude  too  hastily.  We  all  admit  that  there 
is  an  order  in  the  material  world,  a  Nature,  in  thQ  sense  in 
which  that  word  has  been  explained,  a  constitution  (xaraaxeu^) 
what  we  call  a  system,  a  relation  of  parts  to  one  another  and 
a  fitness  of  the  whole  for  something.  So  in  the  constitution 
of  plants  and  of  animals  there  is  an  order,  a  fitness  for  some 
end.  Sometimes  the  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  interrupted 
and  the  end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not  attained.  The  seed, 
the  plant  or  the  animal  sometimes  perishes  before  it  has 
passed  through  all  its  changes  and  done  all  its  uses.  It  is 
according  to  Nature,  that  is,  a  fixed  order,  for  some  t6 
perish  early  and  for  others  to  do  all  their  uses  and  leave 
successors  to  take  their  place.  So  man  has  a  corporeal  and 
intellectual  and  moral  constitution  fit  for  certain  uses,  and 
on  the  whole  man  performs  these  uses,  dies  and  leaves  other 
men  in  his  place.  So  society  exists,  and  a  social  state  is 
manifestly  the  Natural  State  of  man,  the  state  for  which  his 
Nature  fits  him ;  and  society  amidst  innumerable  irregularities 
and  disorders  still  subsists ;  and  perhaps  we  may  say  that  the 
history  of  the  past  and  our  present  knowledge  give  us  a 
reasonable  hope  that  its  disorders  will  diminish,  and  that 
order,  its  governing  principle,  may  be  more  firmly  established. 
As  order  then,  a  fixed  order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  devia- 
tions  real  or  apparent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the  whole 
Nature  of  things,  that  which  we  call  disorder  or  evil  as  it 
seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any  way  alter  the  fact  of  the  general 
constitution  of  things  having  a  Nature  or  fixed  order.  No- 
body will  conclude  from  the  existence  of  disorder  that  ordet 
is  not  the  rule,  for  the  existence  of  order  both  physical  and 
moral  is  proved  by  daily  experience  and  all  past  experience. 
We  cannot  conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe  is  main* 
tained :  we  cannot  even  conceive  how  our  own  life  from  day 
to  day  is  continued,  nor  how  we  perform  the  simplest  move- 
ments of  the  body,  nor  how  we  grow  and  think  and  act^  \ 
though  we  know  many  of  the  conditions  which  are  necessary 
for  all  these  functions.  Knowing  nothing  then  of  the  unseen 
power  which  acts  in  ourselves  except  by  what  is  done,  we 
know  nothing  of  the  power  which  acts  through  what  we  call 
all  time  and  all  space;  but  seeing  that  there  is  a  Nature  or 


THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS  343 

fixed  order  in  all  things  known  to  us,  it  is  conformable  to 
the  nature  of  our  minds  to  believe  that  this  universal  Nature 
has  a  cause  which  operates  continually,  and  that  we  are 
totally  unable  to  speculate  on  the  reason  of  any  of  those  dis- 
orders or  evils  which  we  perceive.  This  I  believe  is  the 
answer  which  may  be  collected  from  all  that  Antoninus  has 
said.^ 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achilles  tells  Priam 
(Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has  two  casks,  one  filled  with  good 
things,  and  the  other  with  bad,  and  that  he  gives  to  men  out 
of  each  according  to  his  pleasure;  and  so  we  must  be  con- 
tent, for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of  Zeus.  One  of  the  Greek 
commentators  asks  how  must  we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with 
what  we  find  in  the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey,  where  the  king 
of  the  gods  says.  Men  say  that  evil  comes  to  them  from  us, 
but  they  bring  it  on  themselves  through  their  own  folly. 
The  answer  is  plain  enough  even  to  the  Greek  commen- 
tator. The  poets  make  both  Achilles  and  Zeus  speak  ap- 
propriately to  their  several  characters.  Indeed  Zeus  says 
plainly  that  men  do  attribute  their  sufferings  to  the  gods, 
but  they  do  it  falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own 
sorrows. 

Epictetus  In  his  Enchiridion  (c.  2*])  makes  short  work  of 
the  question  of  evil.  He  says,  *'As  a  mark  is  not  set  up  for 
the  purpose  of  missing  it,  so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil 
exist  in  the  Universe."  This  will  appear  obscure  enough 
to  those  who  are  not  acquainted  with  Epictetus,  but  he  al- 
ways knows  what  he  is  talking  about.  We  do  not  set  up  a 
mark  in  order  to  miss  it,  though  we  may  miss  it.  God,  whose 
existence  Epictetus  assumes,  has  not  ordered  all  things  so 
that  his  purpose  shall  fail.  Whatever  there  may  be  of  what 
we  call  evil,  the  Nature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses  it,  does  not 
exist;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a  part  of  the  constitution  or  nature 
of  Things.  If  there  were  a  principle  of  evil  {^pxn)  in  the 
constitution  of  things,  evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as  Sim- 
plicius  argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.      Simplicius  (c.  34, 


®  Cleanthes  says  in  his  hymn : 

"For  all  things  good 
So  that. One  everlas 

See  Bishop  Butler's  Sermons.    Sermon  XV.  "Upon  the  Ignorance  of  Man  " 


"For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest. 
So  that. One  everlasting  reason  governs  all." 


344     _        THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    ANTONINUS 

[27]  )  has  a  long  and  curious  discourse  on  this  text  of  Epic- 
tetus,  and  it  is  amusing  and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter.  It  contains 
all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (11.  11)  :  "To  go  from  among 
men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the 
gods  will  not  involve  thee  in  evil;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 
exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about  human  affairs,  what 
is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a  universe  devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of 
providence  ?  But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for 
human  things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means  in  man's  power 
to  enable  him.  not  to  fall  into  real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest, 
if  there  was  anything  evil,  they  would  have  provided  for 
this  also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a  man's  power  not 
to  fall  into  it.  But  that  which  does  not  make  a  man  worse, 
how  can  it  make  a  man's  life  worse?  But  neither  through 
ignorance  nor  having  the  knowledge,  but  not  the  power  to 
guard  against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  possible  that  the 
nature  of  the  Universe  has  overlooked  them;  nor  is  it  pos- 
sible that  it  has  made  so  great  a  mistake,  either  through  want 
of  power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil  should  happen 
indiscriminately  to  the  good  and  the  bad.  But  death  cer- 
tainly and  life,  honour  and  dishonour,  pain  and  pleasure,  all 
these  things  equally  happen  to  good  and  bad  men,  being 
things  which  make  us  neither  better  nor  worse.  Therefore 
they  are  neither  good  nor  evil." 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus'  Philosophy  follows  from 
his  general  principles.  The  end  of  all  his  philosophy  is  to 
live  conformably  to  Nature,  both  a  man's  own  nature  and 
the  nature  of  the  Universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  explained 
what  the  Greek  philosophers  meant  when  they  spoke  of  living 
according  to  Nature,  and  he  says  that  when  it  is  explained, 
as  he  has  explained  it  and  as  they  understood  it,  it  is  "a.  man- 
ner of  speaking  not  loose  and  undeterminate,  but  clear  and 
distinct,  strictly  just  and  true."  To  live  according  to  Nature 
is  to  live  according  to  a  man's  whole  nature,  not  according 
to  a  part  of  it,  and  to  reverence  the  divinity  within  him  as 
the  governor  of  all  his  actions.  "To  the  rational  animal  the 
same  act  is  according  to  nature  and  according  to  reason."^ 

®This  is  what  Juvenal  means  when  he  says  (xiv,  321)— 

"Nunquam  aUud  Natura  aliud  Sapientia  dicit." 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ANTONINUS  345 

ftnr.  II.)  That  which  is  done  contrary  to  reason  is  also  an 
act  contrary  to  nature,  to  the  whole  nature,  though  it  is  cer- 
tainly conformable  to  some  part  of  man's  nature,  or  it  could 
not  be  done.  Man  is  made  for  action,  not  for  idleness  of 
pleasure.  As  plants  and  animals  do  the  uses  of  their  nature, 
so  man  must  do  his.     (v.  i.) 

Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  universal  nature, 
conformably  to  the  nature  of  all  things  of  which  he  is  one; 
and  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  community  he  must  direct  his 
life  and  actions  with  reference  to  those  among  whom,  and 
for  whom,  among  other  purposes,  he  liveSo^'*  A  man  must  not 
retire  into  solitude  and  cut  himself  off  from  his  fellow  men. 
He  must  be  ever  active  to  do  his  part  in  the  great  whole. 
■A.11  men  are  his  kin,  not  only  in  blood,  but  still  more  by  par- 
ticipating in  the  same  intelligence  and  by  being  a  portion  of 
the  same  divinity.  A  man  cannot  really  be  injured  by  his 
"brethren,  for  no  act  of  theirs  can  make  him  bad,  and  he  must 
not  be  angry  with  them  nor  hate  them:  "For  we  are  made 
for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the 
rows  of  the  upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act  against  one  an- 
other then  is  contrary  to  nature ;  and  it  is  acting  against  one 
another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn  away."  (ii.  i.) 

Further  he  says:  "Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in 
it,  in  passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social  act,  think- 
ing of  God."  (vi.  7.)  Again:  "Love  mankind.  Follow 
God."  (vii.  31.)  It  is  the  characteristic  of  the  rational 
soul  for  a  man  to  love  his  neighbour,  (xi.  i.)  Antoninus 
teaches  in  various  passages  the  forgiveness  of  injuries,  and 
we  know  that  he  also  practised  what  he  taught.  Bishop 
Butler  remarks  that  "this  divine  precept  to  forgive  injuries 
and  to  love  our  enemies,  though  to  be  met  with  in  Gentile 
moralists,  yet  is  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  precept  of  Christianity, 
as  our  Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it  than  on  any  other 
single  virtue,"  The  practice  of  this  precept  is  the  most  diffi- 
cult of  all  virtues.  Antoninus  often  enforces  it  and  gives  us 
aid  towards  following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we  feel 
anger  and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is  natural,  just  and 
useful  for  the  conservation  of  society.  It  is  useful  that 
WK)ng-doers  should  feel  the  natural  consequences  of  thek 
"  See  vm.  52 :  and  Persius,  iii.  66, 


346  THE    PHILOSOPHY    OF    ANTONINUS 

actions,  among  which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society  and 
the  resentment  of  him  who  is  wronged.    But  revenge,  in  the 
proper  sense  of  that  word,  must  not  be  practised.    "The  best 
way  of  avenging  thyself,"  says  the  emperor,  "is  not  to  be- 
come like  the  wrong-doer."    It  is  plain  by  this  that  he  does 
not  mean  that  we  should  in  any  case  practise  revenge;  but 
he  says  to  those  who  talk  of  revenging  wrongs,  Be  not  like 
him  who  has  done  the  wrong.    Socrates  in  the  Crito  (c.  lo) 
says  the  same  in  other  words,  and   St.   Paul    (Ep.  to  the 
Romans,  xii.  17).    "When  a  man  has  done  thee  any  wrong, 
immediately  consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or  evil 
he  has  done  wrong.     For  when  thou  hast  seen  this,  thou 
wilt  pity  him  and  wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry,"     (vii. 
26.)     Antoninus  would  not  deny  that  wrong  naturally  pro- 
duces the  feeling  of  anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is  im- 
plied in  the  recommendation  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the 
man's  mind  who  has  done  the  wrong,  and  then  you  will  have 
pity  instead  of  resentment:  and  so  it  comes  to  the  same  as 
St.  Paul's  advice  to  be  angry  and  sin  not;  which,  as  Butler 
well  explains  it,  is  not  a  recommendation  to  be  angry,  which 
nobody  needs,   for  anger  is  a  natural  passion,  but  it  is  a 
warning  against  allowing  anger  to  lead  us  into  sin.    In  short 
the  emperor's  doctrine  about  wrongful  acts  is  this:  wrong- 
doers do  not  know  what  good  and  bad  are:  they  offend  out 
of  ignorance,  and  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true. 
Though  this  kind  of  ignorance  will  never  be  admitted  as  a 
legal  excuse,  and  ought  not  to  be  admitted  as  a  full  excuse 
in  any  way  by  society,  there  may  be  grievous  injuries,  such 
as  it  is  in  a  man's  povN^er  to  forgive  without  harm  to  society; 
and  if  he  forgives  because  he  sees  that  his  enemies  know  not 
what  they  do,  he  is  acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  sublim.e  prayer, 
"Father,  forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what  they  do." 

The  emperor's  moral  philosophy  was  not  a  feeble,  narrow 
system,  w^hich  teaches  a  man  to  look  directly  to  his  own  hap- 
piness, though  a  man's  happiness  or  tranquillity  is  indirectly 
promoted  by  living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A  man  must  live 
conformably  to  the  universal  nature,  which  means,  as  the 
emperor  explains  it  in  many  passages,  that  a  man's  actions 
must  be  conformable  to  his  true  relations  to  all  other  human 
beings,  both  as  a  citizen  of  a  political  community  and  as  a 


THE    PHILOSOPHY   OF    ANTONINUS  347 

member  of  the  whole  human  family.  This  implies,  and  he 
often  expresses  it  in  the  most  forcible  language,  that  a  man's 
words  and  actions,  so  far  as  they  affect  others,  must  be 
measured  by  a  fixed  rule,  which  is  their  consistency  with 
the  conservation  and  the  interests  of  the  particular  society 
of  which  he  is  a  memberj  and  of  the  whole  human  race.  To 
live  conformably  to  such  a  rule,  a  man  must  use  his  rational 
faculties  in  order  to  discern  clearly  the  consequences  and 
full  effect  of  all  his  actions  and  of  the  actions  of  others:  he 
must  not  live  a  life  of  contemplation  and  reflection  only, 
though  he  must  often  retire  within  himself  to  calm  and  purify 
his  soul  by  thought,  but  he  must  mingle  in  the  work  of  man 
and  be  a  fellow  labourer  for  the  general  good. 

A  man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in  life,  that  he  may 
direct  all  his  energies  to  it;  of  course  a  good  object,  (ii.  7.) 
He  who  has  not  one  object  or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be  one 
and  the  same  all  through  his  life,  (xi,  21.)  Bacon  has  a 
remark  to  the  same  effect,  on  the  best  means  of  "reducing  of 
the  mind  unto  virtue  and  good  estate;  which  is,  the  electing 
and  propounding  unto  a  man's  self  good  and  virtuous  ends  of 
his  life,  such  as  may  be  in  a  reasonable  sort  within  his  com- 
pass to  attain."  He  is  a  happy  man  who  has  been  wise 
enough  to  do  this  when  he  was  young  and  has  had  the  op- 
portunities; but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a  man  cannot 
always  be  so  wise  in  his  youth,  encourages  himself  to  do  it 
when  he  can,  and  not  to  let  life  slip  away  before  he  has 
begun.  He  who  can  propose  to  himself  good  and  virtuous 
ends  of  life,  and  be  true  to  them,  cannot  fail  to  live  con- 
formably to  his  own  interest  and  the  universal  interest,  for 
in  the  nature  of  things  they  are  one.  If  a  thing  is  not  good 
for  the  hive,  it  is  not  good  for  the  bee.     (vi.  54.) 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  *Tf  the  gods  have  de- 
termined about  me  and  about  the  things  which  must  happen 
to  me,  they  have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to 
imagine  a  deity  without  forethought;  and  as  to  doing  me 
harm,  why  should  they  have  any  desire  towards  that?  For 
what  advantage  would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to  the 
whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their  providence?  But 
if  they  have  not  determined  about  me  individually,  they  have 
certainly  determined  about  the  whole  at  least ;  and  the  things 


348  THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF  ANTONINUS 

which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in  this  general  arrange- 
ment I  ought  to  accept  with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with 
them.  But  if  they  determine  about  nothing — which  it  is 
wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it,  let  us  neither  slacri- 
fice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by  them  nor  do  anything  else  which 
we  do  as  if  the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us — ^but  if 
however  the  gods  determine  about  none  of  the  things  which 
concern  us,  I  am  able  to  determine  about  myself,  and  I  can 
inquire  about  that  which  is  useful;  and  that  is  useful  to 
every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own  constitution 
(^xaraffxeuTj)  and  nature.  But  my  nature  is  rational  and  social ; 
and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I  am  Antoninus,  is  Rome ; 
but  so  far  as  I  am  a  m.an,  it  is  the  world.  The  things  then 
which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to  me." 
(VI.  44.) 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  state  the 
emperor's  opinions  on  all  the  ways  in  which  a  man  may 
profitably  use  his  understanding  towards  perfecting  himself 
in  practical  virtue.  The  passages  to  this  purpose  are  in  all 
parts  of  his  book,  but  as  they  are  in  no  order  or  connection, 
a  man  must  use  the  book  a  long  time  before  he  will  find  out 
all  that  is  in  it.  A  few  words  may  be  added  here.  If  we 
analyze  all  other  things,  we  find  how  insufficient  they  are  for 
human  life,  and  how  truly  worthless  many  of  them  are. 
Virtue  alone  is  indivisible,  one,  and  perfectly  satisfying. 
The  notion  of  Virtue  cannot  be  considered  vague  or  un- 
settled, because  a  man  may  find  it  difficult  to  explain  the  no- 
tion fully  to  himself  or  to  expound  it  to  others  in  such  a 
way  as  to  prevent  cavilling.  Virtue  is  a  whole,  and  no  more 
consists  of  parts  than  man's  intelligence  does,  and  yet  we 
speak  of  various  intellectual  faculties  as  a  convenient  way  of 
expressing  the  various  powers  which  man's  intellect  shows 
by  his  works.  In  the  same  way  we  may  speak  of  various 
virtues  or  parts  of  virtue,  in  a  practical  sense,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  what  particular  virtues  we  ought  to  practise 
in  order  to  the  exercise  of  the  whole  of  virtue,  that  is,  as 
much  as  man's  nature  is  capable  of. 

The  prime  principle  in  man's  constitution  is  social.  The 
jnext  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the  persuasions  oi  the  body, 
when  they  are  not  conformable  to  the  rational  principle, 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   ANTONINUS  349 

which  must  govern.  The  third  is  freedom  from  error  and 
from  deception.  "Let  then  the  ruling  principle  holding  fast 
to  these  things  go  straight  on  and  it  has  what  is  its  own." 
(vii.  55.)  The  emperor  selects  justice  as  the  virtue  which 
is  the  basis  of  all  the  rest  (x.  11),  and  this  had  been  said 
■long  before  his  time. 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of  what  is 
meant  by  justice  as  a  disposition  of  the  mind,  and  some  no- 
tion about  acting  in  conformity  to  this  disposition;  but  ex- 
perience shovv^s  that  men's  notions  about  justice  are  as  con- 
fused as  their  actions  are  inconsistent  with  the  true  notion 
of  justice.  The  emperor's  notion  of  justice  is  clear  enough, 
but  not  practical  enough  for  all  mankind.  "Let  there  be 
freedom  from  perturbations  with  respect  to  the  things  which 
come  from  the  external  cause;  and  let  there  be  justice  in 
the  things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is,  let 
there  be  movement  and  action  terminating  in  this,  in  social 
acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature."  (ix.  31.)  In  an- 
other place  (ix.  i)  he  says  that  "he  who  acts  unjustly  acts 
impiously,"  which  follows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in 
various  places.  He  insists  on  the  practice  of  truth  as  a 
virtue  and  as  a  means  to  virtue,  which  no  doubt  it  is:  for 
lying  even  in  indifferent  things  weakens  the  understanding; 
and  lying  maliciously  is  as  great  a  moral  offence  as  a  man 
can  be  guilty  of,  viewed  both  as  showing  an  habitual  dispo- 
sition, and  viewed  with  respect  to  consequences.  He  couples 
the  notion  of  justice  with  action.  A  man  must  not  pride 
himself  on  having  some  fine  notion  of  justice  in  his  head, 
but  he  must  exhibit  his  justice  in  act,  like  St.  James's  notion 
of  faith.     But  this  is  enough. 

The  Stoics,  and  Antoninus  among  them,  call  some  things 
beautiful  (xaXd)  and  some  ugly  (aiff/pd),  and  as  they  are 
beautiful  so  they  are  good,  and  as  they  are  ugly  so  they  are 
evil  or  bad.  (11.  i.)  All  these  things  good  and  evil  are  in 
our  power  absolutely,  some  of  the  stricter  Stoics  would  say; 
in  a  manner  only,  as  those  who  would  not  depart  altogether 
from  common  sense  would  say;  practically  they  are  to  a 
great  degree  in  the  power  of  some  persons  and  in  some  cir- 
cumstances, but  in  a  small  degree  only  in  other  persons  and 
in  other  circumstances.    The  Stoics  maintain  man's  free  will 


350  THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF   ANTONINUS 

as  to  the  things  which  are  in  his  power ;  for  as  to  the  things 
which  are  out  of  his  power,  free  will  terminating  in  action 
is  of  course  excluded  by  the  very  terms  of  the  expression. 
I  hardly  know  if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus*  notion 
of  the  free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  question  worth  the  inquiry. 
What  he  does  mean  and  does  say  is  intelligible.  All  the 
things  which  are  not  in  our  power  {aTtpoaipera  )  are  indifferent : 
they  are  neither  good  nor  bad,  morally.  Such  are  life, 
health,  wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty  and  death.  Life  and 
death  are  all  men's  portion.  Health,  wealth,  power,  disease 
and  poverty  happen  to  men  indifferently  to  the  good  and  to 
the  bad;  to  those  who  live  according  to  nature  and  to  those 
who  do  not.  ''Life,"  says  the  emperor,  ''is  a  warfare  and 
a  stranger's  sojourn,  and  after  fame  is  oblivion,"  (ii.  17.) 
[After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have  disturbed  the  world 
and  then  died,  and  of  the  death  of  philosophers  such  as 
Heraclitus  and  Democritus,  who  was  destroyed  by  lice,  and 
of  Socrates  whom  other  lice  (his  enemies)  destroyed,  he 
says:  "What  means  all  this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou 
hast  made  the  voyage,  thou  art  come  to  shore;  get  out.  If 
indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods,  not  even 
there.  But  if  to  a  state  without  sensation,  thou  wilt  cease 
to  be  held  by  pains  and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a  slave  to  the 
vessel  which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is 
superior:  for  the  one  is  intelligence  and  deity;  the  other  is 
earth  and  corruption."  (iii.  3.)  It  is  not  death  that  a  man 
should  fear,  but  he  should  fear  never  beginning  to  live  ac- 
cording to  nature,  (xii.  i.)  Every  man  should  live  in  such  a 
way  as  to  discharge  his  duty,  and  to  trouble  himself  about 
nothing  else.  He  should  live  such  a  life  that  he  shall  always 
be  ready  for  death,  and  shall  depart  content  when  the  sum- 
mons comes.  For  what  is  death?  "A  cessation  of  the  im- 
pressions through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings 
which  move  the  appetites  and  of  the  discursive  movements  of 
the  thoughts,  and  of  the  service  to  the  flesh."  (vi.  28.)  Death 
is  such  as  generation  is,  a  mystery  of  nature,  (iv.  5.)  In  an- 
other passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  perhaps  doubt- 
ful (ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child  which  leaves  the  womb,  and 
so  he  says  the  soul  at  death  leaves  its  envelope.  As  the 
|:diild  is  born  or  comes  into  life  by  leaving  the  v/omb,  so  the 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   ANTONINUS  351 

soul  may  on  leaving  the  body  pass  into  another  existence 
which  is  perfect.  I  am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor's 
meaning.  Butler  compares  it  with  a  passage  in  Strabo  (p. 
713),  about  the  Brachmans'  notion  of  death  being  the  birth 
into  real  life  and  a  happy  life  to  those  who  have  philoso- 
phized; and  he  thinks  that  Antoninus  may  allude  to  this 
opinion. 

Antoninus'  opinion  of  a  future  life  is  nowhere  clearly  ex- 
pressed. His  doctrine  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  of  necessity 
implies  that  it  does  not  perish  absolutely,  for  a  portion  of 
the  divinity  cannot  perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least  as  old 
as  the  time  of  Epicharmus  and  Euripides;  what  comes  from 
earth  goes  back  to  earth,  and  what  comes  from  heaven,  the 
divinity,  returns  to  him  who  gave  it.  But  I  find  nothing 
clear  in  Antoninus  as  to  the  notion  of  the  man  existing  after 
death  so  as  to  be  conscious  of  his  sameness  with  that  soul 
which  occupied  his  vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be  perplexed 
on  this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested  in  this,  that  God 
or  the  gods  will  do  whatever  is  best  and  consistent  with  the 
university  of  things. 

Nor  I  think  does  he  speak  conclusively  on  another  Stoic 
doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  practised,  the  anticipating  the 
regular  course  of  nature  by  a  man's  own  act.  The  reader 
will  find  some  passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on,  and  he 
may  make  of  them  what  he  can.  But  there  are  passages  in 
which  the  emperor  encourages  himself  to  wait  for  the  end 
patiently  and  with  tranquillity;  and  certainly  it  is  consistent 
with  all  his  best  teaching  that  a  man  should  bear  all  that  falls 
to  his  lot  and  do  useful  acts  as  long  as  he  lives.  He  should 
not  therefore  abridge  the  time  of  his  usefulness  by  his  own 
act.  Whether  he  contemplates  any  possible  cases  in  which  a 
man  should  die  by  his  own  hand,  I  cannot  tell,  and  the  matter 
is  not  worth  a  curious  inquiry,  for  I  believe  it  would  not  lead 
to  any  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion  on  this  point.  I  do  not 
think  that  Antoninus,  who  never  mentions  Seneca,  though  he 
must  have  known  all  about  him,  would  have  agreed  with 
Seneca  when  he  gives  as  a  reason  for  suicide,  that  the  eternal 
law,  whatever  he  means,  has  made  nothing  better  for  us  than 
this,  that  it  has  given  us  only  one  way  of  entering  into  life 
and  many  ways  of  going  out  of  it.    The  ways  of  going  out 


352  THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF  ANTONINUS 

indeed  are  many,  and  that  is  a  good  reason  for  a  man  taking 
care  of  himself. 

Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a  Stoic's  life. 
There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained  in  the  precept  that  a  man 
should  pursue  his  own  happiness.  Many  men  think  that 
they  are  seeking  happiness  when  they  are  only  seeking  the 
gratification  of  some  particular  passion,  the  strongest  that 
they  have.  The  end  of  a  man  is,  as  already  explained,  to 
live  conformably  to  nature,  and  he  will  thus  obtain  happiness, 
tranquillity  of  mind  and  contentment,  (iii.  12;  viii.  i,  and 
other  places.)  As  a  means  of  living  conformably  to  nature 
he  must  study  the  four  chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has  its 
proper  sphere:  wisdom,  or  the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil; 
justice,  or  the  giving  to  every  man  his  due ;  fortitude,  or  the 
enduring  of  labour  and  pain;  and  temperance,  which  is 
moderation  in  all  things.  By  thus  living  conformably  to 
nature  the  Stoic  obtained  all  that  he  wished  or  expected.  His 
reward  was  in  his  virtuous  life,  and  he  was  satisfied  with 
that.    Some  Greek  poet  long  ago  wrote : 

For  virtue  only  of  all  human  things 

Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 

Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue. 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  themselves  in  very 
arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about  the  wise  man's  self  sufficiency : 
they  elevated  him  to  the  rank  of  a  deity.  But  these  were 
only  talkers  and  lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all  ages  who 
utter  fine  words,  know  little  of  human  affairs,  and  care  only 
for  notoriety.  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  both  by  precept  and 
example  laboured  to  improve  themselves  and  others;  and  if 
we  discover  imperfections  in  their  teaching,  we  must  still 
honour  these  great  men  who  attempted  to  show  that  there 
is  in  man's  nature  and  in  the  constitution  of  things  sufficient 
reason  for  living  a  virtuous  life.  It  is  difficult  enough  to  live 
as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult  even  for  any  man  to  live  in  such 
a  way  as  to  satisfy  himself,  if  he  exercises  only  in  a  moderate 
'degree  the  power  of  reflecting  upon  and  reviewing  his  own 
conduct ;  and  if  all  men  cannot  be  brought  to  the  same  opinions 
in  morals  and  religion,  it  is  at  least  worth  while  to  give  them 
good  reasons  for  as  much  as  they  can  be  persuaded  to  accept. 


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